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Preface
Professor: “Now what do you see, John?”
John Nash: “Recognition.”
Professor: “Well, try seeing accomplishment.”
John Nash: “Is there a difference?”
This project is rooted in basic incomprehension. More specifically, an inability to 
comprehend, let alone master, some of the basic tenets of our social interactions. I have 
always had a passion for debating. It was fed by many kitchen table conversations 
with the man to whom this project is dedicated. But I stubbornly refused to join 
debating clubs or to follow any kind of formal training in the art of persuasion. Maybe 
this was because of my deep rooted aversion against losing arguments (or losing in 
general). But I like to think it was because the interactions in these ‘clubs’ somehow 
seemed to have a different point of departure. 
Thus, I chose knowledge over skill. Science appeared the obvious route to take; 
politics the ideal topic. As advanced as our scientific knowledge might appear, 
about some things we know surprisingly little. ‘Negotiating’ is one of them, ‘Brussels’ 
is another. Therefore, it feels only appropriate to begin by acknowledging the people, 
who provided me with the unique opportunity to experience both of them first hand. 
I want to sincerely thank Ambassador Tom de Bruijn, Joost Flamand, Lucia Kronsteiner, 
Alexander Jung, Maurizio Greganti, and above all Tony Agotha and Sladjana Cemerikic. 
The time I spent in the halls and corridors of the Justus Lipsius was perhaps the most 
valuable of my life. Without you, this project would not have been possible.
Researchers who employ the technique of participant observation are sometimes 
accused of ‘going native’. This means that they immerse themselves too deep in their 
new environment and forget where they came from. This critique certainly applies 
here. The more fascinated I became about the gameplay in Brussels, the more 
disillusioned I became with the day to day realities of science. I see a lot of cunning, 
but little wisdom; narcissistic nitpicking in saturated fields. There might be an inherent 
logic to this world of ‘impact factors’ and ‘Hirsch indexes’, which as of yet I am unable 
to grasp. Perhaps I should have taken the class.
Science might very well be the biggest Caucus race of them all. Yet, there are exceptions. 
This I learned during my stay at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (ETH) in 
Zürich. No PhD student in political science can escape the maxims of King, Keohane 
and Verba (1994: 15): “no one cares what we think – the scholarly community only cares 
what we can demonstrate.” In light of this statement, I thank Stefanie Bailer for her 
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genuine interest in what I was thinking. I especially want to thank Frank Schimmelfennig 
for our talks on turning some of these thoughts into proof. But mostly for showing me 
how a top-class research institute is run: by means honest hard work and a down to 
earth mentality.
But in the end, the most valuable lessons turned out to be back home, first of all with 
my advisors. On an intellectual as well as personal level, I will always be in their debt. 
The first taught me about credibility, power and scientific progress. Most importantly, 
he pointed out how social actors tend to display the behaviour that is rewarded by 
their institutional environment. The second, no doubt unwittingly, became something 
of a role model, in the way in which he manages to combine modern day science with 
a genuine passion for learning and knowing. I am eternally grateful to Bob Lieshout 
and Jac Vennix for continuing to believe, perhaps sometimes against their better 
judgement, that I was ‘on to something’.
One thing I learned over the years is that science is a team effort. I thank my dear 
colleagues at the departments of methodology and political science for their practical 
advice and fundamental support (and at times merely for putting up with me). I want to 
specifically mention, Etienne Rouwette, Hubert Korzilius, Inge Bleijenbergh, Stephan 
Raaijmakers and my coach and counsellor, Anna van der Vleuten.
I owe a lot of gratitude to a number of people whose main connection might be that, 
over the last couple of years, I have paid far too little attention to them. This applies 
to friends of old: Bjorn, Tim, Patrick, friends of a more recent date: Femke, Carlos, Ton, 
Rhea, Eric, Thomas (Jensen), Thomas (Winzen), Rebecca, Kristof, Niels, Astrid. I thank 
Gijs for sharing his passion for history and science; Erwin (van Dooren) for pointing out 
that there was this thing called ‘politicologie’, which might just be the thing for me; Anne 
for our invaluable conversations; Ralf and Christel for the confidence bestowed on me; 
Erwin (Verhagen) for being my long time ‘brother in arms’. 
There are a number of people to whom this book might very well be dedicated. To my 
mother for here remarkable strength and resilience, to Renate for her ability to confer 
joy, tranquillity and even the occasional peace of mind. But there is in the end only 
one to whom I owe this ‘result’, although he would probably have referred to it as 
simply doing my job. Critic, ally, father, friend: It is through the battles you fought, that 
I was able to compete in mine.
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‘An unusual kind of race’
‘What is a Caucus-race?’ said Alice; not that she wanted much to know, but the 
Dodo had paused as if it thought that somebody ought to speak, and no one else 
seemed inclined to say anything. 
‘Why,’ said the Dodo, ‘the best way to explain it is to do it.’ (And, as you might like 
to try the thing yourself, some winter day, I will tell you how the Dodo managed it.) 
First it marked out a race-course, in a sort of circle, (‘the exact shape doesn’t matter,’ 
it said,) and then all the party were placed along the course, here and there. There 
was no ‘One, two, three, and away,’ but they began running when they liked, and 
left off when they liked, so that it was not easy to know when the race was over. 
However, when they had been running half an hour or so, and were quite dry again, 
the Dodo suddenly called out ‘The race is over!’ and they all crowded round it, 
panting, and asking, ‘But who has won?’ 
This question the Dodo could not answer without a great deal of thought, and it sat 
for a long time with one finger pressed upon its forehead (the position in which 
you usually see Shakespeare, in the pictures of him), while the rest waited in silence. 
At last the Dodo said, ‘everybody has won, and all must have prizes.’1
1 Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Chapter III. 
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A typical day at the Justus Lipsius…
Introduction: A typical day at the Justus Lipsius…
On Thursday 22 July 2010 the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU’s 
Council of Ministers had an early meeting. It was announced the day before that the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) would present its advisory opinion on the legality 
of Kosovo’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence of 17 February 2008. It had 
long been unclear whether the ICJ would manage to present this opinion before the 
summer break. Throughout the Spanish Presidency, Council decision making on 
Serbia as well as Kosovo was in the doldrums. It did not come as a surprise to 
anyone that Kosovo had not featured regularly on the agenda, seeing that Spain 
was one of the non-recognizers of (the independence of) Kosovo. While the 
Presidency tried to reassure the other member states that it would adopt a ‘business 
as usual’ approach, it was hard to imagine what such an approach would look like 
in the case of Kosovo.2 A divided Council had tiptoed around the Kosovo status 
question for years and the ICJ’s judgment might just be what would force everyone 
to recognize the elephant sitting in the room.
Keeping Serbia off the agenda appears to have been even less of a problem, in 
view of the Netherlands’ continuing insistence that this country should first 
apprehend General Mladic (and Commander Hadzic) and transfer them to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. At the 
External Relations Council of 14 June 2010 in Luxembourg, the Netherlands agreed 
to the start of the ratification process of the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(SAA) with Serbia. After all, Serge Brammertz, the ICTY Chief Prosecutor, testified 
that Serbia had maintained its cooperation with the Tribunal. In fact, Brammertz was 
more critical of Croatia, a country that had been making real headway in its 
membership negotiations. Stalling the ratification process even longer did not 
seem to be a tenable position. However, the Council seemed in no hurry to react to 
Serbia’s application for membership of 22 December 2009. Germany in particular 
insisted on a ‘step by step’ approach. The Council Conclusions of June thus merely 
“took note” of the application and decided to return to the matter in due time.3 It was 
clear that some member states wanted to preserve some political room to 
manoeuvre in anticipation of Serbia’s reaction to the ICJ Opinion. 
The PSC meeting of 22 July was called by the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Lady Catherine Ashton. Ashton and her embryonic 
European External Action Service (EEAS) were in the middle of marking out their 
2 Author’s interview, Working party level, 13-1-2011.
3 3023rd Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg 14-6-2010. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
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Introduction
territory, which was even harder with the Balkans because here Foreign Policy and 
Enlargement issues constantly intermingled.4 The reviews on the political clout of 
this new ‘European Minister of Foreign Affairs’ had not been mild, so Ashton wanted 
to be able to come out with a strong and united EU message on the ICJ Opinion. 
There was one obvious flaw to this plan: The EU was everything but united in its 
approach towards Kosovo. Also, it was hard to imagine what this strong message 
would have to look like, seeing that it was still unclear what the Opinion of the ICJ 
would actually be. 
The meeting started at nine o’clock because Ashton’s representative, Robert 
Cooper, wanted the EU Declaration to be available before the reading out of the 
Opinion, which was scheduled for three p.m. This would give the PSC at least six 
hours to agree on a text. Member states were sent the draft statement of the High 
Representative early in the morning. Few Council negotiators will deny the critical 
importance of being the one to ‘draft first’.5 It is often said that in Council decision 
making the fast ones eat the slow ones. This is because others will be forced to 
work from this first draft. Ashton’s draft statement raised a lot of eyebrows and 
stepped on a number of toes. It read: 
“The EU welcomes the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. We are studying 
it with great care.
The future of Serbia and Kosovo lies in the European Union.
Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are the foundations on which the EU is 
built, together with the principle that all differences should be resolved through dialogue. 
The EU is therefore ready to facilitate a process of dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. 
The purpose of this dialogue would be to take forward progress towards EU membership and 
ultimately improve the lives of ordinary people. The process of dialogue would be a factor for 
stability in the region.”6
Now, it might be hard for outside observers to appreciate the delicacies underlying 
these seemingly innocent statements. Ashton does not appear to be saying 
anything that was not part of the ‘agreed language’, as it was reconfirmed in 
numerous formal statements. Of course, ‘agreeing to the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence of what you consider as one of your provinces’ is not part of the EU 
conditionalities. But it was clear to all that Serbia’s behaviour towards Kosovo would 
4 Enlargement issues continue to be dealt with by the rotating Presidency and are discussed in Coreper, 
whereas CFSP and ESDP issues fall under the authority of the EEAS and are dealt with in the PSC. 
5 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 8-12-2011.
6 Meeting of the Political and Security Committee, Brussels 22-7-2010. Room document.
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A typical day at the Justus Lipsius…
weigh heavily in the Council’s eventual judgement on Serbia’s membership 
application. There seemed to be enough ‘constructive ambiguity’ in Ashton’s words 
to leave open the question of what exactly would be expected from Serbia and how 
exactly it would be rewarded for adopting a constructive attitude. All in all, it was 
hard to take seriously the words of some PSC ambassadors as they were rushing 
to the PSC meeting: ‘Ashton is really pushing it with this statement’.
However, anticipating the main conclusions of this study, in Council decision 
making words are everything, but cheap. Countless hours of debate, at Working 
party (Coweb), PSC and Coreper level, on how to refer to Kosovo, should have 
brought home the message, which is that one cannot simply mention the ‘European 
future of Kosovo’. This is because this would imply recognizing it as an independent 
entity. When it comes to the European perspective of Kosovo the agreed language 
is to add a reference to the region. Furthermore, welcoming an Opinion, of which 
the content was still unknown, was considered as far too risky. Some suggested 
that the Council should only ‘take note with interest’ of the Opinion. Explicitly linking 
a dialogue to progress towards EU membership was certainly considered a bridge 
too far. In fact, mentioning Serbia and Kosovo in one sentence already made 
member states feel uncomfortable. Could the Council perhaps not refer to 
‘Belgrade’ and ‘Pristina’ instead? But then, which of the two should be mentioned 
first? Also, referring to good neighbourly relations, the hobbyhorse of Greece in its 
dealings with FYROM rather than Macedonia, did already implicitly assume the two 
to be ‘neighbours’. So, as it turned out, the only uncontroversial part of the draft 
statement was the EU’s readiness to facilitate yet another round of dialogue.
As the PSC ambassadors and their Balkan experts struggled to find the right words, 
the clock slowly but definitely started to approach three. The meeting had to be 
moved to another location, so as not to interfere with planned Coreper meetings. 
But still some member states were not willing to give in on what they considered to 
be ‘assumptive wording’. The rotating Belgium Presidency, formally chairing the 
meeting, managed to provide some breathing space. He stated that the reading 
out of the ICJ Opinion would take at least an hour, so the PSC could safely continue 
its debate until four p.m. 
However, at four o’clock, positions had not moved as matters were being taken up 
to higher levels. There were numerous telephone calls and in some capitals the 
political directors and even some ministers got involved in the drafting. The familiar 
dictum in the Council is that the higher up you take an issue, the harder it is to get 
out without losing face. Thus in order to prevent a complete stalemate, Ashton’s 
representative subtly dropped the message: If need be, the statement would go out 
20
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just on behalf of the High Representative. In that case, the EU as a whole would 
lose face, because it would (again) have failed to speak with a common voice on 
one of the most pressing issues in its backyard. Still it was made clear that Ashton 
would prefer a statement on behalf of the European Union. The Belgian Presidency 
again bought time. The ICJ Opinion might be out already, and there were rumours 
circling about what it said. But at least the US, without a doubt the EU’s main 
contender for taking the lead in the Balkans, had not come out with a statement yet. 
This meant that the PSC could take some more time to find a text to which all could 
subscribe.
As the clock approached seven the PSC was still waiting for confirmation from 
some capitals on whether they could agree to the umpteenth revision of the 
statement. In the meantime, the US had rather unequivocally welcomed the 
Opinion, which stated that Kosovo’s declaration of independence “did not violate 
international law”. Seeing that the delegates had been deliberating for more than 
nine hours, on the basis of one (admittedly lengthy) lunch and two rounds of coffee, 
the meeting once again demonstrated why Council negotiations are referred to as 
‘battles of attrition’. Still, buzzing at one end of the table made it clear that there was 
light at the end of the tunnel. At last, all member states could agree to the wording 
of the final Declaration, which above all suggested to look forward:
“The EU welcomes the publication of the advisory opinion of the International Court of 
Justice. We are studying it with great care.
The advisory opinion opens a new phase. The focus should now be on the future. The future 
of Serbia lies in the European Union. The future of Kosovo also lies in the European Union. 
This is in line with the European perspective of the region and the relevant Council conclusions. 
Good neighbourly relations, regional cooperation and dialogue are the foundations on which 
the EU is built. 
The EU is therefore ready to facilitate a process of dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. 
This dialogue would be to promote cooperation, achieve progress on the path to Europe and 
improve the lives of the people. The process of dialogue in itself would be a factor for peace, 
security and stability in the region.”7
A sense of fulfilment then filled the room. The consensus making mechanism of the 
Council had again proven to be effective. Amidst the jubilations and mutual pats on 
the back, the Presidency praised the dedication of the delegates: After pulling this 
7 ‘EU Declaration by High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, on 
behalf of the European Union on the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Kosovo’, Brussels 
22-7-2010. 
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off, statues might need to be erected for the participants. Although some of these 
very same participants dampened the mood a bit, by openly wondering what would 
happen once they started talking about the actual content of the Opinion.
Consensual processes, weak outcomes; it is the familiar image of how Brussels’ 
decision making works.8 There is an interesting paradox, particularly in the issue 
area of external relations and foreign policy making. Where outsiders often mock 
the EU’s limited decisiveness, insiders tend to reflect positive on the Council’s 
overall effectiveness. The Council of Minister, the main decision making forum of 
the European Union, has somehow managed to acquire a reputation “for taking no 
decisions today, which can be put off until tomorrow” (Gomez & Peterson, 2001: 
74). Observers have noted the sheer endless series of interventions on the basis of 
policy goals, which are defined sufficiently broad, so that it would in fact be difficult 
to oppose any of them (cf. Smith, 2003: 13). The EU is the kind of external actor that 
likes to ‘contribute’, ‘enhance’ or ‘promote’. It does not like to ‘procure’, let alone 
‘enforce’. But most of all, it likes to consult and coordinate even on matters which 
outsiders would consider to be of little significance.9 Insiders are proud of the way 
in which the Council generally manages to find a way around a veto.10 It is true; 
when taking into account the sheer number of players, positions and potential veto 
points, what appears to be most striking is that there is any movement at all 
(Thomas, 2009: 341-342). In spite of numerous red lines and ministerial 
hobbyhorses, in spite of the countless figurative ‘tour de tables’, the Council 
machinery does not come to a halt. And in the end there is practically always 
something resembling a ‘consensus’. A consensus which all involved can then 
claim as their own.
8 Although at his first EU Summit in May 2012, French President, Francois Hollande, found himself a bit 
unprepared. The President appeared to be genuinely amazed by the way things are done inside the 
Justus Lipsius. There had been “no conflict or confrontation” and the positions were no closer after five 
hours of ‘debate’. As for the interventions of his colleagues, Hollande had noticed that where some can 
speak their mind in “a few minutes” others take up “part of the evening”. EU Observer, 24-5-2012: ‘French 
president bemused by lengthy EU summit’.
9 This refers to the ‘coordination reflex’ which forms the basis of the EU’s external policies (cf. Glarbo, 
1999: 647). EU Member states are disposed to seek each other’s counsel when deciding on external 
acts. 
10 With obvious (but I would argue highly atypical) exceptions such as the 2003 Iraq crisis (cf. Puetter & 
Wiener, 2007). 
22
Introduction
Outline of the study
This study is an attempt to grasp some of the governing dynamics of Council 
negotiations. The metaphor of the Caucus race, like the one Alice was invited to 
participate in when she had just tumbled into Wonderland, plays a pivotal role here. 
It is the how of Council decision making that is the subject of study. Academic 
debates about Council decision making (cf. Dür, Mateo & Thomas, 2010; Naurin & 
Wallace, 2008), tend to orbit around two questions. First, what are they actually 
doing all day in the Justus Lipsius? Second, does it really matter what they are 
doing in the Justus Lipsius? 
The first is a question of processes. It is about getting into the black box of Council 
decision making. It is mainly a question of negotiation styles: arguing, bargaining, 
deliberating. The second question is about outcomes. It is about whether and how 
these negotiations ‘matter’ for the actual decisions taken by the Council. Is this 
really the place where member states come to a decision, in this case on the EU’s 
approach towards the Western Balkans? Or are these argumentative encounters 
primarily ‘cheap talk’ or ‘ritual dances’, in which participants typically end up exactly 
where they started and decisions rarely surpass the level of the lowest common 
denominator? 
This study engages itself with both the process and the outcome of Council 
negotiations, specifically in the issue area of the Western Balkans. It is about trying 
to understand the character of these negotiations and then use this understanding 
to make sense of what comes out of them. This research project thus has two 
separate but related goals: 
1. To describe, characterize (model) and explain the specific type of negotiations 
taking place in the EU’s Council of Ministers.
2. To explain what comes out of these negotiations, in terms of words (statements) 
as well as deeds (decisions). More specifically to explain the Council’s successive 
statements and decisions on the European perspective of the Western Balkans.
Part I of this study is about the (presumably) consensual processes. It seeks to 
increase our understanding of how the consensus making mechanism works. The 
approach is as follows. In Chapter 1, I will discern the distinctive characteristics of 
negotiating in a ‘monasterial’ environment such as the Council’s. I will look at 
previous attempts to account for the idiosyncrasies of Council negotiations. As will 
become clear, negotiation theory is an academic discipline characterized by 
dichotomies, most of which are variations of the familiar distinction between arguing 
and bargaining. Such concepts are often linked to broader conceptualizations of 
political (inter)action, for example as being driven by strategic and/or communicative 
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considerations, and to more general theoretical approaches such as rationalism 
and constructivism (cf. Warntjen, 2010; Zürn & Checkel, 2005). But such links are 
usually rather implicit and the dichotomies themselves tend to be conceptually 
ambiguous and therefore difficult to operationalize. Methodological controversies 
– how should one study the Council? – tend to intervene and further cloud the 
picture. It is safe to say that on a theoretical as well as an empirical level, negotiation 
theorists (still) appear to be a bit ‘lost’ (cf. Deitelhoff & Müller, 2005). 
We could decide to dive into this conceptual quagmire in the hope that we will be 
able to pull ourselves out again. Instead, I will adopt the role of ‘pied piper’, helping 
the reader to steer clear of “essentially unanswerable questions” (cf. Krebs & 
Jackson, 2007), for example about ‘real’ preferences, ‘deeper’ dispositions or 
‘genuine’ persuasions of those negotiating. I will rather focus on what negotiators, 
at the different levels, appear to be doing, and how their actions shape interactions 
patterns in the Council. 
In Chapter 2, I will present my alternative ‘Caucus race’ model of Council negotiations. 
It is a model that pivots around the rhetorical power of words (cf. Schimmelfennig, 
2001; 2003). I will first explain what makes Council negotiators so vulnerable to 
words, and second how this vulnerability affects the course of the decision making 
process at large. Negotiations in the Council are causally relevant, be it in a way not 
foreseen by existing conceptualizations. Rather, the ‘culture of consensus’ works 
as an invisible hand, shaping decision making processes and outcomes over the 
heads of those who are participating in them. 
To understand what goes on inside the Council, especially at Working party, PSC 
and Coreper level, we still have to rely on ‘anecdotal evidence’ (Naurin & Wallace, 
2008: 19). This study seeks to go beyond, such ‘soft’ sources.11 In Chapter 3, I will 
present my methodological design, which is aimed at sneaking a peek behind the 
veil of consensus, as presented after the monthly meetings of the Council. My 
model of Council decision making (with regard to the Western Balkans) is based on 
participant observations, confidential reports of Council meetings and a significant 
number of in-depth interviews with participants. These observations, reports and 
interviews have allowed me to get an insider perspective on how decision making 
works on a day to day basis. Of course, the validity of my negotiation model cannot 
be assessed by means of such reliable but unverifiable sources. Seeing that the 
Council primarily communicates through Council Conclusions, ‘causal significance’ 
has to be demonstrated by looking at these Conclusions. It is the (often subtle) 
11 Although I will explain in the methodology chapter why I actually consider them to be hard sources.
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shifts – or absence of shifts - in the language of successive Council Conclusions 
that will serve as the primary evidence for the applicability of my model. I will 
provide the reader with the tools with which to make sense of the specific words 
and phrasings the Council uses to express itself. 
Part II of this study is about the (seemingly) weak outcomes. I will introduce the 
puzzling outcomes I have focused my attention on: the erratic pattern of Council 
decisions on the European perspective of the Western Balkans. Since the fall of 
Milosevic, member states have been negotiating their approach to the states of 
former Yugoslavia. The consensus on the Balkans is as it has always been: these 
countries have a ‘European or membership perspective’, provided they fulfil the 
necessary conditions. Yet, ten years of more or less continuous negotiations have 
made observers and participants wonder about the logic underlying them (cf. 
Gallagher, 2005; Gori, 2010; Gross, 2007; O’Brennan, 2008; Schwarz, 2010). I will 
argue that the pattern of decisions on the Western Balkans results from the specific 
type of ‘races’ member states have got themselves caught up in. 
Chapter 4 presents the players, their positions in the race, as well as the playing 
field, or (to employ the terminology of the Caucus race) the race-course. In 
modelling Brussels’ negotiations as a Caucus race, the first and foremost thing that 
needs to be explained is why players choose to participate. Why do they make an 
argumentative investment and what do they expect in terms of prizes? Chapter 5 
explains the rules of the game and, by doing so, addresses one of the most 
prominent questions in any kind of competition: does any side have a structural 
advantage? This is what lies beneath claims that there is either a ‘joint decision trap’ 
(Scharpf, 1988) or a ‘neo-functionalist logic’ (Niemann, 2006) at work in the Justus 
Lipsius. I will argue that neither is the case. What we are looking at is the result of 
the tyranny of small decisions (Kahn, 1966). Or rather the tyranny of small 
argumentative battles, which are continuously fought out inside the walls of the 
Justus Lipsius. 
The third and perhaps most important part of this study is about the link between 
consensual processes and weak outcomes. Here, I will put the Caucus race model 
into action as I seek to demonstrate that the empirical regularities in Council 
decision making on the Western Balkans can best (or only) be accounted for by the 
mechanism I have discerned. Chapters 6 through 9 thus constitute the empirical 
application of my model of Council negotiations. To be able to ‘process-trace’ 
patterns and paths in EU negotiations on the Western Balkans, I have opted for a 
longitudinal approach. I will thus apply the Caucus race model to a chain of debates. 
These debates jointly make up, what I will refer to as, the Balkan pre-accession 
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game. The empirical part of this study will consist of a historical reconstruction of 
ten years of Council negotiations on the matter. It is an approach of zooming in if 
possible and zooming out if feasible. I zoom in on key moments (‘rounds’) in the 
Balkan negotiations. This is when matters came to a head, forcing the member 
states to engage in a non-routine or political debate about the steps (specific) 
Balkan countries were allowed to take in order to come closer to Europe.12 
The fourth and concluding part of this study is about ‘who won’. Here, I will assess 
the added value of my Caucus race model in comparison to existing conceptualiza-
tions of (Council) negotiations. This study should do more than re-asses the 
‘intuitive plausibility’ of rhetorical conceptualizations of interactions (Schimmelfennig, 
2003: 228). I want to show how rhetoric actually works in the day to day negotiations 
in the Council. I argue that while rhetorical strategies tend to make debates non-
competitive, these debates nevertheless ‘matter’ in that they significantly affect 
outcomes. Caucus races might be about finding ways to ensure – or at least make 
it appear - that ‘everybody has won and all must have prizes’. But this does not 
mean that one cannot comment on the relative value of these prizes. While it might 
prove to be impossible to discern clear winners and losers of the Caucus race – 
after all the race is not over – we should be able to assess who got what prizes, 
when and, most importantly, how (cf. Lasswell, 1950).
12 What constitutes a ‘non-routine’ or ‘political’ debate will be explained in Chapter 3, Section 2. For now, it 
suffices to say that it is a debate which at least partly took place at the ministerial level. 

Part I  Consensual Processes?
Negotiations in the EU Council of Ministers
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1.  Theorizing Council negotiations
The last decade has seen many attempts to find satisfactory conceptualizations for 
the specific type of negotiations taking place in the EU’s Council of Ministers (cf. 
Naurin & Wallace, 2008; Dür, Mateo & Thomas 2010). There are few who deny that 
there is a culture of consensus in the Council (cf. Heisenberg, 2005, Tallberg, 2010). 
However, participants as well as observers hold widely diverging views on what this 
culture entails and how (much) it affects decision making processes and outcomes. 
According to some this ‘culture’ merely refers to a general willingness to keep 
everyone on board, something which can be done simply by providing face-saving 
opportunities and offering side payments (cf. Schneider, 2008). Others have 
referred to it as a distinct mechanism for coming to agreements. They believe the 
institutional environment of the Council changes interaction patterns and facilitates 
co-operative negotiation styles (cf. Lewis, 2010). “Avoiding isolation, accommodating 
differences, and reaching agreements along the lines proposed by the permanently 
involved Commission and rotating Council Presidency are dominant features of the 
Council’s political culture” (Aus, 2008: 100, my italics). The particularities of the 
mechanism however continue to be difficult to grasp. Scholars have spoken about 
it in terms of: ‘a tradition of constructive play’, ‘less hardnosed bargaining’, ‘less 
vetoing and voting’, ‘more equality and inclusiveness’, ‘higher levels of trust and 
reciprocity’ and ‘no clear winners and losers’ (cf. Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006; 
Heisenberg, 2005; König & Junge, 2009; Lewis, 2005; Thomson, 2008). Insiders 
describe it as follows:
“There is indeed something of a culture of consensus. ‘Vertrag kommt von sich vertragen’ we 
say in German…What we do is create a race in which everyone will get prizes…I see it as an 
attempt to frame the decision making process in such a way so that every member state 
involved can manage to get something out of it. Those who want to go at it immediately, as 
well as those who adopt a more cautious approach, know that they will not be overlooked.”13
“This is how it usually works in the European Union. Bluntly saying ‘no’ to ideas or initiatives 
dear to others, is out of the question. It simply does not work like that. At the end of the day, 
you will have to go with the flow. What you can do, is try to canalize the flow and build some 
dikes here and there. This is a way of scaling down the ambitions and trying to keep control. 
But one cannot just say, we do not want this and this is why it is not going to happen.”14
While insightful, these observations still leave us in the dark about how this mechanism 
actually works. Exactly how are differences accommodated? How does this framing 
13 Author’s interview, Gregor Woschnagg, Austrian Coreper Ambassador (1999-2007), Brussels 2010.
14 Author’s interview, Tom de Bruijn, Dutch Coreper Ambassador (2002-2011), Brussels 2010.
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of the decision making process work? How do member states ‘canalize flows’ and 
how do they seek to maintain control? How does one ‘compete’ in such a seemingly 
egalitarian race? 
What, if anything, is so different about the Council as a negotiation environment and 
how should we expect this environment to affect negotiating behaviour? This 
chapter presents some of the answers that insiders as well as outsiders have given 
to these two questions. A lot of metaphors have been employed so far: integrative 
or soft bargaining, problem solving, arguing, communicative action, deliberation 
(cf. Naurin, 2009: 36-41; Niemann, 2006: 40; Odell, 2010: 627-628; Puetter, 2012; 
163-166; Warntjen 2010: 666). However, the specificities of Council negotiations still 
remain hard to grasp.
In scholarly contributions we generally find two types of explanations. There are 
those, typically working from a rationalist/intergovernmental bargaining perspective, 
who (continue to) opt for a formal modelling approach. These scholars sketch a to 
some extent familiar image of negotiating under the unanimity rule (cf. Achen, 2006; 
König & Junge, 2009). And there are those who focus their attention on informal 
norms and social practices. These scholars primarily make use of constructivist or 
sociological institutionalist insights on social interaction in ‘club-like’ environments. 
This normative environment delineates (amongst other things) the appropriate 
forms of (inter)action (cf. Niemann, 2008, Risse & Kleine 2010). 
In this chapter I will elaborate on both types of explanations, as I try to establish to 
what extent they can account for the day to day proceedings in the Council of 
Ministers. I will argue, based on my own participant observations as well as the 
insider-views of others, that both approaches fail to capture some of the crucial 
elements of Council negotiations. More specifically, they fail to grasp the exact role 
that arguments can play in shaping decision making processes and outcomes. 
Explanations of the first type tend to underestimate the power of arguments. 
Explanations of the second type tend to overestimate it. This is why, in the next 
chapter, I will present an alternative interpretation of the argumentative encounters 
as they constantly take place within the walls of the Justus Lipsius.
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1.1  Negotiating in a monasterial environment.
At the basis of practically all research into the consensus norm lies one rather 
self-evident observation: The Council tends to take decisions by unanimity (cf. 
Heisenberg, 2005: 66). In areas where decisions could be taken by means of 
(qualified majority) voting, such voting happens “less often than expected” 
(Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006: 259). In areas where the unanimity rule applies, 
member states often “refrain from using their veto power” (König & Junge, 2009: 
510; cf. Thomas 2009). Rather the Council as a whole seems to be willing - or allows 
itself more time - to continue with the negotiations until all are prepared to come 
aboard. This extra time is spent on additional meetings, informal get-togethers, 
‘bilaterals’ with the Presidency; in short it is used for more talks. 
This tendency has been considered a blessing and a curse at the same time. Some 
have characterized this decision making method as “frustration without disintegration, 
and resilience without progress” (Scharpf, 1988: 239; cf. Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 
2006). They believe the Council tends to get caught in a ‘joint decision trap’, in which 
status-quo positions are protected by vested interests and defensive bargaining is 
privileged over effective problem-solving. As a direct result, policy making becomes 
‘inefficient, inflexible, unnecessary and undemocratic’ (Scharpf, 1988: 247). The 
Council, and thereby the EU as a whole, is severely limited in its possibilities for 
acting spontaneously, because it continuously needs to cater to the needs of those 
who do not feel a particular need to act (cf. Jupille, 1999; Meunier, 2000; Thomas, 
2009; Westlake & Galloway, 2004). The reason that nearly all decisions are consensus 
decisions then becomes relatively straightforward. The proposals of which participants 
expect that there is no consensus, are simply not put on the agenda (König & 
Junge, 2009: 509). And when they are incidentally put up for decision, ‘initiators’ will 
make sure that they have something to offer the ‘obstructionists’ in return (cf. 
Schneider & Cederman, 1994). 
Others come to a more positive assessment of the consensus norm, claiming that 
it improves the quality of the interactions (Niemann, 2006: 53; cf. Deitelhoff & Müller, 
2005). It relieves Council negotiators from the obligation solely to pursue member-
specific gains and allows them (also) to invest in realizing joint gains. The reason 
that nearly all decisions are consensus decisions is that the institutional environment 
allows the participants to look for ‘higher’ or ‘deeper’ levels of agreement on how to 
proceed with the decision making process. A first step towards establishing whether 
the positive or the negative interpretation is more plausible, would be to determine 
what is particular about the Council as a decision making arena. 
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Moving beyond the bargaining metaphor
Even before the term ‘culture of consensus’ was coined by Heisenberg (2005), 
researchers were becoming aware of the idiosyncrasies of day to day decision 
making in the European institutions (cf. Checkel, 2003; Elgström & Jönsson, 2000, 
Lewis, 1998; 2003). Up until then, much of the theorizing on EU negotiations had 
focussed on explaining the so-called ‘grand bargains’, meaning the Treaty 
negotiations that eventually led to the establishment of the European Union in 
Maastricht in 1991. Rationalist intergovernmental bargaining models appeared to 
be most successful in accounting for the process and outcome of these ‘history-
making’ negotiations (cf. Moravcsik, 1998). The pivotal term, bargaining, perhaps 
needs some explanation, seeing that it is often used, but seldom properly defined 
(Odell, 2010: 628). In fact, the words ‘bargaining’ and ‘negotiating’ are often used 
interchangeably. This is confusing seeing that the latter refers to the process as a 
whole, while the former primarily serves to describe a specific way in which the 
process takes shape. In other words, there are many ways to negotiate and 
bargaining is just one of them. Let me start with providing some basic definitions. 
Negotiation is a distinctive mode of joint decision making in which decisions come 
about, not by arbitration (by a judge or referee), nor by simple numerical aggregation 
(coalition building or voting), but by means of social interaction (Jönsson, 2002: 
217). Such social interactions usually, but not necessarily (cf. Schelling, 1980), take 
place by means of the exchange of words. What is typical about negotiation is that 
it is left to the parties themselves to combine their conflicting viewpoints into a 
collective decision (Zartman, 1977: 621-623). This already assumes the presence 
of both cooperative and conflictual elements. Without common interest there is 
nothing to negotiate for, without conflict there is nothing to negotiate about (Iklé, 
1964: 2). Parties come to the negotiation table, holding certain preferences with 
regard to the outcome or decision they prefer (cf. Frieden, 1999). Such preferences 
are then translated into negotiation positions. A position typically consists of 
interests and opinions, whereby interests refer to what the participant wants to 
achieve, and opinions to why the participants think this is worth achieving. 
The field of negotiation theory emerged in the 1970s particularly in the US, which 
explains the focus on the US-Soviet arms control negotiations or the Middle East 
peace process (cf. Hopmann, 1995; 1996). Based on detailed analysis of these, 
often bilateral and often rather sequential negotiation rounds, these researchers 
tried to arrive at general insights regarding (effective) negotiation behaviour. Game-
theoretical models often had a prominent place in their explanations (Avenhaus, 
2002; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). Negotiation analysts thus primarily concerned 
themselves with the (formal) modelling of the ‘players’, their ‘strategies’, their 
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expected ‘pay-offs’ and their subsequent ‘moves’ (cf. Schelling, 1980). Researchers 
could apply these models to predict/explain (un)likely or (in)efficient outcomes. 
However, EU negotiations are usually far more complex. They are, amongst other 
things, multilateral, multi-issue, recurrent (or even continuous), to a significant 
degree informal and subject to a long shadow of the future. They are furthermore 
complicated by the fact that the institutions in which they take place are also 
negotiating parties in their own right (cf. Dür, Mateo & Thomas, 2010: 615). This 
complexity limits, as will become obvious below, the possibilities for parsimonious 
modelling as well as the applicability and intuitive strength of the models that have 
been produced so far. 
Bargaining is a metaphor, which refers to the typical behaviour we can observe at 
the proverbial market place (cf. Sergeev, 2002). People go to the market place 
basically to exchange ‘stuff’, whether these are goods, money or services. 
Bargaining happens when there is a difference of interest, and the way to solve this 
difference is by engaging in social interaction with the other party or parties. The 
essence of a bargain was already described by Adam Smith: “Give me that which I 
want, and you shall have this which you want.” (Smith, 1999ed: 118). “In a bargaining 
situation, actors know their interests and interact reciprocally to seek to realize 
them” (Keohane, 2001: 10). Based on their own private cost-benefit calculations, 
actors decide whether they want to go along with a specific bargain. The other 
party can try to affect these calculations, primarily by promising rewards or 
threatening with punishment. He will thus try to alter the pay off structure of his 
counterpart(s). But why the other wants that which he wants is irrelevant for the 
social interaction or ‘deal making’ as such.15 In other words, preferences are not 
changed by the interaction. Instead, they are assumed to be fixed. 
In explaining interstate negotiations, bargaining models have set the terms of the 
debate. According to this view, EU negotiations can best be conceptualized as a 
series of ‘coordination games with distributional consequences’ (Sebenius, 2002). 
Member states were trying to coordinate each other’s behaviour, so as to realize the 
collective outcome, that (best) suited their individual preferences. It was thus 
predominantly distributional bargaining, in which actors basically strove to maximize 
their share of prospective gains (Schelling, 1980: 21-22). Two observations are 
relevant in this regard. First, the so-called ‘bargaining space’ was determined by 
15 There has been a tendency to attach egoistic and self-serving motives to ‘bargainers’ and altruistic or 
benevolent motives to ‘deliberators’ (cf. Steiner et al. 2004: 23-24). Bargaining then serves to realize 
private gains, whereas arguing or deliberation is about realizing joint gains. It would be more apt to claim 
that bargaining is about realizing interests. Whether it is in an actor’s interest to serve the private or (also) 
the common good depends on the situational characteristics as well as the specific content of the deal.
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the configuration of domestically determined preferences. Second, those that were 
set to gain most from a certain agreement or decision, would have to make the 
most concessions (Moravcsik, 1998: 54). This relates to two key insights from the 
field of negotiation theory. The first concerns a country’s ‘Best Alternative To (a) 
Negotiated Agreement’ (BATNA) (Fischer & Ury, 1981). Those who are most 
satisfied with the status quo, in order words those who have the best BATNA, will be 
able to dictate the terms of any new agreement. This means that outcomes will be 
biased towards those states that have least to gain from that agreement. This is 
directly related to the second pivotal concept, that of the ‘Lowest Common 
Denominator’ (LCD). This can be defined as follows: “The benefits received under 
the present policy become the baseline below which nobody will settle” (Scharpf 
1988: 264). Because EU member states tend to have little means to force each 
other into accepting an agreement, such agreements will rarely surpass the 
absolute minimum of what they could agree on. In decision making under the 
unanimity rule, the lowest common denominator is often found in maintaining the 
status quo (ante).16
I believe it is safe to say that intergovernmental bargaining models sketch a rather 
pessimistic view of what can be achieved by means of interstate negotiations. 
Negotiators are primarily conceived of as national representatives, provided with strictly 
defined, domestically determined (and therefore largely ‘fixed’) mandates, sent out to 
pursue that which is in their countries’ national interest. This might be an appropriate 
way to describe the behaviour of those who incidentally travelled to Brussels to strike 
isolated deals. But researchers started to wonder whether the same imagery could 
also be applied to those, who were involved in these negotiations on a daily basis.
The distinctive features of the arena
It began with observations that the ‘hard bargaining’ image of the Council might be 
misleading (Lewis, 1998). Some researchers claimed that: “Day to day negotiations 
in the EU are to a large extent problem-solving exercises” (Elgström & Jönsson, 
2000, 684). Problem solving is often rather broadly defined as: “the search for 
mutually beneficial solutions to problems that satisfy the needs, identities and 
interests of all parties” (Hopmann,1995: 30; my italics). It tends to be equated with 
integrative bargaining, which refers to “the exploration for opportunities for joint 
gains and imaginative searches for new arrangements outside the parties’ opening 
positions” (Odell, 2010: 621, my italics). Negotiation theory is an academic field 
characterized by - some would say ‘trapped in’ - dichotomous conceptualizations. 
These conceptualizations should, as was already mentioned above, be thought of 
16 Assuming that possibilities for otherwise achieving the set objectives, for example by unilateral action or 
by constructing alternative coalitions, are limited (Moravcsik, 1998: 63-65).
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as mere metaphors. They are usually easy to grasp intuitively, but extremely difficult 
to pin down into concrete definitions, let alone operationalize into empirical 
observables. The meaning of concepts such as ‘hard’ or ‘distributive’ bargaining on 
the one hand, and ‘soft’, ‘integrative’ bargaining or ‘problem solving on the other 
hand, can be explained with help of a well known negotiators dilemma. Negotiations 
are therein compared to baking a pie, in which participants can choose to focus 
either on jointly baking the pie, or else on individually claiming a (large) piece of it 
(cf. Moravcsik, 1998; Risse, 2000; Ulbert & Risse, 2005).17 The difference is thus in 
the latter part of Odell’s definition, as it was presented above. Integrative bargaining 
or problem solving refers to something more than “bargaining from fixed positions” 
(Pollack & Shaffer, 2008: 149). Participants need to be willing and able to look for 
‘positive sum’ solutions instead of framing their encounters in ‘zero-sum’ terms. 
This already implies that Council negotiators have some ‘room to manoeuvre’. 
The discussion on the distinctiveness of the Council as negotiating forum received 
impetus from the broader debate on socialization and Europeanization (cf. Checkel, 
2003; Hermann, Risse & Brewer, 2004; Zürn & Checkel, 2005). This was a debate 
about whether daily ‘exposure’ to the Brussels’ way of life leads to changes in basic 
actor properties: meaning role-conceptions, behavioural dispositions and even 
identities. In short, the question was to what extent Brussels-based officials were 
‘going native’? This strand of research produced a number of valuable insights. 
Council negotiators, below the ministerial level, tended to consider themselves to 
be more than ‘traditional diplomats’. At the committee level, delegates rather spoke 
of themselves as ‘technical experts’ (Beyers & Dierickx, 1998: 292; cf. Beyers, 
2005; Beyers & Trondal, 2004; Egeberg, 1999; Fouilleux, de Maillard & Smith, 2005; 
Juncos & Pomorska, 2011; Häge, 2007a; Pollack, 2003). At the ambassador 
(Coreper) level, participants stressed their dual loyalties: to their country and to the 
community. This led to the well known imagery of Janus-faced officials (cf. De 
Zwaan, 1995). Such supranational role conceptions came with standards of 
appropriate behaviour. Although it was not always specified what these standards 
were, it was clear that a willingness to coordinate and compromise were considered 
part of them (Egeberg, Schaefer & Trondal, 2003: 35-36).
The socialization debate also drew attention to a number of important particularities 
of the institutional setting in which these negotiators were operating (cf. Glarbo, 
17 This pie-metaphor refers to the familiar distinction between ‘claiming and ‘creating’ value or focussing on 
the ‘efficiency’ of the agreement and the ‘distribution’ of the gains (cf. Moravcsik, 1998: 51). It is at best 
an analytical distinction. In the empirical domain it will be hard if not impossible to distinguish the two 
activities, as negotiators are constantly claiming pieces of pies that still have to be baked (Sebenius, 
2002).
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1999; Laffan, 2004). Three institutional features stand out: high interaction density, 
a high degree of insulation and a long and open shadow of the future. To start with 
the latter, the Council can be considered a permanent negotiation forum, locking 
national negotiators into stabilized interaction patterns (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 
2006: 2-3). It would therefore be wrong to equate them with traders visiting the 
occasional market. Because membership tends to be rather exclusive and long 
term, it would be better to compare the Council to a monastery.18 Council negotiators, 
at Working party, PSC or Coreper level, tend to form tight-knit groups, who meet on 
a weekly (some months even daily) basis and take lunches, dinners and even the 
occasional weekend trip together. It is thus ‘diner diplomacy’ in the truest sense of 
the word (Westlake & Galloway, 2004: 387). Day to day encounters between Council 
negotiators can therefore not be considered as ‘isolated deals’, but are part of a 
broader process of open ended coordination and accommodation. In short, it is 
about making it into, and making it in, ‘the club’. 
What characterizes a monasterial environment is not just, or not primarily, the 
‘intensity’ of the bond, but rather the lack of a credible exit option. Participants know 
that for all accounts and purposes they will be stuck with one another for the 
foreseeable future. In most other types of clubs, membership is more or less 
non-committal and members can choose to leave the arrangement the moment it 
stops satisfying their subjectively defined needs. But this particular type of (‘dense’) 
environment does not just serve to realize predefined interests. It has come to affect 
what these interests are, thereby binding its members in more extensive ways. It 
has created a sense of shared objectives, which of course does not preclude ‘give 
and take behaviour’, but which adds a predisposition to find a solution. Because of 
the permanence, it is also not a setting in which it pays to try to pass by, or keep 
secrets from each other. In rationalist intergovernmental bargaining models ‘making 
use of information asymmetries’ is essentially what negotiations are all about (cf. 
Schneider & Cederman, 1994).19 It is about making use of the uncertainties other 
parties have about what you really want. In day to day Council decision making 
however there is usually an abundance of information. Which means that information 
asymmetries are at best temporary and making use of them (to acquire a specific 
advantage in one particular dossier) will only induce your counterparts to scrutinize 
and obstruct your moves in the future. In the long run it pays to keep all those 
concerned, informed.
18 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 8-12-2010.
19 When rationalists speak about the amount of ‘information’ a negotiator possesses, they are usually 
referring to their knowledge of the positions of others, not to their intrinsic knowledge or issue-expertise. 
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This brings us to the second institutional characteristic: insulation. A cloud of 
secrecy surrounds decision making within the Council. A lot of the negotiations 
take place within highly insulated ‘depoliticized’ settings, for example at the famous 
Coreper Lunches, where even interpreters are not welcome. Within these closed 
settings negotiators can speak freely about the politically sensitive issues. In this 
respect they are an unusual kind of political actors, who are seldom faced with the 
pressure of having to defend their actions before press and public. Insulation can 
of course have some liberating effects. In public settings, actors are faced with 
audience costs (Holzinger, 2005: 249; Schoppa, 1999: 314). They are constantly 
held accountable for any concessions they might want to make, or changes of 
opinions they might have, on a certain issue (cf. Papadimitriou, 2009). Insulation 
can relax such direct concerns for accountability and thus facilitate the incorporation 
of more long term considerations. In an insulated environment, your words and 
deeds are primarily judged by your peers. To be sure, there is still an audience, but 
it consists ‘only’ of the other members of the group. Insulation allows Council 
negotiators to focus not just on issue-specific interests (‘bringing home the bacon’), 
but also to take process and relationship interests into account (cf. Lewis, 2008: 
167). 
The third defining feature of the institutional environment, the high interaction 
density, is easiest to explain. It simply means that Council negotiators usually have 
to deal with a wide array of issues within a relatively short time span. And because 
they have had to deal with so many dossiers, they have developed their own 
specific ways of dealing with them. Over the course of time, an elaborate network 
of rules and norms has come to guide Council proceedings. Norms should be 
understood as: “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a 
given identity” (Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996: 54). Lewis, the scholar who 
has dealt most extensively with this network of norms has identified five that best 
characterize the appropriate behaviour in the Council (Lewis, 2005: 949-950):
- Diffuse (instead of direct) reciprocity
- Thick trust (instead of a constant vigilance against being ‘cheated’)
- Mutual responsiveness to member specific concerns
- Self restraint in negotiation style (‘do not rock the boat, do not push for a vote’)
- A shared responsibility to come up with solutions and keep the process going. 
The impact of these three institutional features cannot be assessed in isolation. 
Instead we need to see the broader picture. We are thus effectively talking about 
the same ‘small’ group of people, coming together over an extended period of time, 
behind closed doors, to deal with a multitude of different issues. At first sight, this 
seems the ideal setting to engage in ‘horse-trading’. This is in fact how most 
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rationalists would conceptualize day to day Council negotiations.20 Rationalists 
tend to downgrade the ‘sui generisness’ of the Council as a negotiation environment. 
They opt for rather minimalistic interpretations of the consensus-norm, seeking to 
account for it in terms of anticipation, issue linking, vote trading, logrolling and a 
tendency to form oversized coalitions (König & Junge, 2008; 2009; Mattila & Lane, 
2001). We are thus essentially looking at the same kind of intergovernmental 
bargaining. It is just that deal-making in such a multi-dimensional issue-space is 
usually far more complex. It would of course be almost tautological to claim that 
day to day negotiations are (also) about deal-making. The proof of the pudding lies 
in the ability to explain how this deal-making actually works. 
The problem with most rationalist models is that they do not really provide us with 
an answer to the ‘how’ question. This critique particularly applies to so-called 
procedural models, which limit their attention to the formal decision making rules 
and procedures (‘the vetoes and votes’). Procedural models are only moderately 
successful in accounting for the outcomes of Council proceedings. To insiders this 
will not come as a surprise. These formal tools typically only become available after 
the ‘real’ decision making has been rounded off. It is no secret that much of the 
vetoing and voting in the Council is symbolic (cf. Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006: 
295-296; Westlake & Galloway, 2004: 233, 254). Often it serves as a smokescreen. 
At best, it reveals that member states were unable to influence the course of events 
at an earlier stage. However, from a negotiation perspective, it is what happened at 
these earlier stages that is of more significance.
There are of course plenty of rationalists, who are aware of the need to focus on 
“the fuzzy informality of the pre-decision bargaining” (Achen, 2006: 88). This is in 
fact exactly what bargaining models claim to do. It is just that an informal bargaining 
process is something that is extremely difficult to model (particularly in its extensive 
form). Rationalists have therefore decided to refrain from attempts to model the full 
sequence of decisions in a game. “Instead they treat the bargaining process as a 
black box into which actors’ preferences, the salience they attach to the relevant 
issues, and their capabilities are input” (Sullivan & Selck, 2007: 1154; cf. Achen, 
2006: 97). It then does not really matter anymore whether the actors involved, 
actually and consciously engaged in the postulated bargain. If the model is able to 
produce the right outcome, it is assumed to be a satisfactory reproduction of the 
processes it was trying to model (cf. König & Junge, 2009: 520-521; Schneider, 
Finke & Bailer, 2010).
20 When it comes to explaining day to day proceedings instead of European integration at large, rationalists 
are usually referred to as rational choice theorists, but I will continue to employ the term rationalists.
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There is in essence nothing wrong with an approach that chooses to trade off 
‘empirical correspondence’ for ‘predictive accuracy’. Such an approach only 
becomes problematic if that predictive accuracy remains out of reach. For most 
bargaining models this is still the case. Rationalists have difficulty explaining why 
the Council so often reaches agreement on issues where their models would expect 
deadlock (König & Junge, 2008: 81). This is what is referred to as ‘the rationalist 
puzzle of Council negotiations’ (cf. Naurin & Wallace, 2008: 9). Rationalist models 
therefore end up providing us with very little “insight” into the way in which the 
presumed bargains come about (Schneider, Steunenberg & Widgrén: 2006). 
Diffuse reciprocity and social credit
Where (or because) rationalists refrain from engaging themselves with the actual 
negotiating process, others have sought to fill the void. Constructivists and 
sociological institutionalists have in fact put a lot of time and effort into exploring the 
(presumably typical) process level dynamics. They are usually far less explicit 
about whether and how such processes lead to different outcomes (Risse & Kleine, 
2010: 708). Like rationalist bargaining models, constructivists focus on the 
preliminary and informal part of the negotiations. Unlike rationalists, they opt for an 
empiricist approach (cf. Aus, 2008: 99). They want to stay close to insiders’ true 
understanding of the process. Because of this difference in focus, these scholars 
tend to confirm instead of deny the “robust exceptionalism” of the Council as a 
decision-making forum (Heisenberg, 2008: 261).
What do these scholars consider to be exceptional about the negotiations in the 
Council? Much of their theorizing departs from the aforementioned notion of diffuse 
reciprocity. Diffuse reciprocity refers to situations in which actors do not seek/
expect immediate and equivalent compensation for their contribution in the 
postulated exchange. Reciprocity then supposedly becomes something of a social 
obligation or a norm, instead of a cost-benefit calculation (cf. Keohane, 1986: 20, 
25). Why participants ‘feel’ this obligation – or abide by this norm – is often left 
unspecified. But it appears that social resources (status, reputation, credibility) play 
a key role in this type of exchange mechanism. Social resources become important 
if, as is the case with the Council, the formal means for controlling the decision 
making process do not come up to the mark. This is something that is confirmed by 
participant and insider observations.21 Council negotiators know that to remain on 
top of things in Brussels, they cannot rely on their formal veto and voting powers. 
The high interaction density requires and the high degree of insulation enables the 
coming about of a different kind of social exchange system. EU decision making is 
21 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010.
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highly complex in the formal and informal sense of the word. Yet, all are aware that 
nothing falls from the sky in Brussels. There is never a shortage of plans or initiatives. 
Draft proposals and ‘food for thought’ papers are continuously circulating. Meetings 
and get-togethers are constantly organized. Even for the bigger and well-organized 
Permanent Representations (Permreps) it is impossible to keep track, let alone 
‘control’, everything that is going on at a specific moment in time. Insiders have no 
trouble admitting that even they sometimes have difficulty trying to discover where 
a certain initiative came from. But they know that once the initiative is there, they will 
have to deal with it. They are also very much aware of the fact that once an issue 
makes it onto the ministerial agenda, they are usually already too late. Even a 
minister will have little chance to change a decision making process in motion, let 
alone turn it around as he or she wishes (cf. Heynen, 2011: 12; Puetter & Wiener, 
2007: 1085). Instead, a minister needs to be prepared for what is coming.
To acquire such ‘foresight’, negotiators above all need access. Obviously to the 
buildings, the meetings and the informal get-togethers, but more importantly they 
need access to (the right) people. Informal connections (‘good chemistry’) are 
considered crucial. More than anything, Council negotiators try to make sure they 
are present at/invited to the right places. This is where the ever so crucial 
‘momentum’ is created. Thus, access is inextricably linked to acceptance as a 
legitimate player in a specific decision making process. Negotiating in Brussels is 
not only about knowing a lot of people, but more importantly about making sure 
these people take you (and your concerns) seriously. And to be taken seriously, one 
above all needs social credit. 
Constructivists have tried to capture and conceptualize the more social aspects of 
the game with help of some catching metaphors. Heisenberg herself referred to the 
Council as “an informal market of IOU’s” (Heisenberg, 2005: 70).22 It is not so much 
a weighing and trading of interests, as it is generally considered a national 
prerogative to decide how much an issue matters to your country. It is rather a 
compensatory exchange of favours. A favour is by nature an element of diffuse 
reciprocity. Its value is essentially in the eye of the beholder, or rather in the eye of 
those who grant and receive them. A lot of the negotiations then boil down to 
convincing your counterparts of your willingness to grant them specific favours, 
thereby enabling the coming about of a consensus or compromise. This is of 
course a social resource that needs to be used with moderation. A negotiator 
cannot credibly claim that he or she is ‘acting in the spirit of compromise’ too often. 
Handing out favours all the time will depreciate the value these favours have. 
22 IOU stands for ‘I owe you’. 
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It thus seems more correct to refer to the Council less as an (informal) market, and 
more in terms of a bank. More specifically as a ‘favour bank’ at which member 
states deposit and withdraw from their balance (cf. Aus, 2008; Heisenberg, 2005; 
Lewis, 2008). Social credit should then be considered as the currency in Council 
interactions. One acquires such credit by ‘stockpiling’ the social influence one 
acquires from acting as a team player (Bjurulf & Elgström, 2004: 264; Lewis, 2008: 
177).23 Typical of a team player is that he adopts an integrative instead of distributive 
approach towards the concerns of other members of the club. One does not receive 
credit by focussing merely on individual gain. One acquires credit rather by helping 
(the Presidency in particular) to find solutions for the group as a whole. What is also 
typical of team players is that they try not to cross each other’s ‘lines of pain’.24 
Favour banks, just like ordinary banks, are built on trust, which means that a 
reputation for trustworthiness is pivotal. A bank furthermore offers the possibility to 
store (social) credit, thus allowing its members to be a bit more patient and relaxed 
in getting what they want. More often than not, it will be impossible to concede to 
all on a certain matter. Members thus have to rely on the reasonableness of their 
counterparts that, when the time comes, their specific concerns will be taken into 
account. This is what induces participants to show a certain amount of self-restraint. 
It also allows them to adopt more of a ‘live and let live’ attitude towards the specific 
concerns of others. After all, the only way to get something yourself, is by others 
permitting you to have it.25 Thus, more important than having a lot of friends, is not 
having open enemies.
One qualification already needs to be made with regard to this live and let live 
attitude. It does not imply that the Council is an ‘old boys club’, driven solely by the 
principle of you scratch my back and I will scratch yours. There are few who would 
argue that the culture in the Council is such that it induces member states to act 
‘cooperative’ or ‘consensually’ all or even most of the time. Neither does it require 
the creation of ‘a Kantian life world’ in which rivals have become friends (cf. Wendt, 
1999). Hardly anyone will challenge a member state’s right to fight hard for what it 
considers to be in its national interest. In fact, it is not acting upon one’s interests, 
that is considered to be anomalous. Principled stances or moral claims are often 
considered luxuries, and indulging in them is not appreciated by those who do 
have something at stake in the matter.26 As a direct consequence, debates about 
the fundamental principles underlying the policies are rare. In fact questioning 
23 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 7-7-2010. 
24 Author’s interview, Working party level, 13-10-2010.
25 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 14-7-2010, 27-9-2010.
26 Author’s interviews, PSC and Working party level, 8-7-2010, 10-2-2011.
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fundamentals is frowned upon (cf. Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006: 54). Council 
negotiators generally prefer a ‘technical’ approach, in which they seek to establish 
a common framework that enables the decision making process as a whole to 
continue (cf. Neyer, 2004: 26; Sherrington, 2000: 48, 66). If anything, the culture of 
consensus is about being pragmatic and willing to pick your battles, while allowing 
others to take the lead in theirs (cf. Bostock, 2002: 231-232). The obvious question 
that still remains is of course: how do Council negotiators then manage to coordinate 
the battles they pick? This is a question that will be addressed in the next chapter.
To sum up
In this section I have set out to answer the first question posed in the beginning of 
this chapter: What, if anything, is distinctive about the Council as a negotiation 
environment? It appears that the differences are indeed substantial. Based on its 
institutional features, I have come to characterize the Council as something in 
between a ‘monastery’ and a ‘favour bank’. Thus far such idiosyncrasies have 
mainly been studied from a socialization perspective. Research has convincingly 
established the presence of strong social norms in the Council. These informal 
norms moreover seem at least as important as the formal rules in accounting for 
decision making processes, particularly those taking place below the ministerial 
level. To be sure, none of these observations definitively disqualify rationalist 
explanations as such. But they point to possible reasons for why they have not been 
very successful in explaining how the consensus making mechanism actually 
works. It seems that intergovernmental interest-based exchanges fail to capture the 
whole story. Constructivist or sociological institutionalist insights served to fill the 
void, particularly by including the idea of diffuse reciprocity and the social exchange 
system that is underlying this concept. Such conceptualizations point at the 
important role that social resources play in the Council. But, they tell us little about 
how such resources are active in shaping/guiding negotiation processes.
A question that has thus far remained largely unaddressed, is how the presence of 
these norms affects the actual (and observable) behaviour of the participants. The 
debate about socialization has tended to become metaphysical. It focussed on 
assessing the impact that norms might have on actors’ internalized role-concep-
tions, their intentions and identities (cf. Johnston, 2005; Laffan, 2004; Müller, 2004, 
Wodak, 2004). But it did not tell us a lot about how and how much such dispositions 
matter, in that they significantly change behaviour and thereby lead to different 
outcomes. Negotiators might be induced by their environment to adopt a ‘other-
regarding’ perspective. They might be inclined to adopt an ‘integrative’ approach to 
the concerns of others. They might even feel they are not just acting as national 
representatives, but also as issue-experts and community members. But that still 
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does not tell us anything about what their interactions look like. Now that we have 
established the ‘club-like characteristics’ of the Council as a negotiation environment, 
we can focus on the second and more important question: How is negotiating in a 
club different from negotiating at an intergovernmental conference?
1.2   Negotiation styles: ‘We are all reasonable men here’
The previous section was about giving content and meaning to the ubiquitous 
concept that is the culture of consensus. I have related it to a number of social 
norms, regarding restraint, responsiveness and responsibility, which serve to 
delineate what is considered appropriate behaviour. More specifically, the Council 
was characterized as an informal social exchange system in which integrative 
behaviour is generally ‘rewarded’ (with social status), while confrontational behaviour 
tends to be ‘punished’ (with a loss of face) (cf. Lewis, 2010: 649).27 This section is 
about how these still rather general norms are transposed into the realm of day to 
day negotiations. 
As the story in the Introduction has shown, Council negotiations, certainly in the 
issue areas on which we focus here, are word battles (cf. Glarbo, 1999: 635; 
Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006: 52-54; Sherrington, 2000: 48; Thomas, 2009: 
345). Day to day debates come down to searching for the appropriate phrasing with 
which to express the current level of agreement. The perhaps only indisputable 
finding of this study is that these words are never careless. One can rest assured 
that every word, bracket and comma is the result of ‘careful consideration’ and 
‘thorough coordination’ amongst member states. In the halls and corridors of the 
Justus Lipsius, an impressive amount of time, effort and resources is spent on 
legitimizing one’s position, and avoiding argumentative stalemate. Talking has all 
but become a way of life. It is often hard for outsiders to appreciate the importance 
of all these words. Even insiders wonder whether the Council has not crossed a 
certain threshold, at which the effectiveness of the EU as a whole begins to suffer 
from the insistence to agree on every single word.28 But these insiders also know 
that it is often only in these word battles, that a way forward can be found: 
“Council negotiations are about finding a compromise. The way to do this is by finding words 
that allow for a sufficient amount of discretion. Words that work for you as well as for me, so 
that we both have something to take home and ‘sell’ to our national audiences.”29
27 Author’s interviews, Coreper level, 7-7-2010, 8-12-2010.
28 Author’s interviews, Working party level and domestic level, 14-12,2009, 25-3-2010, 11-3-2011.
29 Author’s interview, Working party level, 13-10-2010.
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Of course, we need to bear in mind that diplomacy has always been a battle of 
words. And ‘buttering up’ has been part of these diplomatic interactions for 
centuries. One needs only to think of the argumentative encounters between 
western diplomats and incumbent rulers during ‘the Great Game’ to see that 
bargaining seldom takes the form of direct promises and open threats (cf. Hopkirk, 
2006). And not only diplomats are long aware of the fact that such promises, no 
matter how eloquently they are wrapped, can come back to haunt those who have 
uttered them (cf. Fromkin, 2009; Schneer 2010).30 So the ‘sui generisness’ of 
Council negotiations is indeed, as rationalists have argued, not something that 
should be assumed too easily (Schneider, 2008: 279). The litmus test of such sui 
generis claims is in proving that in the Council the impact of words is somehow 
bigger. This is essentially what concepts such as arguing and deliberation imply. 
The etiquette inside the Justus Lipsius
The exact role that words and arguments (can) play in the Council’s decision 
making process remains hard to grasp, not only for outside observers, but even for 
the ones who are continuously using them. Insiders sketch a rather contradictory 
view of the argumentative encounters in the Justus Lipsius. On the one hand, they 
acknowledge the pivotal importance of a (sound) argumentative basis for one’s 
claims. The way to show your (country’s) commitment to a certain issue is by 
providing an argumentative legitimization with that claim. Incidentally, one will see 
Council negotiators simply stating that something is ‘very important for them/their 
country’. But usually negotiators will provide reasons and justifications for that 
position. Even when delegates say they want to be brief and merely support the 
positions of others, they will usually launch a full scale intervention to stake their 
claim. In a sense this is part of the protocol: 
“There is a culture of discussion in the Council, which makes that others will not appreciate 
you bluntly stating your red lines. From a strategic perspective just stating your position can 
make you less vulnerable to a rebuttal. But coming up with arguments is considered 
something of a courtesy. Arguments also add to the impression of being knowledgeable and 
thus enhance the status of the one who is presenting them.”31 
30 The example referred to here is the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917: a “declaration of sympathy 
with the Jewish Zionist aspirations” in which the British government pledged it “will use their best 
endeavours facilitate the achievement of this object [a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine]”.
31 Author’s interview, Working party level, 13-7-2010.
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“In order to successfully defend your national position, one needs ‘objective arguments’. If 
one member holds on to a certain position, without providing the others with clear and 
reasonable arguments, this will almost certainly cost them political points. The culture in the 
Council asks of members to explain to one another why they are holding on to a certain 
position.”32
This logic seems to hold at all Council levels. Ministers will be quite offended when 
they feel they were not provided with adequate opportunities for making their 
intervention.33 A leaky argumentation will be mocked in Coreper.34 Even Working 
party members will want to make it appear that they are doing more than simply 
transferring information and carrying out their instructions. Yet, when probed about 
the effectiveness of their interventions, participants sketch a somewhat different 
image: 
“It is a bit naive to assume that by presenting strong arguments, one can convince others, let 
alone their ministers, to change their position on a certain matter.”35
The fact that there is a lot of room for presenting your argument does not necessarily 
imply that there is also substantial debate. In fact, the plenary as such hardly 
deserves the designation ‘debate’. A lot of the ‘real’ negotiations have (presumably) 
already taken place behind the scenes. Once an issue reaches the table, positions 
have become entrenched. Much of the statements are declaratory, much of the 
debate is orchestrated:
“The sheer number of people at the table make it hard if not impossible to have a real debate 
at the plenary. Irreverently put, Council meetings are about rushing through positions and 
identifying member-specific concerns. Those with something at stake are expected to join 
the Presidency in looking for solutions. Those less involved will take a step back, trusting that 
their red lines will not be crossed.”36 
First time participants are often disappointed by the limited possibilities there are 
for engaging in a real dialogue. Long time participants admit that they were usually 
able to write most of the reports of the meetings before they even took place.37 From 
32 Author’s interview, Working party level, 13-10-2010.
33 We will come across an example in Chapter 8, Section 2 in the debate about resuming the SAA 
negotiations with Serbia.
34 Author’s interviews, Coreper and Working party level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010, 8-12-2010. 
35 Author’s interview, Working party level, 27-9-2010.
36 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 7-7-2010. 
37 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 14-12-2009, 14-1-2011. 
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a strictly managerial perspective, Council debates do not appear to be very efficient 
or effective gatherings. If anything, they look like ritual dances. Negotiations are to 
a large degree about procedures. They are about deciding whether, when and how 
the political level will concern itself with a certain matter. Argumentative encounters 
at best serve to influence the course and the pace of the policy making process, 
but not necessarily the content. There is thus a lot of probing or ‘testing the water’ 
and also a lot of repetition. Usually, everything has been said after five or six 
interventions. But still hours are often ‘wasted’ in symbolic tour de tables, when all 
are aware that nobody is willing (or able) to move an inch. The latter of course 
makes sense. Participants generally do not want to make it appear as if they 
themselves are taking a position on a certain matter, instead of their capitals. They 
are there primarily to stake their own claims, not critically to reflect on the claims 
made by others.38
Thus, what one generally sees is a lot of reason-giving but little interaction, dialogue 
or debate. Negotiations, particularly below the ministerial level, tend to be less 
about ‘sweeping the board’, and more about defining the scope of the playing field 
(Westlake & Galloway, 2004: 257, 262-264). They are about trying to get an overview 
of who is seriously committed to playing this round and wherein his or her concerns 
lie. While not coming up with any reasoning might be considered inappropriate, 
openly attacking the reasoning of others is also considered not done.39 Negotiators 
are always looking for things they have in common with relevant others. Of course, 
at all Council levels negotiators will try to close parts of the dossier, be it without 
damaging ongoing relationships. This is typically done by allowing member-specif-
ic amendments or derogations. But substantial obstacles in the negotiation process 
at a certain Council level will usually lead to the Council taking a step back either in 
level (from the ministerial to the ambassador or from the ambassador to the Working 
party level) or in stage (from the negotiation phase back to the drafting phase) (cf. 
Westlake & Galloway, 2004: 266). This approach is perhaps the only feasible one, 
seeing that Council negotiators are in it for the long haul instead of looking for a 
quick fix. This is what induces them to adopt an accommodating approach towards 
the argumentative positions of others:
“Nobody has an interest in taking matters to the extreme and end up in a divisive debate at 
Council or even European Council level. (Prime) ministers have little time and a Presidency 
will surely not want to waste any of it on unpredictable debates with uncertain outcomes.”40
38 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 28-9-2010.
39 Author’s interviews, Coreper and Working party level, 27-7-2010, 17-5-2011, 23-6-2011. 
40 Author’s interview, Working party level, 27-9-2010.
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We are thus faced with something of a puzzle. It seems that a position always needs to 
be accompanied by an (adequate) argumentation, even though the possibilities for 
engaging in a substantial debate on the basis of these arguments seem to be limited. 
This first part of this observation will probably surprise no one. After all, in most 
definitions of the word negotiations, the use of arguments is already assumed (cf. 
Heisenberg, 2008: 67; Müller, 2004: 413-414; Risse, 2000: 18-19). There are probably 
few who would deny that arguing in the sense of reason-giving is omnipresent in the 
Council. After all, the Council is in essence a continuous negotiation machine. Nearly 
everything the Council does or does not do is in the proper sense of the word ‘debated’. 
Plenary sessions provide all member states, big and small, with a platform on which 
they can, and should, present their reasons for (dis)agreeing with a decision. But the 
‘power of the table’ is such that it only ‘forces’ actors to talk (cf. Van Middelaar, 2008). It 
does not force them to actually seek an agreement.
The second part of the observation urges to probe a little deeper into what lies 
beneath this arguing we constantly observe. It is the exact role that these arguments 
can play in influencing the course of the decision making process, which merits our 
attention. After all, if reason-giving is just part of the rules of courtesy, then we need 
not attach a lot of significance to it. This would imply that Working party members, 
Coreper ambassadors and even ministers are mainly fooling themselves, by 
engaging in these extensive verbal encounters, when they might just as well send 
each other their instructions by email or agree to what presumably has already 
been ‘cooked up’ behind the scenes. Thus rather than just establishing that Council 
negotiators are ‘reason-givers’, we need to establish what might be the rationale 
behind this activity.
Towards a definition of debate-quality
The academic debate about reasoning styles and logics of decision making in the 
Council has received a lot of impetus, but at the same time picked up a considerable 
amount of ambiguity, from the broader debate between rationalism and 
constructivism (cf. Pollack, 2005; Warntjen, 2010). Point of departure was the 
presupposition that the Council’s club-like characteristics provided negotiators 
with the opportunity to enter into different types of debates. More specifically, it 
would induce them to engage in high(er) quality deliberations. Intuitively this makes 
sense. As we have seen, Council negotiators ‘strive for consensus, offer reasoned 
explanations and generally avoid pressing for a vote’ (Pollack & Shaffer, 2008: 149). 
However, to be able to determine whether and to what extent a consensual 
environment leads to deliberative behaviour, we need to further operationalize the 
concept of ‘debate-quality’ (cf. Steiner et al., 2004). Most specifically, we need to 
establish what such consensual negotiation behaviour would look like. 
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A good way to start is by clearly defining the different concepts in use. The terms 
‘arguing’, ‘deliberation’ and ‘communicative action’ tend to be used simultaneously 
even though their connotations are not necessarily the same. The most common 
approach has been to refer to them as different kinds of speech acts (cf. Deitelhoff 
& Müller, 2005; Holzinger, 2004, 2005). John Searle (1969) distinguishes three 
levels in a speech act:
- The locutionary level: referring to the (exact) words and phrasings that are being 
uttered.
- The illocutionary level: referring to the intended meaning of these words, for 
example to assert something, to direct someone, to make a promise. 
- The perlocutionary level: referring to the actual effect(s) these words might 
have, in the sense of scaring, tempting, persuading or convincing relevant others
Arguing should be regarded as something of an umbrella-term. Arguing as a 
metaphor stems from the concept of argumentation. Arguing is often equated with 
‘reason-giving’ (Risse & Kleine, 2010: 708). Arguing comes about when there is a 
difference of opinion. There are two necessary elements (cf. Van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1992). First of all, participants need to have diverging standpoints 
(otherwise there would be agreement). Second, they need to be willing to justify or 
legitimize their standpoint by means of ‘an argument’ (otherwise they can do 
nothing more than establish that there is disagreement). Arguing is what happens 
at the proverbial forum (Elster, 2003). The arguer, or proponent, will try to explain to 
others, why he has adopted a specific standpoint. Others will perhaps want to 
challenge the argumentation and thus try to induce the proponent to change his 
standpoint. But it can also be that the arguer is positioning himself vis-à-vis a latent 
opponent. Especially in the latter case, it is often difficult to distinguish an argument 
from an explanation or an observation. The proponent has an interest in making it 
appear as if he is merely establishing, when he is in fact making a claim about 
something.41 A necessary, but not sufficient, condition for arguing is the acknowledgment 
that there are divergent standpoints to argue about. 
By defining arguing in terms of reason-giving, the focus appears to be on the 
illocutionary level. It refers to meaning that the verbal utterance is intended to have; 
namely to explain to others why a negotiation position is ‘justifiable’. It makes sense 
to expect more reason-giving in a monasterial than in a market environment. In 
most bargaining situations reasoning can be kept to a minimum. One generally 
does not have to justify a lot when attempting to acquire a loaf of bread or a new 
pair of pants. One can more or less instantly start ‘haggling’ about what should be 
41 In the light of the current Euro or debt crisis a lot of such arguments dressed up as observations can be 
heard. For example in claims such as: ‘Cutbacks are necessary if Greece wants to be able to survive in 
the Euro zone’, it is often extremely difficult to distinguish the ‘explanatory’ from the ‘opinionated’ part. 
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offered in return (usually money). Of course, non-routine forms of bargaining will 
often be accompanied by elaborate verbal exchanges. But these words then mostly 
serve to make offers and counteroffers, concessions and retractions, and to set 
down the current level of agreement on a (potential) deal. They do not serve to 
legitimize the claim as such. When arguing, the whole point is to establish the 
reasonableness of one’s position.
Speech act theory was initially employed mainly to delineate the distinction between 
bargaining on the one hand and arguing on the other. But by now it has become 
obvious that we are dealing with analytical distinctions instead of empirically 
disjunct classes (Holzinger, 2004: 195-197; Naurin, 2009: 36). There is thus no point 
in trying to come up with a competitive test to see, which of the two is predominant 
in the Council. Some studies have tried to distinguish between negotiation styles at 
the illocutionary or even near the locutionary level (cf. Dür & Mateo, 2010b; 
Holzinger, 2005). The difficulty with such an approach (apart from the fact that one 
needs direct access to the negotiation process and cannot rely on ‘reported 
behaviour’) is that it largely neglects the rhetorical talent of the negotiators and their 
ability to steer clear of confrontational wording. A related problem is that arguing 
and bargaining tend to occur simultaneously. The more relevant question is thus: 
how are arguing and bargaining speech acts related? It is obvious that to give 
content and meaning to the concept of arguing, it needs to refer to more than just 
the willingness to provide arguments. We need to include a perlocutionary 
dimension and say something about the effects of these arguments. This is 
essentially what the concept of deliberation does. What deliberation adds to the 
concept of arguing is openness. More specifically it refers to openness towards the 
demands and to the counterarguments of others (Steiner et al., 2004: 59). When 
actors deliberate, they are engaging in what Habermasians call ‘Verständigungso-
rientiertes Handeln’ (Habermas, 1995). This “implies that actors try to challenge the 
validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement and seek a 
communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation as well as 
justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action. Argumentative 
rationality implies that participants in a discourse are open to be persuaded by the 
better argument” (Risse, 2000: 7, my italics).42 The latter part of this claim was built 
on in particular when accounting for Council negotiations. What the concept of 
deliberation implies is that in the Council: “The power of a good argument can be 
as compelling as a blocking minority or the shadow of a veto. The possibility of 
42 Risse sometimes refers to arguing as mere reason-giving (Risse & Kleine, 2010), but at other occasions 
seems to equate a logic of arguing with deliberation and communicative action (Risse, 2000). To prevent 
conceptual confusion, I will refer to reason-giving as arguing and to the Habermasian concept of 
communicative action as deliberation. 
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persuading others with a convincing argument….works as a great equalizer in 
negotiations” (Lewis, 2005: 951). This presumes that arguments are not only ‘used’, 
but also ‘listened to’ (Risse & Kleine, 2010; Steiner et al., 2004). It is thus a statement 
not just about the amount of debate, but rather about the effectiveness of this 
debate (Heisenberg, 2008: 67). Debates ‘matter’ in that they (can) lead to different 
outcomes. 
Including the idea of ‘openness’ makes it possible to distinguish the kind of 
reason-giving that rationalists would probably be prepared to acknowledge, from 
the kind of reason-driven debate that constructivists seem to refer to. Rationalists 
might be willing to admit that some reason-giving takes place. But this is then, what 
has already been referred to as ‘cheap talk’ (Walsh, 2005: 646). As Naurin (2009) 
has shown, inside the Council deliberations, in the true sense of the word, are ‘most 
common when least important’. “Actors who are not particularly pressured by the 
decision-making situation can ‘afford’ to argue, while actors, who seriously fear 
losing out in negotiations, tend towards a bargaining mode” (Naurin, 2009: 32).43 
Rationalists would expect actors to be everything but willing to engage in an open 
debate. From their perspective argumentative encounters are best conceptualized 
as ‘Melian dialogues’, referring to Thucydides’s rendering account of the dialogue 
between the mighty Athenians and the puny Melians. It serves as a classical 
example of the unwillingness of the powerful to engage in open dialogue rather 
than merely presenting their own argument. This is certainly not to deny that 
argumentative encounters are sought, but mainly by those who either have nothing 
at stake or else no other means to realize their interests.44 This is because those that 
have much at stake will want to avoid the risk of connecting their preferred options 
to specific, and possibly refutable, arguments. After all, using such arguments can 
lead to entrapment (cf. Schimmelfennig, 2003). Only those who need to use factual 
claims will do so, which leads to the perhaps counterintuitive conclusion that the 
more actors invest in arguments, the smaller the chance that these arguments will 
be effective (Lieshout, 1995: 154-156).
From a constructivist or sociological institutionalist perspective such openness is 
essential. It is this openness, which leads to negotiations that are less interest and 
43 Naurin (as Risse) seems to use the terms ‘arguing’ and ‘deliberation’ interchangeably, thereby adding to 
the conceptual confusion about the exact meaning of the different terms. 
44 Melians: “It is natural and understandable that people who are placed as we are should have resource 
to all kinds of arguments and different points of view.” Athenians: “Then we on our side will use no fine 
phrases...Instead we recommend that you should try to get what is possible for you to get, taking into 
consideration what we both really do think…that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do, 
and the weak accept what they have to accept.” Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War Book 5, 
Chapter 7: ‘Sixteenth Year of War. The Melian Debate’ (1956ed: 360).
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more argument driven. The Council would then to some extent come to resemble, 
what Habermasians refer to as, a ‘herrschaftsfreier Umgebung’, providing for an 
‘ideal speech situation’ (cf. Checkel, 2003: 213; Deitelhoff & Müller, 2005: 172-174; 
Diez & Steans, 2005: 134; Risse, 2000: 7). This is a setting in which differences in 
power to some extent are mitigated so that the influence of ‘the message’ can 
become stronger in comparison to that of ‘the messenger’. An ideal speech 
situation does not presume negotiations taking place behind a Rawlsian ‘veil of 
ignorance’ (Rawls, 1971). Open-mindedness should not be caricatured as a 
disposition constantly to adapt one’s stances to the opinions of (dominant) others, 
just as sticking to one’s point of view does not automatically imply the absence of 
a willingness to deliberate. What is crucial in all forms of deliberation is at least a 
readiness to engage oneself with the opinions/arguments presented by others (cf. 
Niemann, 2008: 122-123). 
The double puzzle of Council negotiations
The image of Council debates, as it was sketched above, presents both rationalist and 
constructivist theorizing with a problem. Why risk arguing, is what rationalists would 
have trouble explaining. Why bother to argue, is what constructivists would not be able 
to explain. To elaborate, according to rationalist theorizing, arguments are largely 
epiphenomenal. Arguments merely serve as the decorative wrapping of one’s 
interests. What is puzzling from a rationalist perspective is why Council negotiators 
then engage/invest in these extensive legitimizations, that either do not really seem to 
matter (cheap talk), or worse could harm their cause (if their arguments are refuted)? 
This inclination towards extensive legitimization is something that constructivists 
can explain, namely by referring to the normative environment in which these 
negotiations take place. As Habermas himself explains, social interactions always 
take place within “a framework of previously agreed upon principles, norms and 
rules” (Habermas, 2005: 387). For example, coming up with religion-based 
arguments in a courthouse setting will not help the defendant. Other rules apply in 
a church than in a courthouse, which becomes visible when someone violates 
these rules, for example by referring to ‘divine intervention’ as the cause of the 
defendant’s behaviour. Negotiation moves can only be effective if they are 
considered to be legitimate moves within this specific framework.45 What judges in 
a courtroom and priests in the church are thus trying to establish is the legitimacy 
45 Habermasians prefer to speak in terms of validity instead of legitimacy (cf. Deitelhoff & Müller, 2005: 168; 
Niemann, 2008: 122-123, Risse, 2000: 9-10). I prefer to use the term legitimacy, because the concept of 
validity carries with it some ontological or even ‘metaphysical’ connotations. Validity in Habermasian 
terms refers to claims of ‘truth’ with regard to the employed facts, as well as the ‘truthfulness’ of the one 
who utters the claim. Legitimacy by contrast can be considered as a purely intersubjective criterion. 
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of specific moves or claims. According to Habermasians, such a frame of reference 
cannot be ‘imposed’ on actors, but can only be arrived at by means of genuine 
deliberation (Eriksen & Weingard, 1997: 235; Habermas, 2005: 388; Sjursen, 2002: 
500; Ulbert & Risse, 2005: 364-365). This is a fundamental but at the same time 
rather puzzling claim, as the example of the courthouse already shows that one can 
indeed impose a frame of legitimacy. This does not in any way diminish the capacity 
of this framework to ‘bind’ actors in their (negotiation) behaviour. 
The same reasoning can again be applied to the Council. The need to make one’s 
claims appear legitimate binds all, but at specific points in time enables only some. 
By means of negotiations, participants try to legitimize their positions by making 
sure what they say resonates with the dominant rules and norms - the rhetorical 
commonplaces - of the environment (Krebs & Jackson, 2007: 45). Instead of a 
priest or judge, it is the rotating Presidency that serves as the ‘mediator’ as well as 
the ‘external authority’ here (cf. Müller, 2004; Ulbert & Risse, 2005). The legitimacy 
requirement thus serves as a sorting machine. “Any individual preference can be 
assessed in terms of its coherence with basic consensual norms…All those 
preferences which fail to withstand such scrutiny are easily rejected for their lack of 
normative coherence and will be taken out of the selection of possible solutions” 
(Neyer, 2004: 30). 
While constructivists can explain the need for legitimization, they have trouble accounting 
for the limited openness of Council debates. In the previous section we have already 
established that due to its institutional characteristics, the Council certainly qualifies 
as a suitable normative (perhaps even ‘most likely’) environment for engaging in 
deliberations (Gerring 2007: 120-122; Zürn & Checkel, 2005: 1065). Within the 
confines of the Justus Lipsius, looking for genuine agreement instead of shallow 
compromise not only becomes possible. More importantly it appears to be worthwhile.46 
These are, as I have explained, team-players with cooperative dispositions looking 
for integrative solutions (Elgström & Jönsson, 2000: 697-698). But nevertheless, the 
expected deliberations, in the true sense of the word, seem to be largely absent.
In the Council, it rather appears that the norms of reciprocity, trust and (self)restraint 
work in the opposite direction. With this observation we hit upon an ambivalence 
that is intrinsic to the concept of ‘Verständigungsorientiertes Handeln’. Habermasians 
seem to assume that there is a link between deliberative and consensual processes 
(cf. Johnston, 2005: 1019). Whereas it is perhaps more reasonable to expect that 
deliberations have polarizing instead of unifying effects (Steiner et al., 2004: 4, 92). 
46 One could even maintain that the only way to influence relevant others in day to day interactions is by the 
use of superior arguments. 
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As Shapiro argues: “Deliberation can bring differences to the surface, widening the 
political divisions rather than narrowing them” (Shapiro, 1999: 31). Certainly when 
dealing with issues on which there is ample room for normative as well as factual 
divergence, deliberations will hinder rather than help consensus formation (Puetter 
& Wiener, 2007: 1071). 
Much of the confusion, I believe, stems from the tendency to confuse an integrative 
with an accommodating approach. Integrative (bargaining) refers to a willingness 
to take into account the interests of others, whereas accommodative (arguing) is 
about an unwillingness truly to address the opinions of others. In a bargaining 
situation the optimal solution might indeed be the one that integrates as many 
interests as possible. But in an arguing situation this same logic does not hold. The 
‘best’ solution is not likely to be the one that accommodates as many opinions as 
possible.47 Consider the example of a group of doctors coming together to agree 
on a medicine for a patient. Whatever differences of opinion there might be between 
them on what ails the patient and what drug should be used, a fairly unsettling 
result of this expert-dialogue would be if the doctors decided to ‘apply a little bit of 
everything’. An accommodative debate is in fact a debate in which nobody ever 
loses. A true deliberation would (have to) lead to a clear decision on what and what 
not to do. This means there will be (clear) winners and losers. At the very least it 
should be possible to establish who is more and who is less right. Actors do not 
have to be individually convinced in the end, in order to be able to conclude that 
deliberations indeed took place. Not all doctors have personally to agree that this 
is in fact the best approach. They should merely subscribe to – more precisely 
agree on a decision making procedure that would allow – (one of the) arguments to 
‘win the day’.
Here we see why Council negotiations also present constructivist theorizing with a 
puzzle. If deliberations are characterized by an openness to be persuaded by the 
force of the better argument, then that automatically implies a willingness to 
confront others about the legitimacy of their arguments. And it is precisely this kind 
of confrontational (divisive) negotiation style that does not appear to be ‘rewarded’ 
by the normative environment of the Council. Thus, adopting an accommodative 
approach seems to preclude rather than encourage deliberative behaviour. 
47 What makes an argument ‘better’ is of course an inter-subjective assessment. It refers to what the group 
considers as the best argument that is subsequently (allowed to be) decisive. 
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1.3  Conclusion: An abundance of arguments, but little debate
What, if anything, is different about Council negotiations, and what exact role can 
arguments play in these encounters? In the first section, I have set out to establish 
the particularities of the Council as a negotiating platform. In the second section, I 
have elaborated on how these particularities affect negotiation behaviour. It appears 
that the live and let live attitude, which characterizes Council proceedings, permeates 
down to the level of day to day interactions. There has been a tendency to equate a 
culture of consensus with a disposition towards acting consensually. I have argued 
that it is rather about picking battles and being able to sense how far one can go in 
pushing for national priorities. Even more importantly, it is about trying to avoid 
interferences with the battles picked by others. Such an anticipating attitude makes 
sense in light of the fact that Council negotiators are engaged in a continuous 
process of interpersonal accommodation:
“In the long run Council negotiations are not about making a lot of friends. But they are also 
not about focussing solely on what you want or need. What it comes down to in the end, is 
knowing what the others need, so that they are also able to leave the room with their heads 
held high.”48
Council negotiations do not seem to make sense, when judged from a rationalist 
nor from a constructivist perspective. We are faced with a situation in which member 
states have to invest in substantiating and legitimizing their own position, but are 
under no obligation to engage themselves with the reasoning of others. What we 
are thus essentially confronted with is not bargaining but arguing from fixed positions. 
Rationalists consider arguments as cheap, and therefore have trouble accounting 
for the arguing that does take place. Constructivists link the use of arguments to the 
willingness to deliberate, but have trouble explaining why such deliberations do not 
take place. This is because they (wrongly) presume that the only way in which a 
debate can be causally significant is if there is at least someone in the audience 
who is willing to ‘listen’, ‘learn’ and reconsider his position (Risse & Kleine, 2010: 710).
The by far most parsimonious explanation for the accommodative negotiation 
behaviour we observe in the Council would be that reason-giving is really just part 
of the etiquette. And that Council negotiators are simply not aware that what they 
are doing is of little significance. The lengthy debates and extensive legitimizations, 
not to mention the efforts that national capitals put in adequately equipping their 
delegates with instructions, are then basically a great waste of resources. An alternative 
48 Author’s interview, Maxime Verhagen, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs (2007-2010), The Hague 2012.
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explanation would be that these (plenary) encounters are relevant, be it in a way 
not accounted for by current conceptualizations of negotiations. This alternative 
interpretation is indeed what I will present in the next chapter. In what follows, I will 
try to render plausible a model of (Council) negotiations, which explains how 
debates can ‘matter’ even without there being anyone willing to ‘compete’ over 
argumentative positions.

57
A Caucus race model of negotiations
2.  A Caucus race model of negotiations
There were a number of things that were unusual about the race that Alice was 
invited to participate in. What she saw was a diverse group of participants randomly 
placed along a circle-shaped race-course. The contestants joined and left the race 
whenever they felt like it. They did not seem to put a lot of effort into overtaking 
others, but instead were caught up in their own race. The race was presided over 
by a referee, whose primary task was to decide when the race was over. His second 
task was to allocate the prizes, although in this particular type of race it appeared 
that everybody must have one.
There are a number of things that are unusual about Council debates. Because of 
the closed nature of the proceedings, the rationale behind what Council negotiators 
are doing remains hard to grasp. Those who have managed to catch a glimpse of 
these negotiations tend to describe them along identical lines. We are confronted 
with a seemingly erratic pattern of plenary interventions. These interventions are 
often limited to (re)stating the prompted positions or applauding the interventions 
of others. There is not a lot of room for rebuttals. Such a sequence of interventions 
continues for as long as flags are being raised, or until the Presidency chooses to 
interrupt the debate on this point and move on to the next item on the agenda. It is 
up to the one in the Chair to ‘feel the mood in the room’, decide on what to take into 
account and how to proceed with the decision making on that particular issue. 
Plenary sessions thus consist of a cacophony of attempts to make waves or ride on 
the waves made by others.49 And, also within the walls of the Justus Lipsius, it is 
often hard to answer the seemingly vital question of ‘who has won?’ 
Existing theories have trouble explaining how exactly member states are competing 
in the Council. From a rationalist as well as a constructivist perspective, this ‘arguing 
from fixed positions’ does not seem to make a lot of sense. What I will thus present 
in this chapter is an alternative understanding of the Council’s consensus making 
mechanism. Here, it works as an invisible hand, shaping decision making processes 
and thereby outcomes over the heads of those who are participating in them 
(Schimmelfennig, 2003: 223). Nozick defines an invisible hand process as: “A 
pattern or institutional structure that apparently could only arise by conscious 
design, instead can originate or be maintained through interactions of agents 
having no such overall pattern in mind” (Nozick, 1994: 314). We need to distinguish 
this from hidden hand claims, in which “an apparently unintended, accidental or 
49 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010.
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unrelated set of events is shown to result from intentional design”.50 Invisible hand 
claims are inherently arrogant in the sense that they presume that, in spite of what 
participants might think is guiding their (inter)actions, the researcher claims he 
knows better. Considerable effort should thus be put in explaining why the 
researcher thinks he is better positioned to understand the dynamics. Moreover, 
the researcher should strive to make the invisible hand visible, by outlining its 
observable implications (cf. King, Keohane & Verba, 1994). He or she should outline 
wherein these implications differ from those of existing conceptualizations, in this 
study a rationalist intergovernmental bargaining and a constructivist deliberative 
understanding of negotiations. The purpose of Chapters 2 and 3 is to do just that. 
It is about how I set out to establish that the empirical regularities in Council 
negotiations can best be accounted for by the mechanism I propose. Before I can 
elaborate on the mechanism, I will present the participants and their motivations for 
joining the race.
2.1  The third image of the Council negotiator
The varied company that Alice joined in the Caucus race “began running when they 
liked, and left off when they liked”. One of the main assumptions underlying the 
Caucus race model of (Council) negotiations is therefore that we only need to take 
into account the positions of those who at some point choose to participate in the 
race. This automatically assumes that those who want to achieve anything in the 
Council, cannot do so by staying out of the debate. This is again something that is 
confirmed by participant and insider observations. Plenary interventions are 
considered a necessary element, however symbolic such interventions might often 
appear. After all, member states’ underlying positions are usually well known. In 
fact, who decides to make an intervention in support of whom might very well be 
the only unknown in many meetings.
Of course the decision to join is not solely, or not even primarily, in the hands of the 
individual negotiator. There are after all instructions to be carried out (at the very 
least ‘read out’). Yet, this is not a mechanical exercise. First of all, Council negotiators 
are often involved in the drawing up of these instructions (cf. Kassim & Peters 
50 ‘Conspiracy theories’ are a well known example of hidden hand claims. The metaphor of the invisible 
hand has traditionally been attributed to Adam Smith, who refers to in terms of an individual who: “neither 
intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it…he intends only his own 
gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no 
part of his intention.” (Smith, 1999ed: Book IV: 32).
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2001).51 More importantly, they are the ones who give content and meaning to a 
national position. This is what turns them from ‘mouthpiece’ into actual players. 
They are the ones who have to decide whether they want to show commitment to a 
certain position, or quite to the contrary, present it in such a way so that they know 
it will be shot down.52 Also, they have to make sure they are not ‘wearing out’ a 
position.53 Furthermore they have to prove to others that they ‘can play’ with their 
instructions. This means that they do not have to confer back on every single detail, 
but are also capable of influencing their capital. There is thus without a doubt a 
personal element in making plenary interventions:
“We know how to read each other’s interventions and reactions. And because you know your 
colleagues almost by heart, you know when they ‘cheat’. You hear it in their voices. You know 
it when they themselves believe it to be a stupid instruction. And you choose your reaction 
accordingly.”54
The latter part of this insider observation is most relevant here. In a Caucus race, 
the way in which the participants choose to carry out their instructions is considered 
to be of importance, precisely because it determines how others will react to that 
intervention. Rationalist intergovernmental bargaining models exclude this personal 
element. They (consciously) neglect “the varying ability of individual negotiators to 
strike a deal”, because they assume that such differences will cancel each other out 
on average (Bailer & Schneider, 2006: 155). According to this view, the deal that 
national representatives will probably strike is primarily determined by the domestic 
constraints they face, not by what exactly is said and done at the table. Hence, how 
individual negotiators feel about - and position themselves towards - these 
instructions is not that important. The way in which instructions are carried out 
would become important, when we look at Council negotiators as community 
members. The importance lies in the ability to convince others that the solution they 
propose is in fact beneficial to all. However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, 
possibilities for ‘convincing’ others are limited at best. The way in which instructions 
are carried out, becomes even more important when we add a third image of 
Council negotiators, that of self-serving bureau-political actors in an informal social 
exchange game (cf. Hocking, 2005; Kassim & Peters, 2001). This adds a strategic 
dimension to the lower level interactions. This section elaborates on this strategic 
aspect.
51 Author’s interviews, PSC and Working party level, 10-2-2011, 17-5-2011, 23-6-2011.
52 Author’s interviews, Coreper and Working party level, 13-7-2010, 8-12-2010.
53 Author’s interview, Working party level, 11-3-2011.
54 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 8-12-2010.
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What are these bureau-political actors trying to accomplish by joining or leaving the 
race? Council negotiators have twin motivations: to stay relevant as a group and to 
be influential in the group. Negotiators at all Council levels are essentially trying to 
achieve two not necessarily compatible goals. They want: -1- their concerns to be 
taken into account and -2- they want to be able to do deals at their level. To 
understand the contradictory element we need to bear in mind that if the group 
would tend to strive for solutions in which all interests and concerns are taken into 
account – in the Brussels’ jargon succumb to the temptation of building ‘Christmas 
trees’- then this would very much interfere with the effectiveness of the group as a 
whole. So the cooperative element is in ensuring that the group preserves its 
capacity to (re)act, while the competitive element is in getting others to grant priority 
status to your (country’s) concerns. 
The cooperative element of the game: bureaucratic interests and 
organizational essence
What was referred to above as ‘the ability to do deals at your level’ can be 
understood more broadly as a shared interest in safeguarding the relevance of the 
group or organizational sub-unit. This observation leads us right into the heart of 
bureau-political theorizing (cf. Kahn & Lewicki, 2002). Such theorizing does not 
seek to replace existing conceptualizations of political (inter)action, but rather to 
add something to our understanding of these interactions (cf. Allison, 1971; Allison 
& Halperin, 1972). What it seeks to add is the dimension of role-bound behaviour, 
as is expressed most succinctly in Miles’s well known law: ‘Where you stand, 
depends on where you sit’. There has been a tendency to oversimplify this maxim 
into the proposition that organizational positions determine preferences (cf. Stern & 
Verbeek, 1998: 206). But this would turn actors into puppets of their institutional 
environment. In reality, negotiators are intelligent role players who, like actors in the 
theatre, are of course constrained by the role they have to play, but at the same time 
can make use of the latitude it provides (cf. Goffman, 1959; 1969). Role conceptions 
are obviously important in the Council and accordingly it matters whether one 
occupies the Coreper chair (‘desk-clearers’), the PSC chair (‘foreign policy 
directors’), or the Working party chair (‘issue-experts’). None of the delegates have 
to ‘internalize’ or ‘habitualize’ such roles to the extent that they become full-blown 
scripts. But they will try to make sure that their behaviour fits with their role. Because, 
as I have explained in the previous chapter, only behaviour that is considered 
appropriate within the environment, can be effective in that environment.
How is ‘where one stands’ influenced by ‘where one sits’ in the Council? Each 
sub-unit or in this case organizational level shares a perspective of what their 
specific role is within the larger framework of that organization. So a more adequate 
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maxim might be ‘how one frames matters, depends on where one sits’ (cf. Halperin, 
Clapp & Kanter, 2006: 15). Coreper, PSC or Working party members will be inclined 
to judge the issues confronting them in the light of their bureaucratically anchored 
role in contributing to (the success of) the organization. What this role encompasses 
depends on their perspective of the so-called organizational essence: “the view 
held by the dominant group of what its mission and capabilities should be” 
(Halperin, Clapp & Kanter, 2006: 27). Perception of where this essence lies, will 
vary between sub-units. The essence according to Coreper lies in coming up with 
solutions and keeping the process going (by not overloading the ministerial 
agenda). The essence of the PSC is in enhancing the significance of the EU as a 
foreign policy actor; in the popular jargon, turning its ‘presence’ at the world stage 
into ‘actorness’ (cf. Carlsnaes, 2006; Smith, 2003). The essence of the Working 
party level lies with maintaining its expert role, which is reflected in its capacity to 
act autonomously. This means being able to close dossiers at its level instead of 
having a lot of issues going up to the PSC or to Coreper.
The notion of an organizational essence can also tell us something about the 
strategic interplay between these different levels or units. There is an important 
strategic choice to make in deciding at which level an issue is put on the agenda (‘t 
Hart & Rosenthal, 1998: 235; Stern & Verbeek, 1998: 214). All else being equal, 
taking something to Coreper is an attempt to force an issue through, while taking 
something to PSC is an attempt to engage in a (broader) foreign policy debate. 
Letting an issue ‘linger’ at Working party level tells us something about the 
eagerness of participants, and in particular the Presidency, to keep the dossier 
moving. There might be few law-like patterns to observe in this regard. But at least 
we can use these insights to make sense of some of the intra-institutional regularities 
we will observe in the Council. 
Because the Council is considered to be – at least from a bureau-political 
perspective – a successful organization, members will be willing to invest their own 
resources into safeguarding and enhancing its legitimacy (Lieshout, 1995: 161-164). 
This makes them more inclined to act in line with current institutionalized 
configurations and ‘standard operating procedures’, instead of trying to use such 
organizational resources in opportunistic ways (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 161-162). 
Bureau-political theorizing holds that organizations such as the Council are not 
primarily valued for their capacity to find the most effective solutions to the 
collectively encountered problems, but for their capacity to accommodate the 
interests of those who choose to invest their resources in it. After all, such 
investments only make sense if the organization manages to reward them. Those 
who have made such investments will subsequently be looking for returns. This 
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explains why Council negotiators have a shared interest in guarding against 
irrelevance. Whatever goals an individual participant might be trying to achieve, he 
or she will get nowhere if the unit he or she is part of is considered irrelevant. 
National representatives do not (have to) care about the group’s relevance, but 
about getting the most out of it for their country. Community members do not 
necessarily care about the group’s relevance, but about what is best for the 
community as a whole. Bureau-political actors on the other hand, care a lot about 
whether their specific group is considered relevant, because their individual 
standing to a considerable extent depends on the legitimacy of the group they are 
(considered to be) part of (Lieshout, 1995: 154-156). 
To maintain its relevance, a group or sub-unit needs to maintain its capacity to act, 
more specifically, to act within the confines of its institutionalized role. And it is 
precisely to maintain this capacity to act, that networks of social rules, norms and 
procedures have come into being, which guide the interactions in that arena. Such 
norms and procedures have a tendency to take on a life of their own. As we have 
seen in the previous chapter, Council debates are for the larger part ‘procedural 
battles’. They are often about agreeing on the ‘appropriate’ way, the ‘appropriate’ 
time and the ‘appropriate’ format for issues to be dealt with. Indeed, it often looks 
as if Council negotiators spend a great deal of their time freeing themselves from 
the procedural webs that they (or their predecessors) have previously woven. Thus, 
when making their interventions, negotiators are not primarily acting as traders on 
the market, nor as orators at the forum. They are rather acting as barristers in a 
courtroom, pleading the ‘reasonableness’ of a suggested approach. 
This ‘obsession with appropriateness’ has a number of consequences, which are 
directly related to the image of ‘consensual processes and weak outcomes’, as it 
was sketched in the Introduction.55 First of all, it tends to make successful 
organizations rather inflexible when trying to react to sudden changes in their 
environment. Second, it often means that such organizations are slow to learn, and 
therefore not very effective from a ‘problem solving’ perspective. On the more 
positive side, these procedures also guard against any form of escalation that 
could jeopardize the functioning of the unit and thereby the organization as a whole. 
They provide participants with the means for averting or overcoming deadlock. 
Progress might often be slow and processes might appear laborious. But the 
‘standard operating procedures’, hence the term, at least safeguard the unit’s 
operational capabilities. Especially the more senior members of a group will have 
come to terms with the fact that the only way to be effective in such an environment 
55 I will further build on this claim in Chapter 5, where I present three different views on whether and why 
these outcomes are as ‘weak’ as they often appear.
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is by playing by the rules of the game. They do not necessarily have to agree, on a 
subjective level, that these rules or procedures are effective and valid. They do not 
have to feel a ‘responsibility to adhere’. It will often be fear of exposure that induces 
them to act according to the established rules and procedures. “Actors stick to their 
lines not because of the rules as such, but because they are highly concerned 
about their image and esteem in their social environment” (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 197). 
Bureau-political theorizing thus provides us with an alternative – some would say 
rather ‘minimal’ - interpretation of the consensus norm. To refer back to the metaphor 
of the doctors coming together to agree on a cure, a bureaucratic environment 
provides for a more or less binding procedural pathway for agreeing on such a 
cure. Those who have invested in becoming part of this environment have an 
interest in abiding by these rules and procedures. Also, they are induced to judge 
the claims and positions of others, primarily on whether they fit (are ‘legitimate’ 
within) this procedural framework, not on whether they agree with them on the 
substantive level. On a subjective level they might have their doubts. But on the in-
tersubjective level, they have an interest in ‘keeping up appearances’. This is 
because they are aware that it is by means of this mechanism that the group as a 
whole maintains its ability to act.
The competitive element of the game: signalling credible commitment
‘Barristers’ tend to focus most of their attention on stating their own case. Yet, there 
is also a competitive element to the game, which has to do with making sure that 
one’s concerns are taken more seriously than the concerns of others. As I have 
explained, it will often be impossible to make concessions to all on a certain matter. 
So any collective decision will necessarily come to reflect some positions more 
than others.56 The game is thus essentially about prioritizing. Day to day negotiations 
should be understood as a particular kind of ‘signalling games’. Schneider & 
Cederman (1994) use the concept of signalling games to explain the stop and go 
pattern of European integration at large. Their so-called ‘limited information model’ 
is built on observations at the European Council level. The model hinges on “the 
strategic use of uncertainty in international negotiations” (Schneider & Cederman, 
1994: 634). The uncertainty that Schneider and Cederman refer to concerns the 
domestic win-set of actors. However, as I have observed in the previous chapter, in 
day to day negotiations there is not a lot of uncertainty about what the others need 
and want. Because of the club-like characteristics of the arena, negotiators more or 
less know what the others stand to gain or lose on a certain matter. The main thing 
these negotiators are unsure about is the salience that these others currently attach 
56 In this particular study, a decision does not necessarily have to be a (formal) act of the Council, but it can 
also refer to a verbal statement by the Council. 
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to that particular issue (cf. Naurin, 2009: 44).57 It is this salience that determines how 
much member states want something, and how far their delegates are prepared to 
go in order to get it. What negotiators are thus trying to feel out by means of the 
negotiations is the perseverance of their counterparts and their respective capitals.
In the previous chapter, I have characterized the negotiation environment of the 
Council by the high interaction density, the high degree of insulation and the long 
shadow of the future. I have also established that it is because of these institutional 
characteristics that reputational resources (‘social credit’) are of the utmost 
importance. Here I will further elaborate on the mechanism that lies behind this 
observation. In view of the more or less continuous nature of the negotiations, it is 
usually not feasible to check whether all the individual claims of one’s counterparts 
are warranted. This would very much interfere with the effective functioning of the 
group as a whole. Because negotiators cannot check the message, they need to 
base part of their judgment on the messenger (Lieshout, 1995: 154-155). To a 
considerable degree, Council members need to be able to assess their opponents 
claims at face value. When his or her counterpart makes an argumentative 
intervention in the plenary, they need to be able to judge how much weight should 
be attached to it. Players thus have an interest in providing clear and, if necessary 
‘costly’, signals on where they stand on the (for them) important issues. However 
such signals can only work, if the one who is sending them is considered credible. 
To be able to function successfully in an organization such as the Council, an actor 
needs to possess a certain amount of credibility. “The most brilliant reasoning, the 
most impressive arguments, and the best presentation do not help to persuade the 
audience if the proponent has lost her credibility. Conversely, a proponent who is 
regarded as highly credible, is often able to invest comparatively little effort in her 
arguments and still persuade the audience” (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 220). What 
does an actor need in order to be considered credible? First of all, he needs a 
certain amount of ‘effectiveness; which means that others consider him willing and 
able to execute his threats and fulfil his promises (cf. Halperin, 1974: 90-91). There 
is no point in taking serious the claims of someone who has no power or ‘impact’. 
Second, he needs a certain amount of ‘trustworthiness’, instead of a reputation for 
‘manipulating’ or ‘lying’. Third, he needs a certain amount of ‘legitimacy’, which 
refers to a reputation for playing by the rules and norms that are considered to be 
valid in that specific environment.
57 Rationalists would probably refer to this as endogenous salience because it refers to the salience that 
political actors themselves choose to attribute to a specific issue. Exogenous salience refers to ‘hands 
being tied’ most often by the constraints these actors face at the domestic level (cf. Bailer, 2004). 
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What participants are trying to signal in day to day negotiations is credible 
commitment. In the insulated environment of the Council, the only real ‘threat’ 
member states have at their disposal is the threat of taking issues to a higher level. 
Thus, the primary message negotiators are trying to convey to their peers, is their 
(presumed) ability and willingness to take matters higher up. To act - meaning to 
make a plenary intervention - should therefore be seen as an investment. It is a way 
of saying: this issue is of considerable importance to us, and thus we would like to 
see our suggestions taken into account.58 The first thing Council negotiators want 
to ‘convince’ their peers of is that, if needed, their ambassador or minister is willing 
to back them up. In other words: ‘be careful when taking this issue to a higher level’. 
Whether negotiators will indeed be backed up by the higher levels, is something 
that their counterparts do not (yet) know. They might as well be bluffing. Whether 
their ‘signal’ is picked up, depends on whether others, and in particular the 
Presidency, are willing to call that bluff. The competitive element in the game thus 
lies in getting others to incorporate your concerns already at your level, so that there 
is no need for you to take issues higher up.
Argumentative interventions thus primarily serve to signal commitment. Yet, whether 
such a show of commitment is considered credible, to a considerable degree 
depends on the legitimacy of the concerns that are expressed by it. All are aware 
that eventually even a minister might have to explain why his or her requests are 
reasonable. And making a plenary intervention at a higher level naturally 
encompasses a higher investment. Council negotiators will rightly doubt whether a 
minister will be willing to back up a position that does not even survive scrutiny tests 
at the lower levels. Thus what delegates are actually doing at the lower levels is 
trying out specific arguments for their minister. They know their ambassador or 
minister will probably need these very same arguments. This explains why we only 
have to take into account the positions of those who are actively participating in the 
debate. It is in fact highly unlikely that arguments will make their first appearance 
only at the higher levels. The orchestrating of the debates usually begins already in 
the Working parties. And only those taking part in the race at the lower levels, are 
eligible for prizes in an eventual ministerial debate. 
Yet, and here I believe this bureau-political line of reasoning comes full circle, it 
does not necessarily have to come to a debate on the ministerial level. It can either 
be that all your (country’s) concerns are already accommodated at a lower level, or 
that the higher level negotiators refrain from making the necessary investment. This 
all depends on the amount of investment that is needed, which is conditional upon 
58 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 13-7-2010, 27-9-2010. 
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two things: the legitimacy of the concern itself and the credibility of the one who 
shows commitment to it.
The Council debate as a positional game 
If we combine the cooperative and competitive element in Council negotiations we 
are faced with a meta-game which I would characterize as a ‘positional game’. It is 
a game in which all participants strive to be influential but at the same time have an 
interest in preventing too many others from becoming equally influential (cf. Hollis, 
1987; Schelling, 1980). Positional goods are goods that are valued because other 
people do not have too much of them.59 For example, a philatelist will value his 
collection of stamps the more he considers them rare or unique. In Council 
negotiations ‘social credit’ is the most important positional good. The greater the 
actor’s credibility, the more he will be able to persuade others to act in accordance 
with his claims. The ‘behavioural changes’ that a negotiator is trying to bring about 
are actually quite minimal. He merely seeks to achieve acquiescence in the plenary 
debate. The ‘threat’ he can employ to accomplish this, is that of potential higher 
level support. If the position can be substantiated (even in a purely instrumental 
way) with legitimate arguments, such support becomes more likely. But, as I have 
explained, higher level support equals a higher level of investment in terms of social 
credit. There is no guarantee that such support will indeed be forthcoming.
A negotiator, who loses a number of individual signalling games, by seeing his bluff 
called, will also see his position deteriorate in the meta/positional game. The 
corresponding loss in social credit will lead to the others being even more inclined 
to question his (country’s) commitment. They will justly doubt whether this particular 
negotiator will be backed up by the higher levels the next time they play. This will 
subsequently limit this negotiator’s room for manoeuvre in following signalling 
games. He or she will (have to) limit him or herself to stating national positions (‘red 
lines’). Conversely, a winner of signalling games gains in social standing, which 
makes him or her more able to ‘do deals at his level’.60 The kind of dynamics, and 
more importantly outcomes, that such signalling games lead to, are the subject of 
the next section.
59 While I do not agree with the observation that struggles for recognition are necessarily zero sum (I would 
rather argue they are variable sum), Fukuyama is right to note that “status can only be relative” (Fukuyama, 
2012: 41-42). Contests over status are fundamentally different from struggles over economic exchanges. 
Whereas in the latter there can be pure win-win situations, in the former the status or recognition of the 
one can only come at the expense of the other. In a society of saints no one will receive credit for leading 
a saintly life. In fact, no one will even notice.
60 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 8-12-2010.
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2.2  How to conceptualize consensual debates
The previous section has been solely about the participants. I have characterized 
Council negotiators not just as national representatives or community members. 
They are also intelligent role players, who have a bureau-political interest in 
enhancing their position in and as a group. This induces them to engage in 
signalling games, in which the main goal is to get one’s concerns taken into account 
without deteriorating the group capacity for, and autonomy in, dealing with what 
they believe to be the ‘organizational essence’. What they are trying to signal is 
credible commitment to legitimate concerns. This section is about the ensuing 
game play. As I have noted, the participants in the Caucus race in Wonderland are 
running their own races. Yet, by means of their individual interventions, they are 
(perhaps unwittingly) creating a dynamic pattern of interactions. What this pattern 
looks like, is what this study is trying to unveil. 
The consensus making mechanism I shall introduce below, incorporates elements 
from both rationalist as well as constructivist theorizing. It is closely related on the 
one hand to the concept of ‘deliberation light’ as suggested by Neyer (2004: 28-29), 
which is about negotiators adopting a particular reasoning style not to persuade 
other governments to change their position, nor even to convince them of the 
adequacy of one’s own position. What they seek to accomplish is that the institu-
tionally empowered players, in this case the Commission and the (rotating) 
Presidency “join forces with that selfsame position” (Neyer, 2004: 34). Thus, they 
strive to show that what they propose is in fact in line with the collective line of 
approach. On the other hand, it builds on Schimmelfennig’s (2001, 2003) notion of 
rhetorical action, The Caucus race model also pivots around the ‘rhetorical’ instead 
of ‘communicative’ power of words (Schimmelfennig, 2001, 2003; Krebs & Jackson, 
2007). Originally the concept of rhetorical action was defined as “the strategic use 
and exchange of arguments based on ideas shared in the environment of the 
proponents and intended to persuade the audience and the opponents to accept 
the proponents’ claim and act accordingly” (Schimmelfennig, 2003:199, my italics). 
Schimmelfennig linked the notion of rhetorical action to the strategy shaming, 
referring to the public exposure of the illegitimate goals of others. By means of this 
shaming, actors try rhetorically to entrap rather than truly convince each other. 
However, in the ‘accommodative’ environment of the Council one need not even go 
as far as to persuade others. Nor will the direct and deliberate shaming of others be 
considered a rewarding strategy. Instead, rhetorical entrapment comes about via 
an indirect route. Participants are not primarily challenging each other. They are 
positioning themselves vis-à-vis the status quo, as it is reflected in the verbal 
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Conclusions. What they are trying to do in the game is to divert this stream of words 
in a for them favourable direction. It is this essentially non-competitive version of 
rhetorical action that, I believe, best captures the negotiation dynamics in the Council. 
Competitive, non-competitive and pseudo-debates
What has been referred to in the previous Chapter as ‘the double puzzle of Council 
negotiations’ can be specified into two separate but related theoretical claims. With 
regard to the negotiation process, the claim the Caucus race model makes is that 
Council debates are non-competitive. With regard to the negotiation outcomes, the 
claim is that these debates are causally significant. To be able to substantiate these 
claims, I will first clarify what is meant by ‘non-competitive’ debates and ‘causally 
significant’ outcomes. 
Negotiations can be thought of as attempts to influence the course of a decision 
making process, so as to arrive at a (preferred) outcome. Schimmelfennig (2003) 
uses the Toulmin model of argumentation (cf. Toulmin, Rieke & Janik, 1984; Toulmin, 
2003) to demonstrate that the course of specific negotiations depends on how 
participants choose to react on each other’s successive claims. The negotiation 
phase is in essence always a battle between those who want to change and those 
who want to preserve the status quo, meaning the existing line of policy. Those who 
challenge the status quo will do so by opening up a debate in which they will 
present a claim about their preferred change. Opponent(s) can react in four different 
ways. The possibilities are depicted in Figure 2.1:
First, the opponent can simply accept (‘be convinced by’) the claim and thus agree 
to the suggested change of policy, in which case there is consensus without 
debate. More often there will be (some) participants who will want to challenge the 
claim(s) of the proponent(s). Three argumentative strategies then are available. 
They can truly engage themselves with the facts/assessments the proponent uses 
to ground his claims, for example by claiming factual inaccuracy or a biased 
assessment of these ‘facts’. However, an actor will only dare to enter into a debate 
about grounds (a competitive debate) when he is reasonably sure that reasoning 
within this specific frame is not detrimental to his cause. Otherwise he will choose 
the relatively safe route of questioning the warrant or frame in which the proponent 
reasons (a non-competitive debate). This is because on ‘facts’ one can be proven 
wrong, while sticking to ‘a point of view’ means less chance of openly losing an 
argument. In such a non-competitive debate actors refrain from questioning the 
internal consistency (or ‘validity’) and external consistency (or ‘factual accuracy’) of 
each other’s argument. They will instead present an alternative (supposedly more 
legitimate) line of reasoning. The opponents will subsequently present their own 
69
A Caucus race model of negotiations
specific argument to support their own distinctive claim.61 Frames or warrants are 
inextricably linked to procedures (Thomas, 2009: 345-346). After all, suggesting an 
alternative frame of reference (‘what is this a case of’), will usually have consequences 
for the way in which the case is to be handled. In bureau-political theorizing the 
latter are usually referred to as action-channels. “Action-channels structure the 
game by preselecting the major players, determining their usual points of entrance 
into the game, and distributing particular advantages and disadvantages for each 
game” (Allison, 1971: 170). In negotiating games, framing contests are about the 
particular way in which participants prefer to deal with an issue. The goal is of 
course to suggest the for them most promising frame or warrant(s).
Opponents can also avoid engaging with the claim of the proponent without coming 
up with an alternative line of reasoning. Opponents then choose to challenge the 
proponent instead of the claim. In such a pseudo-debate opponents “seek to 
invalidate [an] argument without having to deal with its substance” (Schimmelfennig, 
2003: 209). Most common will be attempts to keep someone out of a debate, by 
claiming that they have nothing at stake in the matter. One could go even further 
61 Simply put, instead of engaging with (trying to refute) arguments ‘A1’ and ‘A2’ that a proponent uses to 
stake his claim, opponents will present their own arguments ‘A3’ and ‘A4’ to stake their own claim. 
Figure 2.1  A schematic view of a debate
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and denigrate or ridicule the proponent. The goal is then to question his or her 
social standing, as an expert, a team player or a neutral. But such open attacks will 
usually be counterproductive, as they already imply that you at least acknowledge 
someone as a party in the debate. Moreover, it does not appear to be a clever 
strategy to use in the recurrent interactions in the Council. A less confrontational 
approach would be to simply disregard what is being said by him or her.
The strategies chosen by the (key) players determine the character of the ensuing 
debate In a competitive debate argumentative interventions are primarily aimed at 
each other. This is in fact what makes such a debate (appear) so confrontational. 
As has become clear in the previous chapter, the essence of a deliberative 
understanding of negotiations, lies in the openness (to engage with the arguments 
presented by others). Of course, we should not infer too much from single instances, 
in which negotiators refrain from engaging with each other’s reasoning. No 
Habermasian would expect the Council to engage in open deliberations at every 
opportunity. That would make the organization highly ineffective. They would expect 
these deliberations to take place, when the situation asks for it. This is particularly 
the case when the decision making becomes non-routine (cf. Checkel, 2003: 213; 
Deitelhoff & Müller, 2005: 172-174; Niemann, 2008: 124-126; Risse, 2000: 7). 
As the imagery of the ‘Melian dialogue’ has clearly shown, rationalist intergovern-
mental bargaining models expect actors to be everything but willing to engage in 
an open debate, especially when matters come to a head. They do not exclude the 
possibility of some deliberations taking place, for example during the pre-negotia-
tions (Naurin, 2009: 47). This is because in this phase arguments are indeed still 
cheap. However, during the actual negotiations leading up to an important decision, 
delegates will not want to rely on their arguments. The ‘verbal exchanges’ that do 
take place at the plenary phase are considered to be mostly symbolic. Rationalist 
models however provide us with little information about how such symbolic or 
pseudo debates would look like.
On the process level the Caucus race model has more in common with rationalist 
than with the constructivist theorizing. This makes it difficult to distinguish between 
a non-competitive and a pseudo-debate. To be able to participate in the Caucus 
race, negotiators have to come up with some arguments. However they do not have 
to engage in an open debate. Member states tend to take each other’s argumentative 
position for granted (at least in the plenary sessions). Rather, actors will try to 
circumvent instead of engage with or simply ignore each other’s claims. Plenary 
interventions are not aimed at each other, but rather at the presiding ‘Dodo’. The 
Presidency then has to decide which arguments it considers to be legitimate and 
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therefore need to be taken into account. A non-competitive debate thus consists of 
a series of individual attempts to get one’s concerns incorporated in the outcome. 
It works as a filter. Concerns that survive the (public) scrutiny tests, will be reflected 
in the outcome. Concerns that are considered inappropriate are filtered out. Where 
competitive debates are ‘won’ by those actors who succeed in refuting the grounds 
of others, non-competitive debates are ‘won’ by those actors who succeed in 
upgrading their warrant or line of reasoning (in)to the collective warrant.
This last observation brings us from the level of processes to the level of outcomes. 
Technically, there are only two possible outcomes. The debate ends in a decision 
to change or to preserve the status quo. When dealing with decision making by 
unanimity this will by definition be a ‘consensus’ decision. What we can try to 
determine is how substantial a consensus the participants were able to reach. 
Since we are dealing with continuous decision making, the output of one debate 
will be the input of the next. The typical outcomes of Council debates are not 
necessarily decisions (to do something), but more often textual ‘Council 
Conclusions’ (to state something). In light of this research I would characterize 
these Conclusions as ‘interim scores’. They are the extensively polished reflection 
of the current level of consensus and thus provide us with important clues on the 
character of the underlying debate (see Table 2.1).
When it comes to characterizing these outcomes, the Caucus race model departs 
from rationalist reasoning. As little as bargaining models actually tell us about the 
debate itself, what is nevertheless clear is that the messenger (proponent/opponent) 
is considered to be far more important than the message (claim). This of course 
significantly reduces the relevance of the debate itself. Outcomes supposedly can 
be predicted by looking at preference and salience patterns. There is only a Veneer 
of Consensus (Goffman, 1959: 9). This ‘consensus’ will primarily reflect the concerns 
of those who have most at stake, and least to gain from it.
1. (‘consensual’) processes 2. (‘weak’) outcomes
Rationalist bargaining  
model
Pseudo-debate Veneer of Consensus
Caucus Race model Non-competitive debate Rhetorical Consensus
Constructivist deliberative 
model
Competitive debate Reasoned Consensus
Table 2.1   Competing conceptualizations of negotiation processes and outcomes
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Constructivist and Caucus race models by contrast both believe that the consensus 
reached is (usually) more substantive, either because it results from reason or else 
from rhetoric. Constructivists provide us with little information about how to 
recognize a reasoned consensus. They often leave us with some highly conditional 
remarks how deliberations can lead to actors changing their preferences (cf. Häge, 
2007b). We can therefore assume that a Reasoned Consensus necessarily stems 
from a competitive debate. It can only come about when (at least some) actors 
become convinced that the arguments of others are more valid. These arguments 
are subsequently allowed to ‘win the day’ (cf. Lewis, 2005: Risse, 2000). A Rhetorical 
Consensus is less ‘deep’. It comes about by means of rhetorical entrapment, when 
participants become bound by the argumentative choices that were made in the 
past. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether participants were 
‘genuinely convinced’ by an argument. Conclusions on whether a Reasoned or a 
Rhetorical consensus was reached will necessarily remain highly tentative.
2.3  How the consensus making mechanism ‘really’ works
In the previous section I have presented three different ways to conceptualize 
(Council) debates. What has become clear is that if we want to be able to distinguish 
between different conceptualizations of Council debates, we need to combine 
process and outcome level observations. This is because rationalist claims mainly 
concern the outcome level, while constructivist claims largely focus on the process 
level. The Caucus race model seeks to account for both. It argues that the only way 
to establish the character of a particular consensus is by looking at the way in which 
this consensus has come about. 
It would of course be best if we were able to observe and then fully reproduce all 
relevant details of one or more presumable exemplary debates. But in the case of 
the Council, we necessarily need to reconstruct most of the debate, with help of the 
monthly Council Conclusions. These Conclusions represent the collective stance 
on an issue or a compilation of issues. To be able to make sense of these 
Conclusions, I first need to introduce two crucial terms: ‘constructive ambiguity’ 
and ‘agreed language’. As I have shown in the Introduction, there are often many 
ways to interpret the same words. Council debates are often nitty-gritty searches 
for acceptable wording. Constructive ambiguity simply refers to the tendency of the 
Council to use indeterminate wording. The way to turn a regular debate into a race 
in which all participants must have prizes, is to make use of this verbal discretion. It 
is in constructive ambiguity that a first consensus is often found.
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As vague as Council statements might often be, these words nevertheless ‘tend to 
stick’. These words after all represent the explicit endorsement of a political 
agreement, as it was reached at a previous point in time. Once the Council has 
adopted a certain wording, it becomes part of the agreed language. On a conceptual 
level agreed language refers to the idea of rhetorical commonplaces, meaning the 
dominant set of rules and norms and the acceptable set of propositions within a 
specific environment (Krebs & Jackson, 2007: 45). The power of political rhetoric 
stems from the fact that actors always have to justify their position, by claiming that 
it is in line with the rhetorical commonplaces that exist in the ‘public’ discourse. 
Even though participants know that a position might not be based on the underlying 
arguments, the rhetoric is not epiphenomenal. This is because without such an 
‘argumentative smokescreen’, the position itself becomes untenable. 
Agreed language refers to the “dominant pattern of generally forwarded justifications” 
(Schwellnus, 2009: 31). What some might consider as agreed language, others 
might view as open for debate. Member states can of course always choose to 
challenge the agreed language. But they are then facing an uphill battle. This 
means they have to be willing to invest more (social) resources in the matter. The 
rhetorical entrapment comes about via an indirect route (Schimmelfennig, 2003). A 
member state whose position is already in line with the agreed language has an 
easier job uploading its concerns into the Community approach. Conversely, a 
member state whose position is out of line with what was jointly agreed to in the 
past, will have to continue making a lot of waves. And because making argumentative 
interventions should be seen as making investments, going against the agreed 
language requires a lot of investing. There is thus always uncertainty about whether 
that member state is willing to continue doing so. If some member states succeed 
in ‘diverting the stream’, others will come to realize that they have ‘become stranded’ 
and they will subsequently try to revert the stream of words back in a favourable 
direction. The participants in the Caucus race, while all engaged in their own 
individual races, do not only bind themselves to the choices they have made in the 
past. They are also collectively (and to a certain extent unintentionally) ‘marking out 
the race-course’ for the others.
‘A Council Conclusions Reader’
The consensus underlying the monthly Council Conclusions is thus built on the 
‘ambiguous’ or ‘agreed’ character of the words. The course of Council negotiations 
is reflected in the evolving patterns in these words. The first claim I have made is 
that Council debates tend to be non-competitive. The crucial difference between 
competitive and non-competitive forms of debate is in the openness that participants 
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show towards the arguments presented by others.62 To distinguish ‘argument-
based deliberations’ from ‘rhetorical exchanges of words’ we need to look at the 
amount of ambiguity in the Conclusions. If actors are willing to engage with instead 
of accommodate differences of opinion, they should be able to do more than cloak 
the differences between them in a veil of words. This of course does not mean we 
would expect a perfectly linear pattern from utter ambiguity to complete agreement. 
But we would expect to see some progressive development in the verbal statements, 
as the participants were working toward a reasoned consensus on that particular 
issue. Progress might be slow and circumstantial, but there should in time be some 
substantive accumulation and/or breakthroughs, which should be observed in the 
language of the Council Conclusions. Excessive and persistent ambiguity points to 
a low quality debate; a debate in which nobody was willing or able to move an inch 
(cf. Steiner et al., 2004). The Council’s verbal statements then merely serve to 
varnish over the irreconcilabilities afterwards. 
The Council Conclusions thus reflect the current state of play in that specific game 
or debate. They are the quicksand on which a specific consensus is built.63 The 
more member states stir, the less solid a foundation it becomes. A lot of constructive 
ambiguity thus refers to a lot of stirring, while a lot of agreed language means that 
not a lot of stirring was going on. This would lead to the following expectations: 
E1: the more member states tend to invest/engage in a debate, the more ambiguous 
subsequent Council Conclusions will become. 
E2: the less member states tend to invest/engage in a debate, the more Council 
Conclusions will reflect the (‘inherited’) agreed language on that issue. 
The second claim I have made is that Council debates ‘matter’ in that they 
significantly affect outcomes. To be able to refute (rationalist) ‘cheap talk’ claims, I 
need to study how verbal statements are related to substantive decisions. The 
‘quicksand argument’ just serves to explain how one specific verbal consensus is 
reached; either by means of constructive ambiguity or by building upon agreed 
language. This makes the model rather static. Assuming that the Council 
Conclusions reflect the status quo on a certain matter, I need to explain how the 
62 To be sure, I am not stating anything about personal dispositions of those negotiating and I am also not 
claiming that competitive debates are entirely impossible in the Council. Instead, I have tried to outline 
the kind of behaviour that is ‘rewarded’ or ‘punished’ by the social environment. Actors do not even have 
to be aware of the constraining and/or enabling effects of their environment. It is (only) in their behaviour 
that scientific proof needs to be sought and found. 
63 Author’s interview, Working party level, 27-7-2010.
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Council moves from one status quo position to a new one. According to the Caucus 
race model, a new status quo results from another (non-routine) debate, in which all 
should have prizes. In the Council there are essentially only two types of prizes: 
statements or decisions. This means that those whose position is least reflected in 
the actual (non)decision, will (have to) be compensated by having their preferred 
wording adopted in the Council Conclusions. Very explicit language thus tends to 
refer to a side-payment to those who lost out in a certain debate.
E3: the less member states have succeeded in moving the decision making process 
in a for them favourable direction, the more their interests/concerns will be reflected 
in the language of the Council Conclusions.
Rationalists might be able to agree to the idea of words as, according to them 
innocent, side payments. Yet, as the Caucus race model implies these words are 
everything but innocent. As the new language of the previous debate, becomes 
(part of) the agreed language of the next debate, yesterday’s ‘losers’ have a 
head-start in the next round. While this will of course not guarantee them the victory, 
it does provide them with a rhetorical instrument they can use to their advantage 
when the time comes. When exactly this happens, depends on when member 
states decide to ‘cash in’ their advantage. 
E4: the more member states have succeeded (by making use of the agreed 
language) in moving the decision making process in a direction favourable to them, 
the less their concerns/interests will be reflected in subsequent Council Conclusions. 
This last expectation is a specification of the known dictum: ‘you cannot have your 
cake and eat it’. In this case it means, either you get the decision you prefer, or else 
you get the language you prefer. In the long run this consensus-making mechanism 
will even the odds and thus make sure that something of a balance is kept. 
2.4   Conclusion: Analytical distinctions and empirically  
disjunct classes
The Caucus race model, as it was presented in this chapter, in essence is a 
fine-grained social exchange system, driven by the reputational concerns of those 
who make argumentative investments (cf. Schneider & Cederman, 1994: 657). 
Those who choose to make such investments, strive for ‘returns’ in terms of either 
statements or decisions. Their dual motivations, to be effective as and in a group, 
induces Council negotiators to be receptive to those concerns that can be ‘easily’ 
76
Chapter 2
incorporated into the collective line of policy. One does not necessarily have to 
agree to a specific concern, as long as it can be considered as legitimate. Yet, at 
the same time, member states are actively trying to shape/change this collective 
policy line so that it fits with their specific interests. And it is in this indirect way that 
entrapment comes about of those who come to find that their concerns are no 
longer in line with the collective approach. All in all, this leads to an ‘invisible hand’ 
kind of causal mechanism in which reciprocity indeed is diffuse and to a certain 
degree even unintentional. 
On a theoretical level, the main claim the Caucus race model tries to make is that 
even though – contrary to the deliberative model – Council debates are essentially 
non-competitive, they are nevertheless – contrary to the rationalist model - causally 
significant. This mechanism is not easy to capture in terms of competing observable 
implications (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 28). Especially since I want to refrain 
from making statements about essentially unobservable phenomena such as 
intentions, dispositions, persuasion and preference change. On an empirical level 
it might be hard to distinguish pseudo from non-competitive debates, since both 
could account for the prevalence of constructive ambiguity. In the Caucus race 
model words are ‘exchanged’, in the rationalist model they are largely ‘decorative’. 
So both could account for the tendency to ‘cloak’ divisions in a veil of words. 
On an empirical level it might also be hard to distinguish between a ‘reasoned’ and 
a ‘rhetorical’ consensus, since both could account for the ‘stickiness’ of words or 
(agreed) language. In the Caucus race model this is because actors find themselves 
‘stranded’ or ‘entrapped’, whereas in the deliberative model it is because actors 
have become ‘convinced’ that these words reflect the consensus in the Council. 
Yet, both can account for the causal significance of the words in themselves.
Yet, this does not mean that we cannot say anything about which of the different 
conceptualizations of Council debates is more plausible. As I have tried to argue, it 
is by looking at the way in which a particular consensus comes about, that we can 
try to distinguish between them. On the process level, we can distinguish between 
the deliberative and the Caucus race model (or competitive and non-competitive 
debates). The amount of ambiguity serves as the main indicator here, referring to 
the (overlapping or diverging) ways in which these words can be read by different 
member states. If I can establish that debates were not competitive, I can at least 
provisionally rule out deliberative models of Council debates. 
On the level of outcomes, we can distinguish the Caucus race model from the 
rationalist intergovernmental bargaining model. There are substantial differences 
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between a veneer of consensus, typified by fixed positions and lowest common 
denominator outcomes, and a rhetorical consensus, originating to a significant 
degree from the results of previous argumentative battles. If I can establish that 
outcomes are not mere reflections of (or trade-offs between) domestically determined 
preference patterns, I can reasonably question the applicability of rationalist models 
to Council debates.
Figure 2.2 depicts the two steps that jointly make up this research. A thick line 
means that there we seem to be dealing with ‘empirically disjunct classes’, whereas 
the dotted line signifies that we appear to be looking at an analytical distinction: 
meaning different ways of looking at the same empirical phenomenon (cf. Holzinger, 
2004: 195). As a direct consequence, when studying the negotiation processes, I 
will position the Caucus race model primarily against the constructivist deliberative 
model, whereas when I deal with the negotiation outcomes, I will juxtapose the 
Caucus race and the rationalist bargaining model. Steps one and two above jointly 
are sufficient to demonstrate the plausibility of the Caucus race model.
Figure 2.2  Analytical distinctions and empirically disjunct classes
Process level
Outcome level Veneer ofConsensus
Pseudo-debate
Rationalist
bargaining model
Rhetorical
Consensus
Non-competitive
debate
Caucus race
model
Reasoned
Consensus
Competitive
debate
Constructivist
deliberative model
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3.   Methodology: how to sneak a peek behind the veil 
of consensus
It takes only a couple of visits to the ‘bargaining bunker’ that is the Justus Lipsius to 
became aware of it. The EU’s Council of Ministers continues to serve as a classic 
example of a black box. To understand what goes on inside it, we still rely heavily 
on “anecdotal evidence” (Naurin & Wallace, 2008: 19). For Council proceedings, 
especially those taking place below the ministerial level, the documentation is 
extremely sparse and moreover not accessible to outsiders. So, with regard to the 
Coreper, PSC and Working party levels, accounts written by actual participants, or 
based on extensive interviewing of these participants, prevail (cf. Bostock, 2002; 
De Zwaan, 1995; Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006; Lewis; 2005, 2010; Sherrington, 
2000; Westlake & Galloway, 2004). Thus, ‘scientific proof’ remains mostly indirect, 
while few have been able to get a clear view of what was actually going on in the 
smoky backrooms of the Justus Lipsius.
There are essentially two ways of dealing with the black box problem. The first 
solution is to limit our analyses to those parts of empirical reality that can be 
observed by all, meaning the (formal) outcomes of Council proceedings. The 
second solution is to get as close as possible to the conference rooms to witness 
the actual process level dynamics. The first solution offers the best possibilities for 
‘systematic testing’, but is necessarily limited in its analysis of the (largely invisible) 
process level. The second solution provides better opportunities for arriving at a 
‘genuine understanding’ of Council proceedings, but offers fewer possibilities for 
assessing the significance of what is (seemingly) going on at the process level.
The limitations that accompany both of these solutions are reflected in the ‘Heisen-
berg-Schneider exchange’ on how to study the Council (Heisenberg, 2008; 
Schneider 2008).64 Schneider on the one hand dismisses ‘artful participatory 
insights’ or ‘privileged empirical experiences’, and suggests we limit ourselves to 
theory driven systemic testing (Schneider, 2008: 278). In other words; we should 
only use means we all have access to and effectively continue scratching the 
surface. Heisenberg on the other hand disqualifies the ever more complex formal 
models, which have led us further and further from policy-relevant observations 
(Heisenberg, 2008: 261). The quest for sophistication and specialization has driven 
rational choice modellers into an ivory tower, impossible to besiege by non-mathe-
maticians. Her claim is that we should speak words we all understand. At first sight 
this appears to be a turf battle. Looking closer, the modelling and the participatory 
64 I explicitly refrain from using the word ‘debate’ because there seems to be very little interaction between 
the two sides.
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approach are far from irreconcilable. In a scientific discipline characterized by re-
interpretations and re-evaluations of the same (limited) number of events, ‘unique’ 
empirical observations are perhaps the most valuable contribution one can still 
make. But this should not lead those ‘insiders’ to refrain from what is in the end our 
mutual goal; making and testing inferences about patterns and regularities 
(presumably) present in the world around us. Those with ‘privileged access’ should 
not indulge in the temptation of providing us merely with thick descriptions. This 
would risk overemphasizing idiosyncrasies and limit the possibilities for assessing 
the weight that should be attached to case-specific explanatory factors. Scientific 
explanations require structured comparison and systematic elimination of the 
factors that can be ‘proven’ to be insignificant (Popper, 1982). And it is in discerning 
what parts of the (inherently more complex) social reality can be left out, that a 
scientist truly shows his mettle. 
In this chapter I will try to build a bridge between ‘anecdotal evidence’ and 
‘systematic observations’. As I have explained in the previous chapter, I believe a 
way forward can be found in linking (particular) process level and (systematic) 
outcome level observations. While there is no denying that trade-offs need to be 
made, I argue that some methodological choices are better than others. In the rest 
of the chapter, I will justify the choices I have made. The first section concerns the 
context of discovery. I will explain how I have tried to acquire an ‘ideal position’ for 
observing and understanding negotiations in the Council. This section is about 
getting into the black box. The second and third section concern the context of 
justification. They are about explaining that which comes out of the black box. But 
these are of course two sides of the same coin, as the ‘understanding’ arrived at in 
the first part will form the basis for the ‘explanatory framework’ developed in the 
latter parts (cf. Hollis & Smith, 1991).
3.1  Methods for data collection: ‘Hard sources, weak evidence’
The methodological design of this study has one overarching objective: to be able 
to sneak a peek behind the veil of consensus as it is presented at (the end of) the 
monthly meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. A quick glance at the Council 
Conclusions on the Western Balkans already drives home the point. In more than a 
decade of more or less continuous negotiations, the Council has failed to reach 
‘consensus’ only on one occasion. This was the March 2005 decision, “in absence 
of common agreement”, to postpone the opening of accession negotiations with 
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Croatia.65 Of course one can sometimes doubt the ‘substantiality’ of this consensus, 
for example when it reads that the Council considers the recognition of Kosovo a 
national instead of an EU matter.66 Or that it agrees to deal with Macedonia during 
the next Presidency.67 Nevertheless, it is hard for outsiders to get a good view of the 
diverging positions that underlie such a consensus. The Council tends to speak 
with one voice even when it is divided. This is part of the code of conduct: Whatever 
fissures might open up inside the Justus Lipsius, “to the outside world let it be 
known that we are all friends of the Balkans here”.68 Thus the best, if not only, way 
for the researcher to find out what lies beneath this general consensus is by 
becoming part of the decision making. 
This study thus builds on the Dodo’s advice to Alice that: “the best way to explain it 
is to do it”. I invite the reader to join me as I try to find out just what kind of race(s) 
Council negotiators appear to be caught up in. As a consequence, the researcher 
as an individual might feature more prominently than is perhaps customary in this 
field of study. The researcher is a historian, a journalist and a political scientist. This 
research tries to combine the best and compensate for the worst of the three 
approaches. Journalists ideally want to report ‘from the barrel of the gun’ (Fisk, 
2006). Participant observation was used as a technique for acquiring an insider-view 
of the dynamics at Working party, PSC, Coreper and the ministerial level. As 
‘assistant’ Balkan coordinator in the Permanent Representation of the Netherlands 
to the EU, I participated in the work of the Council Working Party for the Western 
Balkans (Coweb) during the Spanish and (part of the) Belgian Presidency in 2010. 
Coweb constitutes the ‘clearing house’ for all issues concerning the Balkans. All 
issues are pre-discussed in Coweb. If Coweb fails to reach an agreement on its 
level, issues go to the PSC (when dealing with CFSP-ESDP issues) or to Coreper 
(when dealing with enlargement). In both PSC and Coreper the Coweb delegates 
are present to provide advice to, and do the reporting for, the ambassadors. Open 
issues from PSC and Coreper are taken to the ministers, where again the Coweb 
delegates are present (albeit in the background) to provide expert support and do 
the reporting.
65 2649th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 16-3-2005. Enlargement. Croatia. Council Conclusions. 
See Chapter 7, Section 1.
66 2851st External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 18-2-2008. The agreed language is as follows: ‘The 
Council notes that Member States will decide, in accordance with national practice and international law, 
on their relations with Kosovo’ (my italics). See Chapter 8, Section 3.
67 At this particular point in time Macedonia was looking to enter into member ship negotiations. 2984th 
General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 7-12-2009. Enlargement/Stabilization and Association 
Process. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 32. See Chapter 9, Section 2. 
68 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 25-5-2010, 12-1-2011.
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Getting into the Justus Lipsius is far from easy. Becoming a true insider requires 
years, as well as outstanding (intercultural) networking skills. Being able just to 
sneak a peek inside the meeting rooms already requires significant investments in 
time and effort. So one can justly ask: (why) do we need insider views? Wherein lies 
the added value of such (transient) process-level observations? The answer is that 
I expect that they significantly increase the quality of (the rest of) my data. 
Historical research is about sources and the quality of these sources (cf. 
Trachtenberg, 2006). In discussing the merits and pitfalls of historical research in 
the field of EU studies it is hard to disregard the contributions made by Andrew 
Moravcsik (1998). There have been persistent doubts about Moravcsik’s own 
‘methodological rigour’ (Lieshout, Segers & van der Vleuten, 2004), but here I focus 
on what is preached instead of practised. Moravcsik’s main methodological claim 
is that his interpretation of events should be considered more reliable because of 
the superiority of his method. What is pivotal in this method, is not so much the 
explicit use of competing hypotheses nor the attempt to multiply the number of 
observable implications by including process-level observations. Such measures 
are admirable but not innovative. What is pivotal is the concept of ‘hard primary 
sources’, meaning sources that are less easy to distort or manipulate. “The greater 
the difficulty of manipulating or concealing evidence of what really occurred at the 
time, the more reliable (the ‘harder’) the source in retrospect” (Moravcsik, 1998: 82). 
Moravcsik is right to note that the main difficulty that faces the contemporary 
student of European politics is not a lack of sources. The main risk is to be left with 
nothing but ‘stated positions’, ‘reported behaviour’ or downright ‘spin’. This certainly 
applies to the issue area in question. There is no shortage of observers monitoring 
all the Council says or does concerning the Balkans.69 So keeping track of Council 
decision making in well documented issue areas such as foreign policy and 
enlargement is relatively easy. What is far more difficult is to assess the value of the 
sources on which many of these commentators build. Often we see references to 
‘senior diplomats’ who happened to be in the vicinity of the meeting rooms and are 
willing to shed their light on what was presumably going on in there. More often 
than not, these are not the people ‘whose hands were on the button’. Thus, they are 
already attributing instead of disclosing causes and motivations (Lieshout, Segers 
& van der Vleuten, 2004: 91). Yet, what historians are looking for is direct evidence 
of decision making. Their efforts are aimed at getting close to the actual motivations: 
“the subjective concerns of the policy makers who participated in the decisions” 
(Moravcsik, 1998: 12). Historians believe there is great value in trying to disclose the 
69 For more information on these sources, see Appendix I. 
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down to earth realities that sometimes drive high level political behaviour. Being an 
historian, I will at times provide the reader with historical particularities.70 The reason 
I do this is: ‘Genscher’s wife’. Bookshelves have been written about Germany’s 
‘Alleingang’ of 1991, when it chose to recognize Slovenia and Croatia (cf. Caplan, 
2003; Lucarelli, 2000; Tanner, 2010. However, none of these studies mention the 
fact that Germany’s Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s wife was Croatian. 
Yet, at least according to insiders in Brussels, this was what explained his 
persistence on the matter.71 This (admittedly rather) personal factor does of course 
not refute other explanations of why Germany has shown a tendency to support 
Croatia. Yet, it is an important observation in its own right. So while it is doubtful that 
even the hardest of sources will provide definitive answers to the questions we 
pose, they can shed light on the plausibility of some of the other interpretations. 
To the historian the merits in being able to reconstruct what really happened when 
and how, lies in the reconstruction as such. For one thing, this guards against 
‘teleological self-evidence’ in which the observed outcome comes to be regarded 
as the obvious one. Participatory research can also serve as an antidote to ‘armchair 
theorizing’ where the researcher, as an omniscient observer, sets out to explain the 
logic behind decision making processes, he or she has never been able to witness 
directly.72 Historians are of course not naïve positivists looking for the truth that is 
supposedly ‘out there’. They know that it is the researcher who needs to provide the 
interpretations (cf. Collingwood, 1956). But precisely because there are so many 
possible interpretations that fit the same chain of events, the ‘hardness’ of the 
sources becomes of the utmost importance. What historians want to avoid is 
“forging sweeping conclusions from weak data” (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 
32). Moravcsik provides us with detailed instructions on where hard sources might 
be found. We should look for internal governments reports and contemporary 
records of confidential deliberations amongst key decision-makers (Moravcsik, 
1998: 82). We should try to build on the (corroborated) memories of participants 
who appear to lack an ulterior motive for distortion. And we should opt for lengthy 
interviews with policy makers from different sides, in which the interviewer can 
thoroughly scrutinize ex-post claims of these policy-makers.
70 Although, I will of course distinguish between the systematic and idiosyncratic explanatory elements. 
71 Author’s interview, PSC level, 10-9-2010. The early recognition is often referred to as one of the main 
instigators of the declaration of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which then precipitated the 
outbreak of the third (and most significant) Yugoslav war. See Glenny (2001), Tanner (2010). 
72 One gets the same impression when listening to expert economists reflecting on the current Eurocrisis 
and mocking the ineffectiveness of the political leaders and their inability to come up with ‘that one big 
solution’. In Brussels, there is typically very little room for big solutions.
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Participatory research provides the best means for acquiring all of these sources. 
First and foremost, they allowed me to go beyond ‘stated positions’ and try to find 
out how heavy such considerations actually weighed in the day to day decision 
making. It would hardly make sense to take into account all of the 27 member 
states’ preferences with regard to the Western Balkans,73 and then use these to 
predict ‘efficient’, ‘likely’ or ‘lowest common denominator’ outcomes. All members 
agree that the Balkan countries have a ‘European perspective’ and all acknowledge 
the conditions that have been posed. But at specific moments in time there were 
often only few prepared to open up a political debate on (the European perspective 
of) the Western Balkans. According to the Caucus race model, we only need to take 
into account the views of those who are willing to act upon their preferences.74 Such 
public shows of commitment are needed in order to be considered as part of the 
decision making process and thus influential for the outcome.
In adopting this approach, I go beyond that of other ‘insider-researchers’ (c.f. Lewis, 
2005; 2010; De Zwaan, 1995; Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006), who tend to focus 
on what Council delegates say they do. This also implies going beyond survey data 
and the kind of ‘reported behaviour’ that such surveys typically yield (cf. Naurin, 
2009). For example, one can justly question the added value of directly asking 
political negotiators questions such as: ‘did you aim to convince people?’ It then 
certainly comes as no surprise that practically all respondents consider themselves 
‘reasonable (wo)men using arguments instead of threats and promises in an 
attempt to truly convince each other’ (Naurin, 2009: 46-47, cf. Dür & Mateo, 2010b). 
Instead I want to find out whether what negotiators say (they do), is also what they 
actually do (during the negotiations). I thus aim to use the data from the in-depth 
interviews in an ‘implication analysis’ (Sherrington, 2000: 6). I want to reveal the 
implications of their acts; more specifically to what extent their interventions are 
reflected in the (absence of) specific language of the monthly Council Conclusions.
One qualification is necessary. I have neither the inclination nor the illusion to be 
able to reveal all relevant moves the players made during a debate. This will not be 
possible for the period I was working in Brussels, let alone for the period before 
that. There are obviously few reports on the relevant ‘corridor talks’ and coalition 
73 For one thing, some of the (admittedly smaller) member states are absent during many of the meetings.
74 Taking into account of course that there is a need to act; and that things are not already moving in the 
preferred direction, or that member states were successful in: “limiting the scope of actual decision 
making to “safe” issues” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963: 632). While this can of course be the case from time 
to time, it is highly unlikely that things will be moving in the right direction for a member state all of the 
time. Studying an issue area over a longer period of time thus also allows me to take potential instances 
of “non-decision making” into account.
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building efforts that took place inside and outside the Justus Lipsius. I was not 
invited to most of the ‘bilaterals’, nor was I able to participate in the behind the 
scenes activities of a Presidency.75 Luckily for the scientist the playing field itself 
always remains visible. Whatever the importance of what happens behind the 
curtains, in the end players will have to come out and ‘perform at the plenary’. No 
matter how symbolic these plenary acts might sometimes be, it is always the place 
where informal deals have to be turned into formal Conclusions and Decisions. And 
it is here that reservations have to be made ‘public’. So by tracing the plenary 
debates, we will get a good view of what the major bones of contention were, even 
if the actual battles were sometimes fought out elsewhere. 
Participant observations were crucial for two other reasons. First, they provided me 
with access to virtually all of the reports of the Balkan meetings at the Coweb, PSC, 
Coreper as well as the ministerial level held since 2003. These were reports drawn 
up by successive Balkan coordinators in the Dutch Permanent Representation. 
One should not confuse these with the minutes of the meetings, as they are 
(presumably) drawn up by the Council secretariat. The Permrep’s reports are meant 
for internal coordination and serve to summarize and characterize the key issues for 
debate during a specific meeting. While there might perhaps be an inclination for 
the delegate to ‘overstress’ his or her own contribution, these reports usually 
provide an accurate description of the interventions made by others. The delegates 
have no interest in deliberately distorting these positions, because that would mean 
misinforming their capitals. These are moreover sources not specifically designed 
for outside observers and thus less prone to manipulation. In short, I think it is fair 
to consider them hard sources. 
The other reason that participant observations were important is that they provided 
me with access to the ones whose hands were actually on or at least near the 
button. Here the historian becomes an embedded journalist. By becoming a Dutch 
delegate, without distorting my true intentions as a researcher, I managed to gain 
the confidence and trust of the delegates from other member states. I deliberately 
aimed for an approach which minimized the degree to which my presence led to 
disturbances in the field. I wanted to induce Council negotiators to ‘act naturally’. 
This was of course not a big issue in the plenary sessions. But it did become of 
importance during the informal background conversations and corridor talks. This 
made them more inclined to reveal to me their ‘true’ intentions and motivations and 
how these translated into the negotiation behaviour of the member state in question. 
75 Although I was fortunate enough to be able to witness part of the Belgian Presidency; a country with 
which the Netherlands are traditionally ‘in close coordination’, not in the least with regard to the issue area 
of the Western Balkans.
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Moreover, by means of snowball sampling, these delegates helped me to get in 
touch with those people within their national delegation who had extensively dealt 
with Balkan decision making in the past. My findings are also based on in-depth 
interviews with key players in the EU’s Balkan negotiations. Seventy-five interviews 
were held with participants of Council decision making on the domestic, Working 
party, PSC, Coreper and the ministerial level, Commission officials (Directors or 
Heads of Unit and members of the Commissioner’s Cabinet), and officials working 
within the Council Secretariat (Western Balkan Unit, Foreign Policy Unit). In order to 
increase the chances of arriving at valuable insights, most interviews were framed 
as ‘informal background conversations’. This induced respondents to speak their 
mind freely, instead of providing me with official positions. I used semi-structured 
interviews. Reports were drawn up of these conversations and the participants 
were given the opportunity to provide comments or suggest amendments. These 
reports are available to all who are willing to respect the confidentially agreements.76 
Throughout this study when using interview data, I will usually refrain from sharing 
personal information and instead refer only to the Council or Commission level at 
which the respondent was involved in the decision making. Appendix I contains a 
list of the people I have interviewed, classified by country or institution. It provides 
the reader with the means to assess whether this ‘strategic sample’ may be 
considered an adequate reflection of the ‘population’ of EU Balkan-negotiators it is 
supposed to represent.
There are obvious downsides to this approach. Embedded journalists have been 
criticized for becoming part of the propaganda machinery of the institution in which 
they were embedded. While I doubt whether such criticism applies here, I believe it 
is up to the reader to judge whether my participation has affected my capacity to 
come to an independent assessment. A more significant problem lies with the 
limited extent to which my data collection is replicable (King, Keohane & Verba, 
1994: 26). This is a necessary and deliberate trade-off. I have focussed on 
enhancing the internal validity of my data. Politicians as well as high level civil 
servants are trained and skilled in selling you their message, their version of what 
happened, their interpretation of events. What they say in official statements and 
on-the-record interviews is often of limited value for anyone who wants to catch a 
glimpse of what was really going on (cf. Risse, 2000). The ‘art’ in political interviewing 
76 Access to the reports of the interviews can be obtained by sending a direct request to the author. A con-
fidentiality agreement will have to be signed, in line with the provisions of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The insider reports are not available to outsiders, in view of the thirty year restriction rule. For the 
same reason, my field notes, made during the participant observations can also not be shared with the 
general public. They should for all accounts and purposes be considered as part of the Dutch Foreign 
Ministry’s internal documentation and thus need to be treated as such. See also Appendix I.
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is making it clear to the respondents that they are talking to more or less an insider. 
Someone who has spoken to many of their counterparts and thus already has a 
pretty good view of what happened. Of course this does not keep some from (at 
least initially) trying to sell you spin. But at least one is able to react more adequately 
to such attempts, mainly by making it clear that there is no point in as well as no 
need to put up a show. This is why I believe this approach has led to qualitatively 
better interviews.
There are other trade-offs that needed to be made. Most refer to the familiar 
shortcomings that accompany this type of qualitative research, for example with 
regard to the ‘negative degree of freedom’ problem (cf. Landman, 2003). ‘Width’ to 
some extent is sacrificed to ‘depth’. The amount of cases on which data were 
gathered is necessarily limited. As other qualitative researchers, I tend to attribute 
a considerable amount of explanatory leverage to specific cases. And in its claim 
to reveal the ‘essence’ of Council negotiations, this study is perhaps less modest 
than it should be. Underlying this perhaps unwarranted generalization, if nothing 
else, is the “reasonable expectation of similar [social] mechanisms operating in 
similar contexts” (Bengtsson & Hertting, 2012: 7).
There is no denying these shortcomings. Internal reports, insider observations and 
(partly) confidential interviews do not by themselves constitute scientific proof. 
They are certainly not ‘soft sources’. They are still ‘weak evidence’. However, I 
believe the strength of this research design lies in the specific combination of 
sources. The key is in what I would call a stepwise triangulation. First, I have used 
participant observations to develop a better a feel for what goes on inside the 
conference rooms of the Justus Lipsius. Second, I have employed this ‘increased 
understanding’ to make sense of what is singled out in the insider reports. Third, I 
have used these insider reports to frame the content of the interviews and evaluate 
the claims made by those who were involved in the decision making at the time. 
And fourth, I have confronted my interview data with the publicly available evidence 
(in particular the Council Conclusions). This final step has served to find out which 
claims and interpretations should be considered more or less plausible (Moravcsik, 
1998). By means of this stepwise triangulation I hope to have been able to travel 
from ‘hearsay’ to ‘social scientific evidence’ (George & Bennet, 2005: 90).
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3.2   Research design: From insider views to social science 
evidence 
In the previous chapter I have suggested a two-step approach for studying Council 
negotiations. Such an approach is necessary so as to be able to distinguish between 
different theoretical perspectives (see Figure 3.1). Step one would be to determine 
that Council proceedings are essentially non-competitive. Which means, they are 
not, what constructivists consider to be, deliberations. Step two would be to determine 
that they are nevertheless causally significant. In short, this is not, what rationalists 
call, cheap talk. 
There are also methodological reasons for opting for a two step approach. So far 
Council negotiations have primarily been studied by means of single case studies, 
which served to establish the occurrence of specific behavioural patterns (Bailer, 
2010: 751; Dür & Mateo, 2010: 684-685; Tallberg, 2010: 644). Such studies focus on 
the process level. They typically approach Council negotiations as distinct and 
isolated negotiation rounds. Thus, what we have are ‘snap shot views’ or 
‘proto-typical recollections’ of what Council negotiations tend to be like. Yet, if we 
want to be able to determine causal leverage, such isolated observations will not 
suffice. Noting the presence of certain negotiation styles, leaves us at best with 
“descriptive evidence” (Schimmelfennig, 203: 228). Some might say that up until 
now research into reasoning styles has been dealing mostly with conventions 
(Axelrod: 1986: 1107-1108). People usually abide by conventions but there is no 
direct payoff or penalty involved for (not) living up to them. Thus, to be able to 
counter claims of inconsequentiality, we need to be able to look beyond singular 
negotiation rounds and assess long term developments.
Figure 3.1  The two step approach for studying Council negotiations
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Consensus
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Consensus
Non-competitive
debate
Competitive
debateStep I
Step II
Rationalist
bargaining model
Caucus race
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Constructivist
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For methodological reasons, we cannot limit our attention to the outcome level 
either. What is unfortunate about some of the prevailing ‘tests’ of whether and to 
what extent decision outcomes in the Council are due to compliance with a 
consensus norm or in line with what rationalist models would predict, is that 
evidence is often inconclusive and can be interpreted in both ways (cf. Warntjen, 
2008: 673-675). We cannot simply look at an outcome and determine of what ‘kind’ 
it is. The significance of specific statements or decisions usually only becomes 
apparent over time. It thus again makes more sense to study Council negotiations 
as a series of interconnected negotiation rounds. This also allows us to study issue 
areas instead of just single issues, Only then will we be able to distinguish between 
‘particular’ and ‘structural’ elements in our explanations. 
In the previous chapter I have presented a way to monitor and trace Council 
negotiations with help of the monthly Conclusions. This ‘reader’ helps us to infer 
behavioural choices during the negotiations from statements that follow from these 
negotiations. Yet, it would go too far to assume that we can get to the ‘essence’ of 
Council negotiations, simply by assessing the amount of ambiguity and accumulation 
in these Conclusions. It would be more appropriate to state that, if we observe a 
specific pattern, we can use that as a starting point for further analysis of that 
specific debate. This is after all primarily a study about the how of Council debates. 
It does not merely seek to establish that a specific type of (non-competitive) debate 
has taken place, with a specific type of (rhetorical) consensus as a result. I want to 
find out what such processes look like. In short, this study seeks to determine what 
causal mechanism is driving such debates (cf. Beach & Pedersen, 2012).
This research project is thus essentially a ‘preliminary study on a relatively untested 
theory and a new set of hypotheses to determine whether further development and 
testing of this framework is warranted’ (George & Bennet, 2004: 75). In other words, 
it constitutes a plausibility probe. A new theory derives its plausibility less from 
‘correlational confirmation’ and more from its ability to reconstruct the processes 
the theory is trying to account for.77 The researcher is not (yet) looking for refutations. 
He rather wants to determine the scope and applicability of his embryonic theoretical 
viewpoint. This has nothing to do with a false sense of modesty or a deliberate 
attempt to lower the standards of inference. Rather it constitutes an honest attempt 
to see what this new theoretical framework is capable of in comparison to its 
established competitors. After all, the theory itself is still taking shape. 
77 It is important to note that ‘accuracy’ does not refer to whether a theory manages to arrive at a ‘realistic 
description’ of the empirical regularities it is trying to explain. Every theory is an ‘as-if theory’, and every 
description of the (social) reality is an approximation of that reality. Yet, what we can assess is whether 
this approximation is more able to account for the patterns and regularities observed.
90
Chapter 3
My Caucus race model is essentially built on a hunch, derived from existing 
literature, participant observations and insider assessments. But the latter two tend 
to be time- and context-bound. The question is thus whether we are dealing with 
case-specific anomalies or a broader social phenomenon. To be able to assess 
this, we need to extend the model and delineate the processes and mechanisms 
by which this model is provided with traction. This allows us to increase the number 
of observable implications of the theory, which is a necessary condition for further 
testing (cf. King, Keohane & Verba, 1994). This is what supposedly separates the 
historical method from a social scientific approach: the latter’s aspiration ‘to 
transcend the uniqueness of the case(s) studied, so as to arrive at analytical 
patterns and across-case regularities’ (cf. George & Bennett, 2004: 225). However, 
this does not refer to a difference in method. It refers to a differences in willingness 
to trade off empirical richness and refinement for levels of abstraction. Historians 
and social scientists are ‘tracing’ similar patterns, within or across similar cases. 
They are engaged in the same ‘counterfactual analysis’. It is just that social scientists 
tend to be far more explicit (historians might say ‘bound to templates’) in justifying 
the approach chosen to study particular empirical phenomena. 
In the remainder of this chapter I will provide a template that should allow us to 
break open the black box of decision making and arrive at general insights about 
prototypical negotiation processes. The method used is closely related to what 
George and Bennett call ‘structured focussed comparison’ (George & Bennet, 
2004: 67-72). This essentially comes down to combining within-case and cross-case 
analyses. The analyses are ‘structured’ in that all cases are analyzed with the same 
guiding questions in mind. The analyses are ‘focused’ in that attention is only 
directed to particular (pre-defined) aspects of the historical cases. The Council 
negotiations with regard to the (European perspective of the) Western Balkans will 
be subdivided into a number of different cases or ‘games’. The empirical part of this 
study consists of an in-depth historical reconstruction of fourteen different games.78 
Some of these games concern the region as a whole, and are therefore referred to 
as ‘Balkan games’. Others are only about specific countries, and are subsequently 
referred to as ‘Serbia’ or ‘Croatia’ games. As mentioned in the Introduction, a game 
starts when the Council has to depart from its ‘standard operating procedures’ for 
dealing with the Balkans, because of the reservations expressed by one or more 
member states. This forces the Council as a whole to engage in a non-routine 
debate about the feasibility of that particular act or decision. A game does not 
necessarily have to end in a clear decision to change the Council’s policy line. It is 
just as likely for debates to fizzle out. A game can consist of a number of different 
78 See Appendix III for an overview of the relevant games and rounds in the meta-debate on the Balkans. 
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negotiation rounds. But the unit of analysis is the game as a whole.79 These games 
jointly make up the Council’s meta-debate on the Balkans. However, we can only 
say something about the characteristics of this meta-debate, by first tracing process 
level dynamics within specific games and then making comparisons between the 
different games. 
The cases I analyze and compare are all of the same type.80 Since I study decision 
making within one particular issue area, it seems reasonable to assume that we are 
dealing with cases that are largely similar. Researchers opting for a so-called ‘most 
similar design’ are ideally looking for cases that resemble each other in every 
respect but one. This would allow them to point to that one particular aspect that is 
different, as the ‘cause’ for the (difference in) outcome (cf. Landman, 2003: 30; 
Gerring, 2007: 131-139). Such a level of control over the (selection of) cases is never 
achieved in practice. It moreover assumes that we already have a clear cut 
theoretical framework, which allows us to delineate the crucial and discard the 
irrelevant features (‘key variables’) for each and every case. 
The added value of a within-case analysis lies in finding out what actually are the 
more and less relevant features of a conceptual framework.81 It is the within case 
analyses, rather than the cross case comparisons, which enable further development 
of a theoretical framework. To the extent that process tracing is indeed a distinct 
method, it serves to refine our theoretical propositions (cf. Gerring, 2007: 185). To 
be sure, we still need to depart from these propositions in order to be able to make 
sense of what we observe within a specific case. George and Bennett seem to 
assume that by means of meticulous process tracing we will ‘hit upon’ the causal 
mechanisms, which are supposedly out there waiting to be found (George & 
Bennett, 2004: 127-149).82 I believe that even the most micro-level mechanisms are 
‘postulated entities’. And we definitely need to postulate them, if we want to be able 
to descend the (meta)theoretical ladder and make sense of actual debates. As I 
have tried to argue, when it comes to understanding negotiation styles and 
strategies, it is hard to depart from general insights.83 Most speech acts only 
acquire meaning within a specific setting. It makes no sense to provide the reader 
79 I will further elaborate on the demarcation of these different games in Chapter 5, Section 3. 
80 This refers to Type I of the four research designs proposed by George & Bennett (2004: 252). 
81 This refers to what Popper termed the ‘searchlight theory of knowledge’ in which our theory allows us to 
focus (fix our searchlight) on those parts of (social) reality we consider essential (Popper, 2004: 127-128).
82 In others words, they seem to assume that causal mechanisms are entities that are ‘real’ on an ontological 
level (cf. Lieshout, 2007: 18-21). 
83 See Chapter 1, Section 2. One cannot sensibly compare negotiation styles on a locutionary or illocutionary 
level, for example by claiming that ‘demands’ (always) equal bargaining and ‘suggestions’ equal arguing. 
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with a list of all the ‘agreed language’, or come up with something resembling an 
‘ambiguity index’.84 The significance of speech acts can only be grasped within the 
context of the case (cf. Holzinger, 2004: 205). This again does not mean that we 
should enter our search for causally relevant factors ‘with an open mind’.85 It does 
however mean that we should not try to define and circumscribe those features too 
strictly. Instead of presenting clear-cut lists of dimensions and indicators, I will try to 
provide for ‘feelers’ or ‘empirical antennas’, which should help us recognize different 
types of debates.
3.3   Operationalization: On measuring ‘openness’ and 
‘substantiality’ 
What should we observe in order to be able to conclude that a non-competitive 
debate is taking place? How would we be able to recognize a rhetorical consensus 
when we see one? In this section I will try to reason through the competing observable 
implications of my alternative view of (Council) negotiations.86 Researchers who try 
to introduce a new perspective on a social phenomenon, in this case negotiation 
dynamics, always have to walk a tightrope between conceptual redundancy and 
conceptual overstretch. A new conceptualization has to be sufficiently distinct so as 
to be worthy of recognition, yet at the same time sufficiently comprehensive to be 
able to account for a variety of different manifestations of that phenomenon.87 
I believe the distinctive implications of my Caucus race model can be subsumed 
under four categories:
1. The players and their positions
2. The game play
84 I refer here to the ‘discourse quality index’ that Steiner et al. (2004) present to measure the extent of 
deliberations taking place. 
85 Something which is by definition impossible to do, seeing that we cannot leave behind our intellectual 
baggage and simply start to observe (Popper, 1999: 6). Instead we need to be explicit about the 
conjectures with which we enter the field. 
86 What complicates this search is that we are faced on the one hand with an abundance of bargaining 
models (cf. Thomson et al., 2006) and a wide variety of factors they distinguish as potentially important. 
On the other hand, I would say there is a shortage of empirically applicable deliberative models. 
Constructivism is slow in its descent from the (meta)theoretical ladder and there are few who have 
attempted to turn their alternative conceptualizations into empirical indicators (cf. Moravcsik, 1999; 
Checkel, 2006). Thus I have to rely quite heavily on the few who have tried to do so (cf. Lewis, 2005; 2008, 
Niemann, 2006; Risse, 2000; 2010). When operationalizing my Caucus race model and  the alternative 
models, I might necessarily be moving away from what (some) rationalists and constructivists themselves 
might claim their viewpoints are.
87 A ‘conceptualization’, ‘metaphor’ or ‘typology’ that can only account for one or few specific cases is of 
limited use to those scientists who are looking for patterns or regularities in our (social) environment.
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3. The result(s) of the game (in terms of language and/or decisions)
4. The success (winners and losers) in the game. 
The first two categories concern the process level. They are about who plays, when, 
why and above all, how. The third and fourth category are about what comes out of 
the games. They focus on the results at the collective as well the individual level. 
Ad 1. The players and their positions.
As I have explained in the previous chapter, existing conceptualizations tend to look 
at Council negotiators either as national representatives or as community members. 
The Caucus race model adds the image of Council negotiators as bureau-political 
actors. This has important implications in terms of access to and participation in a 
debate. What the Caucus race model shares with rationalist models is that one 
needs to have something at stake in order to join the debate. Council negotiations 
are essentially debates between ‘the usual suspects’, those who have traditional or 
long-standing claims with regard to an issue or an issue area (cf. Scharpf, 1994: 
37-41). Rationalist and Caucus race models both pivot around the idea of picking 
your battles. In the (rationalist) limited information model of Schneider and 
Cederman (1994), on which I focus much of my attention here, battles are essentially 
picked for the ministers. Whether one participates depends on the domestic 
constraints one faces. Being able to sell something at home is what matters most. 
This is what I would consider as exogenous salience as it is about ‘hands being 
tied’ by national parliaments, press or public.88 
The Caucus race model does not seek to refute but merely to complement this 
reasoning. Here, battles are picked in the proper sense of the word. The decision to 
join the race is to a certain extent at the discretion of the individual negotiator(s). 
They are the ones who have to decide whether they can and will use the Council 
debate to show commitment to an issue, or else their willingness to acquiesce.89 
But those who decide to invest in a certain matter, will experience ‘lock in’. Due to 
reputational concerns, getting out of a debate is more difficult, even when there 
might no longer be domestic reasons to continue participating. This I would 
consider as endogenous salience, as it is not merely about the domestic salience 
of the issue, but also about (the credibility of) the commitment shown. 
The difference between endogenous and exogenous salience is rather subtle. The 
88 Endogenous factors consist of attributes of negotiators and the setting in which the negotiations take 
place (Bailer, 2004: 100). These are factors that can (more or less easily) be changed during the 
interaction. 
89 As explained in the previous chapter, if negotiators choose to remain silent that can be interpreted as a 
signal to the others of their limited commitment to the matter. This is to be able to transfer the message 
to their capital that something will or will not fly. Author’s interview, Working party level, 13-7-2010.
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difference between the Caucus race and the deliberative model is empirically 
discernible. In a competitive debate access and participation are based not on 
what one has at stake but by what one can contribute, for example in terms of 
issue-specific expertise or problem solving capacity. Member states, even those 
with nothing to gain or lose, are thus allowed to hop on and off in a debate. An 
indicator for such behaviour would be when a member state chooses to engage in 
a debate it could have (easily) avoided (Risse, 2000: 19). A competitive debate 
implies mutual recognition (arguably the best indicator for openness) as free and 
equal participants in the debate (Steiner et al., 2004: 57-58). 
The concept of ‘lock in’ already tells us something about the positionality in a 
Caucus race. In terms of positionality the Caucus race model again has much in 
common with most rationalist intergovernmental bargaining models. The latter 
speaks of bargaining, the former of arguing from fixed positions.90 Rationalist views 
on positions can be summarized in a straightforward way: “the most accurate 
prediction of actors’ final positions is that actors will maintain their initial positions” 
(Arregui, Stokman & Thomson, 2004: 64). This does not imply that member states 
do not move at all during the debate. What is typical in a ‘ritual dance’ is that all 
participants end up more or less in the same position as where they started. What 
varies in the Caucus race is not so much the position itself but the vocality with 
which a participant defends this position. Generally, the aim is to ‘follow the dodo’, 
meaning the institutionally empowered Presidency. If this dodo has a position that 
is far removed from what their country would prefer, negotiators will choose to wait 
for better times (cf. Bostock, 2002: 232). If such better times come, their vocality will 
again increase. In a Caucus race positions tend to become more and less 
prominent, even though the positions themselves do not change. 
In terms of positionality there is again a more substantial difference between the 
Caucus race and the deliberative model. The notion of deliberation is indissolubly 
linked to the concept of persuasion. Positionality in a competitive debate should 
therefore be more fluid, precisely because (some) member states allow themselves 
to be persuaded to change a position. This does not automatically imply a ‘deep’ 
change in convictions. Persuasion can also be quite superficial, for example 
because a member state considers its position as no longer tenable. What matters 
is that member states are willing to give up certain positions because of what has 
happened during the debate.
Also in terms of coalitions the implications of the Caucus race model are hard to 
90 See Chapter 1, Section 2.
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distinguish from those of most rationalist models. This is of course not surprising, 
as stable positions already imply stable coalitions (Sullivan & Selck, 2007: 1156). 
Both assume that in Council debates coalition patterns are well known and not 
likely to change. What matters most in bargaining models is the overall size of the 
coalition; in terms of the number of member states as well as their individual 
weight.91 In day to day negotiations, member states are thus mostly involved in 
‘simple arithmetic’ and what matters most is their ability to harness as much support 
as possible. The Caucus race model again seeks to add something to this 
reasoning. ‘Varying vocality’ means that the composition of coalitions might not 
change much, but their vigilance and resolve might vary over time. And this 
vigilance matters because it signals the commitment behind it. As has already 
been mentioned in the previous chapter, who decides to make an argumentative 
intervention in support of whom, is the most important unknown in day to day 
negotiations. In this sense unexpected support is far more influential than anticipated 
support, even if that support comes from one of the bigger member states.92 Of 
course, bigger coalitions lead to more member states cheering specific 
interventions, which can in turn affect the mood in the rest of the room. But on the 
other hand, it is highly doubtful whether the almost institutionalized interventions of 
‘like-minded’ member states really contribute to one’s cause.93 This means we 
cannot look only at the size of the coalition, particularly if we want to be able to 
explain the ‘when’ in Council decision making. We also need to take into account 
how active this coalition is, particularly at pivotal moments in the game.
Differences between the Caucus race and the deliberative model again are more 
substantial. If the debate that took place was a competitive one, coalition formation 
should be driven by issue-specific considerations instead of longstanding alliances. 
This would lead to varying coalitions. Competitive debates could also lead to 
situations in which coalition size matters less than the soundness of the position 
that such a coalition represents. A ‘smoking gun’ type indicator of such a debate 
would be a disproportionate impact of the weak(er) coalition (Risse & Kleine, 2010: 
712; cf. Van Evera, 1997). 
91 ‘Weight’ or ‘size’ is usually measured either in economic (GDP) instead of military terms, or in the number 
of votes a member state has under QMV. What matters most in the Caucus race, is not the resources a 
member state has at its disposal but his willingness to invest in the issue area.
92 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 8-12-2010.
93 Constant support, in this issue area for instance from the Cypriot for the Greek side, will most probably 
render it meaningless to the other members of the audience.
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Ad 2. The game play.
Seeing that this is a study about negotiation dynamics, more interesting than 
determining who is competing, is how they are competing. On the level of game 
play the Caucus race model again has a lot in common with rationalist intergovern-
mental bargaining models. For a while, scholars used to refer to the rationalist-
constructivist divide in terms of different logics of social action and interaction (cf. 
Fearon & Wendt, 2002; Risse, 2000; Zürn & Checkel, 2005). They tended to build 
on March and Olson’s dichotomy between acting according to a logic of 
consequence or according to a logic of appropriateness (March & Olson, 1989). 
Someone acting according to a logic of consequence was merely looking for the 
most effective way to link expected outcomes to initial preferences. His actions 
were based on an instrumental rationality, meaning that actions are only valued as 
means to accomplish certain (pre-given) ends. Someone acting according to a 
logic of appropriateness was presumably guided by the rules, values and norms of 
the (institutional) environment in which he was interacting. Instead of linking 
preferences to outcomes, he tried, through reasoning by analogy and metaphor, to 
link rules and roles to situations. Acting appropriately meant answering the question; 
‘what does a person such as I do in a situation such as this’ (cf. March & Olson, 
1989).
Implications of Pseudo  
debate
Non-competitive 
debate
Competitive  
debate
Players
(conceptualization)
National 
representatives
Bureau-political 
actors
Experts, community 
members
Access to and 
participation in the 
debate (who plays)
Limited access 
(have something at 
stake)
Limited access, 
lock in (as a 
result of previous 
investments)
Open access 
(Mutual recognition)
Positions
(driver or 
brakemen)
Fixed positions 
(determined 
by domestic 
constraints)
‘Sticky’ positions 
(also determined by 
commitment shown)
Fluid positions 
(determined by 
issue-specific 
assessments)
Coalitions
(who supports 
whom)
Stable coalitions 
(‘blocks’) 
Size of coalition 
matters most
Stable composition, 
but ‘varying vocality’
Vocality of coalition 
matters more than 
size
Fluid composition of 
coalitions 
Composition of 
coalition matters 
most
Table 3.1   The players and their positions
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Successive ‘bridge building’ attempts have however revealed that this divide was 
not nearly as deep as it was often depicted. First of all, what it means to act 
appropriately continues to be a matter for debate. Up until this day, it is very much 
unclear whether March and Olson were talking about perspectives (alternative 
ways of looking at the same behaviour), theoretical propositions (which can be 
tested), or ideal types (according to which actual behaviour can be assessed) (cf. 
Goldmann, 2005). More importantly, it appears reasonable to assume that in a 
community environment, rational(ist) actors will also feel the need to act appropriately. 
They might not necessarily be acting according to: “internalized prescriptions of 
what is socially defined as normal, true, right, or good, without, or in spite of 
calculations of consequences and expected utility” (March & Olson, 2006: 670). 
Perhaps they are just using such rules and norms in an instrumental way. These 
rules and norms then serve as focal points in situations for which actors find it 
difficult to calculate upfront the most efficient way of linking preferences to outcomes 
(Schelling, 1980; Schimmelfennig, 2003). But the (empirically observable) behaviour 
of these actors would be more or less the same. 
I believe that if we leave out all suppositions concerning (instrumental) motivations 
and (internalized) dispositions, we can reduce the difference between a conse-
quentialist and an appropriateness logic to being outcome or process-oriented. 
Some actors attach a lot of value to sticking to the rules and procedures and will try 
to induce others to do the same. Others focus more on the consequences of 
collective actions and less on whether they fit with the standard operating 
procedures.94 March and Olson seem to claim something similar when they admit 
that rules over time come to be considered as appropriate “because they work well 
and provide for better solutions than their alternatives” (March & Olson, 2006: 697). 
Thus, a lot of reasoning behind an actor abiding by institutionalized rules and 
procedures is that these help him to arrive at (for him) better outcomes. Contrary to 
March and Olson, I therefore suggest that rules of appropriateness can and should 
be subsumed under the logic of consequentialism as “the result of higher-level or 
prior utility calculations” (March & Olson, 2006: 703). Rule based action then 
becomes a form of individual satisficing (Simon, 1995). 
It seems that when it comes to different logics of action, we are indeed talking 
about an analytical distinction. It makes sense to link rationalist bargaining to con-
sequentialism, Caucus races to (the instrumental form of) appropriateness. But 
even with access to detailed verbal transcripts of the debates, it remains a distinction 
that is difficult to identify. However, the differences between the Caucus race and 
94 We will come across a relevant example of such a difference in orientation in the Council debates about 
supporting the democratic opposition in Serbia and the effectiveness of this support: Chapter 8, Section 2. 
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the deliberative (‘logic of Arguing’95) model are again more pronounced, even if as 
evidence we have only the extensively polished results of the debates (meaning the 
Council Conclusions). The degree of ambiguity in the Conclusions serves as the 
key indicator here.
Differences become more concrete when we start to descend the ‘ladder of abstraction’ 
from logics to styles of reasoning (Sartori, 1970). Bargaining is inextricably linked to 
the concept of compromise. Bargaining is traditionally equated with ‘threats and 
promises’, but one can assume that in a ‘monasterial’ environment such (open) 
threats and (direct) promises are rare. They will at the very least be cloaked in the 
guise of arguments. But what is key is that actors are behaving as if they are at the 
market place. Consensuses are reached because actors either trade issues or else 
group issues in such a way that all parties to the deal get something out of it. The 
collective result can then be disaggregated into member specific (side) payments. 
However, and this is a crucial observation, if there is little to trade, the deal-making 
will be seriously impaired.
Trading plays a pivotal role in the Caucus race model too, be it in a more diffuse 
way. Here language is ‘exchanged’ for decisions. But the participants are far too 
absorbed in their own race to be considered as merchants at the market. When it 
comes to the type of negotiations, they are as barristers pleading their own case. 
What they are thereby also doing, albeit it in an indirect way, is showing the 
illegitimacy of the (contrasting) claims of others; thereby trying to procure their 
acquiescence for the remainder of the debate. In terms of negotiation strategies 
prototypical behaviour in a Caucus race would be to apply salami tactics. Nothing 
is exchanged and nobody gets persuaded. But rather the decision is cut up in so 
many different slices, that it becomes easier to digest for those who are opposed 
to it. It is also far more difficult to expect something in return. Both salami tactics on 
the one hand, and logrolling linkages and side payments on the other hand, would 
result in Council Conclusions that are ambiguous. In the latter case this is because 
many side deals need to be integrated into one statement. In the former it is because 
the statement needs to be acceptable for those who actually want the decision as 
well as those who have to swallow it. 
When it comes to distinguishing a Caucus race from a deliberative debate, I believe 
the competing observable implications have been sufficiently elaborated in the 
previous chapter. When actors ‘deliberate’ they are trying to figure out how to react 
to the uncertain, problematic or unprecedented situation they are facing (Risse, 
95 See Chapter 1, Section 2 about the conceptual confusion surrounding Risse’s (2000) ‘logic of arguing’. 
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2000: 6-7). They will be looking (often beyond the status quo) for ‘innovative ideas 
and creative solutions’ (Bailer: 2004: 116). Expert groups look for solutions that are 
seen as ‘technically optimal’ (cf. Elgström & Jönsson, 2000: 697-700). And a true 
‘expertocracy’ would reveal itself in a willingness to let the outcome be determined 
by that dialogue. 
In a competitive debate, the winning argument(s) or solution(s) should more or less 
unequivocally be reflected in the Council Conclusions. One important qualification 
needs to be made to avoid setting up a straw man. Few Habermasians will dub 
communicative action powerful enough to convince experts with diametrically 
opposed views. As Checkel admits “Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be 
effective when the persuadee has few prior, ingrained ideas that are inconsistent 
with the persuader’s message” (Checkel, 2003: 213). Thus arguments can only 
convince the undecided members of the audience. Negotiation success in a 
competitive debate means that line of reasoning is taken over by other members of 
the audience (inducing them to change position/coalitions). In a Caucus race 
arguments are utterances of (credible) commitment. Participants are trying to 
induce the Presidency in particular to take their views into account.96 As for all the 
others, they should merely stop with their plenary interventions.
96 Of course, formally speaking participants are always addressing the Presidency (and sometimes the 
Commission), but this is not what is meant here. I try to determine which other participants, member 
states are actually trying to influence by means of their plenary interventions. 
Implications of Pseudo  
debate
Non-competitive 
debate
Competitive  
debate
Logic of decision 
making
Logic of 
Consequence
Logic of 
Appropriateness
Logic of Arguing/
Deliberation
Type of 
negotiations
Resembling those at 
the Market place
Resembling those in 
a Courtroom
Resembling those at 
a Forum
Style of reasoning Bargaining 
(can be distributive 
as well as 
integrative)
Rhetorical action
(making legitimate 
claims, making 
claims appear 
legitimate)
Expert deliberations 
(aimed at convincing 
undecided members 
of the audience)
Negotiation 
strategies
Threatening (with 
constraints), trading, 
linking, grouping
Salami-tactics
Procuring plenary 
acquiescence 
Relying on the 
force of the better 
argument
Table 3.2   The game play
100
Chapter 3
Ad 3. The result(s) of the game.
If we just look at the players and the game play it would be difficult to distinguish my 
Caucus race model from (most) intergovernmental bargaining models. We could 
only refute deliberative conceptualizations of Council debates. However when 
trying to account for the results of Council debates, the Caucus race model has far 
more in common with deliberative models and far less with rationalist models. I 
believe the distinction between a rhetorical and a reasoned consensus is an 
analytical one. Whether participants feel they ‘genuinely agree’ with or ‘became 
entrapped’ in a statement or decision, can only be assessed by ‘measuring levels 
of sincerity’.97 But if we want to arrive at empirically discernible distinctions, we need 
to limit our analysis to the behavioural level. This means that on the level of 
outcomes, I will primarily juxtapose the Caucus race and the rationalist intergovern-
mental bargaining models. 
What primarily needs to be assessed is the substantiality of the consensus reached. 
Much has been said already about the lowest common denominator around which 
rationalist conceptualizations converge. Outcomes are determined by the 
exogenously determined domestic constraints actors face. In the more ‘bread and 
butter’ type of negotiations it might be feasible to predict and even calculate where 
this LCD outcome will lie. When it comes to decision making in the issue areas of 
foreign policy and enlargement, one could reasonably assume that the ‘lowest’ 
outcome would be simply to do nothing. Those with the smallest domestic win-set 
determine the content of the bargain (Schneider & Cederman, 1994). To be able to 
determine what this comes down to in the Balkan pre-accession game, I first need 
to expound on the set-up of that game.98 But the general idea is that in the consensus 
reached, it should be possible to recognize the domestic constraints that the least 
willing were facing. 
The Caucus race model, as well as the deliberative model, expects the Council to 
be able to transcend the lowest common denominator. Risse & Kleine (2010: 712) 
provide us with some potentially useful indicators for such an endogenously arrived 
at consensus: for example when actors give the same reasons for reaching an 
agreement and the same reading of that agreement, or when the agreement is 
(seen as) surprising in light of the underlying preference patterns. When talking 
about the reading of agreements, we need to be aware that what we are looking at 
97 Much of the aforementioned socialization debate seemed to hinge on the idea that, by employing the 
correct methodological tools, we would be able to discern sincere from strategic dispositions. However, 
it has by now become clear that sincerity, or in Habermasian terms ‘truthfulness’ is one of those essentially 
elusive concepts. (cf. Deitelhoff & Müller, 2005; Steiner et al., 2004). 
98 See Chapter 4, Section 1 and Chapter 5. 
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are hindsight legitimizations for, instead of real causes of that agreement (cf. 
Schwellnus, 2009; Sjursen, 2002). Nevertheless, these legitimizations can be 
insightful. I add what I would consider the most important indicator: that participants 
attach the same significance to that agreement. Even if the consensus is merely 
rhetorical instead of reasoned, participants will be inclined to pay lip service to the 
general line of the agreement. But they will be tempted to downgrade the 
unfavourable and overstress the favourable aspects of that result. This can be done 
by means of attaching different significances. In rationalist models – bear in mind 
the metaphor of merchants at the market place – participants will be far more 
sensitive to gaps in pay offs. Rationalist bargaining models would not expect actors 
to invest a lot of effort in trying to Europeanize an agreement. They will rather 
account for it in terms of domestic feasibility (especially when addressing a 
domestic audiences). In short, legitimizations will be in terms of ‘what is good for 
us’. This could mean they do provide different reasons for reaching an agreement 
and different readings of that agreement. They could even start making competitive 
claims (‘we won’) about the deal. Although the latter could again be interpreted as 
‘smoking gun evidence’ of a Veneer of Consensus (Van Evera, 1997).99
Ad 4. The success (winners and losers) in the game.
What determines negotiation success in a Caucus race? Again the model has more 
in common with deliberative than with rationalist models, as it assumes that endogenous 
factors – more specifically the words uttered at the negotiation tables in the Justus 
Lipsius – (co)determine success. This is not what rationalists would normally expect. 
99 ‘Smoking gun’ evidence is the kind of evidence that, when found, counts as very strong proof. But when 
it is not found, this does not automatically mean that the conceptualization is invalid. 
Implications of Veneer of 
Consensus
Rhetorical 
Consensus
Reasoned 
Consensus
Substantiality  
(of the Consensus)
Lowest Common 
Denominator
Ambiguity
Entrapment
Agreement 
Readings of the 
agreement
Different reasons 
for reaching an 
agreement
Different reading of 
that agreement
Paying lip service 
to (the line of) the 
agreement
Different 
significances 
attached to that 
agreement
Same reasons 
for reaching an 
agreement
Same reading of that 
agreement
Same significance 
attached to that 
agreement
Table 3.3   The results
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Rationalist intergovernmental bargaining models assume that whether a member 
state is successful depends on its domestic constraints. As long as the constraints 
are there, there would be no reason for a member state to consider giving in. As the 
ritual dance image already implied, participants can endlessly refer to the same 
domestic constraints. Such constraints are exogenous factors and thus hard if not 
impossible to change during the negotiations. Outcomes are thus in a sense 
predetermined. Therefore I equate them with ‘cheap talk claims’ because what 
unites them is the presupposition that what exactly happens at the negotiation 
tables is considered of less importance. 
In a Caucus race, as well as in a deliberative debate, this logic does not hold. In a 
Caucus race, this is because of reputational concerns. Those who continuously 
find themselves in a blocking position face an uphill battle. Such a de facto veto is 
a costly position and there is always uncertainty about whether negotiators, 
particularly at the higher levels, will be willing to keep investing in it. Thus as 
argumentative resources, domestic constraints can be ‘cashed in’ or ‘worn out’. In 
the Caucus race, negotiation success depends largely on the ability to influence 
the Presidency to take one’s views into account. One can also try to do this indirectly, 
by first trying to ‘feed’ the Commission with viewpoints and information, so that the 
Commission will incorporate them and start defending a view that is largely similar. 
In a deliberative debate one tries to influence not only, or not particularly, the 
Presidency and the Commission but rather the audience in general. Negotiation 
success depends on whether one manages to convince any of the other (undecided) 
members. This difference with regard to whom argumentative interventions are 
aimed at, is of course extremely difficult to discern. How substantial the audience’s 
mood shift was, and whether they just chose to acquiesce or actually adjusted their 
position, will often be impossible to determine. However, the extent to which 
negotiation success is exogenously or endogenously determined is something we 
can observe, by looking at the Council Conclusions. If Conclusions vary, even 
though the underlying domestic constraints have remained constant, an 
endogenous effect can be established.
Arguably the most interesting question in any game is who wins and who loses. 
This is again a matter on which I can elaborate only after I have explained the char-
acteristics of this particular (Balkan pre-accession) game.100 But the general idea is 
that day to day negotiations are incessant attempts to enhance or reduce the 
momentum in a decision making process. There are constant battles to keep issues 
on or off the table. The limited information model is built on the supposition that, in 
100 I will further elaborate on this criterion in Chapter 5.
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these battles, status quo positions (brakemen) are structurally favoured. Moving 
away from the status quo requires disproportionate investments. Deliberative 
theories of interaction would expect the opposite. Drivers have a structural 
advantage. According to them there is something of a ‘neo-functionalist logic’ at 
work in the normative environment of the Justus Lipsius, that is best exemplified by 
the norm of ‘coming up with solutions and keeping the process going’ (cf. Lewis, 
2005; Niemann, 2006). In a Caucus race neither side is structurally favoured. 
Winners and losers are decided by the tyranny of small argumentative battles to 
keep issues on or off the table.101
3.4  Conclusion: Circumstantial evidence?
The matter of how to study the Council will probably keep EU scholars occupied for 
a long time to come. The quest to arrive at both ‘hard sources’ and ‘strong evidence’ 
continues to be a challenging one. I have presented a methodological approach 
that seeks to combine inside knowledge with ‘verifiability’. Admittedly, bridging the 
gap between participatory insights and systematic observations, as I have tried to 
do in this chapter, requires a considerable number of steps. 
101 Referring to the concept of ‘the tyranny of small decisions’ as introduced by Alfred E. Kahn (1966). 
Implications of Veneer of  
Consensus
Rhetorical  
Consensus
Reasoned  
Consensus
Negotiation 
success
Depends on (ability  
to affect) domestic 
win-sets
Can be considered as 
exogenous and thus 
relatively constant
Depends on (ability  
to affect) assessments 
of Presidency (perhaps 
indirectly through the 
Commission)
Can be considered as 
endogenous and thus 
varying
Depends on (ability 
to affect) positions of 
(undecided) members 
of the group
Can be considered as 
endogenous and thus 
varying
Winners  
& Losers
Brakemen advantage
Status quo positions 
structurally favoured
(The paradox of 
weakness)
No structural 
advantage for either 
drivers or brakemen
(The tyranny of small 
argumentative battles)
Drivers advantage
The default option is 
to proceed (The neo-
functionalist logic)
Table 3.4   The success
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To enhance the quality of my analysis, I have travelled from participant observations, 
to the study of internal reports, to the in-depth interviewing of key participants. The 
perceptions I have gathered from these (hard) sources, have been used to assess 
the publicly available evidence; particularly the monthly Council Conclusions. In the 
previous chapter I have elaborated on what these Conclusions could tell us about 
the type of debate. Yet, this study is not only, or not even primarily, about confirming 
certain and disconfirming other theoretical models. The Council Conclusions 
Reader, as it was developed in the previous chapter, serves as the starting point 
rather than the tailpiece of the analysis. The absence or occurrence of certain 
patterns in these Conclusions merely points out certain characteristics of the 
underlying debate(s). If anything, the Caucus race model should allow a better 
understanding of these debates. In the last section, I have tried to provide a 
(preliminary) overview of the competing observable implications of this model, 
compared to the rationalist and the constructivist ones.
Instead of an exhaustive list of mutually exclusive dimensions and indicators, I have 
only provided an indicative overview of potential implications. Those looking for 
smoking gun evidence will perhaps be disappointed. What we are left with is 
‘circumstantial evidence’; evidence moreover that we cannot expect to find for all 
cases invoked. Circumstantial evidence usually does not hold up in court.102 But a 
sufficient amount of such evidence can make a certain interpretation of events 
more plausible. What I hope to render plausible, by means of the subsequent 
reconstruction of ten years of Council negotiations on the Western Balkans, is that 
my alternative understanding of negotiations warrants further development. 
Particularly if we want to be able to account not just for the ‘what’, but also for the 
‘when’ and the ‘how’ in Council decision making. 
102 After reading through the empirical part of this study, some ‘judges’ might still say that member states 
were engaged in ordinary bargaining. Others might say that this is what they would consider deliberative 
behaviour. I do not seek to convince these judges that my conceptualization is the only right one. But 
what I do hope to establish ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, is that current conceptualizations of bargaining 
and deliberation need to be significantly adapted, if they want to be able to account for Council 
negotiations.
Part II  Weak outcomes?
The European perspective of the Western Balkans

107
 ‘The double bluff’. Member state preferences and Macmillian events
4.   “The double bluff”: Member state preferences and 
Macmillian events
In 2004 Stefan Lehne, Director of the Council Secretariat’s Directorate for external 
and politico-military affairs, and ‘right hand’ of Solana in the Balkans, stated that: 
“the prospect of membership can easily turn into an empty rhetorical exercise; into 
a ‘double bluff’ in which the EU pretends to offer membership, while the countries 
of the region pretend to implement reforms” (Lehne, 2004: 122). While actually 
meant as a warning to the member states to remain credible in their promises 
towards the Western Balkans, it appears to have become somewhat of an icon 
image of the actual process. The stop and go pattern, which according to Schneider 
and Cederman (1994) underlies European integration in general, certainly applies 
to the EU integration of the Western Balkans (cf. Blockmans, 2007; Gallagher, 2005; 
Gori, 2008; Pond, 2006; Noutcheva, 2009; Schwarz, 2010). In ten years of continuous 
negotiations about the ‘European perspective’ of the Western Balkans, only Croatia 
has been able to make substantial progress. The ‘yellow brick road’ to the Emerald 
City of Brussels has been littered with obstacles, leading to general feelings of 
frustration on both sides of the table. 
The ‘double bluff’ assumes two things. First of all, that the countries of the region 
are not really willing or able to fulfil the necessary conditionalities. Second, that the 
countries of the EU are not really committed to integrating the Balkans into Europe. 
It is not hard to find circumstantial evidence to back up both these claims. Some 
see the stop and go pattern mostly as a reflection of the state of affairs in the Balkan 
states. Croatia was for a long time unwilling (or unable) to apprehend General Ante 
Gotovina, just as Serbia (until recently) did not appear too eager to track down 
Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. The political elites of the three ethnicities in 
Bosnia have never committed themselves to creating a viable multi ethnic state, so 
that the Commission would finally have an autonomous entity to negotiate with. 
There have been doubts about the ‘good neighbourliness’ of Macedonia, as well as 
its willingness to implement the reforms, it signed up to in the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement (OFA). And the Kosovo authorities have always been more interested in 
getting the EU to recognize its ‘status’ (as an independent country), than in 
improving its ‘standards’ as a viable (proto-)state.
But lacking or lagging reforms in the region can only account for so much. Even in 
recent years, Croatia has not been ‘fully cooperating’ with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). But still the country has been able to 
finalize its membership negotiations. Things have not been moving in Bosnia ever 
since the Dayton Agreement of November 1995. Nevertheless, at specific points in 
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time, Bosnia was allowed to take steps towards Europe. At times, relations with 
Serbia were strained because of Karadzic and Mladic, while at other times they 
were allowed to develop. And Macedonia in fact made its greatest advance towards 
Europe in a time of crisis. So while there might (at times) be a significant amount of 
‘bluffing’ going on in specific Balkan countries (cf. Gori, 2010: 149; Noutcheva, 
2009: 1075; Schimmelfennig, 2008: 928), how such (non)developments in the field 
affect decision making dynamics in Brussels is still very much an open question.
It thus seems reasonable to assume that if we want to explain the stop and go 
character, we need to shift our focus to the Brussels’ part in the bluff. Again, there 
is no shortage of circumstantial evidence. The EU appears to be a rather 
uncommitted - some would even say reluctant - supporter of the Balkan enlargement. 
There are those who argue that the European perspective was primarily given out 
of a feeling of ‘responsibility’ or guilt over the EU’s absence and lacking effectiveness 
during the Yugoslav wars of the Nineties (cf. Gallagher, 2005; Gori, 2008).103 As 
these feelings ebbed away, and geo-political interest shifted, so did the EU’s 
commitment. This would explain the wavering enthusiasm for truly taking on board 
the Balkans. However, one would engage in circular reasoning if one were to explain 
the absence of tangible results as proof that there was a lack of commitment to 
begin with. It is hard to maintain that the Council is not really interested in the 
Balkans, in view of all the time, resources and effort is has put in its ‘backyard’. 
Throughout the entire decade, the Balkans have featured prominently at the majority 
of Council meetings. In fact, insiders find it hard to recall a meeting at which the 
Balkans were not on the agenda. So, while one could criticize its decisiveness and 
effectiveness with respect to the Balkans, the EU has definitely shown commitment.
‘Clientism’ - or member states cheering on their favourites - has often been alluded 
to as the determining factor in explaining the varying speed with which Balkan 
states have moved towards Europe. For example, it is well known that Croatia has 
always been able to build on the warm support of Germany and Austria, whereas 
Serbia had to face the staunch opposition of the Netherlands. Macedonia has been 
struggling to overcome the opposition by Greece, while Bosnia could make use of 
its ‘special status’ as the main victim of the Yugoslav wars. But again, clientism can 
only explain so much. Support from (key) member states can of course be an 
important contributing factor. But such support has remained fairly stable 
throughout the decade and therefore cannot account for specific outcomes. 
Croatia’s positive, Macedonia’s mixed and Serbia’s negative record cannot simply 
be attributed to (or blamed on) Germany, Austria, Greece and the Netherlands 
103 Author’s interview, Working party level, 11-3-2011. About the international community, the EU and the 
Balkans during the Nineties see also Bideleux & Jeffries (2007), Glenny (2001), Silber & Little (1996). 
109
 ‘The double bluff’. Member state preferences and Macmillian events
respectively. These were the countries in the argumentative trenches. From a 
negotiation perspective, the more interesting question would be why, when and 
how other member states have chosen to join or confront those in the trenches. If 
we want to be able explain the specific pattern of decisions, instead of just the 
general differences in speed, we need to understand the varying willingness to pick 
a battle over the Balkans.
The remainder of this chapter prepares the ground for this. I will first present the (key) 
players, their (general) preferences and positions. In the second part I present the ‘race 
course’ or rather the five race courses on which member states need to operate in the 
Council. In the next chapter I explain the rules of this specific (‘Balkan pre-accession’) 
game and how these rules and norms influence the game play. Here I will further 
address the issue of ‘winners and losers’, which was briefly touched upon in the 
previous chapter. The question was whether the procedural set up of the game favours 
certain types of players over others. Part II as a whole sets out to reveal the logic behind 
the Council’s argumentative encounters on the Balkans. Put more simply, it serves to 
introduce the machinery that produces these ‘weak outcomes’. 
4.1  Players, preferences and (fixed?) positions
The ‘Balkan pre-accession game’ is a fairly straightforward one. The consensus on 
the Western Balkans is basically as it has always been; that the countries have a 
‘European perspective’ provided they fulfil the necessary conditionalities (cf. 
Bechev, 2006). This is a consensus which has been reconfirmed in numerous 
Council Conclusions, Summits and Declarations, ever since the European Council 
Summit in Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000.104 Some feel that the EU is merely (re)
stating the obvious. From a geographic perspective it would be difficult to argue 
against this region as being part of Europe.105 And indeed preference heterogeneity 
appears to be rather limited. Discussions are mainly about the exact pace with 
which (specific) Balkan countries are allowed to move. The main thing member 
states disagree about is the self-evident character of (the different steps in) the 
process. And here “different emphases often mean different substances”.106 
104 See for example, the 3060th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 14 December 2010, Council 
Conclusions on Enlargement/Stabilization and Association Process. Western Balkans. The statement at 
the Feira European Summit in June 2000 was subsequently formalized in the “The Declaration of the 
Zagreb Summit” European Council 24-11-2000. See Chapter 6, Section 1.
105 Author’s interview, Working party level, 4-8-2010.
106 Author’s interview, Working party level, 25-5-2010. On the EU’s application of the conditionality principle 
see Blockmans (2007: 214-307) and Trauner (2009a, b). 
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It is not really feasible to make a distinction between those member states who 
favour and those who are against the EU rapprochement of the Western Balkans. 
Naturally, speaking in terms of varying degrees of commitment offends the 
negotiators in the Justus Lipsius. Those who want to slow things down refuse to be 
seen as ‘obstructers’. Those who want to quicken the pace, claim they do not intend 
to go ‘soft on conditionalities’. Yet, there appear to be only two underlying 
dimensions in the Balkan pre-accession game: the weight a member state attaches 
to a tangible European perspective and how strict it wants to be on (specific) 
conditions. One can visualize this by means of a simple scatter plot reflecting a 
member state’s ‘commitment to the European perspective’ and its ‘adherence to 
strict conditionality’. If we were to base our assessments on official positions and 
stated behaviour, most member states would position themselves in the upper-right 
quadrant. This represents the rhetorical commonplace of the ‘strict but fair 
approach’ to which all pay lip service. In reality this is a rather unfeasible position. 
To induce the Balkan countries to make the necessary reforms a balance must be 
found between the incentives offered and the conditions that have to be fulfilled 
(Blockmans, 2007: 281-282; Gori, 2010: 149; Trauner, 2009a: 786-787).107 Strict 
demands to fulfil certain conditions equals slowing down the integration process. 
Requests to speed up the EU integration means that one has to be willing to 
overlook the fact that certain conditions have not (yet) been fulfilled. Thus positioning 
is more likely to resemble that depicted in Figure 4.1. Those who stress the fulfilment 
of conditionalities find themselves in the lower right quadrant, whereas those who 
want to offer tangible incentives are in the upper left quadrant. The ‘undecided’ 
members of the audience can be found near the centre of the plot (not displayed).
I will further expound on the structure of the pre-accession trajectory in the next 
chapter. But one could compare it to a (slow and winding) river which eventually 
leads to Brussels. At different locations along this river, member states can try to 
build dams or diversions, if they want to slow down the process. Others can try to 
create rapids and shortcuts, if they want to speed up the process.108 Both drivers 
and brakemen do this by politicizing specific steps in the pre-accession trajectory. 
In other words, they open up a debate about the feasibility of certain steps. Whether 
such attempts to create rapids or dams are successful depends on what happens 
107 This is a lesson brought home by the traumatizing experiences of the nineties, when the EU found itself 
a concerned but ineffective bystander to three Yugoslav wars. The only effective tool the EU has in 
influencing events in the Balkans is in fact the membership incentive. Thus, in all its crisis management, 
aid, reconstruction and state building exercises, and in all bilateral political and economic relations 
established with the Balkan countries, the European perspective has always held centre stage. It remains 
the underlying rationale of the EU’s approach towards the Western Balkans (cf. Blockmans, 2007, 
Schwarz, 2010; Smith, Crowe & Peterson, 2006). 
108 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 7-7-2010.
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during the debate. There are essentially only two positions: driver or brakeman 
(cf. Schimmelfennig, 2003).109 This does not preclude member states changing 
their position from brakeman to driver or the other way around, even during the 
debate. It only means that a member state cannot credibly act both as a driver 
(stressing tangible incentives) and as a brakeman (calling for strict conditionality) at 
the same time.
Of course there are some who, because of political, economic or cultural ties to 
the region, or simply because they are a neighbouring country, have an interest in 
becoming either a driver or a brakeman. They are after all the ones who have most to 
gain or lose from the Balkan pre-accession game.110 But there are also others who, 
109 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 4-8-2010. Some would say there is an obvious third position, which is 
to be indifferent and thus willing to let things run their natural course. But that would mean that the 
member state in question is not willing to invest in the debate. Being indifferent thus comes down to not 
taking part in the Caucus race and thus amounts to not taking a position at all. 
110 Bearing in mind that in a pseudo and in a non-competitive debate such interests matter a lot. To be 
allowed to participate one needs to have something at stake. In competitive debate interests are neither 
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for participating.
Figure 4.1  Positionality in the Balkan pre-accession game
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at a specific points in time, decided to become an active player. The ensuing overview 
serves to introduce these players as well as their motives for joining the race.111
Germany: German positioning in the Balkan pre-accession game is driven by two 
countervailing considerations; the political argument in favour of enlargement and 
the institutional argument against enlargement.112 The political argument refers to 
the EU’s responsibility towards the region. Germany was very much affected by the 
Yugoslav wars and the Kosovo crisis, mainly in terms of refugees. It was at the 
forefront of the early initiatives, most notably the Stability Pact, to stabilize the 
region. The institutional argument is about ensuring that the EU as a whole, and the 
Council in particular, can continue to function properly. The general feeling in 
Germany is that the EU is reaching its limits in its capacity to absorb new members, 
but also with regard to what German citizens are willing to accept. The Lisbon 
structures are considered too fragile to cope with another enlargement round. 
Adding six (or more) players from splintered Balkan states will not improve the 
Council’s capacity to reach decisions.113 And because further Treaty-reforms are 
considered unlikely, Germany has every reason to present itself as a “careful 
supporter of enlargement”.114
In debates Germany tends to stress the costs of further enlargement, subtly 
reminding the others that it is one of the net contributors in this regard and that it will 
most probably bear the brunt in terms of migration. However, Germany is very 
much aware that such socio-economic realities collide with earlier political 
commitments. “We cannot ask them to do all these reforms and then say we do not 
want them anymore.”115 Germany has managed to unite (or veil) these countervailing 
pressures by propagating a step by step approach. In plenary debates Germany 
can be seen telling others to avoid hasty decisions or shortcuts. At times it positions 
itself close to the European Commission in urging for a ‘technical’ approach. Yet, 
Germany does have its own political interests, which can interfere. There is the 
persistent impression of Germany being a friend of Croatia.116 A politically even 
111 While some might consider the following overview too general, I believe it adequately captures the 
amount of information Council negotiators usually have with regard to each other’s positions.
112 Author’s interviews, Coreper level, 4-8-2010, Wilhelm Schönfelder, German Coreper Ambassador 
(1999-2007), 10-2-2011. On Germany’s EU coordination see Regelsberger (2005).
113 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 4-8-2010. 
114 Author’s interview, Working party level, 13-10-2010.
115 Author’s interview, Wilhelm Schönfelder, German Coreper Ambassador (1999-2007), 10-2-2011.
116 Author’s interview, Working party level, 4-8-2010. 
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more delicate issue is the German involvement – at the political as well as military 
level – in Kosovo (cf. Hacke, 2004: 468-475).117 
By chance, the Kosovo status issue became manifest during the German Presidency 
of 2007. Germany features less prominently in debates about Bosnia or Macedonia. 
But it is generally of the opinion that the EU cannot incorporate countries that have 
outstanding inter- or intra-territorial disputes. Privately, German negotiators might be 
inclined to mention that the ‘yellow brick road’ does not necessarily have to lead to 
membership.118 Other means are sought, such as partnerships or visa-liberalization, to 
provide the incentive. Publically, it will above all stress that reforms are the prerequisite, 
in the Balkans as well as in Brussels. Because of these countervailing pressures 
Germany can usually be located in the lower-right quadrant but still near the centre of 
the scatter-plot. It is one of the ‘pivotal’ or ‘critical’ players in Balkan debates.119
France: It is safe to say that the Western Balkans is not a key priority for France. 
France of course considers itself a global player and consequently has an interest 
in what is going on in the region. However, “France has less of a legacy in the 
Balkans and thus feels less of an historical obligation to continue stabilizing the 
region.”120 It is also not a country with strong bilateral interests or relations, although 
it is considered to be a friend of Serbia. Yet, on the political level this does not 
appear to be a salient issue. With regard to issues of foreign policy France’s main 
concern is with the Mediterranean. When dealing with enlargement the focus is 
very much on Turkey.121 French newspapers tend to write about Turkey instead of 
the Balkans. To the extent that there is domestic debate about the Balkans, it is 
about whether these countries are sufficiently prepared, especially in the areas of 
justice, liberty and security. Problems of organized crime, trafficking and refugees 
are what worries France. The French are not afraid to be isolated on issues where 
they have clear red lines. This is for instance reflected in their tough stance on the 
issue of visa-liberalization, even though the initiative came from French Foreign 
Minister, Kouchner. 
117 Germany, while holding the EU Presidency, took part in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and 
8500 German soldiers originally participated in the KFOR mission to Kosovo (Gross, 2007: 103-104).
118 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 4-8-2010.
119 In game theory, a pivotal player is one who, upon joining the coalition, transforms it from a non-winning 
into a winning coalition. In a winning coalition a player is considered to be a critical player if, by leaving 
the coalition, he would turn it into a non-winning coalition. Because we are effectively dealing with 
decision making under unanimity one could consider all players pivotal as well as critical. I thus use the 
term pivotal to reflect the likelihood or possibility that this player will change his position (between driver 
and brakeman) and that this change will affect the critical mass on either side of the debate.
120 Author’s interview, Working party level, 7-7-2011.
121 Author’s interview, Working party level, 7-7-2010.
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This does not mean that France is absent in the Council debates about the Western 
Balkans. Here it tends to side with Germany in stressing the institutional argument 
against enlargement. The no-vote on the 2005 referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty (CT) was the game changer for France. It triggered a large debate inside the 
Quai d’Orsay, but also in the country in general, about the way the enlargement 
process was to be carried out.122 In plenary debates France started to emphasize 
the matter of absorption capacity. The ‘renewed consensus on enlargement’ of 
December 2006 became its baseline approach. Yet, from time to time politics tend 
to interfere. Due to the timing of its Presidencies (2000 and 2008), France has 
played a distinctive role in shaping the course of the Balkan integration. Also, the 
fact that France can build upon the support of Cyprus and Greece in its ‘hesitations’ 
towards Turkey, means it will be more inclined to show solidarity with these 
countries’ concerns with regard to the Balkans. And of course, France’s support for 
the independence of Kosovo has affected its relations with Serbia. But all in all, 
France is inclined to limit the number of battles it picks, although it shows its 
notorious persistence in the battles it does pick.123 In debates, France can 
consistently be found in the lower right quadrant, decreasing the chances of it 
becoming pivotal.
United Kingdom: According to some ‘the most unequivocal supporter of enlargement’ 
while for others just ‘notoriously pragmatic’, the United Kingdom more than others 
tends to see European integration as a means instead of an end.124 What really 
underlies the UK’s Balkan policies remains an issue for debate. The UK for instance 
has always been one of the prominent players in the ICTY debate. Even though it 
was not easy to understand, even for those closely involved, the UK’s exact 
motivations in this regard.125 Some consider the UK a ‘Trojan Horse’, covertly 
representing US interests in the region. But it seems more adequate to say that the 
country tends to take ‘broader political considerations’ into account.126 The UK of 
course does have a historical legacy in particular with regard to Bosnia (cf. Hodge, 
2006; Gow, 1997; Simms 2002). This makes its position on Bosnia a bit tense. The 
UK is generally in favour of further developing the EU’s CFSP and ESDP capacities, 
whereas in Bosnia it is sceptical on whether the EU can hold its own. While in most 
other member states ‘Bosnia’ has become something of a ‘posh’ issue mainly 
featuring in erudite intellectual debates, in the UK there is still a lot of resonance 
122 Author’s interview, Working party level, 7-7-2010.
123 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-2-2011. France indeed tends to rely a bit more on interstate 
bargaining rather than perfecting the techniques of alliance and consensus building (Menon, 2001: 92). 
124 Author’s interviews, PSC and Working party level, 10-9-2010, 13-10-2010.
125 Author’s interview, ICTY level, 15-11-2010.
126 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-2-2011.
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with the general public.127 But Bosnia appears to be the exception in this regard. 
The other Balkan countries do not seem to attract a lot of attention, except in bad 
news stories about illegal immigrants from Kosovo or Albanian crime gangs.128 The 
mood with the general public is as enlargement sceptic as it has ever been.
Thus, it seems fair to say that what is driving the UK in its Balkan policies is 
endogenous salience. For some reason (prime) ministers have considered this a 
‘sexy’ issue area and have shown a willingness to pick a battle over it. Tony Blair 
was very active on Kosovo; William Hague on Bosnia. David Cameron played a 
notable role in the Greece-Macedonian name dispute when he suggested to start 
referring to Greece as ‘the former Ottoman possession of Greece (Fopog)’.129 For 
the UK the political argument (in favour of enlargement) takes precedence over the 
institutional argument (against it). Of course, this is not reflected in the official policy 
line. But because the country tends to get caught up in the politics, it is inclined to 
rely a bit more on the accuracy of Commission assessments and let others do the 
interventions in this regard. Does that mean that the UK is becoming ‘sloppy’ with 
regard to the conditionalities? It rather seems the UK is aware of the fact that: 
“compromises would be needed in order for the EU to remain effective as well as 
credible in the region”130 The UK furthermore is allergic to attempts to upgrade 
bilateral issues into community concerns.131
Admittedly, for negotiators from a ‘multi-issue’ country, Council negotiations can quickly 
become uncomfortable, if they have to raise their flag on many different issues. Rumour 
has it that the UK is (still) fairly successful in influencing the draft proposals before they 
even reach the negotiation tables (cf. Kassim, 2001b). There is no denying that the UK 
is well represented in relevant echelons in the Commission, the Council Secretariat’s 
Policy Unit and now the EEAS. In Council debates on the Balkans the UK’s position is 
the mirror image of the German one: in the upper left corner but leaning towards the 
centre. This makes the UK one of the pivotal players in the debate.
Italy: Italy might very well be the biggest supporter of the Balkan enlargement. The 
‘backyard argument’ applies most directly to Italy. The country has every interest in 
addressing this zone of instability in its immediate vicinity.132 Italy is thus consciously 
127 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 22-7-2010, 17-5-2011, 23-6-2011.
128 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-2-2011.
129 David Cameron, The Guardian, 10-09-2003: ‘The Macedonian job’.
130 Author’s interview, Working party level, 14-12-2010.
131 Author’s interview, Working party level, 11-3-2011.
132 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 25-5-2010, 12-1-2011.
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“on the soft side” in the conditionality debate.133 It is the one pressing for tangible 
incentives. Its strategy is “to paint a somewhat more nuanced picture of the 
countries in the region”.134 In particular with regard to Serbia and Albania, Italy is 
usually the one who stresses that there are also a lot of good things happening in 
those countries
In spite of its considerable interests in the region, one should not expect Italy to be 
at the centre of attention. The Balkans are a salient issue for Italy’s (Foreign) 
ministers, but they are rarely headline news. Italy is not afraid of promoting its direct 
interests in the region, for example when it comes to the possibilities for buying 
property in Croatia. However, it takes pride in being able to avoid open isolation 
especially at the ministerial level.135 It likes to mention things, rather than insist on 
them. Many praise the seniority and skill of its (Balkan) negotiators.136 They know 
that one has to be careful not to appear overly ambitious. Better to give in at an 
early stage than to experience a loss of face when issues reach a higher level. Italy 
rather tries to build on the support of like-minded and the solidarity of others. “This 
means building alliances, pre-warning others about issues that are really important 
for you, and making sure that you have something to offer them in return.”137
In the Balkan pre-enlargement game Italy is generally looking for ways to maintain 
the momentum.138 It tries to keep issues on the table. It operates in close coordination 
with the Commission and enlargement friendly Presidencies. The Greek-Italian 
tandem during their successive 2003 Presidencies had a large impact on the EU’s 
Balkan policies.139 Italy also tries to make use of ‘Macmillian events’ in the region.140 
It believes the EU’s Balkan policies are very much event-driven. And it tends to see 
the main obstacles as political instead of technical in nature. Italy is less hindered 
by bilateral concerns and can therefore certainly be found in the upper left quadrant 
of the scatter-plot.
133 Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 10-2-2011.
134 Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 10-2-2011. 
135 Author’s interview, Working party level, 11-3-2011.
136 Author’s interview, ICTY level, 15-11-2010.
137 Author’s interview, Working party level, 11-3-2011.
138 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 25-5-2010, 12-1-2011.
139 See Chapter 6, Section 3.
140 A ‘Macmillian event’ refers to British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, and his famous reply to a journalist 
when asked what a politician fears most. Macmillan answered: “events, dear boy, events.” In this study it 
is used to refer to extraordinary events taking place in the Balkan region, which merit a reaction from the 
Council. The term event should be used in the broadest sense. It simply means that something has 
happened (for example an assassination, an arrest or simply an act or statement of a politician) about 
which (some feel that) the Council should express its opinion.
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Austria: Austria works hard to uphold its image as friend of the Balkans, even at 
times when the Balkan countries do not appear to be helping themselves. This is 
understandable in view of its historical legacy and its large Croat, Bosniak and Serb 
Diaspora. “We know, or think we know, more about the region, as we have a lot of 
personal, cultural and social-economic ties with it. This is why we think we 
understand it better.”141 Critics tend to point out the large number of Austrian banks 
in Zagreb. But it would be more appropriate to say that Austria worries less about 
the institutional argument. It believes in the socializing power of the ‘Education 
Européenne’. Of course the EU cannot solve all of the Balkan’s problems. But it can 
provide something of a ceiling above which such disputes cannot escalate. Austria 
thus propagates an ‘inclusive’ instead of ‘exclusive’ approach: stabilization by 
means of integration.
Yet, there is a catch. When engaging in an enlargement debate with Austria one is 
effectively entering into a debate about Turkey.142 And when it comes to Turkey, 
Austria is certainly not one of the drivers. Thus in debates about the absorption 
capacity of the EU the Austrian public tends to have Turkey in mind. It was in fact 
Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ursula Plassnik, who spoke about the EU in 
terms of ‘overstretch’.143 At times, Austria has had trouble convincing people in 
Brussels as well as Carinthia of the need to integrate the Balkans into Europe.
Austria is a bit more straightforward than Germany in its support for specific 
countries. It is one of the drivers in strengthening the EU’s presence in Bosnia, but 
less present in debates concerning Macedonia. The Balkans was presented as one 
of the key priorities during its 2006 Presidency. Austria is less afraid of being openly 
ambitious. That much became clear at the Salzburg Summit, meant to reconfirm (or 
‘give new impetus to’) the EU’s commitment to the Balkans.144 Austria tends to be 
rather active in Council debates about the Balkans, trying to explain to others why 
integrating the Balkans is also good for the EU. One strategy in plenary debates 
has been to stress the ‘technical’ instead of ‘political’ nature of many of the 
decisions.145 Austria does not (openly) promote the downgrading of conditionali-
ties. However, it strongly opposes attempts to add new steps to the ladder. Because 
of its (proclaimed) willingness to remain flexible, Austria can be a pivotal player in 
141 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 8-12-2010. On Austria (expert) role in the EU’s foreign and more 
specifically its Balkan policies see Neuhold (2005: 48-51). 
142 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 28-9-2010.
143 Austria was also at the forefront of initiatives to offer Turkey a privileged partnership rather than potential 
membership. Die Presse, 20-7-2005: ‘Plassnik: Der Türkei eine Alternative bieten’. 
144 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-11-2010, Woschnagg, Mück & Payrleitner (2007: 236). 
145 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 13-7-2010, 8-6-2012.
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debates concerning the (northern) Balkan countries, in spite of its position in the 
upper left quadrant of the plot. 
Greece: The fact that it is hard to find Council Conclusions in which the Thessaloniki 
Agenda and/or Declaration are not explicitly mentioned, already drives home the 
point. Greece is perhaps the most prominent player in Balkan debates. That these 
Council Conclusions refer to FYROM instead of Macedonia already discloses the 
Greek dilemma. There is no hypocrisy in Greece’s support for the region; nor in its 
resistance towards its ‘neighbour to the north’. But the latter has at times influenced 
the ‘vocality’ with which the country advocated the former. Greece traditionally has 
had strong ties, economic as well as political, with Serbia and thus acts as an 
advocate for Serbia and to a lesser extent Albania. Croatia is mentioned mostly for 
its ability to become an example for the region.
Even more than Austria, Greece is not afraid of being openly ambitious. Where others 
opt for a low-key approach, Greece proposes summits, plans and initiatives.146 This 
was the underlying idea during its 2003 Presidency: “If we want to have an impact, we 
need a summit and not just some Council Conclusions.”147 Greece appears to be 
more willing than others to aim for the stars and see how far momentum will take 
them. More often than not, it manages to pull it off, being prepared to make use of 
the social credit accumulated along the way.148 But Greece does not put all its 
energy into summitry. It acknowledges the importance of (political) symbolism as 
well as (ordinary) semantics. To day to day negotiations Greece sends delegates 
with seniority, who are provided with a sufficient amount of leeway to engage in 
actual negotiations.149 Sticking to red lines is not appreciated by them, especially by 
negotiators from countries who do not have something at stake in a particular 
matter. 
Greece operates in close coordination with Italy and opts for a leading role in its 
group of like minded, which ordinarily includes Bulgaria, Romania and of course 
Cyprus. Greece knows where its particular interests lie, but at the same time is not 
blind to the political realities in other member states.150 It will generally not be the 
one to expose those who are in an isolated position. Greece is a strong believer in 
showing solidarity towards friends. Where some see good negotiating, others 
146 Author’s interview, Working party level, 27-7-2010.
147 Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 8-7-2010.
148 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 7-7-2010.
149 Being from a rather small country with more limited administrative capacities, the ability of delegates to 
‘write their own instructions’ is often considered as much of a luxury as a necessity (cf. Spanou, 2001).
150 Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 8-7-2010.
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speak of ‘wheeling and dealing’.151 Greece’s position as “the least principled of the 
non-recognizers of Kosovo” surely offers some opportunities for horse trading.152 
All in all, there is no denying that on a general political level Greece is one of the 
strongest supporters of the Balkans, while in day to day negotiations they are 
“certainly not one of the easy member states”.153 But it is in this way that Greece 
manages to merge an ideological with an interest-based approach. Because of 
these strong interests chances of Greece becoming pivotal in Council debates on 
the Balkans are limited. It is firmly positioned in the upper left quadrant.
The Netherlands: The Netherlands epitomize the institutional as well as the financial 
argument against enlargement. Being one of the largest net contributors to the EU 
budget, and to the Balkan region in particular, it feels it has the right to speak up. 
Money has ever been an important concern for the Dutch. In particular the 
consequences that further enlargement rounds would have on the CAP and the 
Structural Funds. For the larger part of the decade, and in particular after the 2005 
negative referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, the Netherlands have been one 
of the least enthusiastic supporters of yet another enlargement round. Especially 
since the EU was still dealing with the leftovers of the last one.154 In the Balkan 
pre-accession game the Netherlands generally try to fight automatism. The Dutch 
propagate the exclusive approach to enlargement: it is reforms first, integration 
second. The Netherlands abhor the use of summitry and the way in which this 
tends to politicize discussions. Yet, even the Dutch 2004 Presidency was aware of 
the fact that one needs to have some results.
With regard to the style of negotiating, the Dutch tendency to preach is more than 
just a stereotype. Ben Bot, former Dutch Permanent Representative and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, adequately captured this style with his statement: ‘From a tough 
stance, one can continue to reap the benefits.’155 However, privately he adds a 
crucial precondition: “provided that one’s general standing is good”.156 The 
Netherlands take pride in their principled stance on the Balkans, mainly when it 
comes to issues of international justice and more specifically the obligation to 
cooperate fully with the ICTY. But they have had to learn the hard way that their 
151 Author’s interviews, Commission (Director) level and Council Secretariat (Director) level, 1-7-2010, 
22-7-2010.
152 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 17-5-2011, 23-6-2011.
153 Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 8-7-2010.
154 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 7-7-2010.
155 Ben Bot, Elsevier, 4-1-2003: “Van een ferm standpunt heb je lang profijt”. 
156 Author’s interview, Ben Bot, Coreper Ambassador (1992-2002) and Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(2004-2007), 6-12-2010.
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inclination to opt for the moral high ground is frowned upon by those who do have 
tangible interests at stake.157 The Dutch are of course aware of their hardly enviable 
position, which effectively comes down to applying the brake most of the time.158 
At some point they got tired of others hiding behind their firm stance. 
The Netherlands feel they have used a lot of their argumentative resources on the 
lacking ICTY cooperation of Croatia and Serbia, while also trying to be active in 
debates about Bosnia. This limited the possibilities to remain in the forefront in the 
debate about one of their earlier friends in the region: Macedonia.159 Consequently, 
and in spite the EU’s Special Representative’s nationality, the Dutch have opted for 
a low key approach on Kosovo.160 Yet, as national habits die hard, the Netherlands 
will continue to monitor all conditionality-related reforms in the countries.161 The fact 
that the Netherlands do not have tangible interests at stake, makes it an interesting 
player. In spite of the country’s location in the lower right corner of the plot, it has 
the opportunity to become pivotal.
Sweden: Sweden likes to think it personifies the tough but fair approach to 
enlargement.162 It preaches EU rapprochement through the fulfilment of condition-
alities. While not at the forefront of Carla del Ponte’s lobbying efforts, Sweden has 
tended to adopt a tough stance on the ICTY conditionality.163 On the other hand, 
enlargement was one of the three key priorities during the 2001 Swedish Presidency. 
And, in spite of the general mood in the Council, it also featured prominently in its 
2009 Presidency. Sweden would like to approach enlargement as an end instead of 
a means (foreign policy tool), which automatically makes the country rather ‘Com-
mission-oriented’. 
For a long time Sweden could focus its attention on the region as a whole, without 
the clientism that burdens most other key players. This changed when, in 2006, Carl 
Bildt became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Bildt, who served as High Representative 
(HR) in Bosnia immediately after the Balkan wars, has shown a personal interest in 
157 Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 8-7-2010.
158 Author’s interview, Working party level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010.
159 Author’s interview, Working party level, 17-12-2009.
160 The Dutchman, Pieter Feith, the International Civilian Representative (ICR) and EU Special Representative 
in Pristina was nominated not by the Dutch government but personally recommended by Martti Ahtisaari, 
the UN’s Special Envoy for Kosovo at the Kosovo status negotiations.
161 Author’s interview, PSC level, 10-9-2010.
162 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 3-11-2010, 14-1-2011.
163 Author’s interview, Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY (1999-2007)14-6-2011.
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the matter.164 It did not take long for the Swedes to realize that keeping the process 
technical and keeping the process going are seldom reconcilable goals, in particular 
in Bosnia. Here, the exclusive (‘reforms first’) approach could only lead to deadlock. 
Sweden has thus at times opted for a more pro-active role in the pre-accession 
process of specific countries. 
Macmillian events have made Sweden one of the key actors in the Macedonia 
debates. The 2001 crisis and the 2009 Commission recommendation to open 
accession negotiations meant that Sweden had to concern itself with the country. It 
appeared the ideal candidate for the job: adequately informed yet sufficiently 
detached in terms of interests. But Sweden’s effectiveness in the Council hinged on 
its status of ‘technocrat’, while the situation in the field called for a more politicized 
approach. In the Balkan pre-accession game, Sweden is slowly but definitely 
moving from the lower right quadrant towards the centre, increasing its chances of 
becoming pivotal.
Slovenia: Friend and foe have come to terms with the fact that Slovenia is a force to 
be reckoned with in the Balkan debates. In the incentives versus conditionalities 
debates, Slovenia tends to stress the absence of tangible results. Like Austria, it 
considers itself a regional expert. But in the case of Slovenia, this expertise seems 
to be as much of an asset as it is a burden. This former Yugoslav Republic has gone 
to great lengths to explain that it is part of Central Europe, and certainly not 
‘Balkan’.165 Other Balkan minded Presidencies were at times disappointed by the 
limited support they got from Slovenia.166 But the Slovenes would make up for this 
during their 2008 Presidency. 
“It is safe to say that there was a bit of anxiety in ‘the Brussels corridors’ with regard 
to the Slovenian Presidency in general, and its outspoken ambitions on the Western 
Balkans in particular.”167 They are some in Brussels still ‘tushing’ their whirlwind 
approach. They remember stuffed agenda’s and endless meetings with limited 
output. Slovenia wanted to do more than just keep the issue on the agenda. They 
were rather straightforward in admitting that, when push comes to shove, 
enlargement is about politics instead of reforms.168 Macmillian events, in particular 
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, led to push actually coming to shove in the 
164 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 27-9-2010, 3-11-2010. 
165 Author’s interview, Working party level, 15-6-2010.
166 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 8-12-2010.
167 Author’s interviews, Working party and domestic level, 16-7-2010. 27-7-2010. 
168 Author’s interviews, Coreper and Working party level, 27-7-2010, 3-7-2012.
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middle of their Presidency. A friend of Serbia, Slovenia was nevertheless amongst 
the earliest recognizers of Kosovo, which lead to the burning of its embassy in 
Belgrade. Thus, in light of these Macmillian events, there was ample reason to keep 
the Balkans on the ministerial agenda. 
The Slovenes were aware that they might have been pushing the limits of discretion, 
in particular when trying to upgrade their ‘bilateral dispute’ with Croatia into an 
issue of common concern.169 The outward similarities between the Greek-Macedo-
nian and Slovene-Croatian disputes meant that Slovenia often played a rather 
pro-Macedonian role in the former debate. Very much to the discomfort of Greece, 
the Slovene minister was one of the few who from time to time raised the matter in 
plenary session. Yet, Slovenia’s Brussels-based negotiators have quickly become 
socialized to the Brussels’ way of doing business. Instead of bluntly stating their red 
lines, they learned “whom to call before a session”.170 In view of its many ties to and 
interests in the region, Slovenia is undoubtedly located in the upper left quarter of 
the plot.
Spain: As mentioned in the introduction, Spain has tended towards a business as 
usual approach to the Balkans. During its two Presidencies (2002 and 2010), the 
Spanish were at least able to navigate on relatively quiet waters. After settling the 
crises in Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro, the Spanish High Representative of 
the CFSP, Xavier Solana, started to yield the stage in an effort to turn the EU’s 
involvement into a ‘regular’ pre-accession trajectory.171 Spain has every interest to 
keep the process technical. The Spanish are known as tough negotiators, especially 
when it comes to safeguarding their agricultural and fishery interests.172 The country 
has not become entangled into the web of Balkan alliances and can thus safely 
focus its attention on issues such as ‘market access for Croatian anchovies’. 
Unsurprisingly, the Balkans do not feature regularly in Spanish newspapers. 
Provided of course one does not mention Kosovo. But even here, Spanish concerns 
seem to be primarily with the secretive way in which the dossier was handled, rather 
than just with the status of Kosovo itself.173 
169 This was a conflict partly about an ecological zone, but mostly about access to the high seas in the Bay 
of Piran, which presumably Croatia was unwilling to grant to Slovenia. Author’s interviews, Working party 
and domestic level, 16-7-2010. 27-7-2010.
170 Author’s interviews, Coreper and domestic level, 16-7-2010, 3-7-2012.
171 Author’s interviews, Commission (Director), Council Secretariat (Director) level, 11-2-2011, 11-2-2011.
172 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010, 14-1-2011.
173 Spain is not part of the so-called Quint, the Contact Group bringing together representatives from the US, 
UK, France, Germany and Italy, to oversee developments in Kosovo. 
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Spain is generally in favour of the Balkan enlargement, as it showed in June 2010 
when it organized the Sarajevo Summit. While not even the Spanish themselves 
denied that ‘the message was pretty much in the meeting’, at least the Serbs and 
Kosovars sat at the same table for once and listened to each other’s statements.174 
And to be honest, the state of affairs at the time did not really allow for higher 
expectations. More in general, while Spain is more often a driver than a brakeman 
in Council debates about the Balkans, it will not be inclined to push beyond the 
bounds of the appropriate in such matters. Spain should be located, in spite of its 
prominent presence in the non-recognizers of Kosovo block, near the centre of the 
plot.
The audience: There will perhaps be few who completely agree with my selection of 
key players in the Council negotiations on the Western Balkans. But at the very least 
it constitutes an adequate reflection of the different opinions present in the debates. 
Few of the remaining Balkan negotiators will be happy to see their country directed 
to the stands. The use of the term ‘audience’ has to be clarified. I do not want to 
characterize the seventeen remaining member states as passive observers. In both 
competitive or non-competitive debates, they play a pivotal role. In the former, they 
are the ones whom the proponents and opponents seek to convince. In the latter, 
they are the ones from whom they seek acquiescence.175 In both instances, they are 
there to judge the legitimacy of the claims made by those in the race. They can thus 
provide the critical mass in Council negotiations. As I have already explained, not 
even the most ambitious negotiator will invest his time in convincing Greece on its 
stance towards Macedonia or the Netherlands on Serbia. Nor will they merely 
preach to the converted, meaning their coalition of ‘like minded’. Argumentative 
interventions are primarily aimed at the ones in the middle.
That does not mean that the ones in the middle have no ideas of their own. These 
should of course be taken into account. While being less prominently present, 
Belgium tends to agree with the Netherlands on the importance of full cooperation 
with the ICTY; which was the case even before the Tribunal got a Belgian Chief 
Prosecutor.176 Belgium does not have clear priorities or interests in the region, apart 
from avoiding large streams of immigrants. Contrary to the Netherlands, it tends to 
have some more affinity with the Kosovo-dossier than with Bosnia. But above all 
Belgium likes to personify the European outlook, especially during its 2001 and 
174 Author’s interview, Working party level, 13-1-2011.
175 See Chapter 2, Section 2 on competitive and non-competitive debates. See Chapter 3, Section 3 on the 
different role that an audience can play in the different types of debates. 
176 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-2-2011. Serge Brammertz took over from Carla del Ponte at the 
beginning of 2008. 
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2010 Presidencies. The third Benelux country, Luxembourg, usually follows this line 
of approach, although its Prime Minister, Jean-Claude Juncker is a political 
heavyweight in Brussels with a particular interest in the Balkans. The last observation 
certainly also applies to Finland, which saw its Olli Rehn from 2004 until 2010 as 
Commissioner for Enlargement. In its approach, Finland tends to be in line with 
Sweden. While less prominently present, the same goes for Denmark.
Informally referred to as the ‘Habsburg block’, Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia are the ‘like-minded’ of Austria and Slovenia. This does not mean that 
these countries will always form a uniform block. But it means that their general 
outlook and disposition towards the region considerably overlap. Although it should 
be noted that Slovakia is the only member of the group not recognizing Kosovo. 
Bulgaria and Romania could very well be considered as key players in the Balkan 
debates, but were excluded because they themselves only recently acquired 
membership. Nevertheless the two countries have become more vocal; Bulgaria 
mainly in its minority concerns with regard to Macedonia, Romania focussing its 
energy on safeguarding the interests of the non-recognizers of Kosovo.
Poland and the Baltic States (Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia) are generally in favour 
of enlargement, mainly with an eye on their immediate neighbours, but they do not 
feature prominently in debates about the Balkans. The same goes for Malta. Cyprus 
follows the line of Greece, although its main concerns with regard to enlargement 
are of course with Turkey. But here also, Greece and Cyprus tend to operate in 
close coordination. Portugal according to insiders ran very successful Presidencies 
(at least with regard to the Balkans) in 2000 and 2007, precisely because of its 
status as neutral arbiter. The same goes for Ireland. Although usually in close 
coordination with the UK on Balkan matters, the country is aware of its limited 
interests in the region.177
Institutionally empowered players
The European Commission: While the Commission would perhaps like to be 
portrayed as a member of the audience, it is in reality one of the key players in 
Council debates (cf. Hocking & Spence, 2005; Schwarz, 2010). The Commission is 
of course a supporter of enlargement. From a bureau-political perspective it simply 
has to be. Yet, what is even more important for the Commission is to remain in full 
control of this process.178 The Commission will generally not be too happy with 
177 These observations of the general positions of the members of the audience are based on the author’s 
personal observations and informal talks, while working in the Council’s Working Party on the Western 
Balkans (Coweb). They may differ from their ‘official’ line of policy towards the Balkans.
178 Author’s interviews, Commission (Director) level, 28-6-2010, 22-7-2010, 11-2-2011.
125
 ‘The double bluff’. Member state preferences and Macmillian events
‘over-eager’ Presidencies trying to speed up the (pre)accession process. Of 
course, the Commissioner is a political actor, sensitive to the need of achieving 
results from time to time. But his ability to have such results depends on the 
Council’s willingness to grant them.179 This will induce the Commissioner and the 
Commission as a whole to adopt an incremental approach. The Commission wants 
progress, but not by means of a politicized process.180 It thus abhors the use of 
Community instruments to make political gestures. 
As provider of information, the Commission has a privileged position in Council 
debates. Issue-specific expertise presented by member states involved often has a 
limited impact, precisely because these member states tend to have such a big 
interest in the matter.181 The Commission is the one with the true expert role. Member 
states look to the Commission to provide them with information. Because of this 
role, information asymmetries, in the proper sense of the word, are limited. But 
those who are able to ‘feed their information’ to the officials inside the DG 
Enlargement can appear more relaxed or even forthcoming during the plenary 
debates. The Commission itself of course has every interest to appear in full control 
of the drafting process. They need this autonomy to be able to fulfil three not 
necessarily compatible roles: as independent interlocutor, advocate (of the Balkans) 
and representative (of the Council) at the same time.182
The Council Secretariat: If enlargement should be used as a foreign policy tool, 
which is one of the key issues for debate, than the Council Secretariat is the tool 
maker. At the beginning of the decade Solana represented the face of the EU in the 
Balkans. The High Representative could use that status to influence decision 
making in Brussels.183 Solana and his Policy Unit’s main concerns were with 
safeguarding the credibility of the EU as an external actor. At present, Ashton and 
her European External Action Service (EEAS) are working hard to fill the void left by 
Solana.
The Council Secretariat has a privileged position because it serves as the ‘institutional 
memory’ as well as the ‘provider of (legal) expertise’. Even more than the Commission 
179 Author’s interview, Coreper and Working party level, 7-7-2010, 27-9-2010.
180 Author’s working party level, 14-1-2011.
181 To understand this, only consider to what extent member states might be inclined to accept Dutch 
expertise on Serbia’s ICTY cooperation or Greece’s expert opinions on Macedonia’s good neighbourli-
ness.
182 Author’s interviews, Commission (Serbia Unit) and Working party level, 4-6-2010, 17-5-2011.
183 Author’s interviews, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) level, 27-9-2010, 10-11-2010, 12-1-2011.
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it has to be careful not to appear as personally opinionated.184 It has to cater to 
drivers as well as brakemen. But of course the Secretariat can have a policy shaping 
role. It is best positioned to judge ‘what will and what will not fly’ in the Council. It 
can thus help a Presidency in its attempts to break the deadlock. But one should 
not expect the Council Secretariat actively trying to push issues through. A proactive 
role would conflict with its organizational essence (cf. Beach, 2008). Its classic role 
during debates is to assist the Presidency in finding a consensus. Its overarching 
interests are after all bureau-political: safeguarding the adequate functioning of the 
Council as an institution.
Presidency: The last but certainly not the least important player in Council debates 
is of course ‘the dodo’. In the Caucus race in Alice in Wonderland, the dodo is 
merely the one presiding over the proceedings. While Council Presidencies like to 
maintain the image of being a neutral arbiter, they themselves usually have 
something at stake in the race. It is important to note that this is a rotating dodo. The 
main controversy, amongst observers as well as participants alike, is the amount of 
leeway a Presidency has for promoting national interests during its time in the chair 
(cf. Elgström, 2006; Quaglia & Moxon-Browne, 2006; Tallberg, 2006). Using the 
Presidential prerogatives in an agenda setting or prioritizing way seems to be 
acceptable.185 All know that a Presidency needs tangible results. Member states 
are aware of the dynamics created by a succession of enlargement friendly 
Presidencies. They will generally be inclined to grant Presidencies some 
‘deliverables’, if only for the simple reason that there is not much they can do to 
prevent it.186 Even if a Presidency oversteps the boundaries of appropriateness, 
there will be very few member states eager to speak up.187 At all times, delegates 
need to ensure good working relations with the Presidency, if they want to be able 
to realize their own goals. The dodo is after all the one who hands out the prizes.
While a Presidency is of course bound by norms of appropriateness (cf. Laffan, 
2004; Niemann & Mak, 2010; Tallberg, 2008), these norms mainly concern the way 
in which it manages the process. A Presidency does not have to be impartial as well 
as conscientious and considerate. Member states will be most offended if they feel 
that they were denied proper access to the debate and a fair chance to stake their 
claim. But, in order to keep the process going, a Presidency also has to avoid 
184 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Director) level, 1-7-2010.
185 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) level and Working party level, 10-11-2010, 14-1-2011.
186 ‘Deliverables’ is Brussels jargon for the tangible results which member states typically tend to claim at the 
end of their Presidency.
187 Author’s interviews, Coreper level, 7-7-2010, 3-7-2012. Although Presidencies particularly from smaller 
member states generally strive to avoid attracting too much attention from the national capitals.
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lengthy or repetitive debates. A willingness to consult and pre-coordinate is vital, as 
long as it avoids the image of pre-cooking matters behind the scenes. Presidencies 
need to make sure that all are aware of what is coming. To confront member states 
in plenary session is frowned upon.188 Prematurely taking issues to a higher level 
might very well be considered a capital offence. It is part of the normative framework 
not to bring the others into a position in which they have to be openly confronta-
tional. But on the other hand, forcing member states to take their concerns to a 
higher level can also be a (strategic) attempt to break the deadlock.189 A Presidency 
thus has to walk a tightrope between accountability and effectiveness. This above 
all means that it has to be open about the way in which the judging takes place. 
4.2  Marking out the race-course in Balkan decision making
In the previous section I have provided an overview of the main players and their 
general (dis)positions towards the Western Balkans. I have spoken a lot in terms of 
tendencies and inclinations with which they enter the arena. This section is about 
the arena itself. Up until now, I have mainly been referring to ‘the Council’ as if it 
were one monolithic bloc moulding the behaviour of those who get caught in its 
inner depths. And although in the literal sense of the word the Justus Lipsius is a 
monolith and one can very easily get lost in its interiors, it would be wrong to deduce 
too much from such outward appearances. At a closer look the Council appears to 
display at least as much internal heterogeneity as any other organization (see 
Figure 4.2). 
In Chapter 2, I have suggested to complement the image of Council negotiators. I 
have introduced the image of Council negotiators as self-serving bureau-political 
actors. Negotiators in all Council configurations have a bureau-political interest in 
safeguarding their relevance in and as a group. For any organizational sub-unit 
maintaining relevance comes down to ‘getting the job done’. What their specific 
(part of the) job is depends on what unit we are talking about.
Working party (Coweb): The primary level of play in the Council is the Working party. 
As national representatives, Working party members hardly have an autonomous 
role. They function as throughput of national interests or “stand-in negotiators for 
their minister” (Häge, 2007a: 307). They are merely exchanging positions and 
notifying each other about the salient points of the dossiers on which their respective 
188 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-2-2011.
189 Author’s interview, Working party level, 14-12-2010.
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ministers would like personally to state their opinion.190 Consequently, weighty 
matters will be instantly transferred to the higher levels and the real decisions will 
be taken elsewhere. Member states will not be inclined to invest a lot of their 
resources, in terms of time and expertise, into the encounters at Working party 
level. It is considered a necessary but preliminary step towards the actual negotiations.
Self-serving actors on the other hand need room to manoeuvre. Such actors will 
generally only want to engage themselves with a debate, if there is a reasonable 
chance of arriving at a decision by means of this debate. As I have explained in 
Chapter 2, this does not necessarily imply that there is room for open deliberations. 
There are also non-competitive ways to reach decisions at this level. An indicator 
for the perceived relevance of the Working party level is the seniority of its members. 
There is no point in sending your top men or women to what you consider as 
irrelevant encounters. There is no chance of getting into a debate if your counterpart 
is merely there to read out his or her instructions. The relevance of a particular 
Working party thus depends on the willingness of (all) member states to do deals 
at this level. This is reflected in the weight of the dossiers it handles as well as its 
aversion against taking issues to a higher level. Having to go to PSC or Coreper 
would then be considered a defeat. The effectiveness of the Working party level is 
reflected in the substantiality of the debate that took place there.
190 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 7-7-2010. See Chapter 1, Section 2.
Figure 4.2  Five levels of play in the Balkan pre-accession game
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The Council Working Party for the Western Balkans (Coweb) has always been rather 
political in its outlook and in the issues it dealt with.191 Coweb deals with all issues 
concerning the Balkans, whether they concern trade, aid, crisis-management, foreign 
policy making or enlargement. Coweb is thus a regional rather than a sectoral 
Working party. Consequentially its organizational essence lies in its regional expertise. 
Even though quite a number of the higher level diplomats (for example in the PSC) 
have built up expertise in dealing with the Balkans, their knowledge of day to day 
affairs is limited.192 Coweb proves its worth by its ability to assess the relevance of 
current developments in the field and whether these merit a reaction from the 
Council.193 The contours of the debate are in essence always the same: do we 
consider specific developments or reforms as substantial or merely symbolic? The 
question is whether delegates will be able to agree on an adequate reaction. To the 
extent that they are, their encounters can be considered as causally significant.
The general impression is that Coweb is losing ground, mainly to the PSC.194 At the 
beginning of the decade, when the PSC was still in an embryonic state, Coweb was 
where the member states crossed swords over the Balkans.195 But, as the Balkans 
started to slip from the front pages of the newspapers and foreign policy priorities 
shifted elsewhere (mainly the Middle East), representatives tended to become less 
‘senior’. However, there appear to be significant national differences in this regard. 
Where some member states (Greece, Austria, Italy) allow their representatives to 
stay in the group for a long time and build up social resources and expertise, others 
(France, the UK) tend to rotate representatives more frequently. This is to prevent 
them from getting ‘too attached’ to the dossier.196 Whether the image of decline is 
correct is an empirical question, to which I will return in Chapter 9. But one would 
expect that the effectiveness of the group as whole depends on their weakest 
link(s). Even if there are only one or two key players unable to negotiate at their level, 
the relevance of the group as a whole is in jeopardy.
Political and Security Committee (PSC): The second race course on which the Balkan 
pre-accession game takes place is the PSC. The Political and Security Committee’s 
organizational essence comes down to “monitoring the international situation in the 
191 Although the distinction between ‘political’ and ‘technical’ (parts of the) dossiers is quite artificial (cf. 
Fouilleux, de Maillard & Smith, 2005: 611). I would argue that politicizing is in fact a deliberate strategy.
192 Author’s interviews, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) and PSC level, 10-9-2010, 27-9-2010, 12-1-2011.
193 This can refer to regular developments, meaning the reforms undertaken by the Balkan countries, as well 
as irregular developments or ‘Macmillian events’ in the field. I will elaborate on this claim in Chapter 5. 
194 Author’s interviews, PSC and Working party, 16-6-2010, 14-1-2001, 11-3-2011, 8-7-2012.
195 Author’s interview, Working party level, 14-1-2011.
196 Author’s interview, Working party level, 7-7-2011.
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areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and issuing opinions to 
the Council” (Westlake & Galloway, 2004: 218, my italics). The PSC ambassadors 
are thus (considered to be) the foreign policy experts. The PSC epitomizes the 
ambition of the EU to be more than just an economic union.197 At first sight, there 
appears to be a lot of room for expert-oriented deliberations at the PSC level. Yet, 
herein also lies its potential pitfall. There are those who doubt whether the PSC level 
has indeed gained much ground. According to them the PSC is (still) the place for 
general exchanges of view and grand political outlooks rather than action oriented 
discussions (cf. Westlake & Galloway, 2004: 54). To quickly reach decisions, one 
still needs to travel the Coweb-Coreper route.
The PSC’s effectiveness hinges on the decisiveness the ambassadors are able to 
display in their internal debates. The PSC is known for its lengthy exchanges of 
view, for example on the (non)developments in Kosovo or Bosnia, in which, in the 
words of Voltaire: ‘le mieux est l‘ennemi du bien’. Their quest for optimal solutions 
is perhaps understandable. After all, their personal standing depends on their 
expert status. They are not primarily judged on the number of dossiers they can 
digest. This can and will at times hinder the PSC’s capacity to come up with a 
solution at all. While, according to insiders, debates at PSC level can be lively and 
fierce, outcomes are euphemistically characterized as ‘well-considered’ or just 
‘declaratory and weak’.198
Whether the PSC should be considered as a Coreper III is still an issue for debate 
(cf. De Zwaan, 1995: 186; Kassim, 2001a: 22). It is clear that the PSC mainly has 
had to position itself vis-à-vis Coreper II (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006: 82-86). 
While the PSC has the competence to report to the Council, Coreper is the one that 
actually prepares the ministerial meetings. In practice, Coreper will seldom be 
inclined to reopen a dossier that was already extensively discussed at the PSC 
level. In the early years, the PSC benefitted from Solana’s preeminent role in dealing 
with the Balkans. Solana, Lehne and other important EU officials in the field briefed 
the PSC instead of Coreper.199 The PSC consequently managed to gain a lot of 
ground, particularly on matters concerning Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. But 
when Balkan debates became less about foreign policy and more about 
enlargement, Coreper gained prominence. Still, the Working party level has some 
197 Author’s interview, PSC level, 10-9-2010.
198 Author’s interviews, PSC and Working party level, 10-9-2010, 10-2-2011. Solana once characterized the 
European Political Cooperation (EPC), that preceded the CFSP, as ‘gesture politics’ in which the output 
was mainly ‘declaratory’ (Westlake & Galloway, 2004: XI). The relevant question here is whether the PSC 
has been able to shed this profile.
199 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) level, 10-11-2010.
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leeway in deciding whether to take something up to the PSC or rather to Coreper. 
This is a decision in which the rotating Presidency can make use of its discretion.200 
In the Balkan pre-accession game, the PSC level thus serves as something of a 
side-show. PSC debates are after all less about how the Balkan countries are doing 
in their quest for membership, and more how the EU is doing in its endeavours in 
the region. But, as we have seen in the introduction, there is still considerable 
overlap. PSC opinions on the status of Kosovo, the constructive attitude of Serbia, 
or the EU presence in Bosnia and Macedonia, have a direct bearing on the 
pre-accession debate at other levels. It would go too far to state that taking 
something to the PSC is a stalling technique. But it is clear that drivers as well as 
brakemen cannot focus all their energy on the Coweb-Coreper axis if they want to 
influence the pace of the game. The PSC is an important arena even if it does not 
deal directly with enlargement.
Coreper II: Coreper is the third level at which the Balkan pre-accession game is 
played.201 Coreper operates in between the political and the technical level. It is 
perhaps the most important level to discuss the enlargement process as a whole. 
In view of the multitude of issues it has to deal with, Coreper will not indulge in 
lengthy debates about country specific developments. This is certainly not the 
place for expert dialogues on the Balkans. Coreper is about finding ways around 
the roadblocks that have remained from the debates at Working party level. There 
is a big difference in approach. Whereas on the Working party level delegates will 
be inclined to focus on evaluating a specific solution to a given problem, Coreper 
looks for ways to accommodate these different solutions so as to be able to 
proceed with the decision making process as a whole.202
In contrast to the PSC, the organizational essence of Coreper is less of mystery 
nowadays. Coreper’s raison d’être is in ‘keeping the Council’s machinery running’ 
(cf. Bostock, 2002; De Zwaan, 1995; Lempp & Altenschmidt, 2008; Lewis, 2003; 
2005). Coreper has considerable procedural autonomy as well as agenda setting 
powers in preparation of the ministerial meetings. But this autonomy is conditional 
upon them adopting an incremental approach.203 Debates on the Coreper level are 
for a large part about whether, when and in what order/form issues should be discussed 
by the ministers. Coreper members have above all a great ‘feel’ concerning the 
200 Although its room of manoeuvre has somewhat lessened of late, now that the EEAS is up and running. 
Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-2-2011.
201 Coreper I consists of the deputy ambassadors, who deal with all matters relating to the internal market. 
Coreper II consists of the (actual) ambassadors, who concern themselves with all other issues. 
202 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 8-12-2010.
203 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 3-7-2012.
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feasibility of certain issues. Ambassadors are experts in answering the question; 
“how important is a point at issue in the context of a Member State’s overall priorities 
in the EU….and is it of sufficient importance for a minister’s credibility to pursue it 
at Council level” (Bostock, 2002: 231-232). Coreper ambassadors are known for 
their ability to strike deals; deals that will hold both in Brussels as well as back 
home. “Coreper ambassadors have to be brave enough to decide a lot of issues 
already at their level. We simply cannot put more than eight issues before the 
ministers, or otherwise the machinery will simply come to a halt.”204 
Yet, some of the imagery that surrounds Coreper seems a bit outdated. A lot has 
been written about the ‘Esprit de Corps’ and the dense network of interpersonal 
contacts (cf. Kassim & Peters, 2001: 307). One should not read too much into the 
presumably ‘clubby atmosphere’. Coreper meetings are (or rather have become) 
highly institutionalized gatherings with more than sixty people sitting around the 
table and more than hundred present in the room. This is certainly not a small and 
closed in-group (cf. Janis, 1982). One should also not overestimate an ambassador’s 
room for manoeuvre. “If permanent representatives acted as free agents, they 
would not remain in Brussels for long” (Westlake & Galloway, 2004: 216). Gone are 
the days in which Coreper ambassadors could retire, ‘entre nous’, to hammer out 
creative deals (De Zwaan, 1995: 92). In an EU of 27 (plenary) debates have become 
public events.
The image of ‘consensual processes’ has been ascribed primarily to Coreper. 
Again some qualifications are in order. Coreper negotiations are as much about 
accommodating differences as about applying pressure, especially on those who 
find themselves in an isolated position. The declaratory ‘tour de tables’ are important 
in that they serve to delineate the playing field with respect to a certain issue. 
Debates serve to signal who (still) wants to play a certain round.205 Solutions are 
rarely found in these sessions. Plenaries are about putting all means at the disposal 
of the Presidency, so that it can decide what to take into account, whom to approach 
and whether and how to proceed with the decision making process as a whole.206 
In short, they are about ‘facilitating the dodo’. The game play nevertheless remains 
distinctive. Social resources matter a lot in Coreper debates. An adversary on one 
dossier can be an ally on the next. Coalition patterns are fleeting. So Coreper 
ambassadors have to be careful not to allow factual dissension to turn into personal 
animosity. They will therefore generally not engage in finger pointing. There is an 
204 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 8-12-2010.
205 To use the terminology of Chapter 2: It is about who is willing to invest in an issue at this level.
206 Author’s interviews, Coreper level, 7-7-2010, 3-7-2012.
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atmosphere of trust.207 Coreper negotiations are usually not about definitively 
settling scores. Ambassadors are very much aware of the fact that the buck does 
not stop with them.
Council/ministerial level: The fourth level at which the Balkan pre-accession game 
is played out is the ministerial level. Here the game becomes more about day to day 
political realities and less about long term technocratic/procedural considerations. 
Ministers are public figures. They will only want to concern themselves with salient 
issues on which there is a possibility for arriving at a clear decision. At first sight 
there appears to be little room for an actual debate at Council level (cf. Häge, 2008; 
Van Schendelen, 1996). Ministers meet once a month to rush through their 
overstuffed agenda’s (Gomez & Peterson, 2001). Delegates usually have a couple 
of minutes to brief their minister on the positions of other key players and the 
opportunities for coalition building. Ministerial ‘debates’ come down to orchestrated 
sequences of interventions in which the room for spontaneous interaction is sparse. 
At the slightest indication of ‘real discussions’ occurring, a Presidency will ask the 
Council either to go into ‘restricted session’ or else to leave the matter to be 
discussed over lunch. The idea behind this is clear: ministerial debates are not 
nearly the insulated gatherings they appear to be. Transcripts of meetings are not 
hard to come by. So for all accounts and purposes, ministerial interventions should 
be seen as public statements instead of privately held opinions.
This does not automatically mean that these interventions are insignificant. The 
signalling game argument applies most directly to the ministerial level.208 The fact 
that a minister shows his willingness to make an argumentative intervention, usually 
suffices to get that country’s views taken into account. It reveals to the others his or 
her willingness to invest in the matter. Council negotiators anticipate these 
interventions. They know what their ministers will probably want to make a stance 
about and their day to day encounters serve to convince the others of this ministerial 
commitment. If they fail to convince all, then the statement of the minister becomes 
crucial.
Ministers generally like to be able to behave as diplomats. They do not like to have 
to say ‘no’ at the highest level.209 They know that to be able to get what they want, 
they must make sure that others want to grant them this deliverable.210 Thus even at 
207 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 28-9-2010.
208 See Chapter 2, Section 1.
209 Author’s interviews, Coreper and Working party level, 7-7-2010, 10-2-2011.
210 Author’s interview, Ben Bot, Coreper Ambassador (1992-2002) and Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(2004-2007), 6-12-2010.
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the ministerial level, there is something of a culture of consensus, inducing ministers 
to avoid stepping on each other’s toes. Perhaps the most important task of the 
Coreper level is to avoid open collisions at Council level. This can be quite difficult. 
Ministers after all are political actors and no amount of orchestrating can guarantee 
a flawless concert. Ministers travel to Brussels with their own outlooks and priorities. 
They are surely not the ones who are constantly aware of the need for reciprocity. 
Ministers are there to run their own race. This is why, when the doors (inevitably) 
close, ministerial debates can sometimes become quite tough. Although ministers 
are usually quite capable of distinguishing plenary ‘scolding’ from serious attempts 
to apply and maintain pressure.211
European Council level: The fifth and final level of the Balkan pre-accession game 
is the European Council. The European Council is not part of the Council’s decision 
making infrastructure and thus will not feature prominently in this study. The 
European Council operates by its own rules and procedures (cf. Werts, 2008). 
Much of the orchestrating is done from the national capitals. Brussels-based 
officials hardly have an influence on what will be on the European Council’s Agenda. 
Therefore, I do not consider it as part of the Brussels machinery. Moreover, the 
European Council tends to follow the Council of Ministers’ lead when it comes to 
routine decision making. The important Council and European Council Conclusions 
of December, in which the progress of the Balkan states is evaluated, are usually 
copy-paste exercises. 
In terms of the organizational essence, the European Council is characterized by 
what I would call a ‘tendency for big gestures’. In terms of negotiating strategies, 
taking something to the European Council level can thus be a deliberate attempt to 
induce such a big gesture. Yet, it is not easy to get the Heads of State and 
Government to engage themselves with a certain matter. Especially after the 
Thessaloniki Summit of 2003, which served to ‘normalize’ the EU’s dealings with 
the Balkans, European Council involvement rapidly diminished.212 It is hard to get 
Chirac, Blair, Merkel and the likes to sit down and discuss the Balkans. Heads of 
State and Government will definitely not engage in open ended debates. And when 
they do decide to invest in an issue there is no way of telling what will come out of 
it. They can provide for new impetus but also interfere with the normal decision 
making routines and procedures. ‘Summitry’ can at times do more harm than good 
if there is nothing new on which to decide. So trying to get the European Council 
involved can be a risky but nevertheless rewarding strategy.
211 Author’s interview, Maxime Verhagen, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs (2007-2010), The Hague, 2012.
212 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) level, 10-11-2010.
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The reason for including the European Council in this overview is that, when the 
European Council does decide to engage itself with the Balkans, its words will be 
taken very seriously indeed. For example, a statement by the Heads of State and 
Government that: “Maintaining good neighbourly relations, including a negotiated 
and mutually acceptable solution to the name issue, remains essential” will be 
instantly taken over in all lower level statements on Macedonia.213 The European 
Council is therefore highly important in its role as provider of agreed language. The 
level at which specific language is agreed upon - even if that level is just parroting 
what has been agreed on at a lower level - is crucial. Being able to refer back to 
European Council Conclusions makes for a stronger case than referring back to 
‘mere’ Council Conclusions. It is in this role that the European Council will primarily 
feature in this study.214 
4.3  Conclusion: The Brussels’ side of the ‘bluff’
This overview of the players, their positioning and the race course, served to 
address the Brussels’ part of the ‘bluff’. Above all it served to elaborate on the 
member specific motivations for joining the race. What is perhaps most noteworthy 
is the limited amount of bluffing that is going on. There is no shortage of players 
willing to invest resources in argumentative encounters about the Balkans. Lack of 
interest or commitment therefore cannot be the explanation for the ‘stop and go’ 
pattern of the Balkan integration process. Over-eagerness seems a more 
appropriate characterization.215 Explanations for the presumably ‘weak outcomes’ 
need to be sought not at the level of preferences but at the level of processes. It is 
to this process level that I now turn to. 
213 European Council meeting, Brussels 19/20-6-2008. Western Balkans Conclusions, 56. See also Chapter 
9, Section 2.
214 Also, in my participant observations I was not able to include the European Council. So, from personal 
experience it would be hard to say anything about the dynamics that govern those proceedings. 
215 Author’s interview, Commission (Director) level, 22-7-2010.
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5. Explaining the when and how of Balkan decisions
The overview of players, positions and race courses of the previous chapter has led 
us to one, perhaps obvious, conclusion. They do not provide us with a sufficient 
explanation for the specific (stop and go) pattern of Council decisions on the 
Balkans. Preference patterns in themselves can at most account for general 
differences in speed, for instance between Croatia and Serbia. But if we want to 
understand the ‘when’ and ‘how’ of Council decision making, we need to break 
open the black box of day to day Council negotiations. 
The logic underlying the Balkan pre-accession game remains hard to grasp; that 
much became apparent from the arrest of the Bosnian-Serb General, Ratko Mladic, 
in May 2011. Numerous media sources claimed this would then finally “unblock 
Serbia’s bid to join the EU”.216 Former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla del Ponte 
reacted by stating that: “Serbia always tends to deliver at the very last moment. This 
is why the arrest of Mladic also was to be expected.”217 In reality, it was certainly not 
the very last moment. The new Chief Prosecutor, Brammertz, was in fact in the 
middle of writing a highly critical report on Serbia’s current level of cooperation.218 
Furthermore, it was doubtful whether the arrest of Mladic (and soon thereafter of 
Goran Hadzic) would indeed open any doors for Serbia. More in line with how 
things are done in Brussels were hasty statements by the Dutch Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Uri Rosenthal: ‘that it had never been just about Mladic’ and ‘that there were 
of course numerous other conditions that still had to be fulfilled’.219 Those who 
remember the EU’s reaction to the arrest of Radovan Karadzic cannot have been 
surprised. In July 2008 the Council had basically limited itself to saying ‘thank you’ 
and then continued with business as usual.220 
To understand that this is not, or at least not primarily, a matter of member (state) 
specific obstinacy, we need to ask ourselves what would happen if the EU did 
decide to reward the arrest. The Council would then openly admit the political 
character of the process, thereby effectively undermining the credibility of the 
pre-accession trajectory as a whole. This would confirm to the Balkans something 
which politicians in the Republika Sprska and Macedonia have been claiming all 
216 European Voice, 26-5-2011: ‘EU welcomes Mladic arrest’.
217 Author’s interview, Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY (1999-2007), 14-6-2011. 
218 Author’s interview, Council level, 28-6-2012. One of the twelve points on which Serbia’s cooperation was 
lacking, was their unwillingness to conduct a search at an address visited only recently by Mladic’s wife. 
When the Serb authorities finally decided to search the location, this is where they found Mladic. 
219 NOS News report, 26-5-2011: ‘Reactie Rosenthal op arrestatie Mladic’. 
220 Author’s interview, domestic Level, 8-11-2010. See also Chapter 9, Section 2.
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along: that enlargement is all about politics rather than reforms.221 A speedy Opinion 
on Serbia’s membership application would thus paradoxically enough come down 
to giving in to the Balkan’s bluff. It is not hard to see why the Commission in 
particular would not be happy about such a move. But remaining in control is also 
in the interest of the Council. Making explicit links between the fulfilment of certain 
conditions and specific steps in the process would mean that the assessment itself 
can also be done by someone else, most notably the Commission. And the Council 
is of course keen on safeguarding its political room to manoeuvre. All this leads to 
a rather sequential logic: first the countries in the region have to ‘deliver’ and then 
the Council chooses an appropriate response. This chapter serves to illuminate the 
specific way in which the Council decides, for and by itself, whether and how to 
react to events, developments and reforms in the Balkans.
When discussing the procedural set-up of the Council’s policy making process for 
the Balkans, we are effectively talking about ‘the rules of the game’ and thus the 
way in which winners and losers are decided upon. As will become clear below, 
insiders hold widely diverging views with regard to the logic underlying this 
negotiation game. A first group believes the Council is structurally incapable of 
surpassing the lowest common denominator. According to them, the brakemen 
determine the pace and are therefore able to take home most prizes. A second 
group sees something of neo-functionalist logic at work. This refers to a process, 
which to a certain extent is self-propelling. They maintain that in day to day decision 
making in the Council, incrementalism has replaced deadlock and drivers instead 
of brakemen have the upper hand. That would also imply that drivers are more 
successful in terms of prizes. A third group sees no clear logic at all, but merely a 
Council haphazardly reacting to day to day political realities.222 According to them, 
the presumed logic of the Balkan pre-accession game is nothing more than the 
accumulated result of a series of such reactions. If this is indeed the case, than 
there is no reason to assume that either side is in a better position to acquire prizes. 
Which of these views is (more) correct, is of course an empirical question that will 
be addressed in Part III and answered in Part IV. Here, it is important to note that 
there are clear links between these three types of insider views and the theoretical 
perspectives presented in Part I. Within the first group a rationalist understanding 
appears to prevail, while the second group tends towards a constructivist reading 
of the decision making process. The third group does not seem to represent such 
221 Republika Sprska is the name of the Serb part of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was given an 
autonomous status in the Dayton Agreement of November 1995.
222 Author’s interviews, Ben Bot, Coreper Ambassador (1992-2002) and Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(2004-2007), 6-12-2010, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) and Working party level, 10-11-2010, 11-3-2011.
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an overarching theoretical perspective, or at least not yet. It primarily seeks to 
account for the way in which specific processes and procedures have come 
about.223 This is in line with what the Caucus race model aims to achieve: to reveal 
the invisible hand (presumably) guiding the process. A logical first step towards 
determining whether there is an underlying logic behind who wins and who loses, 
would be to find out what the (formal as well as informal) rules of the game actually 
are.
5.1  A rationalist understanding of EU negotiations:  
Schelling’s blackmail
“The culture of consensus means that we are all at the mercy of those who are least inclined 
to give in on a certain issue.”224
“Instead of coming to strong substantial agreement, the EU often ends up with softened 
language mirroring the lowest common denominator on which member states could agree.”225
“The domestic political costs tend to be more important than the costs of isolation in 
Brussels.”226
“There are countless opportunities for putting sticks in the wheels, even when the train is 
already moving.”227
“One can in all honesty wonder how many really have an interest in accepting the Balkan 
states into Europe.”228
If one looks at the formal characteristics of the Balkan pre-accession game, it 
becomes easy to understand why, according to many, brakemen have a structural 
advantage. For one thing, we are dealing with decision making under unanimity. 
The Council can only move if all are on board.229 While vetoing (or voting) seldom 
takes place, participants know where their adversaries veto points lie and will be 
inclined to steer clear of them. Trying to change the status quo accordingly requires 
223 See Chapter 2, Section 3 where I argue that to be able to distinguish between different theoretical 
perspectives, we need to look at the way in which (consensual) decisions and policies have come about. 
224 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-2-2011.
225 Author’s interview, Commission (Director) level, 22-7-2010,
226 Author’s interview, Working party level, 4-8-2010.
227 Author’s interview, Working party level, 15-6-2010.
228 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Director) level, 1-7-2010.
229 Although under the rules of unanimity an abstention does not count as a no-vote, which means that the 
Council can also ‘move’ with some member states abstaining. 
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a substantive investment of resources, to which member states will only be inclined 
if they consider it an important national priority. But in the Balkan pre-accession 
game there appears to be too little to gain and too much to lose to warrant such an 
investment.230 In view of the high political costs and the modest economic benefits, 
one would not expect many politicians to be enthusiastic about making the Balkans 
a priority. On the contrary, because of concerns regarding illegal immigration, 
organized crime and unemployment, enlargement fatigue is omnipresent. While 
enlargement might (still) be in the long-term economic and geo-political interest of 
(some of) the member states, it becomes hard to imagine why a politician would 
invest limited (social) resources, and limited speaking time in the Council, in such a 
risky endeavour. From a rationalist perspective, there simply seems to be too little 
at stake to keep the process going (cf. Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003). 
Participants’ outlook on the process, as reflected in the quotations above, expose 
a similar kind of reasoning. It is the same reasoning that underlies the by now 
familiar limited information model (Schneider & Cederman, 1994). In a general 
sense both drivers and brakemen are interested in keeping the process going, 
albeit at a different pace. But this means that in practice the pace is determined by 
the ones who face domestic constraints. The underlying logic is Thomas Schelling’s 
paradox of weakness, in which the power of the negotiator rests on a “manifest 
inability to make concessions and meet demands” (Schelling, 1980: 19). If on the 
national level, an actor can openly commit himself to a specific position, thereby 
creating domestic audience costs, he acquires an advantage at the European level 
negotiations. Putnam (1988) builds on this understanding in his logic of two-level 
games. Politicians are always simultaneously operating on the international level 
(level I) and the domestic level (level II). Those with a ‘small domestic win-set’ – 
meaning those who face severe limits on what they can get accepted back home 
– have a bargaining advantage at level I. They can credibly threaten the others with 
negotiation failure. Conversely, those who have a large domestic win-set, for 
example because it is not considered a salient issue, can be ‘pushed around’ on 
level I (Putnam, 1988: 440). They will be the ones making concessions, simply 
because they are considered to be able to make them. 
The limited information model adds an element of bluff to the game. Negotiators 
can strategically use their (presumed) domestic constraints to induce others to give 
in. Liberal intergouvernmentalist theory maintains that it is extremely difficult for 
national negotiators to hide their true domestic win-set from their peers (Moravcsik, 
1993: 159). However, as Bailer and Schneider have convincingly argued, this makes 
230 An observation that might very well apply to the issue area of foreign policy making as a whole (cf. Smith, 
Crowe & Peterson, 2006; Wallace, 2005).
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it hard to understand why such “fully informed negotiators bother to bargain at all, 
instead of agreeing on the supposedly easily foreseeable bargaining outcome in 
the first place” (Bailer & Schneider, 2006: 158-159). Why waste time and resources, 
if all know already where they are going to end up? A possible explanation might be 
that negotiators are really not that sure about their counterparts’ win-sets. This 
creates room for ‘blackmail’. On a general level Council negotiators might be 
well-informed about each others’ sensitivities and red lines. But they cannot with a 
reasonable degree of certainty assess whether someone is really unable to sell 
something at home. 
In the original model of Schneider and Cederman, the exit threat is very concrete: 
either a government will claim that it will be ‘forced to’ opt out of an agreement, it 
will not be able to get the agreement ratified, or even that it will lose power if it signs 
the agreement. The last one is in fact one of the recurring claims of Greece in the 
Macedonia game. Giving in with regard to the name issue would lead to the fall of 
the government.231 But I believe that, in light of the metanorm of consensus, the exit 
threat does not have to be as concrete as this. It suffices if a minister can credibly 
claim that signing up to an agreement will have a negative effect on his or her 
domestic standing. Politicians will be inclined to show solidarity to the political 
concerns of their peers, even without being able to assess the exact amount of 
damage a concession will do. An obvious example are the Dutch Foreign Minister 
Verhagen’s claims with regard to the ICTY cooperation of Serbia. While it would be 
hard to maintain that signing an SAA with Serbia (before Karadzic and Mladic were 
apprehended) would lead to massive protests in the streets of The Hague, Verhagen 
was able to employ the scrutiny by press and parliament as an argumentative 
resource.232 Along the same lines, without being able to assess the exact domestic 
repercussions of Spain recognizing Kosovo, Spanish mentioning of such diffuse 
audience costs would typically suffice. 
What this means for the Balkan pre-accession game as a whole is that we would 
expect the brakemen to have the upper hand, because they can strategically 
employ the domestic constraints they are (presumably) facing. In view of the limited 
gains to be made and the significant political costs, one would not expect drivers to 
231 Which was indeed what happened in October 1993. A Greek government that was already under 
pressure lost power, presumably because it had adopted an accommodating stance on the dispute with 
Macedonia over the name of that republic. Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 8-7-2010. 
See also Axt, Milososki & Schwarz (2006), Mavromatidis (2010). 
232 Author’s interviews, Council and PSC level, 8-7-2010, 28-6-2012. Although it is admittedly difficult to 
judge (even post hoc) how effective such an argument really was, even for the ones who employed them. 
It seems that there were some ministers willing to accept it as a legitimate reason for applying the brake.
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be willing and/or able to force brakemen into making concessions. In other words, 
the pace is determined by those who are least receptive to change (cf. Thomas, 
2009: 349). In view of the prevailing norms of responsiveness and restraint, it does 
not even matter whether we are dealing with ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ brakemen (Schneider 
& Cederman, 1994: 647). Drivers will from time to time ‘probe’ the possibilities for 
changing the status quo, but they will refrain from applying too much pressure. 
Even weak brakemen (whose ‘real’ domestic constraints are unclear) can quite 
comfortably remain in opposition and trust on the solidarity of their peers. 
Consequently, the enlargement train can only move when nobody is applying the 
brake. Outcomes are ‘weak’ because brakemen are structurally favoured. 
5.2  A constructivist reading: The neo-functionalist logic of the 
Justus Lipsius
‘The strange thing about the enlargement process is that it appears to create its own 
momentum. The tendency is always to pretend that everything is on track.”233
“The machinery does not stop, simply because we are divided. There are plenty of 
opportunities for bringing an issue to the table.”234
“The culture of consensus means that the pressure to find compromise-solutions greatly 
increases. One member state can less easily block a dossier for a longer period of time.”235
“Commission and Presidency are committed to keeping the process going. Those accused 
of being in a blocking position constantly find themselves in the dock, having to explain to the 
others what is so terribly important for them.”236
“The default option is to proceed.”237
Insiders frequently describe day to day decision making in Brussels as the proverbial 
butterfly wings that can at times lead to hurricanes in unforeseen places.238 While it 
might not necessarily be the place where the key decisions are taken, it is where the 
political dynamics originate. There is, as I have already explained in Chapter 1, 
never a shortage of plans or initiatives in Brussels. The relevant question here is 
233 Author’s interview, Working party level, 4-8-2010.
234 Author’s interview, Working party level, 12-1-2011.
235 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 4-8-2010.
236 Author’s interview, Working party level, 27-9-2010.
237 Author’s interview, Working party level, 13-10-2010.
238 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 27-5-2010, 16-6-2010, 17-7-2010, 
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how negotiators can anticipate, or perhaps even cause, such butterfly effects. Even 
for insiders it is often hard to determine where an initiative came from, who provided 
the spark and who is active in keeping up the momentum. Issues just appear to 
boomerang back onto the tables from time to time. It seems that in the Council one 
has to work hard(er) to keep something off the agenda. Issues may lie dormant for 
a while, but rarely do they die. 
When talking about (decision making) processes developing their own dynamics, 
institutions taking on a life of their own, while their members seemingly stumble 
from one decision onto the next, international relations theorists will instantly 
recognize the contours of neo-functionalism (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963). 
Originally neo-functionalism was a rather straightforward theory, trying to explain 
European integration through increased functional and economic interdependen-
cies (Haas, 1958: 383). The idea was that the integration in one economic sector 
(for example coal and steel) would create pressures for integration in other sectors 
(for example transport). Thus, European integration would, in a rather automatic 
and deterministic fashion, spill over from one policy field to another. Neo-function-
alism has been discredited mainly because it failed to come up with necessary 
scope conditions for its pivotal concept: (functional) spillover.239 More importantly, 
it failed to account for ‘the ghost in the machine’, meaning the driving mechanism 
behind that seemingly automatic process. European integration appeared to be 
something of a perpetual mobile machine. So when the machinery stopped 
(because integration slowed down), the theory lost ground.
Recently, there have been attempts to revitalize neo-functionalism by linking it to 
constructivist theorizing (cf. Niemann 2006; Niemann & Schmitter, 2009). Admittedly, 
the theory seems to have lost most of its grand theoretical pretensions. The 
parsimony is also gone. Next to functional, political and cultivated spillover, there is 
now exogenous, social and geographical spillover, the occurrence of each being 
highly conditional (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009: 56). This is not the place to engage 
in an extensive analysis of the progressive and degenerative elements of the 
modern neo-functionalist research programme (Lakatos, 1978). I will limit myself to 
‘cherry-picking’ some of the useful insights for understanding EU decision making 
on the Balkans, as it was characterized in the quotations at the head of this section.
The key elements of neo-functionalist theorizing, technocratic decision-making and 
incremental change, certainly seem to apply to the Balkan pre-accession game. 
Social spillover appears to be the applicable type of spillover here. Niemann (2006: 
239 Spillover seems to be closely related to the more general mechanism of feedback (cf. Jervis, 1997).
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37-42) postulates a four step (causal) mechanism. Social spillover starts with the 
internalisation of behavioural norms of appropriate behaviour. This induces/allows 
participants to engage in different types of interaction: deliberation instead of 
interstate bargaining.240 By means of these deliberations participants find ways to 
prevent deadlock and “induce consensus formation and progress” (Niemann, 
2006: 38, my italics). Lastly, social learning processes help generate a shift of 
expectations and loyalties from the national to the Community level. Although in 
modern neo-functionalist theorizing this shifting of loyalties and Europeanization of 
identities is something that can, but does not need to happen in order for social 
spillover to be able to occur (cf. Kerremans, 1996: 218; Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 
1997: 301).
According to this view, the Balkan pre-accession game is not really a two level 
game. Neo-functionalism attaches limited importance to the domestic level, as 
long as there is something of a permissive consensus (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009: 
48). One could reasonably assume that there is such a permissive consensus on 
the Balkans, seeing that it is not a highly salient issue in many member states. It is 
thus a process driven by elites, more specifically by the officials in their day to day 
meetings. The driving force comes from ‘the technocrats’ engaged in their 
continuous problem-solving exercises. Their interactions have evolved into: “a 
cumulative pattern of accommodation in which the participants refrain from uncon-
ditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by means of 
compromises upgrading common interests” (Haas, 1958: 66). A specific ‘tradition 
of play’ has thus come into being, favouring those who aim to keep the process 
going. The institutionally empowered players play a pivotal role in this. The 
Commission acts as the policy entrepreneur. By the skilful timing, strategic framing 
and proactive tabling of proposals, it has an important agenda shaping role. 
Provided the Commission does not overplay its hand vis-à-vis the member states, 
it can provide entrepreneurial leadership and broker agreements that surpass the 
lowest common denominator (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009: 60-61).241 
In the Balkan pre-accession game, the routine is usually as follows. The Commission 
is guiding the Balkan states through the process. It does most of the day to day 
negotiations. More importantly, it assesses the progress made (in fulfilling the 
240 Niemann initially uses the term ‘supranational problem solving’ but then switches to communicative 
action (Niemann, 2006: 65, 83-87). For reasons of consistency I will continue to use the term deliberation. 
241 Niemann (2006: 42-44) refers to the Commission’s entrepreneurship as part of cultivated spillover, 
referring to the “cultivation of relationships with interest groups and national civil servants so as to gain 
support for realising integrative objectives and to cultivate pressures vis-à-vis governments”. But since I 
focus solely on the Commission’s role within the Council debates, I refer to this as part of social spillover. 
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conditions). It has two important instruments for this. The first and most important 
are the annual Progress Reports in which the Commission evaluates the reforms 
undertaken by the countries in the region, and gives its opinion on whether further 
steps towards Europe are warranted. These reports are the building blocks of the 
December Council Conclusions. For the Council the bulk of the work comes in the 
Fall, when they have to agree on what parts of the elaborate reports will make it into 
the Conclusions, in what order and in what form. Here, literally every comma counts, 
as member states try to obtain priority status for their specific concerns. The 
Commission itself is not a passive observer and ‘absorber’ in these proceedings. 
As I have explained in the previous chapter, member states are effectively lobbying 
the Commission to take their requests into consideration. While inclined to take the 
wishes of member states seriously, the Commission can also decide that ‘the shop 
is closed’.242 The second instrument the Commission has at its disposal are the 
(Strategic and European) Partnerships. In these Partnerships, the Commission 
outlines the key priorities that specific Balkan countries have to work on, with 
corresponding time tables and deadlines. The Commission thus has the means to 
prioritize matters. Brakemen generally do not like time-lines and calendars as they 
create a sense of automatism. 
The Council Secretariat fulfils similar (assessing and prioritizing) roles, when it 
concerns CFSP instead of enlargement issues. Both tend to operate in close 
coordination with the incumbent Presidency. As day to day process manager a 
Presidency has extensive procedural and agenda-setting powers (cf. Tallberg, 
2008: 188-189). Presidencies have the right to make the first proposal and thus 
have a ‘first mover advantage’ (cf. Warntjen, 2008: 212). A Presidency also has ‘ex 
ante veto power’. It can enable as well as prevent a debate about an issue. It might 
be true that a Presidency, certainly in the issue area on which we focus here, does 
not have full control over the agenda (Warntjen, 2008: 207). There are in fact so 
many routine or recurring issues, that around eighty percent of the agenda is 
already pre-filled, before a Presidency can consider adding some national 
priorities.243 Moreover, prioritizing requires elaborate planning and Macmillian 
events have a habit of interfering with long term plans. But of course a Presidency 
will generally manage to squeeze in some matters it considers to be of particular 
interest. Also, it will make sure to include those dossiers on which it can reasonably 
expect to have some deliverables. In this way, even a Presidency that might not 
have substantive reasons for promoting the European integration of the Balkans, 
might find itself providing impetus. 
242 Author’s interview, Working party level, 13-7-2010.
243 Author’s interview, Working party level, 3-11-2010.
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“The most ‘political’ decision with regard to the agenda, is when to have Council 
Conclusions.”244 Some Presidencies aim for Conclusions almost every month, while 
others build up to an extensive package of Conclusions at the end of their 
Presidency. The first points to a strategy of riding the momentum, the second is 
about logrolling. Whichever is the wisest approach depends on the number of 
things happening ‘in the field’, and more importantly on the ‘mood in the room’. 
Having Conclusions every month can be a quite effective to keep up the pace. 
Provided that there is not a critical mass of member states, who feel that they are 
being rushed, If the latter is the case, then no Macmillian event will induce the group 
to quicken the pace. In that situation a Presidency better focus its energy on the 
June or December Conclusions. Few member states will deny a Presidency the 
courtesy of having at least some results at the end.
The national delegates themselves also have an interest in ensuring the relevance 
of their sub-unit. “Delegates like to have a sense of purpose. A Presidency can 
insert this purpose into the work of the group.”245 Over time functional loyalties can 
develop (cf. Kerremans, 1996: 232). Insiders tend to cite the example of Lord 
Cockfield, “who was sent by Thatcher basically to frustrate the integration process 
as much as possible, but who ended up writing the White Paper on which the 
internal market is based.”246 Being part of an organization, and taking part in a 
decision making of that organization, can create a sense of ownership. This sense 
of responsibility will probably not be strong enough to override pressing national 
concerns. It does not even have to mean that participants genuinely care about the 
process. But at the very least it can lead to a sense of (public) shame or a loss of 
social standing for those who can be shown as obstructing it. Appearing to be 
constructively engaged with the task at hand, thus serves all.
To sum up: if we limit our attention to the level I of the two-level game, it appears 
that here the drivers have the upper hand. I have indicated some of the neo-func-
tionalist characteristics. The process to a certain extent is self-propelled and 
depoliticized. The Balkans of the 20th century are no longer the playing-ground for 
top level politicians and their grand designs. Technocrats, at the community as well 
as the national level, appear to be (at least partly) in charge. The Commission in 
particular has ample room to display its supranational entrepreneurship. The 
Presidency has a need for - and the means to ensure - deliverables. And in their 
‘bureau-political roles’, national delegates are inclined to look for possibilities to 
244 Author’s interview, Working party level, 3-11-2010.
245 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-11-2010. See Chapter 2, Section 1.
246 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 8-12-2010.
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add meaning to their work. Of course all sides have an interest in adopting a careful 
approach so as to assure the others that they are in full control. But the default 
option is to proceed along the lines of the European perspective, as it was agreed 
to by all. All this leads to a process in which the brake is at best a temporary option. 
Outcomes might at times appear ‘weak’ as well as ‘long overdue’. But at least the 
mechanism ensures that progress will eventually be made.
5.3  Caucus race negotiations: The tyranny of small 
argumentative battles
“All in all, I have never had too high expectations about what could be achieved in Brussels. 
The EU is not a political actor. You cannot go to the Council and get it to adopt a position on 
anything.”247
“Discussions on foreign policy, especially when they concern the future implications of that 
policy, are certainly not an exact science.”248
“I think it would be a mistake to speak of the SAP as a blueprint or roadmap, when there is in 
fact no such thing as a clear strategic vision of the EU towards the Western Balkans. There is 
no ‘master plan’…Throughout the decade, political dynamics have shaped the SAP in ways 
often unforeseen by those taking the decisions. The Council thus operates by setting 
precedents and then getting stuck with them.”249
“The enlargement process seems to be guided by a tyranny of small decisions. With all these 
statements and declarations we are effectively committing ourselves over and over again.”250
When, in May 1999, the Commission launched the Stabilization and Association 
Process (SAP), of which the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA’s) are 
the central element, it was very careful about what it proposed to offer the Balkan 
countries. The communiqué underlined “that all the countries in the region have the 
prospect of increasing rapprochement with the EU.”251 In view of the particular 
situation the countries found themselves in, moving further away from Europe hardly 
seemed possible. The Commission of course had to be careful not to offend the 
member states, by offering something that was not hers to give. What the SAP 
mainly provided for was the prospect of establishing contractual relations with the 
247 Author’s interview, Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY (1999-2007), 14-6-2011.
248 Author’s interview, Working party level, 14-7-2010.
249 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) level, 10-11-2010.
250 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Director) level, 1-7-2010.
251 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, and the European Parliament on the Stabilization 
and Association process for countries of South-Eastern Europe’, Brussels 26-5-1999: 3.
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EU.252 Yet, it was obvious what the SAP envisioned. The process was after all 
modelled on the Europe Agreements (EA) that had been signed with the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC’s) and had served as the framework of their 
accession process. “What was clear to all was that the SAP in itself does not lead 
to anything substantial. These first steps do not by themselves make sense unless 
they are followed by further steps towards accession, such as the awarding of 
candidate status and the opening of negotiations.”253 
Initially the driving instructions were rather poor. Article 49 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Union (TEU) basically stated that any European state can apply for 
membership, after which the Commission assesses whether the country in question 
fulfils the necessary (Copenhagen) conditions, while the Council keeps the overview 
and together with the European Parliament (EP) takes the eventual decision.254 
Nowadays, there appears to be a clear succession of steps that the Balkan 
countries have to take on the road towards Europe. The basic logic of the SAP is as 
follows (see Figure 5.1). 
The Council first has to agree to ask the Commission to launch a feasibility study. 
This study serves to assess whether the country in question is ready and able to 
negotiate a SAA (and carry the obligations that accompany it). The Commission 
conducts and then adopts the feasibility study, after which the Council has to 
decide whether it agrees to the opening of SAA negotiations. Then the SAP 
trajectory as such can begin. The negotiations for a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement are again conducted by the Commission, while the Council is kept 
informed about the progress of the proceedings. The Commission can and will 
autonomously decide when the negotiations are completed and the country is 
sufficiently prepared to sign an SAA. It will then initialize the SAA. Then the ball is 
on the other side of the Rue de la Loi. The Council has to decide on the signing of 
the SAA, as well as the Interim Agreement (IA) on trade and trade-related matters. 
252 The SAP contained in total six elements: - the opportunity of signing a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement,- the further development of existing economic and trade relations, - the development and 
partial reorientation of existing economic and financial assistance, - increased assistance for democrati-
zation, civil society, education and institution building, - cooperation in the field of justice and home 
affairs, - the setting up of a political dialogue (cf. Blockmans, 2007; Schenker, 2008; Tatham, 2009).
253 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) level, 10-11-2010.
254 European Council meeting, Copenhagen 21/22-6-1993. Presidency Conclusions: 13: “Membership 
requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market 
economy as well as the capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.”
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Decisions Taken by the Council Taken by the Commission
14 Opening of accession 
negotiations
13 Recommendation to open accession 
negotiations
12 Awarding of candidate status
11 Delivery of avis on membership 
application
10 Request for an avis on the 
membership application
9 Entering into the second stage of 
the SAA
8 Assessment of track record in the 
implementation of the SAA
7 Decision to start ratification 
process of the SAA
6 Entering into force of the Interim 
Agreement (IA)
5 Signing of the SAA and the Interim 
Agreement (IA) 
4 Initializing of the SAA 
(closing of SAA negotiations)
3 Opening of SAA negotiations
2 Adoption of feasibility study for a SAA
1 Request for a feasibility study for 
a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA)
0 Pre-trajectory (political dialogue, 
autonomic trade preferences, 
roadmaps, tracking mechanisms)
Figure 5.1   Consecutive steps in the Balkan pre-accession trajectory
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It has to agree to the entering into force of the IA. And lastly it has to decide on the 
start of the ratification process (and thereby the entering into force) of the SAA. 
A new step was introduced in December 2006.255 Just signing an SAA was no 
longer considered as sufficient for entering into the accession process. The Council 
will first ask the Commission to assess whether a country has made sufficient 
progress in implementing the SAA. A positive assessment of this ‘track record’ is 
needed to be able to enter into the second stage of the SAA. The Council will 
subsequently decide whether it considers a country ready to enter into this second 
stage. After that, the road is more or less open for the Balkan country, to apply for 
membership.256
The implementation of the provisions of the SAA is overseen by a Stabilization and 
Association Committee and a Stabilization and Association Council.257 Such regular 
SA Committee and SA Council meetings of course provide excellent focal points 
(Schelling, 1980) for member states that want to raise attention to, for them, 
important issues. Agreeing on what will be the Council’s Common Position for such 
a meeting can be the subject of fierce debates at Working party and incidentally at 
PSC or Coreper level.258 However, the meetings themselves are highly structured 
and routinized proceedings, which for a large part consist of reading out precooked 
declarations.
The accession process proper starts when a country decides to apply for 
membership. Commission and Council have a joint interest in avoiding hasty 
applications, because these can only lead to disappointment and disillusionment 
with the EU. When a country has applied for membership the procedure is as 
follows. First the Council has to decide to ask the Commission to study the 
application and provide an avis. Then the Commission delivers the avis and can 
also suggest the opening of membership negotiations.259 Next the Council has to 
decide on the awarding of candidate status and the opening of accession 
negotiations. After the Council has agreed to the opening of accession negotiations 
the pre-accession process, which is the focus of the current study, is over. Council, 
255 Author’s interview, Working party level, 7-7-2010. I will return to the matter in Chapter 8, Section 1.
256 Although technically of course a country can apply for membership whenever it desires to do so.
257 The meetings of the SA Committee are the prerogative of the Commission and the rotating Presidency, 
while in the SA Council meetings the member states (the Council as a whole) play a larger part.
258 See for example Chapter 7, Section 2 and Chapter 9, Section 2 on the negotiations on the 2004, 2008 
and 2009 SA Council meetings with Macedonia. 
259 The avis will usually be positive otherwise the Commission would simply withhold it until it judges the 
country sufficiently prepared.
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Commission and the country in question will throw themselves on the thirty-five 
chapters of the accession negotiations.
In view of the elaborated framework provided for by the SAP, those who claim that 
the Council’s Balkan policies are erratic and event-driven, appear to have a hard 
case. Differences between the Caucus race and the constructivist/neo-functional-
ist model are indeed rather subtle.260 One has to be able to monitor closely what is 
going on at process level, to be able to see the differences in observable 
implications. What proponents of this third view are in fact claiming is that the 
process is not nearly as clear-cut and self-evident as it might appear. Where outside 
observers might see one step logically (and more or less automatically) leading to 
the next, they see a road that is constantly under repair.261 Such adjustments are 
considered necessary, because of lessons learned from previous enlargement 
rounds,262 but mostly because of different views of member states. In Council 
debates a way out is typically found in adjusting the instrument.263 The incentive can 
come from drivers, who at specific points in time want to offer incentives or rewards 
(such as for example the granting of candidate status). But it can also come from 
brakemen, who want to add intermediate steps to the ladder, where they can then 
apply specific conditionalities (for example, introducing a second stage in the 
SAA). But once the Council as a whole has agreed to such an adjustment, there is 
no way back. It will necessarily have to apply the adjusted instrument in all 
successive cases. 
The one question that still needs to be answered is: how does the Council typically 
adjusts its instruments? How do member states agree on a change in the collective 
line of policy? As I have already mentioned in Chapter 3, I believe these changes to 
be the result of a tyranny of small argumentative battles, as they are constantly 
taking place in the halls and corridors of the Justus Lipsius. These are the battles 
about the (monthly) Council Conclusions. In these Conclusions the Council expresses 
260 There is, I believe, a broader tendency for ‘historical institutionalist’ and ‘sociological institutionalist’ 
explanations to overlap (cf. Pollack, 2009, Pierson, 2004). Scholars opting for one or the other approach, 
might speak in terms of different mechanisms, for example path-dependence versus the diffusion of rules 
and norms. But on an empirical level, the observable implications often seem to be rather similar (in this 
case: actors and institutions choosing certain modes of decision making over others). At least when it 
comes to explaining decision making on a meso or macro level, opportunities to engage in ‘competitive 
testing’ appear to be limited (cf. Jupille, Caporaso & Checkel, 2003: 20-21). 
261 Of course, deliberations could (also) lead to an agreement on changing some of the procedures at some 
specific point(s) in time. However, from a deliberative perspective we would not expect these procedures 
to be challenged all of the time. I will further elaborate on this claim in Chapter 10, Section 2.
262 In particular the, according to many, premature accession of Bulgaria and Romania. 
263 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) level, 10-11-2010.
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its current point of view on specific matters. Day to day decision making on the 
Western Balkans effectively boils down to working from one set of Council Conclusions 
to the next. A lot of the dirty work comes down to drafting texts.264 Most of these 
drafting exercises take place, at least initially, at Working party level. These debates 
are by nature non-competitive: “The debate in Coweb merely allows members to 
clarify their position and explain to their capitals what the playing field looks like.”265 
Nobody expects Coweb to find solutions to big questions. Delegates rather look for 
creative ways to reiterate the usually well known positions. But as a consequence 
of these creative drafting exercises, language will over time evolve. The direction in 
which this language will evolve is what is at stake. Brakemen are trying to induce 
the Council to adopt careful language; drivers are constantly suggesting more 
ambitious wording. The overall policy line is the (to a certain degree unintended) 
result of the continuous struggles over who holds the pen.
According to this view, the key to winning a Council debate lies in the ability to draft 
well and draft first. Because then others will be forced to work from that draft, 
meaning that specific interpretation of developments. Those who manage to come 
up with an acceptable draft proposal, will be in a position to shape instead of react 
to a debate. It seems reasonable to assume that in these types of battles, neither 
side has a structural advantage. This would be in line with the third and fourth 
expectation of the Council Conclusions Reader, as they were presented in Chapter 
2: either you get the decision or you get your preferred language (drafting). It is in 
this way that a balance is kept between those who want to slow down and those 
who want to move forward with the policy making. To the extent that there is an 
invisible hand behind the decision making process, it appears to be the hand that 
holds the pen. However, at least in the Council it seems that neither side is able to 
keep the pen in their possession.
5.4 Conclusion: Structural winners or contingent results?
This chapter has provided three alternative explanations for the patterns and 
regularities (or ‘logic’) of the Balkan pre-accession game. The first stressed 
unanimity decision making and domestic constraints, the second peer pressure 
and incrementalism, the third varying success in drafting exercises. If the first view 
is correct, we would expect the brakemen to be able to take home most of the 
prizes. If the second view is correct, we would (at least in the long run) expect the 
264 Author’s interview, Working party level, 27-7-2010.
265 Author’s interview, Working party level, 16-6-2010.
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drivers to be able to prevail. Lastly, if the third view is correct, there would be no 
reason to expect either side to be the structural winner. Success in a specific battle 
is largely contingent upon what happens over the course of that battle. However, in 
line with the expectations of the Council Conclusions Reader, either side should be 
able to get back into the race, by means of the ‘language’ they acquired in the 
battles they ‘lost’. 
What logic prevails in the Council’s Balkan pre-accession game? This is something 
that cannot be determined by an accumulation of (self)assessments, as they were 
reflected in the quotations above. The answer to this question needs to come from 
a detailed reconstruction of the actual Balkan pre-accession game as it was played 
out over the last decade. For this reconstruction we need to travel back to where the 
game started, a provincial Portuguese town called Santa Maria da Feira.

Part III  From process to outcome
Council negotiations on the Western Balkans
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6.  Procedural anchors and verbal commitments  
(June 2000 – June 2003)
Conventional wisdom holds that the countries of the Western Balkans received their 
Membership Perspective at the European Council Summit in Feira in June 2000. 
Here, for the first time, the countries were explicitly referred to as “potential 
candidates for EU membership”.266 Afterwards, Feira was presented as one of the 
defining moments in the European integration of the Balkans. But at the time, 
participants felt they were mainly (re)stating the obvious.267 Since the Sarajevo 
Summit of July 1999, and in fact ever since the Dayton Agreement of November 
1995, Council and European Council had rather haphazardly been mentioning the 
fact that the Balkans ‘were part of Europe’. There was sufficient ambiguity in the 
phrasing to keep all member states aboard. After all, actual membership was still 
far away and a lot of conditions needed to be fulfilled. So what the member states 
were mainly signing up to in Feira, was the intention to help stabilize the region, by 
means of closer association with the EU. 
At the outset it appeared that this strategy of stabilization through association was 
anything but effective. After summitry had set all the Balkan countries on track, 
crises again broke out, notably in the country that was supposed to serve as an 
example for the region: Macedonia. While it provided the EU with the opportunity to 
prove that it had grown as a crisis-manager, the crises themselves appeared to 
strengthen the hand of the brakemen. Standstill in the region seemed to provide 
them with strong arguments for taking it slow in Brussels.268 In the years 2001-2002 
none of the countries was making real headway in their integration into Europe. 
Thus, when in May 2002 the upcoming Greek Presidency mentioned its ambition to 
organize yet another “high level meeting”, many did not see the relevance.269 Some 
member states saw it as ‘creating mousse’ and taking away focus from day to day 
work.270 Yet, the Thessaloniki Summit of 21 June 2003 would turn out to be the 
single most important event in the EU integration of the Western Balkans. Here 
member states explicitly acknowledged that the EU membership was more than a 
mere possibility. It was actually on the agenda.271 The European Council committed 
itself, and thereby the Council as a whole, to the implementation of this agenda.272 
266 European Council meeting, Santa Maria da Feira 19/20-06-2000. Presidency Conclusions
267 Author’s interviews, Working party and Commission (Director) level, 14-1-2011, 10-2-2011.
268 Author’s interview, Ben Bot, Coreper Ambassador (1992-2002) and Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(2004-2007), 6-12-2010.
269 2425th General Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels 13-5-2002. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
270 Author’s interview, Working party member, 14-1-2001.
271 I will elaborate on the (rhetorical) significance of this statement in Section 6.3.
272 ‘Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans Summit’, Thessaloniki 21-6-2003. Part 3.
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This chapter tries to reconstruct how the Council travelled from the ‘ambiguous 
commitments’ of Feira to the ‘agreed language’ of Thessaloniki. In view of the 
patchy evidence available, I will adopt something of a bird’s eye view. This means 
that the analytical framework, as it was developed in Part I, will only partially be 
applied.273 For the pre-Thessaloniki period, my data cover only fragments of the 
Council debates. Conclusions, particularly about the process level dynamics, will 
necessarily be a bit more tentative than in the chapters that follow. I will focus my 
attention on interpreting the verbal and non-verbal outcomes of the proceedings. 
The Council Conclusions Reader will be employed to denote the significant 
developments in this regard.274
273 See Appendix IV for an overview of the analytical structure of the Argument.
274 See Chapter 2, Section 3 for a specification of this ‘Council Conclusions Reader’. 
When What Who Concerning whom
26-2-1996 Adoption of Regional Approach Council All Balkan countries
29-4-1997 Establishing the principle of 
progressive conditionality
Council All Balkan countries
3-6-1999 Endorsement of the Stabilization 
and Association Process
European Council All Balkan countries
15-2-2000 Request for a feasibility study (1) Council Croatia
5-4-2000 Opening of SAA negotiations (3) Council Macedonia
24-5-2000 Adoption of feasibility study (2) Commission Croatia
19-6-2000 Santa Maria da Feira Summit European Council All Balkan countries
24-11-2000 Zagreb Summit
Initializing of SAA (4)
Opening of SAA negotiations (3)
Request for a feasibility study (1)
Preliminary steps towards 
feasibility study (0)
European Council
Commission
Council
Council
Council
All Balkan countries
Macedonia
Croatia
Serbia (& Montenegro)
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
9-4-2001 Signing of SAA and IA (5) Council Macedonia
14-5-2001 Initializing of SAA (4) Commission Croatia
1-6-2001 Entering into force of the IA (6) Council Macedonia
29-10-2001 Signing of SAA and IA (5) Council Croatia
1-3-2002 Entering into force of the IA (6) Council Croatia
1-9-2002 Request for a feasibility study (1) Council Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
21-6-2003 Thessaloniki Summit 
Declaration and Agenda
European Council All Balkan countries
Table 6.1   Key decisions with regard to Balkan pre-accession (2000-2003)275
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Table 6.1 provides an overview of the decisions taken in this period. Not all these 
steps were politicized.276 Of course, all steps were discussed at the relevant Council 
levels, but only few sparked a ‘real’ debate. I have discerned four games; two of 
which concerned all Balkan countries. The first one was about the political decision 
to grant a European perspective. This will be the subject of Section 1. The second 
was about giving content and meaning to this Perspective, which will be discussed 
in Section 3. The intervening period saw two country specific games; the first one 
about Macedonia, the second one about Serbia and Montenegro. These are the 
subject of Section 2. These two games were not solely, or even primarily, about 
European rapprochement as such. But they would have a large impact on 
Macedonia’s as well as Serbia’s further trajectory. This is why they are included in 
the study. The chapter as a whole seeks to explain how the stage was set for the 
Balkan pre-accession game of the rest of the decade. 
6.1 An accumulation of verbal commitments
Council debates are word battles. Much of the EU’s involvement in the Balkans 
during the Yugoslav wars of the Nineties can be reconstructed through its verbal 
statements; whether these served to express concern, call for dialogue, or suggest 
to refrain from unilateral actions. The ambiguous part of these statements was 
usually not the part about what the EU would like the Balkan countries to do. 
Suggestions are easy, not in the least because suggestions can be aggregated. 
The parts of the texts that required careful weighing were those that alluded to what 
the EU was prepared to offer in return. Commitments after all can only be specified; 
a move that cannot be undone. In one of the first (EPC) statements on the future 
relations between the Community and Yugoslavia, the Council already “expresses 
its confidence” that “the necessary conditions for the opening of negotiation[s] on 
the conclusion of an Association Agreement” will soon be fulfilled.277 It however 
explicitly mentioned that this was less of commitment and more of a “wish”. This 
example serves to show that when reading Council statements, particularly on 
issues of foreign policy making and enlargement, the parts that require close 
reading are those that link conditionalities to commitments, or ‘carrots’ to ‘sticks’. 
275 The numbers between brackets refer to different steps in the trajectory. See Chapter 5, Section 3.
276 For an explication of what I consider to be a (sub)game, see Chapter 3, Section 2.
277 Agence Europe, 4-1-1991: 7. At the time, the Council was mainly trying to induce the different republics 
of Yugoslavia to stay together in one state. In April 1991 it therefore stressed that “A united and democratic 
Yugoslavia stands the best chance of integrating itself in the new Europe” Agence Europe, 6-4-1991. 
Soon afterwards Slovenia and Croatia would declare themselves independent, precipitating the first 
(Slovenia), second (Croatia) and maybe also the third (Bosnia) Yugoslav war (cf. Silber & Little, 1996; 
Weller, 1992).
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Prehistory of the European perspective
If we were to follow the EU’s official reading, it started its ‘renewed involvement’ with 
regard to the Western Balkans, when it launched its so-called Regional Approach, 
aimed at “ensuring lasting stability and good-neighbourly relations in the region”.278 
The Council at the time was still reasoning along the lines of the Dayton/Paris peace 
process. The Regional Approach was designed specifically for those countries with 
which the EU was not planning to engage in association negotiations. There was no 
explicit mentioning of any Membership Perspective. The focus was on stabilizing 
Bosnia and making the neighbouring countries work together on Bosnia. In April 
1997 the Council introduced the principle of progressive conditionality in the further 
development of contractual relations with the countries of the region. While the 
particularities of these contractual relations would remain unspecified for another 
couple of years, most of the conditions were clear-cut and (by now) overly familiar: 
full cooperation with the ICTY, regional cooperation, a willingness to engage in a 
dialogue on the status of Kosovo.279 Some of the contours of the ensuing Balkan 
pre-accession debate were thus already in place: such as the idea that each further 
step required the fulfilment of stricter conditions, and the mixing of a ’political’ 
stabilization and a ‘technical’ rapprochement process.
Matters became more concrete during the 1999 German Presidency. The big 
Macmillian event was of course the Kosovo crisis and the ensuing NATO 
bombardments of Serbia. With hindsight the Kosovo crisis has been presented as 
the big game changer for the EU, after which all member states were forced to 
realize “that the Enlargement Process is the strongest means to ensure stability in 
Europe.”280 Yet, in the internal debate another matter featured at least as prominently. 
Some member states, most notably France, Italy and Greece (with regard to Serbia) 
and Austria and Germany (with regard to Croatia), were getting increasingly 
frustrated with the rigidity of the Regional Approach, which pivoted around the non-
developments in Bosnia. A working paper from the German Presidency suggested 
creating more room for ‘diversification’.281 Germany did not intend a complete 
revision of the Regional Approach. Insiders claimed that it merely wanted to be able 
to provide impetus to the EU’s relations with Croatia. The Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom were much in favour of maintaining the current mechanism. 
278 1915th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 26-02-1996. Council Conclusions. Former Yugoslavia. 
See the European Commission’s DG Enlargement’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement. 
279 2003rd General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg 29/30-4-1997. Council Conclusions. Former 
Yugoslavia and Annex III.
280 2109th General Affairs Council meeting. Brussels 19-7-1999. Open debate on the Presidency Programme. 
EU External Relations in the Post-Kosovo Era. See also (Gori, 2008).
281 Coweb 8-2, 1-3-1999. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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Obviously, their priorities at the time were with Bosnia.282 However, as the Kosovo 
crisis gained in intensity, it would be hard to argue in favour of anything but a 
regional approach.283 Moreover, this did not appear a suitable moment to make a 
push for Croatia, seeing that the nationalist regime of Tudjman was still in power. 
The regional initiative subsequently presented by the German Presidency was 
however not an exclusive EU affair. The so-called Stability Pact for Southeast Europe 
was a broader initiative primarily aimed at integration into the OSCE structures.284 
What is relevant from a ‘verbal commitments’ perspective, is that the link between 
stabilization and association had been made explicit. The Commission was 
subsequently provided with the opportunity to develop specific instruments with 
which to make this link more concrete. In its Communication on the Stabilization and 
Association Process, the Commission cleverly presented the SAP as the desired 
“enhancement of the Regional Approach”.285 At the time, member states were not 
sure what exactly the Commission was envisioning when it suggested the 
establishment of a “new category of contractual relations”.286 But it seems that there 
was simply not enough time thoroughly to study the initiative. Not certain about what 
they were signing up to, the member states urged the Commission to be careful when 
presenting it, so as not to raise unwarranted expectations. A Commission’ 
communiqué is after all not automatically EU Policy, although it tends to be interpreted 
as such, particularly in the region. The communiqué was nevertheless welcomed by 
the May Council and the June European Council as a way to draw the countries 
“closer to the perspective of full integration into its structures”.287
In subsequent Coreper discussions it became clear that some member states were 
not too happy about the amount of initiative displayed by the Commission.288 Would 
engaging in an association process with countries, which more or less found 
282 See Chapter 4, Section 1 on member states’ positionality in general and Dutch and British sensitivities 
with regard to Bosnia in particular.
283 Extraordinary General Affairs Council meeting. Brussels 8-4-1999: Council Conclusions. Kosovo: “A 
political solution to the Kosovo crisis must be embedded in a determined effort geared towards stabilizing 
the region as a whole.”
284 2173rd General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg 26-4-1999: Kosovo Crisis Conclusions. “The 
Stability Pact will give all Countries in the Balkans region a concrete perspective of stability and integration 
into the Euro-Atlantic structures.” See also, Agence Europe, 26/27-4-1999: 5-6.
285 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, and the European Parliament on the Stabilization 
and Association process for countries of South-Eastern Europe’, Brussels 26-5-1999: 2.
286 Coweb 22-9-1999. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
287 2186th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 31-5-1999: Council Conclusions Western Balkans.
288 Author’s interview, Working party level, 11-3-2011. Coreper 16-6-1999. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.
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themselves in a state of war, not be a bit premature? Did the SAP approach not offer 
too much, too soon and most importantly too automatically? However, with a 
Council in desperate need of a ‘comprehensive approach to the Balkans’, the 
debate was necessarily framed less in terms of readiness (of the countries), and 
more in terms of responsibilities (of the EU). The June Council Conclusions did 
contain a number of verbal side payments to the more hesitant member states. 
They for instance stressed “the active responsibility of the peoples and governments 
of the region”.289 However, in line with the fourth expectation of the Council 
Conclusion Reader, the decision itself went to the drivers. The SAP was adopted as 
the baseline approach for the EU as a whole. The most convincing proof of this 
perhaps are Germany’s relentless efforts to make sure that subsequent Council 
Conclusions continued to mention the Stability Pact.290 The fact that such efforts 
were needed already hints at the diminished standing of the Pact. From 2000 
onwards the focus would be on the SAP, although most member states were 
working from the assumption that, for the time being, the emphasis would be on 
stabilization instead of association.291
A big gesture to get rid of Milosevic
The year 2000 tends to be presented as one big success story for the EU in the Balkans. 
After the regime changes in Croatia and Serbia, the European Council summits of Feira, 
and Zagreb, the EU had seemingly found its comprehensive approach. At Zagreb all 
would have prizes. The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Macedonia 
was initialized, Croatia would formally start SAA negotiations. The Commission was 
invited to start working on a feasibility study for Serbia. Bosnia was to be assisted in 
fulfilling all conditions of the ‘roadmap’ towards a feasibility study. And Montenegro was 
satisfied simply by being invited to the meeting.292
Yet, with hindsight the run-up to Zagreb does not appear as smooth and the 
success as self-evident. It all started with what was indeed a big gesture from the 
European Council. The fact that at the Feira Summit the Western Balkan countries 
were presented as potential candidates for membership appears to have come as 
a surprise to many member states.293 It was rumoured that the Portuguese 
Presidency had acted under intense US pressure to strengthen the EU’s impact, 
289 2192nd General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg 21-6-1999: Conclusions on the development of a 
comprehensive policy based on the Commission Communication on “The Stabilization and Association 
Process for Countries of South-Eastern Europe. Annex I.
290 Author’s interview, Wilhelm Schönfelder, German Coreper Ambassador (1999-2007), 10-2-2011.
291 Author’s interview, Working party level, 11-3-2011.
292 Serbia and Montenegro (and Kosovo) jointly made up the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
293 Author’s interview, Working party level, 14-1-2011.
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coherence and visibility in the region.294 The direct occasion was a report, presented 
only at the actual meeting, from the Secretary General and High Representative, 
Solana, in which he laid out much of the EU’s Balkan strategy for the years to come. 
Solana, in close coordination with Commissioner Patten, had explicitly aimed for a 
rather loose mandate coming from the highest level, so as to provide him with 
sufficient leeway.295 Again, the constructive ambiguity in the report concerned the 
link between conditions and commitments; more specifically the use of Community 
instruments as a means to induce reforms. The Feira Summit instantly provided 
Solana with a mandate to start implementing this new approach. The Solana-Patten 
tandem had proven to be effective in steering the European Council level, thereby 
setting the terms of the debate at the lower levels.
Still, Solana and Patten were not the ones who could autonomously decide on the 
employment of Community instruments, notably the SAP, as foreign policy tools. 
For this, the member states needed to be brought on board. After the change of 
government in Croatia there was some momentum for positive gestures towards 
that country. But member states were still divided on how to approach Serbia.296 
The one thing that all member states could easily agree on was that Milosevic had 
to be removed from power.297 This more or less automatically implied supporting 
the (divided) democratic opposition in Serbia. The debate was about how to do 
this? It was in this light that the joint French-Croat initiative for another Balkan 
Summit was presented.298 Supposedly the initiative came from a tête-à-tête between 
President Chirac and President Mesic, although it is said that the incoming French 
Presidency had taken the initiative. Insiders refer to it as a typically French initiative 
to commemorate their Presidency, ‘with a lot of protocol and picture opportunities’. 
But was this really all there was to it?
It is hard to understand what Croatia, a country that was fighting hard to detach 
itself from the region, expected to gain from this regional initiative? Croatia had for 
example insisted on calling it the Zagreb summit, because it (too) wanted to shed 
the image of being ‘Balkan’.299 More significantly, Croatia at the time was already 
making progress in its European integration, when the June Council “agreed with 
the Commission’s assessment that the necessary conditions have been met by the 
294 Agence Europe 27/28-3-2000: 4. Author’s interview, Working party level, 2-2-2011.
295 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) level, 27-9-2010 (See Patten, 2006: 157-161).
296 Coweb 13-1-2000. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
297 Author’s interview, Working party and domestic level, 14-12-2009.
298 Agence Europe, 13/14-6-2000: 6.
299 In line with the efforts of Slovenia (See Chapter 4, Section 1), Croatia has tried to detach itself from (rather 
than identify itself) with the Balkans (cf. Tanner, 2010: XI). 
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new Croatian Government for the opening of negotiations on a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement”.300 The actual opening of the negotiations was thus a 
matter of time. Croatia did not really need an EU-Western Balkans summit for that. 
Why would Croatia still want to act as initiator? A possible explanation might be that 
Chirac had in fact made Mesic an offer one cannot refuse.301 The new Croatian 
government could simply not afford to turn down an invitation from such a major EU 
player. They were working hard to make their (re)appearance on the European 
stage. Hosting a summit would be a first step in getting rid of the Tudjman legacy. 
As it turned out, Croatia would very soon come to regret all the requirements 
regarding regional cooperation inserted into the Zagreb Declaration.302
What did the French seek to gain from the initiative? After all, French priorities had 
been with Serbia instead of Croatia. On the political level, France had focussed its 
energy on the (automatic) lifting of the sanctions on post-Milosevic Serbia.303 
Supposedly, it was France that had insisted on including the Croat General Gotovina 
on the ICTY’s ‘most wanted list’.304 And in day to day SAA negotiations the country 
was very hesitant about granting Croatia (asymmetric) access to the Community 
market.305 So it would be hard to maintain that France was traditionally acting in the 
best interests of Croatia. French motivations might be derived from Solana’s reading 
of events. According to the High Representative, favourable developments in 
Croatia, could lead to Serbia becoming a black hole in the Balkans, which would in 
turn entail “dramatic consequences for Montenegro and Kosovo”.306 The Zagreb 
Summit was therefore meant - this was to become the official reading - to use the 
positive example of (democratic reform in) Croatia to put pressure on Serbia. It 
served to show to the Serb democratic opposition what the EU had to offer. The 
Summit was the big gesture that was needed to finally get rid of Milosevic. Yet, what 
is strange about this reasoning, is that Serbia was already a black hole; largely 
isolated and still suffering under a largely ineffective sanctions regime.307 And 
300 2271th General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg 13-6-2000. Western Balkans Conclusions.
301 Author’s interview, Croatia level, 12-10-2011.
302 Coweb 15-12, 18-12-2000, 8-2, 19-2-2001. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (See Bechev, 
2006). 
303 See for instance Agence Europe, 18/19-9-2000: 5. The sanction regime was the EU’s most decisive 
reaction to the Kosovo crisis. The Council had been debating the effectiveness and feasibility of the 
sanctions for months. The explicit promise that the sanctions would automatically be lifted, if the Serb 
democratic forces managed to win the elections, was a clear victory for French Foreign Minister Védrine.
304 Author’s interview, Working party level, 14-1-2011. See Chapter 7, Section 1.
305 Coweb 15-9-2000. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
306 Agence Europe, 13/14-6-2000: 6.
307 ‘Ineffective’ because it did not provide enough of an incentive for the Serbian opposition to unite in an 
effort to get rid of Milosevic. See also De Vries (2002), De Wilde d’Estmael (1998).
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organizing a summit, in which the other Balkan countries would be able to parade 
their progress, would only enhance this isolation. If this was really an attempt to 
bring Serbia forward, the Council took a big risk. There was the very real possibility 
that the September 2000 elections would not lead to Milosevic losing power.308 And 
that would have meant that the black hole would only have become bigger. 
A more convincing explanation as to why the French made a smart move when they 
approached Croatia about organizing the summit, is that they were acting not 
(primarily) as a driver for Serbia, but rather as a brakeman on Croatia.309 At the very 
least, they had an interest to prevent Croatia from getting too far ahead of the 
others. This was of course not the kind of reasoning for which they could expect to 
get the support from the friends of Croatia. What was part of the agreed language 
however was the Regional Approach. The Council had always stated that it 
considered regional cooperation a precondition for European integration. Critics 
pointed out that this condition came down to establishing: “Yugoslavia as a 
permanent waiting room”.310 A regional approach meant that to a considerable 
degree the pace was determined by the slow(er) ones. An interpretation of events, 
along the lines of the second expectation of the Council Conclusions Reader, would 
then be that France proactively employed the agreed language on regional 
cooperation so as to prevent too many member states from investing in the debate. 
At the outset, this strategy appeared to work. While the French Presidency had 
pledged to keep all involved in the preparations for the Zagreb Summit, it quickly 
became clear that this was going to be “a French Party”.311 Most of the texts were 
drafted in Paris and were hurried through Coweb, PSC and Coreper at the last 
minute.312 The plenary strategy of the Presidency was to invite participants to take 
their concerns almost instantly to the ministerial level. However, again in line with 
my fourth expectation, the French might have succeeded in using agreed language 
to get their preferred decision; in this case a regional summit. But they would have 
to allow others to get their preferred language into the Final Declaration. The Council 
delved into the verbal commitments that were to make up this Declaration. In view 
of its constructive role during the Kosovo crisis, there were a lot of pledges for 
allowing Macedonia to make progress. Some member states were more hesitant 
308 In fact, the fall of Milosevic in October 2000 came as a surprise not only in Brussels but also to the 
initiators (for example ‘Otpor’) in Serbia. Author’s interview, 14-1-2000. See also Blommaert (2003). 
309 Author’s interviews, Coweb and Council Secretariat (Director) level, 14-1-2011, 11-2-2011.
310 Agence Europe 13-7-2000: 5.
311 Author’s interviews, Working party and Council Secretariat (Director) level, 14-1-2011, 11-2-2011.
312 Coweb 7-11-2000, PSC 14-1, 15-11-2000, Coreper 15-11, 16-11-2000. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
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about already allowing Serbia as well as Bosnia to participate in the SAP. There 
were the soon to be familiar ‘incentives versus conditionalities’ debates in which 
member states expressed their concerns, about mentioning the ICTY, stressing 
territorial integrity, good neighbourly relations and adopting a constructive attitude 
towards Kosovo. Most of these concerns would make it into the Final Declaration of 
the Zagreb Summit. Which adds to the impression that the Council had indulged in 
its habit of building ‘a Christmas tree’, to which all could add ornaments.313 However, 
what the Declaration stressed most explicitly was the need for “regional cooperation 
and regional reconciliation”.314
At the Zagreb Summit, the European Council’s big gesture of Feira was turned into 
an actual policy line. The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), which until 
then had been presented as a separate initiative, became the main pre-accession 
instrument.315 The member states seemed to be united in their stabilization by 
means of association approach. But part of this consensus appears to have been 
rhetorical. For some this regional initiative was primarily meant to bring Croatia 
forward, while for others it was an attempt to prevent Serbia from being left behind. 
There are two observations that strengthen this characterization of the debate. First 
of all, it might explain why some were trying to bring the Summit forward so that it 
would take place before the elections in Serbia.316 Obviously the friends of Serbia 
were against this move, which is probably why the summit was not brought forward. 
To the Croats and their friends this must have been something of a disappointment. 
When the event was conceived in mid-summer, they had intended it to be a show 
performed for Belgrade, with Mesic in a star role. They were obviously not amused 
that, after the long-awaited fall of Milosevic in October 2000, the intended audience 
would not only be able to join them on the stage. They would in fact come to steal 
the show.317
313 See Chapter 2, Section 1. The image of a ‘Christmas tree’ refers to an essentially non-competitive debate 
in which participants seek to include (aggregate) practically all the concerns uttered by their peers.
314 European Council meeting, Zagreb, 24-11-2000. Final Declaration. See also Agence France Press 
20-11-2000. This is clearly the message the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Védrine wanted to send: 
“une coopération régionale dans le sud-est de l’Europe” sans recréer une “nouvelle Yougoslavie”.
315 “The Declaration of the Zagreb Summit”, 24 November 2000, 4: ‘The way is now open to all the countries 
of the region to move closer to the European Union as part of the stabilization and association process.”
316 Coweb 6-7-2000. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See the 2282nd General Affairs Council 
meeting, Brussels 10-7-2000: Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. Here the Council deliberately 
states its intention to hold the summit in the autumn in support of the democratic opposition forces. By 
the time of the actual summit, these democratic forces would no longer be in the opposition. 
317 Financial Times 24-11-2000: 3: ‘Balkan Summit: EU to offer aid to troubled region’.
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This reading of events would also explain why, according to many insiders, the 
Serbs were offered too much in Zagreb.318 When discussing the incentives that 
should be offered in order to induce democratic change, most were under the 
impression that the Council would not actually have to deliver on them, or at least 
not right away. Telling are the remarks by leader of the democratic opposition, 
Kostunica. He publically expressed his fear that the summit would come too soon, 
thus not providing Serbia with enough time to ‘democratize’ and not allowing the 
relations between Serbia, its neighbours and the EU to ‘normalize’.319 Here, we see 
the Serb leadership effectively asking the EU to please hold on to their gifts, 
because they might not be in the opportunity to receive them. 
What to make of this first round of the Balkan pre-accession game? Even after 
Zagreb, there was a lot of ambiguity about what was going to be the EU’s approach 
to the Balkans. First and foremost, the SAP proposed an own merits approach, in 
which progress depended on individual achievements, while the political message 
was first to improve regional relations. The one thing that was clear was that the 
Balkan countries were not particularly committed to this regional element. The SAP 
was seen by them as the way in which to make individual progress. To a certain 
degree there appears to have been a neo-functionalist logic at work during this 
early period. Supranational entrepreneurship of the Commission had created the 
SAP. Entrepreneurship of Solana had led to the incorporation of the SAP into the 
EU’s foreign policy toolkit. Presidencies could (still) make ample use of their room 
to manoeuvre and come up with grand initiatives. 
As for the member states; it appears that many of them were still trying to figure out 
what kind of tool they were actually holding with the SAP. This became clear in day 
to day negotiations about the SAA negotiations with Macedonia and Croatia.320 In 
its negotiation mandate for an SAA with Macedonia, the Commission had without 
much ado managed to get the Council to accept that it would also be able to 
negotiate an Interim Agreement (IA), covering the trade related elements of the SAA. 
‘Zagreb’ was to offer all Western Balkan countries asymmetric trade preferences, 
meaning favourable access to the Community market. The IA would adjust this 
imbalance and provide equal access to the market of that specific Balkan country. 
Member states appeared hesitant about providing the Commission with this extra 
competence, even though it seemed very much in their interest to do so.321 It was 
318 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Director) level, 11-2-2011.
319 Agence Europe 20-9-2000: 4.
320 Coweb 28-11, 15-12, 18-12-2000, Coreper 4-10, 15-11, 16-11-2000. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
321 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-11-2010.
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equally unclear what other elements of the SAP, such as the political dialogue, 
would amount to. From a rationalist perspective one could perhaps even claim that 
the SAP represented the lowest common denominator outcome at the time. In the 
short term, there certainly did not appear to be very much at stake, which means 
that there was also little reason (for the brakemen) to consider applying the brake.
6.2 Driving lessons for the Dodo?
The first round of the Balkan pre-accession game had been one in which summitry 
played an important role. The institutionally empowered players played a pivotal 
role in drafting initiatives.322 The European Council was where most of the important 
decisions were taken. However, from 2000 onwards much of the game was 
transferred to the Council. Management increasingly fell to the rotating Presidencies 
of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC).323 This was the first 
step towards ‘standardizing’ decision making on the Balkans. The SAP provided 
the general framework. The debate shifted to the specificities of that process. The 
main thing member states had to reach a consensus on was again the link between 
what it was they wanted (specific) Balkan countries to do and what they were 
prepared to offer in return. This section traces two of the earliest games and tries to 
characterize the outcome or consensus reached. As will become clear, for most of 
the drivers and brakemen these early rounds were largely part of the warming-up. 
But they would soon learn that even in a warm-up round, prizes can be won.
 
The ‘anchoring’ of post-crisis Macedonia
In the margins of its April 2001 meeting, the Council signed the first Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (SAA) with Macedonia, a republic which found itself in the 
midst of an inter-ethnic crisis.324 There is the persistent impression, at least amongst 
outsiders, that the SAA was offered because of the crisis. It was to be used as a carrot: 
meaning an incentive for engaging in political dialogue and reforms. In reality, the 
signing of the SAA was certainly not a reaction to this crisis. The signing as such was 
to be expected. After the Commission had initialized the agreement in Zagreb, it was 
322 See Chapter 4, Section 1 for an overview of the institutionally empowered players and their positions.
323 Throughout the decade this Council would sometimes be split in two; General Affairs and External 
Relations/Foreign Affairs (GAC/FAC). At other times, it would meet as one joint (GAERC) Council. 
324 The crisis followed after similar unrests in the Presevo valley in South-Serbia, which in its turn had spilled 
over from the 1999 crisis in Kosovo. All three crises concerned the inter-ethnic relations between the 
Albanian and Slav (Macedonian or Serb) populations living there. Whereas in Kosovo the Albanians 
formed the clear majority, in Macedonia they were a minority, fighting (with words as well as weapons) for 
improved rights and political representation (cf. Detrez, 2002).
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clear that the Council would sign the SAA soon. For the incoming Swedish Presidency 
this was a fait accompli.325 Yet the way in which the decision was eventually framed, 
made it clear that crisis management and European integration were not going to be 
parallel processes. The main question was how exactly they were (to be) linked. 
In preparation of the Council in April, Coweb had already engaged in an extensive 
debate about whether the EU could use the political conditionalities of the SAP to 
stimulate inter-ethnic dialogue and political-judicial reforms in Macedonia. At the 
March Council meeting, Commissioner Patten had in fact encouraged such 
instrumental use of the SAA.326 Seeing that this was primarily an exercise in crisis-
management, it appears to have been a debate between ‘the usual suspects’, 
meaning those who traditionally take the lead, when it comes to discussing the 
development and employment of the EU’s CFSP/ESDP capabilities.327 It is difficult 
to frame this as a driver-brakemen debate. None but Germany appeared to be in 
favour of postponing the signing of the SAA. Even though most were aware that this 
was effectively the only ‘carrot’ the EU had to offer at the moment.328 The UK and 
France (as well as Italy and Spain) were in favour of decoupling the crisis management 
process from the SAP. Greece, the obvious key player in any debate about Macedonia, 
had been raising numerous concerns during the actual SAA negotiations, but was 
notably absent.329 At the Council meeting, Foreign Minister Papandreou made it 
clear that his main concern was with the inviolability of borders in Southeast Europe. 
The Council decided to use the occasion of the signing of the SAA to send a 
political signal about the way in which it would like the Macedonian authorities to 
handle the crisis. For the time being the Council agreed on a rather ambiguous link 
between the two processes. It urged all parties involved “to work together to 
consolidate further a true multi-ethnic society in FYROM as part of its progress 
along the road to Europe under the Stabilization and Association Process”.330 
The consensus underlying the Council’s approach to Macedonia at the time was 
that it had to become an example for the region. The question however was, an 
example of what? For ‘Commission-minded’ member states, Macedonia was to be 
an example of the viability of the SAP. Even though the process towards the signing 
of the SAA had been far more ‘politicized’ than the Commission would have 
325 Author’s interview, Working party level, 14-1-2011.
326 Agence Europe 19/20-3-2001: 5-6. 
327 Meaning France, The United Kingdom and Germany (cf. Gross, 2007; Patten, 2006; Smith, 2003).
328 Coweb 29-3-2001. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
329 Author’s interview, Working party level, 2-2-2011.
330 2342nd General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg 9-4-2001: Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
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preferred, it was eager to show that the instrument itself functioned properly.331 From 
a bureau-political perspective there is little relevance in designing a process, 
if there are none able to participate in it. For the member states interested in developing 
the EU’s CFSP/ESDP toolkit, Macedonia was to be an example of the Council’s 
improved crisis management capabilities.332 At the time of the signing of the SAA 
both goals were still compatible. Very soon, it would turn out that they were not.
The reason for this incompatibility was that the signing of the SAA did not help to 
solve the crisis in Macedonia.333 The continuation of the crisis did provide the Council 
with the opportunity to employ one of the aforementioned elements of the SAP: 
the political dialogue.334 However, the inter-ethnic violence increased. The Council, 
and the PSC in particular, started looking for additional instruments to employ.335 
331 Author’s interview, Working party level, 14-1-2011.
332 Author’s interview, Commission (Macedonia Unit) level, 26-1-2011.
333 The Commission tried to present the “historic event” of initializing of the SAA with Croatia on 14 May, as 
a signal to Macedonia as well as Serbia and Montenegro that it had something to offer them. 2346th 
General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 14/15-5-2001: Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. Agence 
Europe 14/15-5-2001: 5,10. 
334 Coweb 3-5-2001. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See Section 1.
335 Such as the permanent deployment of an EU Special Representative (EUSR) in Skopje to facilitate the 
dialogue between Macedonians and Albanians. 
When Who What
9-4-2001 Council At the signing of the SAA, “called on the government and 
all democratically elected political representatives to work 
together to consolidate further a true multi-ethnic society in 
FYROM, as part of its progress along the road to Europe 
under the Stabilization and Association Process.”
25-6-2001 Council Calls for a political dialogue, whose “results will determine 
the further development of the EU’s relations with FYROM”. 
13-8-2001 Presidency Confirms the EU’s “determination to stand by the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as it draws closer to 
Europe, along the route mapped out at the Zagreb Summit 
by the Stabilization and Association Process.” Stresses 
“that there is no alternative to implementation of the political 
agreement which has just been reached.”
8-10-2001 Council Stresses that: “Unless the Framework Agreement is 
implemented, the process of rapprochement of the FYROM 
with the European Union will be compromised.”
Table 6.2   Key moments in the debate on the OFA Conditionality (Macedonia)
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Many of these instruments would eventually be ‘tried out’ in Macedonia.336 But 
more important for the Balkan pre-accession game was that Council as well as 
Commission started to reconsider whether the SAP could and should continue to 
be used as one of these instruments. The ideal occasion for discussing the matter 
presented itself in June 2001, when the Council was to debate the Commission’s 
annual Review of the SAP. Patten, who only three months earlier had supported the 
political use of the SAP, now applied the brake. Further politicizing of the SAP meant 
putting its integrity and credibility in danger. According to the Commissioner the 
SAP should no longer be used as ‘an incentive’. Upholding the conditionalities was 
more important than using the SAP to induce and reward broader reforms.337 The 
ensuing Council debate can again only be described as messy, at least when 
judged from the perspective of drivers and brakemen. Member states appear to 
have been unsure about whether political use of the SAP would come down to 
speeding up or slowing down Macedonia’s European integration. Judging the 
ensuing Council’s Declaration it seems that those in favour of the political use of the 
SAP, eventually won out. The Declaration stressed that “results [in the political 
dialogue] will determine the further development of the EU’s relations with 
FYROM”.338
The EU’s, and in particular Solana’s, crisis management efforts would soon turn out 
to be successful, which led to the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) 
on 13 August 2001. In what appears to have been clever drafting on the part of 
Solana’s Policy Unit, the accompanying EU Declaration drew a rather explicit link 
between the OFA and the SAP. It reiterated the EU’s “determination to stand by the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as it draws closer to Europe, along the 
route mapped out at the Zagreb Summit by the Stabilization and Association 
Process.” But it also stressed: “that there is no alternative to implementation of the 
political agreement which has just been reached”.339 The language became even 
more explicit in the Council Conclusions of October 2001. Here the Council stated 
that: “Unless the Framework Agreement is implemented, the process of 
rapprochement of the FYROM with the European Union will be compromised”.340 
This effectively meant that all the commitments that the Macedonian authorities 
had (necessarily) signed up to in Ohrid, now became part of the conditions to be 
336 Author’s interview, Commission (Macedonia Unit) level, 26-1-2011.
337 2356th General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg 11/12-6-2001: Annex, Council Report – Review of 
the Stabilization and Association Process.
338 2362nd General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg 25-6-2001. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Statement on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
339 Declaration of the Belgian Presidency on behalf of the EU. Agence Europe 15-8-2001: 1-2.
340 2372nd General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 8/9-10-2001: Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
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fulfilled under the SAP. These Council Conclusions apparently could count on broad 
approval by the member states.341 Perhaps some of the ministers were not aware of 
the potential consequences. Not only had the link between a (supposedly) technical 
(SAP) and a (supposedly) political (OFA) debate been made explicit. The logic had 
been turned upside down. It was no longer about using elements of the SAP to 
induce political reforms, but about making these reforms part of, and a pre-condition 
for further progress in, the SAP.
The October Conclusions would significantly affect the contours of the ensuing 
rounds of the Macedonia game.342 Even after the crisis had long passed, the OFA 
conditions were still there. The Council had seemingly without much ado gone from 
considering the (temporary) loosening of conditionalities to effectively adding new 
conditionalities.343 In the coming years, difficulties in implementing the OFA reforms 
could and would be used by brakemen (most notably by Greece) to slow down 
Macedonia’s progress towards the EU.344 It thus comes as no surprise that after the 
Interim Agreement entered into force in June 2001, Macedonia’s progress towards 
Europe came to a standstill.
How to make sense of the first round of the Macedonia game? It appears to have 
been primarily a race between the institutionally empowered players. The first thing 
to note is the limited willingness of member states to pick a battle over Macedonia.345 
Member states, and the Swedish Presidency in particular, wanted to bring the 
region as a whole forward, using Macedonia as an example. Nobody really had 
much at stake, which explains why the ‘positionality’ was so messy in terms of 
drivers and brakemen. It appears that at the time member states were inclined to 
follow the one holding the pen. This was either the Commission or the Council 
Secretariat’s Policy Unit.346 Bureau-political considerations can account for the 
difference in outlook between the two. While from 2002 onwards the Commission 
341 General Affairs Council 8/9-10-2001. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
342 See Chapter 7, Section 2 and Chapter 9, Section 2. 
343 One can for example wonder whether the political promise to facilitate the coming about of an Albanian 
University in the city of Tetovo should be part of the discussions about Macedonia’s EU integration. Even 
though the Copenhagen criteria (see Chapter 5, Section 3) are sufficiently broad to subsume this under 
the heading of ‘respect for minorities’.
344 Author’s interview, Commission (Macedonia Unit) level, 8-7-2011. See also Chapter 7, Section 2.
345 Participants find it hard to recall who (if any) were pushing for Macedonia at the time. Author’s interviews, 
Working party level, 14-1-2011. 2-2-2011.
346 Bearing in mind that the Council’s ESDP framework, such as the PSC, had only just become operational, 
providing Solana with a considerable amount of leeway. For the time being, the member states were 
more than happy to let Solana take the lead. Author’s interviews, Working party level and Council 
Secretariat (Policy Unit) level, 27-9-2010, 12-1-2011, 11-3-2011.
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considered Macedonia to be a “fairly stable country”, the Secretariat had an interest 
in presenting it as a “post-crisis hot spot”.347 Because of the 2001 crisis the one 
holding the pen, even in SAP related discussions, was often Solana. But, officials 
inside the Commission proved themselves to be quick learners. Bureau-political 
actors strive to safeguard their relevance, by maintaining autonomy and control 
over their part of the job. Thus, when Solana engaged in another attempt to employ 
Community instruments as foreign policy tools, the Commission was ready to stand 
its ground.348 This time the Commission was the one giving driving lessons to the 
Presidency and thereby to the Council. And Solana would soon get frustrated with 
the Commission: “because they could not deliver on his promises”.349
‘Solania’
At the Zagreb Summit of November 2000 the seeds had already been sown for 
what was to become the first round in the Serbia game. This would (again) turn out 
to be a game mostly between the institutionally empowered players. But it would 
(again) have major consequences for the subsequent Serbia games. In Zagreb, all 
but the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), had been assigned two seats; one 
for their Head of Government and one for their Minister of Foreign Affairs. The FRY 
however needed a third seat, because before the overthrow of Milosevic the 
Montenegrin President Djukanovic had already been invited. In view of the tension 
his presence might cause with the new leader of the FRY, Kostunica, there were 
some in Brussels who hoped that Djukanovic would not show up. But Djukanovic 
decided to make use of the extra chair. More than that, he instantly asked the 
European leaders to recognize Montenegro as an independent state. While stating 
his willingness to engage in a “patient dialogue” with Belgrade, he also announced 
that he would organize a referendum on independence within half a year.350
In Brussels, Serbia was considered the motor of the region and there was a 
(‘reasoned’) consensus on avoiding further fragmentation of the Balkans. Kostunica 
had already stated that a unilateral breakaway move from Montenegro would be 
disastrous. The Council wanted to provide him and the newly democratic FRY a 
chance to prove itself. As it turned out, the Council would be a bystander in the high 
level political brokerage to preserve the union of Serbia and Montenegro. It limited 
347 Author’s interview, Commission (Macedonia Unit) level, 26-1-2011. While with hindsight, it is of course 
easy to conclude that Macedonia was ‘a training ground without real danger’, the general impression 
seems to be that the EU was overdoing it a bit in the employment of its ESDP tools in Macedonia. (cf. 
Emerson & Gross, 2007).
348 Author’s interview. Commission (Director) level, 11-2-2011.
349 Author’s interview, Working party level, 14-1-2011.
350 Agence Europe 25-11-2000: 3.
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itself to praising the efforts made by the Solana-Patten tandem, and urging the 
participants to agree on constitutional reforms.351 A lot of US pressure, and a lot of 
meetings behind closed doors were needed to be able to reach a deal in which the 
Montenegrin ambitions were effectively put on hold for three years. This ‘moratorium 
on independence’, which was formalized in the “Belgrade Agreement” of 14 March 
2002, led to the coming into being of a new state. On 4 February 2003, the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro replaced the FRY, although in view of its creator, 
the state has often been referred to as ‘Solania’.
The creation of Solania was without doubt a political deal with security concerns in 
mind. Yet, it was a deal in which Community instruments were involved. There have 
been many debates about whether the State Union has hampered or promoted the 
European integration of Serbia as well as Montenegro (cf. Kim, 2005). Understandably, 
people around Solana refuse to see it as a step back (mainly for Montenegro), 
whereas people within the Commission believe it did contribute to a stalemate.352 
What is more interesting, at least in light of this research, is how the decision was 
framed. And how this framing led to the (perhaps partly voluntary) entrapment of 
both drivers and brakemen.
At the outset the Council had been very careful in choosing its words. In the January 
2001 Conclusions statements regarding the SAP were (quite literally) far removed 
from remarks about need for a constitutional dialogue between Belgrade and 
Podgorica.353 The message the Council was trying to send was rather straight-
forward: “EU integration starts at home”.354 It took until October for remarks about 
the SAP and the dialogue to start appearing in the same paragraph.355 The language 
however remained highly ambiguous. In its November 2001 Conclusions for 
example the Council stated that: “new constitutional arrangements would strengthen 
the necessary coordination of efforts by Serbia and Montenegro to allow the FRY 
and the Republics to benefit fully...from the reform process, in particular in the 
context of the Stabilization and Association Process”.356 By January 2002 the link 
351 See for instance the Conclusions of the 2409th and the 2416th General Affairs Council meeting on 
18/19-2-2002 and 11-3-2002. 
352 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) and Commission (Director) level, 9-2-2011, 11-2-2011.
353 2327th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 22/23-1-2001: Western Balkans FRY/Serbia Council 
Conclusions. The distance, in terms of paragraphs, between different elements of Council statements 
can also be the subject of fierce debate, as well as the specific ordering of the paragraph. 
354 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) level, 9-2-2011.
355 2372nd General Affairs, Council meeting, Brussels 8/9-10-2001. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
356 2386th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 19/20-11-2001. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Although in the same Conclusions the Council already hints at what should happen in case of a 
referendum.
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became more explicit. The Council stated that: “Staying together in a functioning 
federal state is the best and fastest way for them to participate in European 
integration”.357 By now, this was a rather peculiar statement, seeing that it was clear 
that the federal state was not functioning, nor was it likely to function. This was 
something delegates must have been aware of. It rather seems that the Council 
could now afford to be explicit, because it was clear that it would most probably not 
have to deliver on its promises. In line with the second expectation of the Council 
Conclusions Reader, member states (in this case brakemen) could safely stop 
‘investing’ in the matter, thus allowing the language to become more concrete. This 
would also explain the Council’s reaction to the Belgrade Agreement itself. The April 
Conclusions stated that: “The Agreement of 14 March brings closer the perspective 
of negotiating and concluding a Stabilization and Association Agreement provided 
that both republics contribute to the effective functioning of the common state.”358 
This again appears as an easy promise to make, seeing that at least one of the 
republics had no intention to contribute to the functioning of the state. In fact, the 
Agreement had for the first time recognized Montenegro’s ambitions to hold a 
referendum on independence.
The obvious first step towards an SAA would have been for the Commission to 
conduct the promised feasibility study.359 The April 2002 Council had “expressed 
the hope that…conditions will soon permit the carrying out of this feasibility study”. 
‘Hope’ was indeed the appropriate term to use here, seeing that Commission 
officials had made it abundantly clear that it would be extremely difficult for them to 
conduct such a study. For this, there needed to be (among other things) one internal 
market.360 Commission officials pointed out the (for them obvious) SAA requirements: 
“This would not work with two different currencies, with internal custom borders still 
in place and with two such different economic systems.”361 They were apparently 
told to stop their ‘Taliban-like insistence’ on the functioning of the Internal Market 
and ‘make it work’. It would in fact take the Commission until October 2004 to make 
it work. The solution was eventually found in a so-called twin track approach in 
which the SAA negotiations would largely be conducted separately with Serbia and 
357 2406th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 28-1-2002. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
358 2421st General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg 15-4-2002. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
FRY/Serbia and Montenegro.
359 As already announced in the Declaration at the Zagreb Summit of November 2000. See Section 1.
360 With hindsight it appears that the structural differences between the two ‘parts of the Union’, and the level 
of autonomy they received in economic and monetary matters, made it unlikely that there would soon be 
something of a common market. A common market and the free movement of persons, goods services 
and capital are of course crucial if a country wants to be able to negotiate an SAA. After all, the SAA is 
primarily a trade agreement.
361 Author’s interview, Commission (Director) level, 11-2-2011.
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with Montenegro. This was a solution that had already been suggested to the 
Council in 2001. But back then it was considered not in line with the Regional 
Approach.362 Had the Council not insisted in Zagreb that the countries in the region 
first learn to live and work together? The German coordinator of the Stability Pact, 
Bodo Hombach, was invited to nearly every Council meeting to remind the member 
states of the approach they had signed up to.363 
Afterwards, the Commission has been blamed for being too rigid in its approach, 
thereby adding to Montenegro’s determination to organize a referendum.364 The 
Commission for its part criticized the political level(s) for using Community instruments 
without truly understanding them. For this study the more important question is: 
where were the member states in what appears to have been another race between 
the ‘supranational entrepreneurs’? There might have been consensus about avoiding 
further fragmentation, but were member states really indifferent about speeding up or 
slowing down Serbia’s and Montenegro’s European integration? It seems they were. 
As had been the case with Macedonia, there were few, if any, willing to pick a battle 
over the integration as such. In the aftermath of the Zagreb Summit, brakemen had 
expressed some concerns about Serbia receiving preferential treatment. But these 
concerns quickly ebbed away, as remarks about the country’s insufficient ICTY 
cooperation started to feature more prominently in the Conclusions. But the Council 
seemed aware that, for the moment, Kostunica had more than enough on his mind.365 
On the side of the drivers, the sentiment was largely the same. Even Italy, perhaps the 
strongest supporter of Serbia in the Council, was happy with the Belgrade Agreement: 
“What ‘Solania’ did was buy us some time, to let the situation in the region calm 
down.”366 Macmillian events, most importantly the murder of the (EU-minded) Serbian 
Prime Minister Djindic on 12 march 2003, did little to quicken the pace. It seems that 
the real debate had not yet started. In line with the image of the Caucus race, there 
were simply too few “that began running”. 
Because of this limited participation, it is hard to come to strong conclusions about 
the type of consensus in this game, let alone of the characteristics of the internal 
debate. To the extent that Council Conclusions were ‘daring’ and straightforward, 
362 Author’s interview, Working party level, 14-1-2011.
363 The added value of the Stability Pact itself would become an ever bigger issue for debate, in particular in 
relation to the SAP. Coweb 7-11-2001. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
364 Which Montenegro eventually did in May 2006, see Chapter 8, Section 2 (cf. Noutcheva, 2009: 1076).
365 2342nd General Affairs Council meeting, 9-4-2001, Western Balkans. Council Conclusions: In highly 
ambiguous wording the Council welcomed the arrest of Milosevic and referred to the fact that it would like 
to see him transferred to ICTY in The Hague. Agence Europe 9/10-4-2001: 5.
366 Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 10-2-2011.
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they seemed to favour brakemen. Conclusions became more explicit when they 
could (safely) stress the fulfilment of conditions. It thus appears that the conjecture 
in the introduction, that crises strengthen the hand of the brakemen rather than that 
of the drivers, is correct. The opposite however does not appear to be true. The 
year 2002 was undoubtedly a calm one in the Balkans. But apart from the launching 
of a feasibility study on Bosnia, nothing happened in the EU integration process. It 
was time for a new impetus and more importantly time for a new ‘example for the 
region’. With regard to the latter there was now an obvious candidate. After the 
signing of the SAA and the entering into force of the IA, Croatia had managed to 
overtake Macedonia in the race towards Europe. And this was a country with 
influential friends and no outspoken enemies in the Council.367 But first the new 
dodo’s (meaning the Greek and Italian Presidencies) had to create the necessary 
momentum. How they managed to do this, is the subject of the next section.
367 Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 10-2-2011. Although some countries had already stated 
their disappointment about Croatia’s unwillingness to cooperate with the ICTY in the case of General 
Bobetko. 2450th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 30-9-2002: Western Balkans. Council 
Conclusions. The Council would repeat this message in October 2002.
When Who What
22-1-2001 Council “Urges the authorities in Belgrade as well as Podgorica 
to agree on an open and democratic process, within an 
overall Federal framework, to decide on a new constitutional 
arrangement for the relations between the components of 
the Federation.”
8-10-2001 Council Adds that this process of dialogue “would also promote 
beneficial participation by the FRY in the Stabilization and 
Association Process.”
19-11-2001 Council “New constitutional arrangements would strengthen the 
necessary coordination of efforts by Serbia and Montenegro 
to allow the FRY and the Republics to benefit fully from 
international aid and from the reform process, in particular in 
the context of the Stabilization and Association Process.”
28-1-2002 Council “Staying together in a functioning federal state is the 
best and fastest way for them to participate in European 
integration”
15-4-2002 Council “The Agreement of 14 March brings closer the perspective 
of negotiating and concluding a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement provided that both republics 
contribute to the effective functioning of the common state.”
Table 6.3   Key moments in the debate about ‘Solania’ (Serbia and Montenegro)
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6.3  The Thessaloniki Summit: ‘Noyer le poisson’
The second round of the Balkan game was typical and exceptional at the same time. 
What was typical was that most of it was played out within the deep confines of the 
Justus Lipsius. What was exceptional was that the game rarely reached the higher 
levels. This is therefore not a game, the development of which we can trace by means 
of successive Council Conclusions. After “the Council [had] welcomed the readiness 
expressed by the Greek government to organise, during its Presidency, a high level 
meeting between EU Member States and SAP countries, as a follow up to the Zagreb 
Summit”, it was left to the lower levels to fill in the details.368 By April 2003, the Council 
had come to terms with the fact that this high level meeting was going to be an actual 
“EU-Western Balkans Summit”.369 But even then, it appeared that the occasion was 
to be used primarily to come up with  recommendations on the Commission’s annual 
review of the SAP. This was part of the Council’s standard operating procedures.370 
What the Greeks had in mind however, was certainly not ‘business as usual’. The 
coming about of Thessaloniki can tell us a lot about how the Dodo can orchestrate 
the race, provided the Council is willing to play along.371
The first vital ingredient is of course ‘an occasion’. This turned out to be quite easy. 
In the Spring of 2002 the Council had used the annual review of the SAP for 
engaging in a debate about revitalising and reconsidering the Balkan pre-accession 
trajectory. The Greek Permrep had been very active in stirring up such a debate, 
mainly by launching non-papers and inviting discussions inside think tanks and 
NGO’s.372 Now that the crises had passed and Solana’s hour therefore appeared to 
be over, it seemed wiser to opt for a more Commission-oriented approach. There 
was still considerable uncertainty on (the different elements of) the SAP. 
Nevertheless, the May Council stressed that the SAP “remains at the heart of EU’s 
policy towards the region”.373 However, it acknowledged that the effectiveness and 
coherence of the SAP instruments should be re-evaluated. Member states had 
different reasons for engaging in this exercise. Some feared an ‘accession panic’. 
Now that Croatia would soon apply for membership, most of the others would 
368 2425th General Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels 13-5-2002. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
369 2501st General Affairs and External Relations Council Meeting, Luxembourg 14-4-2003. Western Balkans 
Council Conclusions. 
370 See Chapter 5, Section 2 on the significance of the annual SAP reviews as ‘focal points’ in the debate.
371 The Salzburg Summit of March 2006 is telling with regard to the limits of this orchestrating power, when 
the mood in the Council is less favourable. See Chapter 8, Section 1.
372 Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 8-7-2010. 
373 2425th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 13-5-2002: Western Balkans. Annual review of the 
Stabilization and Association Process for South Eastern Europe. 
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probably follow suit. They felt that the part of the SAP that had to be improved, was 
the conditionality part. Others feared just the opposite; further stalemate in view of 
the worsening economic forecasts. They saw the need for further incentives.374 
Thus, when the member states welcomed Greek intentions to organize a ‘high level 
meeting’ on the Balkans, it was unclear what the Greek Presidency had in mind. 
Would it cater primarily to the (other) drivers or (also) to the brakemen?
The Greeks had learned from the French ‘Alleingang’ in Zagreb. They reassured the 
member states that all the deliverables of Thessaloniki would be thoroughly 
discussed at Coweb and Coreper level. As it turned out, such discussions started 
rather late. By April, Coweb delegates were wondering whether the Greek 
Presidency was trying to hide what would be on the Thessaloniki Agenda.375 
Brakemen feared the Greeks would try to shift the SAP into a higher gear, which 
would automatically lead to a depreciation of certain conditionalities. But in reality 
the Greek Presidency, acting in tandem with the incoming Italian Presidency, had 
opted for a two step strategy. “The first step was convincing the political level of the 
necessity of the summit. After this was done, we could start talking about the 
substance.”376 The reasoning was the following. After the member states had come 
to accept the fact that there was going to be a meeting of their Heads of State and 
Government, they would probably want to make sure that they had something to 
decide on. Thus, when they eventually opened up the debate in the Council, they 
showed no restraint in discussing deliverables. The Greeks made ample use of the 
fact that they were holding the pen. Even Commission officials admit that: 
“Thessaloniki was exceptional because of the dominant role played by the 
Presidency, instead of the Commission, in drafting proposals”.377 Greece seemed 
to opt for what insiders call a strategy of ‘noyer le poisson’: which means 
overwhelming the member states with ideas and initiatives. It would however still 
need all the help it could get, navigating them through the Council. 
Help came from the side of the Commission, which presented its annual SAP 
reports, but more importantly a communiqué on possible ways to accelerate the 
European integration of the Balkans. The Commission appeared eager to make use 
374 Coweb capitals 18-12-2002. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Coweb capitals is a regular 
meeting of the Balkan experts coming from the different national administrations.
375 Coweb capitals 2-4, 14-5-2003. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
376 Author’s interviews, PSC and Working party level, 8-7-2010, 10-2-2011. This was a smart but at the same 
time risky strategy. After all, there was the very real opportunity that many Heads of State and Government 
would decide not to attend. Apparently, the Greek permrep had a difficult time convincing Athens, and in 
particular Prime Minister Simitis, that a summit was indeed feasible. 
377 Author’s interview, Commission (Director) level, 28-6-2010.
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of the entrepreneurial possibilities provided by Greece. Its main contribution to 
Thessaloniki would be to integrate instruments employed in the accession process 
of the CEEC’s into the SAP. Among the abundance of ideas, the European 
Partnerships stand out. By means of these Partnerships the Commission would be 
able annually to assess and prioritize reforms to be undertaken by the countries. 
The Partnerships foresaw in action plans and timetables, and even a redirection of 
financial assistance according to these priorities. On the political level, 
Commissioner Patten joined the fray by encouraging the Greek Presidency to try to 
convince the member states to give more money.378 
A Presidency can create momentum and the Commission can provide entrepre-
neurship. But the ultimate power of approval of course lies with the Council. And in 
the Council the balance was not in favour of organizing a grand event. Member 
states were reluctant to say the least.379 Most of them did not have much to gain 
from a summit. Croatia was already making headway, after the April 2003 Council 
had accepted its membership application and asked the Commission to provide its 
avis. Which meant that there was no need for its friends, Germany and Austria, to 
press for a summit. The other Balkan countries were held up because of lacking 
reforms and insufficient ICTY cooperation. So, for the moment there was not much 
more the EU had to offer. To the brakemen it appeared that Thessaloniki was mostly 
about repackaging ideas and initiatives that had already been suggested earlier. If 
this was the deliberate strategy of Greece, to make it appear as if Thessaloniki did 
not offer anything new, than it was indeed a clever one. It was a way to ensure that 
member states would perhaps engage in ‘damage reduction exercises’, but would 
refrain from applying the brake.380 Greece moreover appeared forthcoming and 
generous in taking into account member specific concerns. They had to abandon 
some of their ambitious wording, for example on visa liberalization or on having 
regular ministerial meetings between the EU and the Balkans.381 
The Thessaloniki Summit and Declaration are in line with the fourth expectation of 
the Council Conclusion Reader: either you get the decision or you get the language. 
The eventual Declaration contained a lot of verbal side payments. In fact, the text 
started with stressing conditions instead of incentives.382 It mentioned, amongst 
378 Agence Europe 22-5-2003: 13.
379 Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 8-7-2010. 
380 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010, 14-1-2011, The draft proposals were of 
course properly discussed, but few member states seem to have paid extraordinary attention to them. 
381 Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 8-7-2010. The wording was eventually changed in having 
such annual meetings as appropriate. 
382 ‘Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans Summit’, Thessaloniki 21-6-2003. Part 1. 
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many other things, the importance of full and unequivocal cooperation with the 
ICTY, the fighting of organized crime and the sustainable return of refugees.383 In 
highly ambiguous words it described possibilities for visa free travel.384 It even 
confirmed the “complementary” role of the Stability Pact. But in terms of drafting, 
the most important victory was the explicit use of the word agenda. More important 
than the Summit and Declaration was the Thessaloniki Agenda, which the European 
Council had already endorsed the day before. This was to be the EU’s “shared 
agenda and we all commit to its implementation”.385 Brakemen, and France in 
particular, had been reluctant about using the word ‘agenda’ because of what it 
implied in the sense of time lines and automatism. Presenting the French-Croat 
Zagreb Summit as a source of inspiration thus appears to have been a clever move. 
The Zagreb Declaration however had turned out to be primarily a political statement. 
Thessaloniki contained numerous concrete provisions and proposals, such as to 
assist with the “restoration of cultural and religious monuments” and the “revising 
of history textbooks”.386 Yet, the most important thing it did not contain was access 
to the pre-accession funds.387 The Greek Presidency had indeed managed to get 
more money (financial aid) from the member states. But Germany, France and the 
Netherlands in particular did not allow the Balkans to share in the enlargement 
budget.388
How to explain the success of Thessaloniki? The evidence again does not allow for 
a definitive judgment on how the drivers managed to win this round from the 
brakemen. The most parsimonious explanation is in line with rationalist reasoning: 
“This is something you can do, when you are in the chair.”389 Brakemen admitted 
that they would rather not have had the summit, but there was really not that much 
they could do to prevent it.390 Furthermore, aside from the access to the 
pre-accession funds, on which the brakemen were able to hold their ground, none 
of them really stood to lose much from it. Quite a few Heads of State and Government 
383 Again a highly ambiguous term, that would come to haunt the Council for many years to come. Whether 
refugee return is indeed ‘sustainable’ has been the subject of heated debates, particularly in the region. 
384 ‘Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans Summit’, Thessaloniki 21-6-2003. Part 7. The text “acknowledges 
the importance the people of the Western Balkans attach to it” and allows the Commission “to discuss 
the major reforms needed in this regard”. 
385 ‘Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans Summit’, Thessaloniki 21-6-2003. Part 3.
386 2518th General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 16-6-2003. Western Balkans. 
Council Conclusions; Annex A: The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans. Part 5. 
387 Author’s interviews, PSC and Working party level, 8-7-2010, 11-3-2011. (See also Gori, 2008).
388 Author’s interview, Ben Bot, Coreper Ambassador (1992-2002) and Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(2004-2007), 6-12-2010. 
389 Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 10-2-2011.
390 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 7-7-2010.
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were in fact absent. Some of the others, such as the German Chancellor Schröder, 
came, made an intervention and then left.391 But in the end there were enough 
leaders present for the picture. The significance of Thessaloniki would only become 
manifest in the years to come.
Seeing the favourable mood in the Council at the time, some might even be inclined 
to conclude that Thessaloniki resulted from an open and competitive debate leading 
to a reasoned consensus to patch up and revitalise the SAP. After all, member states 
shared the opinion that the current instruments had to be re-evaluated. And drivers 
as well as brakemen were eventually satisfied about the room there was to discuss 
the content of the Thessaloniki Agenda. What speaks against such an interpretation 
however are the different significances attached to Thessaloniki. For drivers it was the 
most significant event in the entire Balkan pre-accession game; for brakemen it was 
a symbolic re-uttering of previous commitments. 
Thus perhaps the secret behind the success of Thessaloniki was the clever framing 
of what was supposedly the overarching goal: “to give them everything a candidate 
country has, without actually declaring them candidates”.392 The inherent ambiguity 
meant that both those who foresaw further stalemate as well as those who feared 
accession panic, could be brought on board. To the drivers this could be sold as 
giving them everything but candidate status; to the brakemen as giving them 
anything but candidate status. Thessaloniki could be explained as providing the 
Balkan countries with incentives as well as distracting them with side-payments.393 
This is why I believe the consensus was more rhetorical than reasoned.
6.4 Conclusion: Warm-up rounds?
What to conclude from these first four games of the Balkan pre-accession game? 
For one thing, the real debate between the member states had not started yet. The 
coming about of the European perspective for the larger part had been the work of 
the institutionally empowered players. First there was the race between the German 
Presidency and the Commission and the competition between the Stability Pact 
and the SAP. While there were strong arguments against engaging in an association 
391 Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 8-7-2010. One of the arguments presumably used to 
convince the Greek Prime Minister, that he needed to host a summit, was that people will generally not 
remember who was and who was not there. People will just remember that there was a summit.
392 Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 8-7-2010.
393 Author’s interview, Ben Bot, Coreper Ambassador (1992-2002) and Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(2004-2007), 6-12-2010.
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process with countries still in a state of crisis, the SAP nevertheless won out.394 This 
was not because it was generally considered as the best approach. Members were, 
as we have seen, unsure about what they had signed up to. It was because it was 
presented as something of a ‘fait accompli’ and more importantly because it was 
considered the ideal compromise solution between offering too much and too little of 
a perspective. After the big gesture of Feira, followed the French Party at Zagreb, at 
the basis of which there seemed to be two irreconcilable goals: to push for Croatia and 
to prevent Serbia from being left behind. Because of the overthrow of Milosevic in the 
month before, Zagreb could afterwards be presented as a huge success, where ‘all 
would have prizes’. But it is unsure how much the Croat hosts had enjoyed their party. 
In the crisis year, 2001, the race was between the Council Secretariat’s Policy Unit 
(Solana) and the Commission. But this was an exercise in crisis management. Any 
consequences these crisis management efforts might have for the integration 
process were of secondary importance. To the member states it was not always 
clear whether they were creating ‘rapids’ or ‘dams’ in Macedonia’s, Serbia’s and 
Montenegro’s European trajectory. But they did not appear to be eager to pick a 
battle over it. Lastly, Thessaloniki was without a doubt meant to create rapids. But 
it is hard to determine why the drivers won the day. While the underlying consensus 
appears to have been largely rhetorical, there is not enough evidence to rule out 
rationalist intergovernmental bargaining or constructivist deliberative explanations. 
There was after all little at stake and the debate might very well have contained 
competitive elements. All in all, it might be more prudent to conclude that, up until 
now, the Council had mainly been setting the terms of the (subsequent) debates.
One thing had become clear: the SAP was to be the framework for the debate 
about the “European course of the Western Balkan countries, all the way to their 
future accession”.395 This was surely going to be an individual race from now on. 
The time for high level summits and big gestures was over. That much became 
clear from Commission President Romano Prodi’s statement in reaction to the 
Thessaloniki Summit. While trying to highlight the regional dimension of the process, 
he stated that : “Balkan countries should not enter the EU at the same time”.396 The 
message was well received in Brussels as well as in the Balkans. Now, it was every 
country for itself in its race towards Europe. Seeing that there was only one potential 
candidate at the moment, the stage had been prepared for Croatia to become the 
first success story.
394 Author’s interview, Working party level, 11-3-2011.
395 ‘Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans Summit’, Thessaloniki 21-6-2003. Part 4.
396 Agence Europe, Special Edition 22-6-2003: 4 (See also Bechev 2006). 
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7.  Croatia sets the stage or raises the bar?                                            
(June 2003 – December 2005) 
On 21 February 2003, Croatia was the first Western Balkan country to apply for EU 
membership. This application came too soon, even in the eyes of some of the 
drivers.397 But now that it was there, the Council had to respond to it. The application 
formed the starting point for, what I will argue, was the most significant game in the 
entire Balkan pre-accession trajectory: the debate about opening of accession 
negotiations with Croatia. This debate would turn out to be largely about the 
country’s ‘international obligation for full cooperation with the ICTY’. It would span 
three years and six Presidencies. The main drivers were the ‘enlargement friendly’ 
member states (Italy, Greece) as well as the ‘friends of Croatia’ (Austria, Germany). 
The brakemen were the ‘enlargement-weary’ member states (France, the Netherlands) 
as well as the ‘ICTY-minded’ (The UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and sometimes 
also Finland and Denmark). The game ended when the request was granted in 
October 2005. ICTY cooperation had always been one of the central conditionalities 
to be fulfilled, by Croatia, Serbia and, to a far lesser extent, by Bosnia, Macedonia, 
and Kosovo. But now it was to become a conditio sine qua non.398 The ‘Gotovina-
case’ would set the terms for all subsequent debates about ICTY cooperation.399 
The first part of this chapter provides a detailed reconstruction and structured 
analysis of the debates that took place at the different Council levels. It tries to 
account for the type of debate, the negotiation strategies that were employed, and 
the way in which these process level dynamics led to a specific outcome.
During most of the Gotovina debate, Croatia was the only country with a reasonable 
prospect of making progress in its European integration. Only in the second half of 
2005 would things again be set in motion. Croatia’s success in ‘leaving’ the Balkan 
pre-accession game would not be an isolated event. During the UK Presidency, 
Serbia (and Montenegro), Bosnia and Macedonia were also able to make significant 
progress. In fact, when Austria took over the Presidency in 2006, it had a hard time 
finding any remaining deliverables.400 The second part of this chapter is dedicated 
397 The current Greek and the incoming Italian Presidency, both drivers in the enlargement process, had tried 
to discourage Croatia from applying, even though they had an interest in seeing at least one of the 
countries making progress. Coweb 6-2, 25-2-2003. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
398 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) level, 10-11-2010.
399 Ante Gotovina is a Croatian General and commanding officer during Operation Storm, which in August 
1995 led to the ‘recapturing’ of Serb held territories in Croatia.
400 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-11-2011. Finishing the SAA negotiations with Albania (not part 
of this study) was one of the few deliverables left, as was the proper handling of the Montenegrin 
referendum on independence.
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to explaining the apparent effectiveness of the UK Presidency. Were they merely 
riding waves (of events) or were they truly able to create momentum (and if so, 
how)? What strategies did they adopt to keep all aboard? 
This chapter moves beyond assessing outcomes and engages in a detailed 
reconstruction of process level dynamics. The analytical framework will be applied 
far more extensively than has been the case in the previous chapter. In Chapter 3, I 
have classified the (competing) observable implications of the Caucus race models 
When What Who Concerning whom
14-4-2003 Request of an avis on membership 
application (10)
Council Croatia
21-7-2003 Launching of feasibility study (1) Council Serbia (and 
Montenegro)
18-11-2003 Adoption of feasibility study (2) Commission Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
1-4-2004 Ratification (entering into force) of the 
SAA (7)
Council Macedonia
20-4-2004 Delivery avis on membership 
application (11), Recommendation to 
open accession negotiations (13)
Commission Croatia
17-5-2004 Request for avis on membership 
application (10)
Council Macedonia
18-6-2004 Awarding of candidate status (12) Council Croatia
11-10-2004 Re-launching of feasibility study
(twin track approach) (1)
Council Serbia (and 
Montenegro)
21-12-2004 Ratification of the SAA (7) Council Croatia
1-2-2005 Entering into force SAA (7) Council Croatia
12-4-2005 Adoption of feasibility study (2) Commission Serbia
3-10-2005 Opening of accession negotiations (14)
Opening of SAA negotiations (3)
Council
Council
Croatia
Serbia (and 
Montenegro)
9-11-2005 Delivery avis on membership 
application (11)
Commission Macedonia
21-11-2005 Opening of SAA negotiations (3) Council Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
17-12-2005 Awarding of candidate status (12) Council Macedonia
Table 7.1   Key decisions with regard to Balkan pre-accession (2003-2005)401
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into four categories. The first two, players, positions and the game play, concern 
the process level. The last two, outcomes and success, focus on the outcome level. 
When diving into the intricacies of Council decision making, these four categories 
should be kept in mind. Table 7.1 provides an overview of the decisions reached in 
this second part of the Balkan pre-accession game. But at least as important as the 
decisions themselves was the way in which these decisions were framed (in Council 
Conclusions). After all, these words and statements constitute the basis on which 
subsequent decisions were based. The question is how solid a basis we are dealing 
with. It seems that, at least temporarily, the Council was able to break away from 
‘weak outcomes’. This chapter seeks to reveal the ‘consensual processes’ that 
made this escape possible. 
7.1  Whether there is, what is, and who decides there is  
‘full cooperation’
This section provides the reader with a structured narrative of the Council 
negotiations in reaction to Croatia’s application for membership. Table 7.2 provides 
the reader with a summary of the key moments in these negotiations. In view of the 
duration and the complexity of this particular game, I believe it is useful to break it 
down into a number of distinctive rounds, presided over by different Dodo’s. These are: 
Round I. Asking the Commission for an avis (2003 Greek Presidency).
Round II. Setting the terms of the debate (2003 Italian Presidency).
Round III. ‘Noting’ the Commission avis (2004 Irish Presidency).
Round IV. Getting the (conditional) date (2004 Dutch Presidency).
Round V. Suspending (the opening of) negotiations (2005 Luxembourg Presidency).
Round VI. Opening of accession negotiations (2005 UK Presidency).
Round I: Asking the Commission for an avis
While the decision to apply for membership is of course solely in the hands of the 
applicant, there was something peculiar about it. Croatia applied before the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) had been ratified by all member 
states. For some (Italy) this non-ratification was due to non-related reasons, while 
for others (the Netherlands, the United Kingdom) it was because they had continuing 
doubts about Croatia’s commitment to ICTY cooperation. The main bone of 
contention at the time was not the arrest of General Ante Gotovina, but Croatia’s 
lack of willingness to cooperate with the extradition of General Bobetko.402 At the 
401 The numbers between brackets refer to different steps in the trajectory. See Chapter 5, Section 3.
402 See Chapter 6, Section 2. 
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time (July 2001) member states had taken good notice of the indictment against 
Gotovina, but the focus of the ICTY seemed to be on apprehending the Bosnian 
Serb political leader Karadzic and General Mladic.
In view of the pro-enlargement mood in the Council, the UK, the Netherlands and 
Sweden were keen on preventing over-enthusiastic reactions from ‘the usual 
suspects’.403 The argumentative strategies available to the brakemen were however 
403 Referring to the friends of Croatia, in particular Austria and Germany. Author’s interviews, Working party 
level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010, 14-12-2010.
When Who What
21-02-2003 Croatia Membership application, before ratification of the SAA
14-04-2003 Council Asks the Commission for an avis on membership 
application
13-10-2003 Council Invites Del Ponte to address the Council, and notes that a 
number of countries are “failing to cooperate”
20-4-2004 Commission Provides positive avis on membership application
18-06-2004 European 
Council
Concludes that Croatia meets all criteria to be awarded 
candidate status and suggests opening negotiations “early 
in 2005”
11-10-2004 Council Draws very explicit link: “continued failure to cooperate…
would seriously jeopardize further movement towards the 
EU”
17-12-2004 European 
Council
Suggests the opening of accession negotiations on 17 
March, “provided that there is full cooperation with the ICTY”
31-01-2005 Council Rehn reopens the debate, leading to very explicit Council 
Conclusions: “full and unconditional cooperation…remains 
an essential requirement for further movement to the EU”.
16-03-2005 Council “In absence of common agreement”, postpones opening 
of negotiations, but adopts negotiation framework and 
stresses that it is “the Council” that has to establish “that 
Croatia is cooperating fully”
23-03-2005 European 
Council
Decides to set up a Taskforce to ‘help’ the Council in 
assessing Croatia’s ICTY cooperation
13-06-2005 Council ‘Notes’ Del Ponte’s proposal to postpone judgment on the 
ICTY cooperation for a few months.
03-10-2005 Council “Concludes that Croatia has met the outstanding condition 
and that negotiations should therefore begin as soon as 
possible”
Table 7.2   Key moments in the debate about Gotovina (Croatia)
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limited. The ‘informal understanding’ that entering into an accession process 
should be preceded by the ratification of the SAA had not yet been codified.404 
Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) however did not give a definitive 
answer as to whether such an application was to be transferred automatically to the 
Commission. It was unclear whether the asking of an avis required a political 
decision by the Council. This would again become a major bone of contention in 
2010, when the Council had to decide on how to react to the membership application 
of Serbia.405 However, in the Spring of 2003 the majority considered this to be a 
technical step. The brakemen then tried to delay the asking for an avis until after the 
Commission’s annual SAP Report would come out, thus implicitly creating a link 
between the two.406 The drivers counterattacked by means of an Italian-Austrian 
non-paper in which they proposed a ‘welcoming’ reaction to the application. The 
underlying threat was that such a positive reply might induce other applications. 
The threat apparently worked. Already in April, thus before the Council had had a 
chance to look at the Commission’s SAP Report (which was presented at the same 
meeting), it asked the Commission for an avis. This decision however came with 
verbal side-payments. The April 2003 Conclusions were certainly not positively 
framed. They merely stated that the Council decided “to implement the procedure 
laid down in Article 49”.407 Apparently, the aforementioned ambiguity in the Article 
was now gone. What the brakemen obtained with this ‘neutral’ formulation, was the 
guarantee that such a political debate would in due time be necessary. The 
Conclusions thus indirectly confirmed that asking the Commission’s avis in no way 
precluded a decision by the Council on the feasibility of Croatia’s application. 
Seeing that the Commission reserved a year for the preparation of the avis, this 
debate would probably take place when brakemen (i.e. the Netherlands) instead of 
drivers (Greece, Italy) were presiding over the proceedings.
Round II: Setting the terms of the debate
A new round in the Gotovina debate began in September 2003. The focal point was 
the October briefing of the General Prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla del Ponte, to the 
UN Security Council (UNSC). It was customary for Del Ponte regularly to brief the 
UNSC about the progress made and the amount of cooperation received by the 
ICTY. While visiting Zagreb, Del Ponte openly called upon the Croatian Authorities 
to deliver Gotovina to The Hague before the UNSC meeting on 9 November. The 
General Prosecutor of the ICTY was actively searching for allies in her quest for 
404 Author’s interview, Commission (Croatia Unit) level, 25-5-2010. Codification would take place in 2006.
405 See Chapter 9, Section 3. 
406 Coweb 6-2-2003. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
407 2501st General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 14-4-2003. Croatia. See also 
Agence Europe 16-4-2003: 7. 
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Gotovina, and found them in the ‘non-ratifiers’ of the SAA with Croatia: The UK and 
the Netherlands. Those countries realized that their leverage over Croatia had now 
significantly increased. Croatia had initially assumed that after ‘solving’ the Bobetko 
case, the SAA would be ratified.408 By now it began to feel ever less comfortable 
under Del Ponte’s relentless attacks. Croatia tried to get the indictment withdrawn 
and in an interview Gotovina himself had stated his innocence.409 Croatia’s sense of 
unease was warranted. The September Council Conclusions for the first time 
explicitly asked for Gotovina.410
Perhaps building on the momentum created by Thessaloniki, the Commission 
informed Croatia already in the beginning of October, that it could count on a 
positive avis, provided of course that it continued to improve its cooperation with 
the ICTY. The message was framed as an opportunity for Croatia to set itself free 
from the rest of the Balkan region.411 But by now it was clear to the drivers, and the 
Italian Presidency in particular, that this Gotovina matter would not simply blow 
over. Thus, they decided to face the problem head-on and invited Del Ponte to the 
October 2003 Council meeting.
It was during this first visit of Del Ponte, that the contours of the ICTY debate became 
clear. From the start, Del Ponte and her team adopted a clear cut strategy: 
“Basically, we tried to get the EU to adopt a policy line in which each and every 
step, a specific country was allowed to take towards the EU, was conditional upon 
full cooperation with the ICTY, as defined by the Prosecutor of the ICTY.”412 This last 
part was key. The ICTY wanted the Council to outsource part of its assessment 
capabilities. This was also Del Ponte’s message to the Council: “The assessment, 
that is my job. You provide the political pressure. I will be the one to judge the efforts 
made by the Balkan states.”413 The ensuing Council debate was predictable. Most 
ministers paid lip service to the importance of the ICTY. The Dutch and British 
minister made it abundantly clear that they had no intention of ratifying the SAA 
soon. Some of the others wondered whether it would not be better to ‘let justice 
take its course’ or apply this particular conditionality ‘later on in the process’. But 
408 The General died in April 2003.
409 Author’s interviews, ICTY and Commission (Commissioner’s Cabinet) level, 12-7-2010, 15-11-2010. This 
was in June 2003. Gotovina’s public appearances made it harder for the Croatian government to maintain 
that the general had gone into hiding and was thus impossible to track down.
410 2527th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 29-9-2003, Western Balkans. Council Conclusions: 
The Council asked for: “particular efforts to bring Karadzic, Mladic and Gotovina to the ICTY”. 
411 Agence Europe, 10-10-2003: 12.
412 Author’s interview, ICTY level, 15-11-2010.
413 Author’s interview, Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY (1999-2007), 14-6-2011.
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none seemed to address the core of the matter: why is there no full cooperation? 
What Del Ponte had really tried to get the Council to mention was the political 
unwillingness in Zagreb. The Council refrained from directly addressing this matter. 
It merely “noted with deep concern that a number of countries and parties in the 
region were still failing to cooperate fully with the Tribunal”. The Council “reiterated 
the need to intensify efforts to bring Karadzic, Mladic and Gotovina to the ICTY”.414 
The October Conclusions were thus ambiguous with regard to the three pivotal 
questions of the ICTY debate: 
1. Whether there is full cooperation with the ICTY?
2. What is full cooperation with the ICTY?
3. Who decides that there is full cooperation with the ICTY?
The differences between these questions can be clarified with help of the Toulmin 
model.415 The ‘whether’ question is the only competitive one. It is empirical and it 
focuses on grounds: how to judge the efforts Croatia made and more specifically 
whether one should see failing cooperation as an ‘inability’ or an ‘unwillingness’. 
‘Noting a failure to cooperate’ meant avoiding to address this matter directly. The 
‘what’ question is a non-competitive question. It is the necessary preliminary question 
that needs to be answered: how should we understand/define full cooperation? More 
specifically it would be about whether full cooperation should be framed in terms of 
‘achievement of a given result’ (mainly the transfer of all indictees) or as an ‘obligation 
in substance’ (referring to the efforts or even the commitment of the country in 
question). The October Conclusions again chose the middle ground by speaking of 
intensified efforts which should lead to the apprehension of Karadzic, Mladic and 
Gotovina. The ‘who decides’ question is about proponents as well as procedures. It 
is thus partly a pseudo and partly a non-competitive question. It is not about ICTY 
cooperation as such. It focuses on who should do the assessment (proponents), 
when and under which circumstances (procedures). More specifically, it would be 
about the weight that should be attached to Del Ponte’s judgment and the procedural 
embedding of these assessments.416
Round III: ‘Noting’ the Commission avis
In the run up to the Commissions avis the game was about framing its content. 
While visiting Zagreb, The German Chancellor, Schröder, stated that Croatia should 
be able to join Romania and Bulgaria in entering the EU in 2007. Schröder 
414 2533rd External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 13-10-2003. Western Balkans. Council 
Conclusions.
415 See Chapter 2, Section 2.
416 Croatia had already accused Del Ponte of having ‘mood swings’ and some drivers started subtly 
mentioning her obsession with capturing the (three) big fish.
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considered Del Pontes assessments as overly negative and he urged the Commission 
to take into account Croatias excellent reform record.417 Also, he denied there being 
an explicit link between EU accession and the apprehension of Gotovina. This was 
certainly not a wise move, as it was not hard to imagine how the Commission would 
react to such high level political pressure. The Commission considers itself to be the 
foremost driver of the enlargement process and is therefore generally uncomfortable 
with others trying to be on the wheel. After its ‘enthusiasm’ in October, the Commission 
now suddenly became more careful. Commissioner Patten confessed his doubts 
about being able to present a (positive) avis in the beginning of 2004.418 The 
Commission felt it a bit inappropriate to come up with a positive avis as long as a 
number of member states, for political reasons, refused to ratify the SAA.419 It started 
to stress the many other criteria that still needed to be fulfilled and it explicitly refrained 
from setting a definitive date for its avis to come out.420
The beginning of 2004 brought a number of positive signals for the drivers. For one, 
Croatia seemed to pick up the gauntlet. The new Croatian Prime Minister, Sanader 
publically stated his commitment to full cooperation.421 Sanader nevertheless asked 
the Commission for some discretion in dealing with the matter. The Prime Minister 
and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zuzul, started touring European capitals. On 17 
February Solana visited Zagreb, subtly mentioning the fact that Del Ponte was not 
a member of the EU and that it would be up to the Council to decide how to deal 
with the application.422 Sanader struck the right chord with the High Representative 
by mentioning that Croatia could help the EU achieve lasting peace and stability in 
the region. Minister Zuzul visited Coreper on 25 February, trying to convince the 
ambassadors that Gotovina was nowhere to be found.423
Inside the Justus Lipsius things were also beginning to look better for Croatia. The 
Council had asked the Commission for the avis to come out no later than the end 
of March, so that a decision could be taken at the European Council in June.424 The 
Irish Presidency had no intention of making the Balkans a special priority, but taking 
417 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 4-11-2003: ‘Del Ponte will Kroatien zur Kooperation zwingen‘. 
418 Note that Patten was not the Enlargement Commissioner but the Commissioner for External Relations.
419 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010.
420 Coweb 9-12-2003. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See also: EU Observer, 12-1-2004: 
‘Croatia heads for EU membership’. Agence Europe 13-1-2004: 6.
421 EU Observer 12-1-2004: ‘Croatia heads for EU membership’. Although Sanader evaded the question on 
whether this also included the apprehension of Gotovina. 
422 Agence Europe, 17-2-2004: ‘Joint Press conference of Solana and Sanader, Zagreb’.
423 Coreper 25-2-2004. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
424 2559th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 26-1-2004. 
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a decision on Croatia’s application seemed the only attainable deliverable in the 
issue area. Drivers as well as brakemen furthermore shared an interest in avoiding 
interference from the bilateral (border) disputes between Croatia and Slovenia.425 
Slovenia had made it abundantly clear that it was looking forward to joining the 
debate.
At the March Council, the Commission presented the annual Progress Reports as 
well as the new European Partnerships with the countries of the Western Balkans. 
The Reports on Croatia were withheld in view of the upcoming Commission avis. It 
was still unclear when the avis would come out and whether it would be positive. In 
the SAP report, the Commission had been rather negative about ICTY cooperation 
in the region as a whole. It judged it to be “generally insufficient” and it stated that 
the work of the court was “systematically obstructed”.426 Coweb nevertheless 
started discussing the potential implication of a positive avis.427 The UK and the 
Netherlands were still not inclined to ratify the SAA, but they could not predict what 
would happen once the matter reached the Agenda of the European Council. There 
would be the risk of another ‘big gesture’. On the political level, the outgoing 
Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen, was lobbying Del Ponte for a (positive) 
assessment, so that the avis could come out. This positive assessment came in the 
form of a telephone conversation and a letter in which Del Ponte reassured 
Verheugen that Croatia was fully cooperating at the moment.428 It is unclear what 
formed the basis for Del Ponte’s remarkable ‘turn’.429 But it enabled Commissioner 
Verheugen to present his positive avis on 20 April 2004, which was still well before 
the SAA was ratified.430
The obvious question with which Coreper had to concern itself was how to react to 
this avis.431 Drivers, Austria in particular, were pushing for a welcoming reaction. 
Brakemen in fact hoped to avoid all sorts of reactions. The Netherlands and UK, a 
425 Coweb 9-12-2003. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main question at the time was 
whether the new member states (i.e. Slovenia), which were set to join 1 May 2004, would also have to 
ratify the SAA agreement. This would create pressure on the UK and the Netherlands to ratify the SAA 
before the accession of Slovenia, while the brakemen would like to keep the ball in the court of Zagreb. 
426 ‘The Stabilization and Association Process; Third Annual Report’. Brussels 30-3-2004: 6.
427 Coweb 18-3, 1-4-2004. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
428 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010. The letter seemed to imply that Croatia 
was indeed close to capturing Gotovina, although it did not explicitly state this. 
429 Del Ponte presumably had spoken favourably about six arrests but at the same time she had complained 
about Sanader’s limited efforts regarding Gotovina (Del Ponte, 2008: 373-374).
430 ‘Opinion on Croatia’s Application for Membership of the European Union’. Brussels 20-04-2004. EU 
observer, 21-4-2004: ‘Croatia on track for EU membership’. Agence Europe 21/22-4-2004: 4/7.
431 Coreper 21-4, 23-4-2004. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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bit ‘entrapped’ by Del Ponte’s sudden satisfaction with the current level of 
cooperation, tried to postpone all forms of debate until the Council and European 
Council of June.432 The April Council nevertheless discussed the matter. Most 
member states welcomed the avis and the UK and the Netherlands admitted that 
the ratification of the SAA could not be postponed any longer. But the brakemen 
managed to avoid Council Conclusions on Croatia. 
In the run up to the European Council of June, the debate was (again) about 
procedures instead of content; whether the Council should set a specific date for 
the opening of the accession negotiations. Brakemen generally consider dates to 
be dangerous because they imply automatism, while drivers present them as good 
incentives for further reforms. Coreper managed to find the compromise in agreeing 
on a time frame instead of a specific date.433 The European Council of June 2004 
suggested to award Croatia candidate status and stated that the negotiations could 
commence “early in 2005”.434 The European Council Conclusions put a remarkable 
amount of effort in presenting Croatia as an example for the region, albeit in terms 
of ‘setting the stage’ instead of ‘raising the bar’.
Round IV: Getting the (conditional) date
In the second half of 2004 the Netherlands took over the Presidency. Croatia was 
still looking for a specific date for the opening of negotiations. Sanader continued 
his lobbying efforts within the Christian-Democratic ‘family’.435 As Chancellor 
Schröder’s amicable relations with Sanader were the mirror image of his attitude 
towards Del Ponte, the Dutch had one clear goal: to avoid a debate on the matter in 
the European Council.436 While they did not have direct control over that agenda, 
they could try to make such a debate pointless, by adopting firm Conclusions on 
Croatia’s lacking ICTY cooperation.
The Netherlands stuck to their strategy of relying on an assessor whose assessments 
could not be assessed. Members of Del Ponte’s team were constantly invited to 
share their views with Coweb. While it had become clear that it was now ‘just about 
Gotovina’, the brakemen were reluctant to frame the issue in such a way, as this 
would provide Croatia with an easy way out. It could simply maintain that Gotovina 
was dead or not in Croatia. It was their deliberate strategy to keep out of a debate 
432 This was thus same European Council they had hoped to avoid less than a month before. 
433 Coreper 10-6-2004. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
434 European Council meeting, Brussels 17/18-6-2004. Presidency Conclusions. Enlargement. Croatia: 29.
435 Author’s interview, Ben Bot, Coreper Ambassador (1992-2002) and Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(2004-2007) 6-12-2010.
436 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010.
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about the meaning of full cooperation.437 Instead they more or less unequivocally 
aligned themselves with the judgment of the General Prosecutor. The ICTY itself 
had every interest in not clearly defining what it meant by full cooperation: a 
commitment, an effort or a result. Because that would mean that the judgment 
could also be made by others.438 
The main event would be the October 2004 meeting, at which Del Ponte was invited 
to share her ‘deep concerns’, after which the Council was to adopt unambiguous 
Conclusions on the matter. Del Ponte made it clear that she was not satisfied with 
what had become of Sanader’s promises. As it was hard to find out what these 
promises had been, her personal judgment continued to be leading. This strategy 
apparently worked. The October Conclusions explicitly state that: “Continued 
failure to cooperate fully and in a timely manner with the ICTY would seriously 
jeopardize further movement towards the EU.”439 They asked Croatia for the 
necessary assistance in apprehending Gotovina, while mentioning the next 
deadline: Del Ponte’s November Report to the UNSC. Drivers might have had their 
doubts about the political bias of the Tribunal and Del Ponte’s apparent refusal to 
reveal her sources, but they (still) had not found the means for ‘complementing’ her 
assessments.440
But at this same Council meeting, the brakemen also suffered a defeat. 
Commissioner Verheugen presented his report on the EU enlargement process, 
with Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey. And it appeared ever more likely that 
the December European Council would simultaneously have to decide on the 
opening of accession negotiations with both Croatia and Turkey. The main players 
would be the same: The UK pushing for Turkey and on the brake on Croatia; Austria 
pushing for Croatia while on the brake on Turkey. Both were unsure whether a 
linkage would be to their advantage.441 But it was clear that the European Council 
debate would be primarily about Turkey, instead of Croatia. Fears about a potential 
political trade-off were certainly justified. 
There was one obvious opponent to politicizing the (pre)accession trajectory.442 A 
most welcome ally to the brakemen appeared in the Commission, where the 
437 Author’s interviews, Coreper and Working party level, 27-5-2010, 07-07-2010. 14-7-2010.
438 Author’s interview, ICTY level, 15-11-2010.
439 2609th General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 11-10-2004: Western 
Balkans - Council Conclusions.
440 Author’s interviews, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) and Working party level, 10-11-2010.
441 Author’s interviews, Council Secretariat and Working party level, 10-11-2010, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010.
442 The Commission, as said, most of all wants to remain in control of the process.
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Balkans had been transferred from DG Relex to DG Enlargement and Olli Rehn had 
become the new Commissioner. The significance immediately became apparent 
when members of his Cabinet presented themselves in Council debates as staunch 
supporters of the ICTY conditionality.443 Coweb at the time was involved in a debate 
about how much weight should be attached to Del Ponte’s negative UNSC speech 
of November. Brakemen argued that the setting of a date was out of the question. 
Drivers argued that the Council should keep the promise made by the European 
Council in June.444 Rehn’s representatives followed the brakemen’s line of reasoning: 
Croatia should convince Del Ponte that they were fully cooperating. Brakemen 
pointed to the precedents set by relying on Del Ponte’s judgment in the past, even 
when (as in April) they had been ‘unpleasant’ for them. Drivers mentioned Del 
Ponte’s ‘turn’ after her positive assessment in April. Brakeman again stressed 
‘ability but unwillingness’, drivers stressed ’willingness but inability’.445 But all along 
the definition of full cooperation remained open. It seemed to drift somewhere 
between ‘showing commitment’ and ‘extraditing Gotovina’ to at least providing 
‘clear information on his whereabouts’. 
The debate was then taken up to the Coreper and the ministerial level. But there the 
debate shifted from the ‘what’ to the ‘who decides’ question. Seeing that Coreper 
considered it unfeasible for the Council to come back on promises made by the 
European Council, one could more or less count on Croatia getting a date. It was 
also clear that this date would be made conditional on Croatia’s ICTY cooperation. 
The question was whether the Conclusions should explicitly mention that it was the 
Council that had to confirm that there was full cooperation. The ambassadors and 
ministers struggled to find the right dictum and eventually opted for a minimalistic 
approach. The European Council would suggest the opening of accession 
negotiations on 17 March 2005, “provided that there is full cooperation with the 
ICTY”.446 Thus the uncertainties remained about how to judge, and who should 
judge, Zagreb’s cooperation.447
443 Author’s interviews, Commission (Commissioner’s Cabinet) level, 12-7-2010, 15-7-2010. Agence Europe 
20-1-2005: 4-5.
444 Coweb 30-11-2004. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The European Council Conclusions 
had not made an explicit link between full cooperation and the setting of a date. 
445 Author’s interviews, Council Secretariat and Working party level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010, 13-10-2010, 
10-11-2010. 
446 European Council meeting, Brussels 17-12-2004. Presidency Conclusions. Enlargement Croatia.
447 Agence Europe 14-12-2004: 5.
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Round V: Suspending the opening of negotiations
In the beginning of 2005 the Luxembourg Presidency received several letters from 
Gotovina’s lawyers proposing a voluntary surrender in exchange for a trial in Croatia 
instead of The Hague. In the ‘whether’ debate, Croatia had made some unfortunate 
moves. The Croatian government for one had tried to induce a voluntary surrender 
and must therefore have been in contact with Gotovina. Adopting the frame of 
‘inability’ no longer appeared to be a winning strategy. To the Commission it 
presented a number of contradictory statements such as: ‘we are doing everything 
we can, but we will nevertheless double our efforts’ and ‘we have absolutely no idea 
where Gotovina is, but we swear that he is not in Croatia’.448 It was in reaction to 
similar statements that Del Ponte and her team started propagating their ‘within 
reach’ claims.449 Rehn visited Del Ponte on 28 January in preparation of the Council 
meeting on the 31st .
Still, there was some anxiety about how the Luxembourg Presidency would want to 
deal with the matter. The European Council Conclusions made it clear that the 
Council had to consult with Del Ponte before 17 March, in order to be able to decide 
on the opening of negotiations. The question was when and how. Brakemen would 
have opted for inviting Del Ponte to the Council or else get a complete report from 
her about the current level of cooperation. But what the Luxembourg Presidency 
foresaw was a meeting of Foreign Minister Asselborn and Prime Minister Juncker 
with Del Ponte only on 11 March, after which they would present a proposal to be 
discussed by the Council. Until that date, they would have liked to avoid Council 
level debates on the ICTY. Rehn made such an approach impossible. He opened 
the attack at the Council meeting in January. According to the Commissioner, 
Croatia felt too comfortable; convinced that they would achieve the opening of 
negotiations without making any further efforts.450 Brakemen (particularly the UK, 
the Netherlands, Sweden) supported the Commissioner in asking for another ICTY 
debate at the Council in February. The January Council Conclusions went ever 
further than those of October: “Full and unconditional cooperation with the ICTY 
remains an essential requirement for further movement towards the EU.”451 
Luxembourg now seemed willing to fulfil its role as honest broker by giving Del Ponte 
and her team numerous occasions to share their views with Coweb and Coreper. 
Only three days after the Council, Del Ponte was invited for a lunch with the Coreper 
448 Agence Europe, 8-2-2005: 4. Author’s interview, Commission (Commissioner’s Cabinet) level, 12-7-2010. 
449 Meaning, Gotovina is within reach of the Croatian Authorities. 
450 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010.
451 2637th General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 31-1-2005. Western Balkans. 
Council Conclusions.
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ambassadors.452 Del Ponte decided to pour more oil on the fire. She recounted how 
Sanader flaunted his German and Austrian friends, who would safeguard the 
opening of accession negotiations for him. Still, the Luxembourg Presidency 
appeared hesitant about providing Del Ponte with direct access to the Council 
level.
At the February Council meeting, the Council limited itself to giving a last chance 
warning. The Luxembourg Foreign Minister stated afterwards that: “There is no 
possible ambiguity on the matter, Croatia has less than one month”.453 There had in 
fact been a lot of ambiguity, be it (again) mostly on procedures. There was one 
Minister, who felt the Council could no longer evade the ‘what’ question. But with 
that, the debate shifted to whether the possible suspension of the accession 
negotiations was a ‘technical’ decision that could be taken by Coreper or a ‘political’ 
decision that should be dealt with by the Council itself on 16 March.454 Where the 
brakemen now stressed automatism, the drivers preferred a political debate. 
Until that time the brakemen wanted to avoid unnecessary responses to all kinds of 
press statements and presumably positive gestures made by Croatia.455 Coreper 
had already decided that it would deal with the matter when preparing the March 
Council Conclusions.456 As there never was much hope for a positive judgment 
from the General Prosecutor, what Coreper mostly debated was the procedural 
follow up.457 Should the Council set a ‘rendezvous date’ for again discussing 
Croatia? Should the matter be discussed at European Council level? Or should the 
debate be postponed, even though there would be the clear ‘risk’ of interference 
with the Turkey issue? None of these options looked very attractive to the brakemen. 
But avoiding them all would be difficult. 
452 Coreper 3-2-2005. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Author’s interview, Carla del Ponte, 
Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY (1999-2007), 14-6-2011.
453 Agence Europe, 22-2-2005: 6.
454 2640th General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 21-2-2005. Internal report, Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
455 For an overview of Croatia’s statements, pleas, threats and efforts see EU Observer 17-2-2005, 28-2-2005, 
2/3-3-2005 Agence Europe, 10-3-2005: 5. Some of the more interesting attempts include Prime Minister 
Sanader’s invitation to come and help find Gotovina; an offer that was politely declined by the EU. 
Another is President Mesic request for proof from the EU that Gotovina is in Croatia. It seems that if the 
EU had such proof, it would not be so difficult to locate the general. 
456 This would be after it had received an update from Del Ponte. Coreper 25-2-2005. Internal report, Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
457 Coreper 4-3, 9-3, 10-3, 15-3-2005. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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The Council Conclusions of March 2005 provide us with one of those rare moments 
when the Council made no effort to cloak its differences of opinion. They stated 
that: “after deliberation by the Council, and in the absence of a common agreement, 
the opening of accession negotiations has been postponed”.458 It is unclear who 
exactly gained from revealing this internal dissension. Brakemen had hoped to 
wrap up the Council Conclusions at Coreper level, but drivers and the Luxembourg 
Presidency wanted an ‘open’ debate at Council (and then at European Council) 
level. Even though the outcome was clear beforehand, these ‘debates’ were 
thorough and led to some unforeseen changes in the agreed language. While the 
suspension itself was a clear victory for the brakemen, the drivers now managed to 
get the verbal side payments. First of all they got the negotiation protocol approved 
(so that the Commission could begin negotiations as soon as the Council would 
give the green light). The Conclusions mentioned no rendezvous date, which could 
be explained as a victory for the brakemen (no automatism). But on the other hand, 
there would still be the risk of interference with the Turkey debate set to continue in 
the Fall, something which the drivers could use. 
Second, the Council felt it necessary to stress that it was the ultimate assessor. The 
Conclusions read that negotiations will start “as soon as the Council has established 
that Croatia is fully cooperating with the ICTY”. This is of course a truism. What lay 
beneath was a thorough debate about Del Ponte’s assessment capabilities. Since 
brakemen still refused openly to admit that it was all about ‘achieving a given result’ 
(Gotovina), the drivers could reframe it into “an obligation in substance”.459 In other 
words ‘all’ Croatia had to do was to convince the Council that it showed the 
necessary efforts. The battle then became about how to judge these efforts. The 
drivers had suggested something of a ‘collective monitoring-mechanism’ which 
could objectively assess the cooperation. 
The brakemen had (again) been set on avoiding a debate at European Council 
level, something which they (again) failed to do. Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Hungary reopened the debate at the European Council of 23 March, but this did not 
lead to changes in the Conclusions. What it did lead to was the announcement of a 
Taskforce, which was to monitor and support Croatia’s efforts in apprehending 
Gotovina.460 Drivers scored an important victory with this. While brakemen tended 
to see it as a face-saver or at most ‘consultative body’, drivers hoped that it could 
458 2649th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 16-3-2005. Enlargement. Croatia. Council Conclusions.
459 Agence Europe, 17-3-2005: 4-5.
460 Agence Europe, 24-3-2005: 3. This Taskforce was to present its first Report on Croatia’s ICTY cooperation 
already on 25 April. It was to consult with Croatia and the ICTY right away, which did not seem very useful 
seeing that Del Ponte had just concluded that Croatia was not fully cooperating at the moment. 
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fulfil a ‘complementary’ role in assessing Croatia. Coreper subsequently concerned 
itself with the ‘mandate’ and ‘political assessment faculty’ of this Taskforce.461 While 
its formal competences would be limited, what the drivers managed to achieve was 
(at least temporarily) to banish Del Ponte from the Plenaries. It was decided that she 
would present her views to the Taskforce, instead of directly to the Council. But it 
was still unclear when exactly she would be invited to do so.
At the first meeting of the Taskforce at the Council of 26 April, Croatia’s Prime Minister, 
Sanader, presented his (according to brakemen ‘symbolic’, according to drivers 
‘comprehensive’) Action Plan for the apprehension of Gotovina. The plan focussed 
primarily on rounding up the support network around Gotovina. It spoke to the 
Commission’s concerns about strengthening the rule of law, fighting organized crime, 
but it did not promise the arrest of Gotovina. After all, Sanader had always maintained 
that the General was not ‘within reach’. Coreper had to discuss whether the Council 
had ‘warmly welcomed’ or ‘took note with interest’ of the Action Plan.462 At this point, 
the brakemen were merely trying to get the file safely through the Luxembourg 
Presidency. The drivers wanted to keep discussing the matter at Council and 
European Council level. Del Ponte tried to preclude such debates by suggesting, in 
the beginning of June, to give Croatia another three or four months to produce 
tangible results.463 The June Council noted this suggestion, but nevertheless agreed 
to come back to the issue already in July. The Conclusions, remarkably enough, 
stated that: “by implementing its action plan, Croatia was on the road towards full 
cooperation”.464 The Council had seemingly agreed on a definition preferred by the 
drivers. Brakemen were for once successful in keeping the issue off the agenda of 
the European Council. But the UK now had to engage in careful agenda-manage-
ment to avoid overlap with the Turkey debate, set to continue on 3 October.465
Round VI: Opening of accession negotiations
A lot of conjectures surround the UK Presidency of the second half of 2005, the 
most persistent of which is the ‘trade-off’ that presumably took place at the Council 
meeting in October in which the UK managed to get Austria to agree to the opening 
of negotiations with Turkey in return for the opening of negotiations with Croatia. But 
461 Interestingly enough, both Austria and the UK (as incoming Presidencies) would be represented in this 
Taskforce. Author’s interview, Commission (Commissioner’s Cabinet) level, 12-7-2010. Coreper 
24-3-2005. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
462 Coreper 27-5-2005. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
463 Agence Europe, 9-6-2005: 7.
464 2667th General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg 13-6-2005. Enlargement. Croatia. Council 
Conclusions.
465 This date was already decided at the European Council meeting in December 2004.
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if this was indeed the UK’s ‘cunning scheme’ than it contained one major liability: 
Carla Del Ponte. Brakemen had been very effective in delivering Del Ponte at the 
right time.466 But not even the UK could control what the General Prosecutor was 
going to say. Everyone knew that putting pressure on Del Ponte might very well 
produce opposite results.467 Nor could the UK be the one to look for alternative 
assessments, seeing that the country had always committed itself to her judgment 
in the past. So there appears to have been ample reason to strive for a decoupling 
of the two files. This is something the Presidency tried to do at the Council in July. 
There was yet another debate about whether the Council should already ask for an 
assessment by the Taskforce. But Del Ponte’s opinion in June made it hard for the 
Council to conclude anything else than a promise to come back to the issue at the 
informal Gymnich meeting of September and then again in October.468 
Still, the Netherlands were beginning to feel trapped. Not only was there the fear of 
losing its ally, the UK. The Netherlands were also trapped in words. On the one 
hand, they had to insist on the full implementation of the Action Plan, so that it 
would not remain a dead letter. On the other hand, it did not want to put too much 
emphasis on a Plan it considered to be mostly cosmetic. Its goal was thus to 
postpone a debate at least until the next briefing of Del Ponte. At the ICTY itself, 
they were also becoming entrapped between asking for ‘efforts’ while seeking 
‘results’.469 The drivers meanwhile were openly defining full cooperation as full 
implementation of the Croatian Action Plan. Croatia claimed to be successful in 
winding up Gotovina’s supporting network, and Austria and Germany made it clear 
that it would be hard to explain to their domestic audiences if negotiations would be 
opened with Turkey but not Croatia.470 
The Presidency’s strategy was to make sure that Del Ponte’s assessment would be 
as close as possible to the Council meeting of 3 October. The debate about the 
standing and significance of the Croatian Action Plan then faded out completely. 
The Council chose to remain in appropriate anticipation, as Del Ponte prepared for 
her visit to Zagreb on 30 September. At the Taskforce meeting of 3 October, there 
were three possible scenarios: either Del Ponte was completely satisfied, still very 
unsatisfied, or something in between. Many expected the last. While the Council 
had always refrained from making it a strict condition, the single most important 
466 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-11-2010.
467 Author’s interviews, Working party and ICTY level, 10-11-2010, 15-11-2010, 14-12-2010.
468 2674th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 18-7-2005. Enlargement. 
469 Author’s interviews, Working party and ICTY level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010, 15-11-2010.
470 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 13-10-2010, 10-11-2010.
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fact was that Gotovina had not been located or apprehended. Drivers as well as 
brakemen were thus completely surprised by Del Ponte’s assessment that ‘Croatia 
had been cooperating fully for a couple of weeks now’.471 Some got the impression 
that “she jumped before she was being pushed”.472 Del Ponte tried to refute rumours 
about significant political pressure. Whatever may have been the case, the fact that 
she spoke those magic words effectively precluded plenary debate in the Council. 
Brakeman had become entrapped in their argumentative strategy of hiding behind 
the judgment of Del Ponte. Therefore they could not even make use of the ‘ground’ 
that Gotovina was still at large. They could only ask for this “full cooperation to be 
maintained, until the last remaining indictee was in The Hague”.473 
To sum up: procedural battles?
On 3 October 2005, the Council finally reached a ‘consensus’ on opening accession 
negotiations with Croatia. Even with this extensive reconstruction of the different 
rounds of the Croatia game, it remains difficult to determine when and how exactly 
this presumed consensus came about. What is clear is that the debate about 
whether there is, what is and who decides there is ‘full cooperation with the ICTY’ 
had primarily been about procedures instead of substance. Drivers and brakemen 
had largely evaded the substantial (whether) question. Of course, brakemen would 
from time to time explain why they thought Croatia not apprehending Gotovina was 
an unwillingness, to which drivers would then ‘react’ by stating that they considered 
it to be an inability. But if we take a closer look at this ‘debate’, what is striking is that 
both sides apparently felt able to engage in such an argumentative encounter 
without agreeing on what they actually expected from Croatia. In fact, brakemen 
employed the deliberate strategy of not defining what they meant by ‘full 
cooperation’. This was a smokescreen drivers helped to erect, by focussing their 
attacks on the assessor instead of the assessments. As a direct consequence, the 
debates themselves were repetitive instead of progressive. There appear to have 
been two parallel but separate lines of reasoning. While brakemen could safely rely 
on Del Ponte and her team finding things Croatia was not doing, drivers could 
always point to other things Croatia was doing.474 The Gotovina debate appears to 
have been predominantly non-competitive. 
The majority of the battles were therefore about apparent technicalities: such as 
timelines, dates, and assessment procedures. The reasoning then resembled that 
471 Agence Europe, 4-10-2005: 4-5.
472 Author’s interview, Commission (Commissioner’s Cabinet) level, 12-7-2010.
473 2678th General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg 3-10-2005. Enlargement. Croatia: opening of 
negotiations. Council Conclusions. Gotovina would in fact be arrested in Tenerife on 7 December.
474 Author’s interviews, Coreper, Working party and ICTY level, 27-5-2010, 7-7-2010, 15-11-2010.
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of a courtroom, focussing on what would be the appropriate way, the appropriate 
time and the appropriate format for dealing with a specific matter. If we then look at 
the eventual agreement, we can in fact only conclude that there was none. Brakemen 
might have won the debate on proponents (who decides), but drivers won on 
warrants and procedures (what is full cooperation and how should the assessments 
take place). In the end all were forced to reason within the frame of judging efforts 
to be assessed by the ICTY. It was Del Ponte’s turn of October 2005 that ironically 
enough led to the rhetorical entrapment of those who had been pressing hardest 
for this frame. The consensus underlying this frame might be largely rhetorical. The 
debate had been causally significant nonetheless.
7.2 Making or riding waves? Explaining the momentum of 2005
If Presidencies are to be judged solely on the basis of their deliverables, than the 
UK Presidency was without a doubt the most successful one of the decade. In the 
second half of 2005 all candidates but Albania made tangible progress in their 
European integration. At the same meeting where Croatia was allowed to start 
accession negotiations, Serbia (and Montenegro) entered into SAA negotiations. A 
month later, Bosnia and Herzegovina was able to do the same. In December, 
Macedonia was awarded candidate Status. The UK had managed all this, by not 
allowing the Council to become bogged down in debates about Serbia’s limited 
efforts to capture Karadzic and Mladic, the status of Kosovo, the inevitable 
referendum on independence of Montenegro or the absorption capacity of the EU 
as a whole. Most of these issues would come back to haunt the Austrian Presidency 
of 2006. All this of course begs the question: why were the British so successful? 
Was it simply because they were one of the big players, because they acted skilfully 
during the negotiations, or were they just plain lucky in terms of events? 
The three possible explanations roughly relate to the three different conceptualiza-
tions of Council debates. Deliberative models would provide for the baseline 
explanation here. The different Balkan countries were able to proceed because 
member states essentially agreed that they were all individually ready to take the 
next step towards Europe. The fact that this happened during the UK Presidency 
was at most coincidental. The UK indeed was lucky in the sense that it could ride 
the waves caused by events and reforms inside the Balkan countries. These were 
for the larger part processes, which had already been set in motion during previous 
Presidencies. There was consensus on the way forward and the deliverables of 
2005 were thus the expected result. When, in 2006, the momentum behind the 
reforms ebbed away, the integration process would again slow down.
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Intergovernmental bargaining models would suggest an explanation in terms of 
linkages and logrolling. The UK was able to move all forward by trading one country 
off against the other. This meant that it could cater to different configurations of 
drivers, while isolating the remaining brakemen. In this way the UK was able 
(temporarily) to surpass the lowest common denominator. Moreover, because the 
UK was a big and important player, it had the capacity to make waves. But this 
success would turn out to be fleeting. It did not result from any sort of consensus 
on integrating the Balkans. The backlash against enlargement that followed their 
Presidency, abundantly showed that the pace was still determined by the brakemen. 
Domestic constraints, most notably in Greece, France and the Netherlands, effectively 
precluded any further progress.
The Caucus race model intends to supplement instead of completely dismiss either 
one of these lines of reasoning. It does not deny the important role that events/reforms 
(in the Balkans) or constraints (of member states) play. It merely holds that such factors 
do not provide a sufficient explanation of the events in question. The Caucus race 
model therefore attributes causal primacy to what was happening in Brussels, instead 
of in the Balkans or inside specific member states. It emphasizes (negotiation) skills 
and (salami) tactics. According to this reading, the momentum of 2005 was for the 
larger part created by the Presidency. Yet, this was not a ‘package deal’. These were 
separate argumentative battles, in which the UK used different kinds of tactics to get 
all member states aboard. The main reason that the UK had so many deliverables, 
was because member states differed on the significance of these steps. Thus, they 
could be ‘silenced’ into accepting what appeared to be minor concessions to which 
they had signed up in the past. The backlash of 2006 can be explained in terms of key 
brakemen ‘waking up’ and realizing that the process was getting out of control. It 
would in fact be the Austrians who unwittingly rang the alarm bell, by opting for an 
anything but low key approach.475 After that, the Balkan enlargement was no longer 
business as usual and brakemen got the upper hand over the drivers.
The opening of accession negotiations with Croatia has been extensively discussed 
in the previous section. Here I will subsequently discuss the deliverables on Serbia, 
Bosnia and Macedonia, while trying to determine their origins and causes.
‘Keeping it technical’: the opening of SAA negotiations with Serbia  
(and Montenegro)
In the run-up to the Thessaloniki Summit, the Serbian authorities had resolutely declared 
to Commissioner Patten their intention to (once again) catch up with Croatia and 
475 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-11-2010. 
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join the EU in 2007.476 This was ambitious to say the least. Serbia and Montenegro 
were certainly not on track. The murder of Prime Minister Djindic had destabilized a 
State Union that was neither stable nor a ‘union’. There might be something 
resembling a constitution now, but there was not one internal market.477 The EU was 
still calling for a practical dialogue on/with Kosovo as well as improved ICTY 
cooperation. There was some light on the horizon when the Council acknowledged 
that, after the finalisation of the Internal Market and Trade Action Plan, the 
Commission could at least start with a feasibility study for a SAA.478 But 2003 was 
an election year in Serbia, grinding to a halt most of the reform momentum.479
The January 2004 Council could only ‘note’ that the [parliamentary] elections had 
been free, fair and peaceful.480 It was certainly not happy with the results. The EU/
reform-minded parties had broken up, which meant that the radical right was now 
the biggest party. Solana was deeply worried about what had become of his State 
Union, while Patten was above all happy that the Commission had never set a date 
for the presentation of the feasibility study.481 By February 2004, the Council had so 
many ‘concerns to express’ that there was no real need to stress the importance of 
ICTY cooperation; which of course it did anyway.482 Kostunica however had been 
able to build a government with the support of the former Socialist party of Milosevic. 
Further ‘help’ came in the form of Macmillian events in Kosovo. The March 2004 
riots there would become an important game changer.483 The EU suddenly needed 
the Serbian government and Kostunica was well aware of this. He promised help, 
as well as (ICTY) cooperation, provided that this would not destabilize institutions in 
Serbia.484
476 Agence Europe, 22-5-2003. Serbia had been able to ‘catch up’ with Croatia and the others at the Zagreb 
Summit. Although the country was obviously still a few steps behind Croatia. See Chapter 6, Section 1.
477 2487th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 24-2-2003. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
478 2522nd External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 21-7-2003. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
There was one precondition. The State Union Assembly had to endorse the Plan first. 
479 There were parliamentary and presidential elections planned, but as it turned out the latter would only 
take place in 2004.
480 2559th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 26-1-2004. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
481 Coweb 3-2-2004. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
482 2563th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 23-2-2004. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
483 The March 2004 riots were the result of a shooting of a Serbian teen and the subsequent drowning of 
three Albanian children. These led to violent unrests and wide scale attacks on the Serbian population 
living in different parts of Kosovo. A number of Serb churches and religious monuments were destroyed. 
484 EU Observer, 23-3-2004: ‘Serbia called upon to act on Kosovo violence’. This statement was made at a 
meeting of Kostunica with Commission President, Romano Prodi. 
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The May 2004 Council mentioned “the lack of consensus over the functioning of 
the State Union” as the main reason for postponing further work on the feasibility 
study.485 In reality the Council had been so pre-occupied with Kosovo that it hardly 
took note of yet another election round in Serbia. However, these Presidential 
elections brought hope as the pro-European candidate, Tadic, was able to beat the 
candidate for the Radical party, Nikolic. Within the Council, drivers began looking 
for ‘shortcuts’ with which to help Tadic. An obvious one would be the resumption of 
the feasibility study. But this meant that the Council had to find a way around the still 
completely dysfunctional State Union. In what appears to have been a clever coup 
over the head of Solana, Patten re-launched the idea of a twin track approach. In a 
letter to the Council, Patten argued that the only way to proceed with the two 
countries was to split the SAP process in two.486 The October Council abundantly 
showed the paradoxical situation in which the Council, and the Dutch Presidency in 
485 2582nd External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 17-5-2004. Annex 2004 Annual Council Review of 
the SAP for South Eastern Europe. Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo as defined by UNSCR 
1244.
486 Author’s interview, Commission (Director) level, 11-2-2011. See also, Chapter 6, Section 2. Solana was 
understandably not happy because this moves precipitated the end of the State Union, he had created. 
When Who What
21-7-2003 Council Welcomes the finalisation Internal Market and Trade Action 
Plan and acknowledges that Commission can start a 
feasibility study
17-5-2004 Council Postponement of feasibility study because of lacking 
consensus on the functioning of the State Union
11-10-2004 Council “Expresses its support for the twin track approach…
welcomes the Commission’s intention to re-launch the 
feasibility report”.
31-1-2005 Council Notes lacking ICTY cooperation and a still largely 
dysfunctional State Union
12-4-2005 Commission Adopts feasibility study, waits for negotiation brief from 
Council
25-4-2005 Council Welcomes feasibility study, looks forward to rapid opening 
of SAA negotiations
3-10-2005 Council Opening of SAA negotiations, “the pace and conclusions 
of the negotiations would depend on...full cooperation with 
the ICTY”.
Table 7.3   Key moments in the debate on opening SAA negotiations (Serbia)
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particular, found itself. While encouraging the Commission to move forward and 
finish the feasibility report “early next year”, the Council itself was on the brake 
because of lacking ICTY cooperation.487
Despite all the efforts put into making the twin track approach work, the reality was 
that it did not.488 Montenegro was holding out for the 2006 referendum. The Council 
at the time was putting a lot of emphasis on Croatia’s insufficient ICTY cooperation. 
One could reasonably expect it to adopt a similar tough stance on Serbia. However, 
the Commission was now set on making progress. In March it praised the reforms 
undertaken by Serbia and on 12 April it presented its feasibility study.489 
Commissioner Rehn used the focal point of the tenth commemoration of Srebrenica 
in July 2005 to stress that, while ICTY cooperation had somewhat improved recently, 
EU-membership talks would not be able to begin “until the very last person 
responsible for war crimes committed has been caught”. This was clever framing 
from the Commissioner, seeing that Serbia was nowhere near membership 
negotiations. The question was whether Serbia could enter into SAA talks. Seeing 
that it had adopted the feasibility study, the Commission clearly thought this was 
the case. But to be able to start it needed a ‘negotiation brief’ from the Council. 
Under the Luxembourg Presidency, the Council already prepared the ground for 
this by welcoming the feasibility study and expressing its wish to open SAA 
negotiations as soon as possible.490 The Council meanwhile continued to pay lip 
service to a “strengthened State Union” whose demise it had in fact hastened by 
agreeing to a split in the SAA process. 
This negotiation brief was what the British Presidency would have to deliver. To 
understand why the British would be inclined to do so, we need to bear in mind the 
UK’s more instrumental approach to European accession.491 For the UK, Balkan 
enlargement was less of an end and more of a means (to achieve lasting stability). 
In view of the latter, there were more important things at stake now. The EU was 
warming up for the Kosovo status talks, as well as the Montenegrin referendum. 
This meant that all Balkan countries needed to be firmly anchored to the European 
trajectory. Opening SAA negotiations was the only means to do so. Still the UK 
487 2609th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 11-10-2004. Western Balkans. Council 
Conclusions. See also Section 1 of this chapter. 
488 Statement of SG/HR Solana to the Council. 2637th External Relations council meeting, Brussels 31-1-2005. 
Coweb capitals 2-2-2005. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
489 Agence Europe, 24-3-2005: 5, 9-4-2005: 3, 13-4-2005: 6. 
490 2656th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 25-4-2005. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
491 See Chapter 4, Section 1 for the United Kingdom’s positionality in the Balkan pre-accession game: it is 
generally a driver, but (usually) on the brake on ICTY as well as Bosnia related matters. 
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needed the brakemen, and in particular the Dutch and the French, to come on 
board. The negative referenda on the Constitutional (Lisbon) treaty meant that their 
enthusiasm for enlargement was now at an all time low.
The UK Presidency made a smart move when it suggested to separate the political 
decision on the opening of SAA negotiations from the technical debate about the 
content of the negotiation framework.492 The goal was to keep the Coweb debates 
practical, while forcing the pace by means of a tight time schedule.493 Those with 
member-specific doubts and reservations were urged to take issues to a higher 
level. The British ventured that most of these ‘petty’ concerns would be untenable 
at PSC or Coreper level. Thus, they could focus on the concerns of the few who 
indeed seemed willing to block decision making at a higher level: France and the 
Netherlands. What might have helped in appeasing the French, was that the UK 
made it clear that they had no intention of pushing for visa-liberalization during their 
Presidency.494 The “opening of borders”, as mentioned in the Thessaloniki Agenda, 
had always been a very sensitive issue for Paris. For the Dutch, the visa liberalization 
debate had served as a useful distraction from the debate about accession. For 
once, they were not the ones on the brake in the Balkans. For the French, the SAA 
formed the lesser of the two evils. During subsequent Coweb debates the French 
could furthermore be appeased by maintaining the two-staged approach to the 
SAA.495 Up until the present day it is very much unclear what exactly is supposed to 
happen/change when a country is allowed to enter into the second stage of the 
SAA.496 All the Council was effectively doing was adding another step to the ladder. 
The Dutch were to be appeased by including the ICTY suspension clause in the 
negotiation framework. This is mirrored in the Council Conclusions of October. 
These explicitly stated that “the pace and conclusions of the negotiations would 
492 The debate about the negotiation framework spanned the Coweb meetings of 20-7, 25-7, 5-9, 8,-9, 12-9, 
15-9, 22-9, 26-9-2005. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
493 Author’s interview, Working party level, 14-12-2005.
494 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010. Coreper 30-6-2005. Internal report, Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The UK cleverly suggested to let this dossier be handled by the technical (JHA) 
Working parties instead of the more political Coweb. This meant that the debate would be less about 
whether it was politically opportune to grant visa-liberalization. Rather it was about whether the countries 
were able to fulfill all the (technical) requirements that would enable visa liberalization. 
495 This two stage approach had been introduced in the negotiation mandate with Albania, in view of the 
particular problems that country faced at the time. But the Commission had never been too enthusiastic 
about it. The main problem was with determining the benchmarks for entering into this second stage. 
Author’s interviews, Working party and Commission (Macedonia Unit) level, 7-7-2010, 26-1-2011.
496 So far none of the countries has been able to enter into the second stage, even though the Commission 
had repeatedly stated that it considered Macedonia ready to do so.
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depend on [amongst other things] full cooperation with the ICTY”. The Council and 
the Commission will jointly review Serbia and Montenegro’s performance in these 
areas before negotiations conclude.”497 Here the words ‘pace’ and ‘before’ were 
crucial. The Netherlands had been willing to concede the opening of accession 
negotiations as long as there was the possibility to suspend them again once the 
ICTY cooperation deteriorated. The suspension clause in itself was a Pyrrhic victory. 
The Commission had always had the possibility to suspend the negotiations.498 No 
one could force the Commission to negotiate. The clear language was meant to 
bind the Commission. The Netherlands wanted to create an automatism: the 
second that ICTY cooperation deteriorated, suspension would have to follow 
inevitably. How effective this suspension clause really was, would become clear in 
the next year. But for now the brakemen were satisfied with the possibilities offered 
by the Council Conclusions.
Why were SAA negotiations opened up with Serbia? It was not because member 
states agreed that Serbia had fulfilled all the conditions. There had been notable 
improvement in the Spring of 2005, but the State Union was still not functioning and 
ICTY cooperation was still not full. Unrest in Kosovo had initially strengthened the 
hand of the drivers, but it was not enough to get the brakemen on board. From an 
intergovernmental bargaining perspective one could stress the (verbal) side 
payments offered, in particular to France and the Netherlands. But these were not 
substantial enough to explain their acquiescence. ‘Trading opportunities’ were 
furthermore limited, because there was not that much one could offer the brakemen 
in return. What appears to have mattered most was the varying significance that 
could be attached to this step. The EU entered into negotiations with a State Union 
that would soon come to its long foreseen end and the negotiations could be 
suspended again later on. It seems the Council had mostly reached a consensus on 
buying time to deal with Kosovo. That however would take far longer than expected.499 
Potemkin-like police reforms: the ‘opening’ of SAA negotiations  
with Bosnia
“Any possible decision in the latter part of 2004 towards the opening of SAA negotiations 
will depend on BiH’s own efforts and the progress achieved.”500 With these words 
the December 2003 Council had welcomed the Commission’s feasibility study for 
an SAA with Bosnia. Understandably, the Council was less reticent about stating 
497 2679th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 3-10-2005. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Serbia and Montenegro.
498 Author’s interview, Commission (Serbia Unit) level, 4-6-2010.
499 See Chapter 8, Section 3. Kosovo status talks were set to commence somewhere soon.
500 2553th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 9-12-2003. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
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explicit timelines and dates when it came to Bosnia. The Commission had initially 
listed sixteen priorities for Bosnia to work on in order to be able to start SAA 
negotiations. There were few who believed that the country would be able to fulfil 
them all and thus meet the deadline (Summer 2004) set by the Commission. 
Council debates about Bosnia had always been a bit different. They were the 
prerogative of the PSC, responsible for monitoring the development and application 
of the EU’s CFSP/ESDP capabilities. They thus tended to focus on what the EU 
could and should do in and for Bosnia, more than about what Bosnia should do to 
be able to move closer to the EU. Discussions were about what should be done to 
keep things moving.501 Very slowly this began to change as the EU started stressing 
‘local ownership’.502 This was the opposite of what the international community’s 
High Representative (HR) - who was also the EU’s Special Representative (EUSR) 
- Paddy Ashdown had been doing. Bosnia was an international protectorate. 
Ashdown tended to rely on sticks, particularly his ‘Bonn-powers’ with which he 
could impose legislation and sack politicians and officials who were obstructing the 
peace implementation process. The EU however wanted to focus on carrots, more 
specifically a tangible European perspective. The only problem was that this 
perspective was anything but tangible. There certainly was consensus on what the 
EU should not do: sit back and wait for the necessary reforms to happen. It had 
always been clear that Bosnia needed some extra assistance. The debate was 
about how much support should be offered and what should be expected in return. 
Ministerial level debates on Bosnia were becoming ever more scarce, seeing that 
everything had already been said more than once. Bosnia-fatigue had been creeping 
in since the beginning of the decade.503 The 2004 Progress Report – an euphemism if 
ever there was one - almost obligatorily mentioned that there was some progress 
(mainly in terms of stabilizing the country), but that this progress had too often stemmed 
from international pressure.504 Coweb incidentally discussed Bosnia, for example when 
it had to extend the mandate of the EUSR, or in reaction to the regular visits of the 
Consultative Taskforce, established at the Zagreb Summit. In November 2004 none of 
the 16 priorities had been fulfilled.505 On 16 December 2004, Ashdown decided to 
remove nine Bosnian Serb government officials, because they were actively helping war 
criminals and their networks. By now it was clear that whatever chance Bosnia had to 
make progress towards Europe depended on what was happening outside the country. 
501 Author’s interview, Working party level, 14-12-2010.
502 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 17-5-2011, 23-6-2011. 
503 Author’s interview, Working party level, 2-2-2011.
504 Meaning it was imposed by the OHR. 2582nd External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 17-5-2004. 
Annex 2004 Annual Review of the SAP for South Eastern Europe. Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
505 Coweb 22-10-2005. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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Bosnia had always been something of a special case for the UK.506 Keeping the 
process technical as had been the approach on Serbia, did not seem to be a 
feasible approach. The fact that this was primarily a foreign policy dossier meant 
that the reasoning was more political. The UK wanted to make sure that Serbia and 
Bosnia would proceed at the same pace, so that this would make both a bit more 
accommodating once the Kosovo status process would draw to a close.507 There 
was no shortage of compatriots, which could help create momentum. The British 
High Representative, Ashdown, approached the British Commissioner, Patten, in 
order to prioritize the matter of police reforms and present it as the key concern on 
the way to the opening of SAA negotiations.508 
The dominant line of reasoning employed by the drivers (Greece, Austria, Italy, but 
in this case also France) in Council debates was to avoid Bosnia becoming a black 
hole in the Balkans. Serbia making progress would therefore automatically lead to 
a debate about whether Bosnia could now do the same. For the Commission it was 
clear that it could not credibly state that Bosnia was in a position to engage in SAA 
506 See Chapter 4, Section 1 on the UK’s positionality with regard to Bosnia.
507 The key concern was how the political elite in the Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb part of Bosnia, would 
react to Kosovo moving towards independence. All member states wanted to avoid further fragmentation 
of Bosnia. Coweb capitals 15-4-2005. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
508 Author’s interview, Commission (Director) level, 11-2-2011. Coweb 4-4-2005. Internal report, Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus making use of the focal point of the EU’s Police Mission in Bosnia.
When Who What
18-11-2003 Commission Adoption of feasibility study listing 16 priorities as necessary 
for the recommendation to open SAA negotiations 
9-12-2003 Council Welcomes the Commission’s feasibility report and hints at 
possibility to open SAA negotiations at the end of 2004
17-5-2004 Council Annual SAP report notes limited progress in terms of 
reforms. 
13-6-2005 Council Notes lacking police reform as major obstacle for entering 
into SAA negotiations
3-10-2005 Council Regrets not being able to open SAA negotiations before the 
10th Anniversary of Dayton
21-11-2005 Council Opening of SAA negotiations characterized as ‘the historic 
moment at which BiH’s EU journey could begin in earnest’. 
Table 7.4   Key moments in the debate on opening SAA negotiations (Bosnia)
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negotiations.509 Failed police reforms were indeed presented as the major stumbling 
block. Ironically enough it appeared that politicians in the RS, aware of the EU’s 
inclination to let Serbia and Bosnia proceed simultaneously, had backtracked. 
While welcoming considerable progress, the June Council “regretted to see, in 
particular, that the line taken by the authorities in the Republika Srpska [RS] had 
prevented an overall agreement on police restructuring in accordance with the 
principles established by the EU”.510 Here the Council risked self-entrapment as 
there had in fact been very little in terms of EU standards, for example on how one 
should organize the district boundaries of different police forces.511 Making police 
boundaries independent from the federal boundaries, as Ashdown had suggested, 
was certainly not part of the Acquis.512 For the next couple of years, the Commission 
would be stuck with a criterion for which it lacked Acquis-related standards on 
which to base its assessments.513 
At the lower levels, member states started looking for creative solutions. One would 
be to adopt the negotiation mandate without actually starting the negotiations. The 
UK Presidency then decided that Coweb would deal with the negotiation mandate 
of Serbia first. After that, the mandate of Bosnia could be presented as a “copy-paste 
exercise”.514 The Presidency tried to use the historical resonance of the Srebrenica 
commemoration as a focal point. But not even the UK could get the Council to 
brush aside the lacking police reform. In October 2005 it excessively dangled the 
SAA carrot in front of a reluctant RS National Assembly, which had rejected the 
latest proposal for police reforms. The Council “regretted that it would not now be 
possible for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to start negotiations on a Stabilization 
and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU by the 10th Anniversary of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement.”515 The Commission had in the meantime managed to establish 
some EU-related principles for these police forces: “free from political interference, 
with policing areas based on technical and professional criteria, and with exclusive 
state-level competence for policing”. The second one in particular left much to the 
imagination. Who would ever argue against using ‘technical and professional criteria’? 
509 Most of this was discussed in the Coweb meetings of 13-5, 19-5, 24-5-2005. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs.
510 2668th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 13-6-2005. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
511 Author’s interview, Commission (Director) level, 11-2-2011.
512 Insiders admit that suggesting something similar in Belgium would probably raise hell. 
513 Author’s interviews, Commission (Bosnia Unit) level, 22-7-2010, 13-1-3011.
514 Author’s interview. Working party level, 14-12-2010.
515 2679th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 3-10-2005. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. See also Muehlmann (2007). 
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What appears to have happened next is that Presidency, Commission and Council 
found each other in building a Potemkin Village, and doing it prefab-style so that 
they would be able to bring presents to the celebration of the ten year anniversary 
of Dayton after all.516 It started when the Commission noted at the end of October 
that there had been significant progress, sufficient to start SAA negotiations.517 
There were however some points that would require additional monitoring. These 
were the by now familiar priorities with regard to international obligations (ICTY), 
tackling organized crime and adopting the necessary legislation in the area of 
public broadcasting. Furthermore, the opening of the SAA negotiations required 
the endorsement of an agreement on police reforms.518 These were in fact the same 
points that had led to the stalemate less than a month ago. Coweb then managed 
to race through the negotiation mandate in record time. The November 2005 
Conclusions were the icing on the cake: “The Council warmly welcomed the fact 
that the progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina had now made it possible for 
the Commission to recommend the opening of negotiations for a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement. The Council authorised the Commission to open 
negotiations at the earliest opportunity.” The opening of negotiations marked “an 
historic moment for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s development” and a “key moment in 
the region’s transition from stabilization towards the EU”. “Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
journey towards the EU had now begun in earnest.”519 “The Council expressed its 
gratitude for the work of the EU Special Representative and High Representative, 
Lord Ashdown for the key role he had played in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress.” 
But the Council was now looking for ways to diminish the role of the OHR in favour 
of an “EUSR-led mission”. The Conclusions incidentally mentioned that the focus 
was now on monitoring the implementation of the police reform. 
When the smoke had cleared, it became clear that all the Council had effectively 
done was adopt the negotiation directive for an SAA. There had been no substantial 
police reforms. The only thing that had changed was the agreed language. Council 
and Commission were no longer talking about police reforms as a precondition for 
opening SAA negotiations. From now on they regularly “urged further progress in 
516 It also turned out to be HR Ashdown’s going-away party, which the Council managed to brighten up.
517 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council on the progress achieved by Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in implementing the priorities identified in the Feasibility Study on the preparedness of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European 
Union’, Brussels 21-10-2005. 
518 Coweb 24-10-2005. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
519 2691th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 21/22-11-2005. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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[amongst other things] the implementation of police reforms”.520 This supposedly to 
maintain momentum that was never there. In fact, Council and Commission would 
find themselves insisting on police reforms right until the signing of the SAA in June 
2008.521 To answer the question of why SAA negotiations with Bosnia were opened: 
certainly not because of reforms in Bosnia. It seems that there was something of a 
consensus in not allowing Bosnia to be left behind. But there was certainly no 
consensus on whether the protectorate it still was, could ‘now begin its journey 
towards the EU in earnest’.
‘A star on their shoulder’: Awarding candidate status to Macedonia
There might have been a ‘permissive consensus’ on Bosnia, a country far removed 
from membership, but the Council was certainly not in common agreement about 
how to react to the membership application of Macedonia. Macedonia had taken 
good note of Croatia’s decision to apply too soon. In the run-up to the first meeting 
of the EU-Western Balkans Forum on 9 December 2003, Commissioner Patten and 
most of the member states had politely dropped the message with Foreign Minister 
Mitreva, that now might not be the best time for an application. Not even the 
momentum of Thessaloniki could conceal that the 2003 Progress Reports had 
been critical about the pace of reforms, again particularly in the implementation of 
the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA). ‘Decentralisation’ was the buzzword here, 
meaning that the Albanian minority should be granted more extensive rights and 
privileges, in particular by a revision of the municipal boundaries. The Council 
stressed that: “Full and rapid implementation of this agreement remains the only 
way for former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to move towards the 
EU.”522 In spite of the warnings, Macedonia used the focal point of the Forum to 
announce its intention to apply for membership in the beginning of 2004. 
Croatia had also set the precedent for the Council reserving to itself the right to 
engage in a political debate about the feasibility of the application. Yet, by the time 
of the actual application, 22 March 2004, skies had cleared for Macedonia. There 
now was reform momentum. By February all member states had ratified the SAA, 
and the Council was more than aware that unrest in Kosovo had the tendency to 
spill over into Macedonia.523 The 2004 SAP Report was very positive, even noting 
520 For instance in the Conclusions of the 2701st External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 12-12-2005. 
521 Author’s interview, Commission (Bosnia Unit) level, 22-7-2010. See Chapter 9, Section 1.
522 2518th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 16-6-2003. 2003 Annual Council Review of the 
SAP for South Eastern Europe. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
523 This was what in fact had happened in 2000-2001. See Chapter 6, Section 2 (Gallagher, 2003: 170-172; 
Pond, 2006: 168-187).
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positive developments in the relations with Greece.524 The request for an avis was 
an A-point at the May Council meeting, largely dedicated to the developments in 
Kosovo.525 There was no desire for a big political debate, but the Council did 
mention the need “to accelerate preparatory efforts for the implementation of the 
decentralisation process”.526 By the end of the year this had transformed into an 
explicit link: “a delay in the decentralisation reform would seriously jeopardize 
further progress towards the EU”.527 There would in fact be no such delay, and when 
524 In fact, the biggest concern of the Commission was the bilateral immunity agreement that Macedonia 
had signed with the USA, stipulating that it would not deliver US citizens to the ICC. Stabilization and 
Association Report 2004 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Brussels 30-3-2004. Sections 
2.3.1and2.
525 2582nd External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 17-5-2004. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
526 2582nd External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 17-5-2004. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
2004 Annual Council Review of the SAP for South Eastern Europe. Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.
527 Presidency Declaration on the 7 November referendum in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
This was a referendum called by the opposition parties to revoke EU-backed decentralization legislation. 
This referendum failed due to low voter turnout. Southeast European Times, 8-11-2004. The declaration 
was discussed in Coweb 26-10, 29-10-2004. Internal reports. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
When Who What
11-3-2004 Macedonia Application for membership
17-5-2004 Council Request for an avis on the membership application of 
Macedonia
25-4-2005 Council Encourages Greece and Macedonia to find “a 
negotiated and mutually acceptable solution” for the 
name-dispute.
9-11-2005 Commission Delivery avis on membership application Macedonia, 
suggesting to grant candidate status, while delaying 
the opening of accession negotiations until the country 
“has reached a sufficient degree of compliance with 
the membership criteria”.
12-12-2005 Council Decides that the avis of the Commission “will be 
considered by the European Council”
17-12-2005 European Council Awarding of candidate status to Macedonia, without 
providing a date for the opening of membership 
negotiations
Table 7.5   Key moments in the debate about awarding candidacy (Macedonia)
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the USA declared that it would from now on use the name Macedonia instead of the 
acronym FYROM, Macedonia seemed to be heading for calm waters. 
Yet, in the run-up to the first meeting of the Stabilization and Association Council with 
Macedonia in September 2004, it became clear that progress is seldom as smooth 
and self-evident as it appears at the surface. The SA Council meetings may be ritual 
dances, but agreeing on what would be the Common Position of the Council was not. 
The Dutch Presidency had to work hard to avoid explicit mentioning of the 
‘name-dispute’ between Greece and Macedonia.528 It was clear that Greece was 
warming up for a debate about an issue that should officially be dealt with within the 
UN-framework. In October 2003, the EU had called on Croatia: “to urgently pursue a 
constructive dialogue with its neighbours to meet the concerns of all those involved”.529 
Greece now argued, why not ask the same from Macedonia? While the other member 
states at the time were not willing to show responsiveness to this member-specific 
concern, it made all aware that Macedonia’s progress was not nearly a done deal. 
What the Greeks (and others) could use in the debate was the continued presence of 
the EUSR.530 This did not automatically turn Macedonia into an international protectorate 
like Bosnia. But indirectly, it did interfere with the SAP. After all, the fact that the country 
still ‘needed’ an EUSR, meant that the OFA was not yet fully implemented. And 
implementation of the OFA had become a precondition (under the SAP) for the 
opening of membership negotiations. Behold the argumentative trap! Debates about 
EUSR exit strategies (in the PSC) thus had a direct bearing on SAP related discussions 
(in Coweb and Coreper). It comes as no surprise that Greece acted as a brakeman in 
the PSC debates.531 But for the time being, the UK, France, Germany and Solana’s 
Policy unit, were also in favour of prolonging the EUSR’s mandate.
While waiting for an avis on the membership application, Macedonia did not do 
itself a favour by displaying its inability to organize flawless local elections, yet 
another one of those “essential requirements for closer relations with the EU”.532 
528 Author’s interviews, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010. Coweb 8-7, 16-7, 20-7, 22-7-2004. Internal reports, Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Internal reflection on the Dutch Presidency with regard to the Balkans, Coweb 
11-1-2005. 
529 2533rd External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 13-10-2003. Western Balkans. Council 
Conclusions.
530 See Chapter 6, Section 2. The Council had deemed it necessary to instate an EU Special Representative 
(EUSR) to oversee the implementation of the OFA. 
531 Coweb 6-1-2005, PSC 15-3-2005. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This also explains the 
Commission’s eagerness to get rid of the EUSR. Author’s interviews, Commission (Macedonia Unit) 
level, 8-7-2010.
532 2656th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 25-4-2005. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
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The April 2005 Council spoke of “irregularities” but it also “noted recent developments 
concerning the dispute as to the name of the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia”. Apparently the UN Secretary General was concerning himself with the 
matter. Greece now managed to slip in most of the language it had asked for at the 
SA Council: “The Council encouraged Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia to intensify their efforts with a view of finding a negotiated and mutually 
acceptable solution within the framework of United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 817/93 and 845/93 as quickly as possible.” In a meeting dominated by 
Serbia’s long awaited feasibility study, no minister chose to intervene on (behalf of) 
Macedonia. But many member states must have been aware of what insisting on a 
negotiated (by means of a direct dialogue) and mutually acceptable (both have a 
veto) solution meant, not only in the case of Greece and Macedonia but also with 
regard to Serbia and Kosovo.533
At the beginning of the UK Presidency, Macedonia was still waiting for the avis. The 
Commission tried to temper expectations a bit, by pointing out the difficulties in 
Skopje as well as the ‘changing climate’ in Brussels. If one focussed solely on the 
current state of reforms, coming up with a positive avis would be difficult. But, if one 
took into account the need to guarantee the stability of a country so close to the 
turmoil in Kosovo, then a positive gesture might be in order. From this second 
perspective Macedonia’s weakness suddenly became its strength. It is thus not 
hard to predict what line of arguing the drivers started to adopt. They started to 
paint a picture of country “in existential doubt”.534 They argued that this was not 
(yet) a stable multi-ethnic society. Many Macedonians were still wondering whether 
Macedonia was a real country. They thus needed encouragement.
At the second meeting of the SA Council in July 2005, Macedonia expressed its 
strong desire to achieve candidate status at the European Council in December 
2005.535 Apparently, behind the scenes two things had already been agreed on. 
First, the opening of accession negotiations, or even the setting of a date for this, 
was out of the question. The debate was now solely on whether Macedonia could 
acquire candidate status. Second, the European Council would have to concern 
itself with the matter.536
533 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-11-2010. On the latter see Chapter 8, section 3, on the former 
Chapter 9, Section 2.
534 Author’s interview, Commission (Macedonia Unit) level, 26-1-2011. 
535 Second meeting of the EU-Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilization and Association 
Council, Brussels 18-7-2005. Press Release. 
536 The European Council is always the one to take the formal decision on the awarding of candidate status, 
but now they might also have to take the actual decision. 
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What followed was a nicely orchestrated interplay between a Presidency, “never 
very enthusiastic about pushing a line that is not the Commission’s”, and a 
Commission, “feeling out [and anticipating on] what member states would be 
willing to accept”.537 The former could appear accommodating to the brakemen 
(France, the Netherlands and of course Greece) and their doubts about the pace 
and character of the enlargement process, while at the same time stressing the 
need to follow standard operating procedures. The latter could claim it acted under 
political pressure to come up with a positive avis to help stabilize the country and 
the region.538 Both could maintain they were presenting a compromise solution in 
order to avoid a divisive debate at European Council level.539 In its avis the 
Commission presented the awarding of candidate status mainly as a ‘political 
recognition of a closer relationship’. The material consequences were indeed 
limited. It was clear to all that: “real candidacy starts only with the opening of actual 
accession negotiations.”540 Yet, symbolic as it might be, this ‘star on the shoulder’ 
did come with verbal side payments. Under the political criteria for membership the 
Commission explicitly stated that: “Sustained efforts are needed in this area [of 
regional cooperation], in particular in order to resolve the name issue with Greece 
in the interest of good neighbourly relations.”541 The ‘link’ was now explicit and it 
addressed only one side of the table. The Commission was of the opinion that 
negotiations for accession with Macedonia should only be opened “once it has 
reached a sufficient degree of compliance with the membership criteria”. Again, 
abundant verbal ammunition for those who would want to put pressure on 
Macedonia for bilateral reasons. 
Now that the Commission avis was out, the UK Presidency could present it as a fait 
accompli. This was a matter that had to be dealt with through the appropriate 
channels; Coweb, Coreper, Council and finally the European Council in December.542 
This was still no walk in the park for the Dodo. Requests to stress the open-ended 
character of the process, or to refrain from addressing the Western Balkans under 
the heading of enlargement (but under ‘external relations’) made it abundantly clear 
that a big debate about enlargement was forthcoming. Some member states would 
have liked to start up this debate already at the European Council in December. But 
537 Author’s interviews, Working party and Commission (Macedonia Unit) level, 14-12-2010, 26-1-2011. 
538 Author’s interview, Commission (Director) level, 11-2-2011.
539 Coweb 28-7-2005. Internal Reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
540 Author’s interview, Commission (Director) level, 11-2-2011.
541 ‘Commission Opinion on the application from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for membership 
of the European Union’, Brussels 9-11-2005. 
542 Coweb 17-11, 1-12-2005, Coreper 1-12, 6-12, 8-12-2005. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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the most practical problem was an already overloaded Agenda.543 What all this 
would mean for Macedonia was still unclear. The December Council gladly passed 
on the hot potato. “The [Commission] Opinion will be considered by the European 
Council.”544 As Council President, Jack Straw, explained to the press: “We have not 
yet reached a consensus on this issue. It will, therefore, be up to the Heads of State 
and Government to decide.”545 His French counterpart, Douste-Blazy openly linked 
the decision to a “wider debate on enlargement” that should serve to “clarify the 
rules of the game” delineate “who decides on enlargements” and “what is the EU’s 
absorption capacity.” It was clear that the decision on Macedonia was to be used 
as an important signal to the other Balkan countries and to Turkey. The Council 
furthermore appeared to be sending a message to the people within the DG 
Enlargement, to consider a sabbatical leave for 2006. The reply of the drivers was 
as to be expected: candidate status was really not that big a deal. The opening of 
accession negotiations was an entirely different matter.546
The European Council Conclusions of December 2005 on Macedonia were in fact 
one big verbal side payment to the brakemen. Macedonia might from now on be 
called a candidate country. But at what price? “The European Council makes clear 
that further steps will have to be considered in the light of the debate on the 
enlargement strategy.”547 Such steps would depend on:
- “Compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria”
- “Requirements of the Stabilization and Association Process”
- “Effective implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement”
- “The need for further significant progress to respond to other issues and criteria 
for membership included in the Commission’s Opinion”
- “Implementation of the priorities in the European Partnerships, on the basis of 
specific benchmarks”
- “The absorption capacity of the Union also has to be taken into account”.
Most of the underlying conditionalities were of course not new. But the fact that Heads 
of State and Government felt the need to dictate them once more, already drove home 
the point. Drivers might have won a battle, there certainly had not won the war.
543 Coreper 6-12-2005. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
544 2701st External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 12-12-2005. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
545 Agence Europe, 13-12-2005: 4. 
546 This is what Commissioner Rehn and German Foreign Minister Steinmeier stated in their reply to the 
concerns of French. Also, they stressed that a decision on the opening of accession negotiations would 
only follow after the debate on enlargement had taken place. Agence Europe 13-12-2005: 4.
547 European Council meeting, Brussels 15/16-12-2005. Presidency Conclusions. Part X. Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia.
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How did the UK Presidency get the Council to agree on the awarding of candidate 
status to Macedonia? It is telling in this regard that many participants mention it as 
a remarkable feat without exactly remembering how they pulled it off.548 It was not 
about Macedonia’s reform record, which had been negative in 2003, positive in 
2004, and again negative in 2005. Based on this, one would have expected Council 
and Commission to withhold the extra star. Again a shift in emphasis seems to have 
mattered more than a change in substance. Attaching different significances to the 
same agreement appears to have played a central role. It could be sold as a small 
price to pay for what was in the common interest of all: ensuring stability at the 
borders of Kosovo. And it would also get the pressure off the Council and 
Commission for a while, so that they could re-evaluate the enlargement process. 
Yet, for a move that was sold as merely symbolic, it did cause a lot of waves. And 
even more significantly, it put an disproportional amount of verbal ammunition – in 
the form of agreed language at European Council level – in the hands of the 
brakemen. 
7.3 Conclusion: Digging the trenches
When explaining the Council’s decisions on the European perspective of the 
Western Balkans, the focus is often on those in the argumentative trenches: Greece 
on Macedonia, the Netherlands on Croatia and Serbia, France in general. This 
chapter has addressed the preliminary question of how some of these trenches 
were dug. Much of the groundwork for the successive debates about ‘good 
neighbourly relations’, ‘full cooperation’, or ‘local ownership’, was laid in the years 
2003-2005. This chapter reconstructed the first (and as it turned out, only) Croatia 
game, the first Bosnia, the second Serbia and the second Macedonia game. What 
can we say about the players, positions, game play as well as the results and 
success in these games?
-1- The players and their positions. The first thing we can conclude is that, contrary 
to what was the case in the years 2000-2003, member states were definitely taking 
part in the race by now. With regard to their reasons for participating, it seems that 
endogenous salience mattered at least as much as exogenous salience.549 These 
were not just races between those who had something at stake, in terms of (material) 
interests. The Croatia and Serbia games were not only between those most 
concerned (the neighbouring countries, Austria, Germany), but also included 
548 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 10-11-2010, 14-12-2010, 17-5-2011, 23-6-2011. 
549 See Chapter 3, Section 3 for the difference between endogenous and exogenous salience. 
221
 Croatia sets the stage or raises the bar? (June 2003 – December 2005)
others who had invested in the ICTY-issue in the past (the Netherlands, the 
Scandinavian countries and the UK).550 Greece of course played a prominent role 
in the Macedonia game.551 But so did the Swedes, the French and the British (as 
Presidency). The brakemen did not have much to gain or lose from allowing Croatia 
or Serbia to take the next step(s) towards membership. Domestic constraints were 
limited, no matter how hard the UK in particular argued that, in its handling of the 
Gotovina case, the Council, was setting the bar for Mladic and Karadzic. Serbia 
was nowhere near the opening of accession negotiations, and here the ICTY 
conditionality would be applied much earlier in the process.552 So Serbia would 
have been very happy if Croatia was indeed setting the bar, because then it would 
not have had to worry too much about ICTY cooperation for another couple of 
years.553 Domestic constraints were even more limited in the Bosnia and Macedonia 
games. But, because of previous investments, staying out of the debate would 
have been difficult. In terms of access and participation there certainly was lock-in. 
In terms of positions and coalitions, the main question is of course: did anything 
really change during the games? The short answer is ‘no’. Positions and therefore 
(sizes of) coalitions remained rather stable during the debate. There was varying 
vocality in particular by Germany in its support for Croatia (depending on the 
Council level), the United Kingdom in its opposition to Croatia and Serbia 
(particularly during their own Presidency) and France in its objections with regard 
to Macedonia. But in essence, drivers remained drivers and brakemen remained 
brakemen. 
 -2- The game play. Were the Balkan debates of the years 2003-2005 competitive or 
non-competitive? On the process level, I primarily juxtaposed the Caucus race and 
the deliberative model. The best view of these process-level dynamics, we acquired 
in the two ICTY games. There were few ‘forum-like deliberations’ in these games, 
certainly not of the open ‘Habermasian’ type as defined in Part I. Both drivers and 
brakemen of course came up with arguments to substantiate (legitimize) their own 
position. But a competitive debate and a reasoned consensus assume a willingness 
to engage oneself with the arguments of others. And this was something key 
member states were keen to avoid.554 Telling in this regard are Del Ponte’s remarks 
550 Author’s interview, Working party level, 14-1-2011. These had also been key players in the debate about 
the apprehension and transfer of Milosevic in the years 2000-2002.
551 Albeit it less outspoken than would be the case in the third Macedonia game. See Chapter 9, Section 2.
552 It became a strict condition already at step 3 of the pre-accession trajectory, while with Croatia the 
condition came to be applied only at step 10. See Chapter 5, Section 3 for the different steps.
553 Croatia had in fact been raising the bar, as Serbia would find out in 2006. See Chapter 8, Section 2.
554 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 7-7-2010.
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that only those who were interested in slowing down the EU rapprochement of 
Croatia and Serbia, were eager to seek her advice.555 There appear also to have 
been few deliberations about the status of police reforms in Bosnia or decentralisa-
tion in Macedonia. Member states refrained from challenging the assessments of 
the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the UK Presidency on these matters. 
Rather they focussed their attention on how these assessments would subsequently 
be referred to in the Council Conclusions. 
In the race of drafting the Council Conclusions, a lot of salami tactics were employed. 
The drivers were constantly looking for incremental progress, and ways to welcome 
such progress (for example, setting of a time frame for discussing Bosnia, noting 
relevant efforts made by Macedonia, welcoming voluntary surrenders presumably 
induced by Croatia). Brakemen were mostly trying to put the significance of this 
progress into perspective. Drivers and brakemen were primarily ‘battling’ over how 
explicitly the Council should link reform requirements to steps in the pre-accession 
trajectory. Their provisional success is mirrored in the varying tone of the Council 
Conclusions. The Caucus race model attaches primary significance to these drafting 
exercises. They show that the Balkan debates in this period were predominantly 
non-competitive. 
-3- The results. Were the Balkan debates causally significant? There is no denying 
that in terms of results, the year 2005 was undoubtedly a good one for the Balkans. 
By means of meticulous agenda management and muscular chairing, the UK had 
procured a lot of deliverables. The Presidency had thus clearly found a way for the 
Council to transcend the lowest common denominator. Rationalists would be 
inclined to interpret this as the result of an intergovernmental bargain. However, as 
I have tried to show, these deliverables did not result from logrolling, issue-linkages 
or trade-offs. Trade-offs would have been difficult anyway, seeing that in the 
different games the brakemen were largely the same (France and the Netherlands). 
Rather, there were four separate races. And different tactics had to be employed in 
each one of them, so as to enable progress.
Even within some of these different races, this rationalist logic does not seem to 
hold. To use again the Croatia game as an example, member states were not ‘at the 
market’ trying to exchange Gotovina for the opening of accession negotiations. 
Otherwise brakemen would have never agreed to the opening of accession negotiations, 
555 See also Del Ponte (2008: 351-394). Although, it must be said that the first time Del Ponte was invited to 
share her views with the Council was during the pro-enlargement Italian Presidency. Supposedly this was 
due to Del Ponte’s connection to the Italian Foreign Minister, Frattini. Author’s interview, Carla del Ponte, 
Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY (1999-2007), 14-6-2011.
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before Gotovina had been arrested. They were also not exchanging Croatia for 
Turkey.556 This bargain pivoted around the UK being able to steer the ‘loose cannon’ 
that was Del Ponte. And it seems very unlikely that they were able to do so. Both 
sides moreover were very unhappy about the presumed bargain. For the drivers, 
Austria in particular, a long awaited victory was overshadowed by the simultaneous 
opening of negotiations with Turkey.557 Nor were the brakemen very happy. Perhaps 
the UK’s foreign secretary Straw was satisfied with the result. But at the lower levels, 
the UK and the Netherlands were not at all comforted by Del Ponte’s private 
reassurance that Gotovina’s arrest was indeed forthcoming.558 The arrest was 
promised within a week, while in reality it would take months, as well as significant 
pressure on the Spanish Authorities.559 
Of course, the deal had come with verbal side payments. Brakemen above all took 
comfort in the statement that: “The Council agreed that less than full cooperation 
with the ICTY at any stage would affect the overall progress of the negotiations and 
could be grounds for triggering the mechanism in paragraph 12 of the negotiating 
framework.”560 Brakemen could not really provide a different reading of the 
agreement. But, by mentioning this suspension clause, they tried to downplay the 
significance a little bit. If this is to be interpreted as reciprocity, than it was indeed 
very diffuse. 
Attaching different significances was of crucial importance also in the other three 
games. Results were generally achieved by looking for ways to make incremental 
progress, while (more or less simultaneously) putting the significance of this 
progress into perspective. It was in this way that Bosnia, Macedonia, and to a lesser 
extent Serbia, were able to take baby steps towards Brussels. Intergovernmental 
bargaining models would have trouble accounting for any of the three decisions. 
Rather, constructive ambiguity played a key role, as it enabled the coming about of 
a rhetorical consensus on Balkan enlargement.
556 Author’s interviews, Working party, ICTY level and Croatia level, 10-11-2010, 15-11-2010, 14-12-2010, 
12-10-2011. Even Croatia itself was not happy about the link, seeing that the accession process with 
Turkey was to be an open-ended process, which was precisely what Croatia was trying to avoid. 
557 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 10-11-2010. Die Presse, ‘Türkei-Beitritt: Österreich lenkt ein’ 
4-10-2005
558 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 7-7-2010. Coweb 11-10-2005. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.
559 Author’s interview, ICTY level, 15-11-2010. The arrest of Gotovina was thus certainly not the ‘done deal’, 
even though with hindsight many claim that it was inevitable, already in October. 
560 2678th General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 3-10-2005. Croatia: opening 
of negotiations. Paragraph 12 encompasses a ‘suspension clause’ in case of a serious and persistent 
breach by Croatia of any of the Copenhagen political criteria. 
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-4- The success. In the years 2003-2005 there was still something of a ‘permissive 
consensus’ on the Balkans. Which would imply that, at least for the moment, drivers 
had the upper hand. This reasoning particularly applies to the model country: 
Croatia. Drivers like to present the opening of accession negotiations as something 
that was bound to happen. “Gotovina and the suspension of the opening of 
accession negotiations was just a delaying factor. Everyone knew we were going to 
move ahead in due time.”561 There is neo-functionalist reasoning behind this. The 
EU needed Croatia as a ‘success story’. Its progress would serve as encouragement 
to the other countries. The detailed reconstruction of the actual negotiation 
dynamics, I believe, convincingly shows that such reasoning is flawed. If one only 
looks at the amount of time and investment it took to ‘agree’ on the opening of 
accession negotiations, then it is clear that there was little self-evidence in the 
eventual decision. In February 2003 Croatia had hoped to be able to catch up with 
Bulgaria and Romania. The decision to apply, which according to many came too 
soon, was taken precisely because the Croats saw their window of opportunity 
closing.562 As we will see in the next chapter, Croatia was lucky enough to start the 
negotiations just before enlargement fatigue set in. But this was nowhere as 
self-evident as it may appear afterwards. By the second half of 2005, many in the 
Council felt they no longer needed a Balkan success story. If Del Ponte’s judgment 
had been even slightly different, it would most probably have led to protracted 
delays.563 
In view of the length of the debate, one might even be inclined to say that the 
brakemen had a structural advantage. For a long time it appeared that building 
dams was easier than creating rapids. The reason that also the brakemen were not 
favoured, lies in the fact that they had to keep building them. Brakemen could not 
prevent movement on any one of the four dossiers. The drivers eventually managed 
to acquire nearly all potential deliverables. But these deliverables had come at a 
price. That price was enlargement-fatigue. Brakemen would force the Council to 
reconsider the enlargement process as a whole. In the case of Croatia the deliverable 
perhaps had been significant enough to warrant the costs. But in the cases of 
Serbia, Bosnia and certainly Macedonia, the opposite can be argued. It would go 
too far to state that the momentum shifted only because of what happened in this 
particular issue area.564 But, what little automatism there had been in the Balkan 
561 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) and Croatia level, 10-11-2010, 12-10-2011.
562 Author’s interview, Croatia level, 12-10-2011. The application was thus a deliberate attempt to start up a 
parallel process, now that the momentum was there and the SAP route was blocked.
563 As would be the case with Serbia. See Chapter 8, Section 1.
564 Enlargement fatigue followed primarily from the failed referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France 
and the Netherlands, and from the difficult negotiations on the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013. 
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pre-accession trajectory, evaporated now that some member states were beginning 
to feel rushed.565 Much of the Thessaloniki commitment had been cashed in and 
accountability shifted to those who wanted to create rapids instead of those who 
tried to build dams. This did not mean that brakemen could now sit back and relax. 
But especially after the December 2005 European Council, they were in the 
possession of Acquis-related criteria they could subsequently refer back to. Those 
who blame the ensuing stalemate on the ones in the trenches would do good to 
keep the third and fourth expectations of Council Conclusions Reader in mind. In a 
game in which all should have prizes, either you get the decision, or you get the 
preferred language. By the beginning of 2006 all but Kosovo were in some way 
anchored to their European trajectory.566 But these decisions had been embedded 
in words that were not in favour of the drivers. The seeds for the subsequent 
rhetorical entrapment had been sown in small argumentative battles for what were 
at best marginal gestures.
565 Author’s interviews, Working party and Coreper level, 7-7-2010, 10-11-2010.
566 Some would argue that even Kosovo was anchored, by means of the Stabilization and Association 
Tracking Mechanism (STM), launched by the Commission in November 2002. Whether this really mirrored 
a regular SAP will be discussed in Chapter 8, Section 3. Albania did not make progress, but it had entered 
into SAA negotiations in 2002 and was thus already anchored to the European trajectory. 
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8.  Searching for Standard Operating Procedures                        
(January 2006 – June 2008)
The Commission’s ‘2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper’ and the accompanying 
communiqué, the ‘Roadmap for the Western Balkans’ had caused some unease at 
some of the brakemen’s Permanent Representations. The Commission had tried to 
present itself as a careful driver of the accession process, whereby “the shared 
objective is accession, although the outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand”.567 
But they also suggested a well-defined trajectory; from feasibility study to 
association (SAA), from potential to actual candidacy and then through accession 
negotiations to signing the accession treaty.568 All in all the message to the Council 
(and the European Parliament) was clear: the Commission had laid down its 
standard operating procedures for dealing with (Balkan) enlargement. It was now 
up to the Council to do the same.
Throughout the year 2006 the Council, and Coreper in particular, would be involved 
in “an in-depth debate” on, what was euphemistically called, improving the quality 
of the enlargement process.569 Commissioner Rehn had been able to enthuse 
drivers as well as brakemen for this debate, by introducing a ‘three C’s strategy’: 
consolidation of previous commitments, applying fair and rigorous conditionality, 
and improving communication.570 Drivers would be inclined to stress the first C; 
brakemen the second. And all could pay lip service to the typical EU aspiration to 
engage in a dialogue with civil society about enlargement. This in-depth debate 
would turn out to be a success, leading to what is commonly referred to as the 
“renewed consensus on enlargement”.571 Moreover, this appears to have been a 
consensus that was ‘Brussels-bred’ and the significance of which tends to be 
appreciated by all sides.572 At the outset there had been doubts and discord about 
the pace and character of the accession process. In the end there was consensus 
on clarifying the rules of the game. What lies in between appears as a textbook 
example of consensual decision making. The first section traces the coming about 
of this renewed consensus and assesses the impact it had on the Balkan pre-accession 
567 ‘European Commission 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper’, Brussels 9-11-2005. This was a verbal side 
payment to the brakemen on Turkey, as it was agreed to by the European Council in December 2004. 
568 See Chapter 5, Section 3 for a clarification of the different steps identified in the process. 
569 European Council meeting, Brussels 14/15-12-2006. Presidency Conclusions I. Enlargement Strategy.
570 Agence Europe, 17-11-2005, 4-5. Commissioner Rehn in debate with the European Parliament. 
571 European Council meeting, Brussels 14/15-12-2006. Presidency Conclusions I. Enlargement Strategy.
572 Author’s interviews, Coreper and Working party level, 7-7-2010, 10-11-2010.
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game.573 How ‘new’ was the consensus on the Balkans and how typical was its 
coming about? In the end it seems that member states were still disagreeing about 
the political or technical character as well as the preferred pace of the process. 
Nevertheless, they had managed to agree on a procedural way forward. 
 
The Balkan pre-accession game in the years 2006-2008 would be primarily about 
Serbia. Table 8.1 again provides an overview of the main decisions during this 
round of the game. There was continuing stalemate in Bosnia and Macedonia. 
Serbia was the only country that possessed sufficient administrative, judicial and 
socio-economic capacities to make headway. Yet, in its dealings with Serbia the 
Council faced the triple challenge of -1- remaining tough on existing conditionalities 
(in particular ICTY cooperation), -2- getting Serbia to adopt a constructive attitude 
with regard to the Montenegrin referendum and the Kosovo status process and -3- 
supporting the democratic/EU-minded forces in Serbia in their attempts to get (re)
elected. Whereas Coreper and European Council were searching for standard 
operating procedures for dealing with enlargement, Coweb, PSC and the Council 
were searching for standard operating procedures on Serbia and Kosovo. The 
second part of this chapter reconstructs this process in the case of Serbia. How did 
the Council manage to stay united, while trying to realize what appear to be 
incompatible goals? Again it seems that consensus was found not in the content of 
the matter, but in its procedural settlement. 574
573 The renewed consensus on enlargement most directly affected Turkey and Croatia, the two countries that 
had already entered into membership negotiations. It nevertheless also had some indirect consequences 
for the pre-accession trajectory of the Western Balkans.
574 The numbers between brackets refer to different steps in the trajectory. See Chapter 5, Section 3.
When What Who Concerning whom
11-3-2006 Salzburg summit and Declaration Presidency All Balkan countries
3-5-2006 Suspension of SAA negotiations Commission Serbia
13-6-2007 Resumption of SAA negotiations Commission Serbia
7-11-2007 Initializing of SAA (4) Commission Serbia
4-12-2007 Initializing of SAA (4) Commission Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
18-2-2008 Confirmation of the European 
perspective, request for a (feasibility) 
study (1)
Council Kosovo
29-4-2008 Signing of SAA and IA (5) Council Serbia
Table 8.1   Key decisions with regard to Balkan pre-accession (2006-2008)574
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Already in November 2005, the Council had stated that: “The resolution of Kosovo’s 
future status must enable both Belgrade and Pristina to make progress towards the 
European Union”.575 Adding content and meaning to this statement would keep the 
Council occupied for the next couple of years. Member states somehow had to 
agree on integrating a ‘entity’, which some of them did not even acknowledge as a 
country. The creative solutions the Council had to come up with in the case of 
Kosovo form the subject of the third and final part of this chapter. The goal is to 
understand what lies beneath the agreed language that Kosovo has: “a clear 
European perspective in line with the European perspective of the region”.576
8.1  Thessaloniki Two? Salzburg and the renewed consensus  
on enlargement 
‘Giving them everything/anything but candidate status’: this was the cleverly framed 
consensus underlying the Thessaloniki Declaration and Agenda.577 In the second 
half of 2005 the memory of Thessaloniki was fading and in the corridors of the 
Justus Lipsius, people were wondering about the need for another big gesture 
towards the Balkans. The flow of concrete and tangible measures, as outlined in the 
Thessaloniki Agenda, was starting to dry up. In fact, visa facilitation and liberalization 
was the biggest ‘carrot’ left. But as we have seen, the UK Presidency – not a 
member of the Schengen area – had no intention of providing the necessary 
push.578 The incoming Austrian Presidency however saw in it a promising deliverable 
for their Presidency. Visa free travel appeared as an appropriate surrogate incentive 
now that enthusiasm for enlargement was wavering. The visa-debate would come 
to display its own configuration of drivers and brakemen, and its own particular 
‘agreed language’.579 There were those (France, Germany, United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Spain) who wanted to keep the debate ‘technical’ and thus adopted a 
more prudent approach.580 And there were those (Greece, Austria, Italy, Slovenia, 
but also the Netherlands) who acknowledged the political nature of any decision 
on visa. They stressed that it could be used as an important signal to the region 
that Europe was ‘open to them’. On the whole the visa debate appeared to be a 
575 2687th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 7-11-2005. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Serbia and Montenegro/Kosovo.
576 European Council meeting, Brussels 14-12-2007. Presidency Conclusions: 65-70.
577 See Chapter 6, Section 3.
578 See Chapter 7, Section 2.
579 Coweb 19-5, 24-5, 30-6-2005. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
580 In the visa-debate opting for a ‘technical’ or ‘horizontal’ approach’ meant that the issue would not be 
discussed in Coweb but in the JHA/Visa-working group. This was the approach brakemen would prefer.
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rearguard action, gaining momentum mostly at times when the European perspective 
was fading or faint. The debate about the big gesture however was centre stage.
‘A message of encouragement’
The Council did not wait for the Commission’s Strategy Paper to start discussing 
the potential implications of the negative referenda in France and the Netherlands. 
Coweb used the recent rapport of the International Commission on the Balkans as 
a focal point.581 While there has never been a shortage of expert-committees eager 
to shed their light on what Europe should and should not do in the Balkans, this one 
was a heavyweight.582 Their April 2005 Report, ‘The Balkans in Europe’s Future’, 
offered a rather peculiar medicine to a Union supposedly suffering from enlargement 
fatigue: “fast-track membership”. The rapport suggested to speed up the accession 
of the Balkan states, by means of a clear roadmap with timetables and everything. 
Chairman Amato warned that if the EU wanted to end its presence “as a colonial 
power”, it “should move from the current stage of protectorates and weak states to 
the stage of EU accession”.583 Whereas many of their suggestions eventually made 
it into the (European) Commission’s reports, getting these same ideas passed the 
Council would be an entirely different matter.
A necessary but not sufficient condition for a constructive debate on the Balkans is 
a ‘favourable Presidency’.584 The UK Presidency had focused on concrete 
deliverables, leaving the big debate for the Austrians. Austria seemed to be willing 
to pick up the gauntlet. Long before its Presidency, it had already stated its ambition 
to organize another Balkan summit. The rhetorical trap was there from the start. 
Austria had to appear modest in its ambitions for the summit (so as not to offend 
the brakemen, and in particular France), while at the same time stress the need for 
and importance of a summit (so as to enthuse drivers, and most notably the 
Commission).585 This proved all the more difficult when both were in the same room. 
‘Salzburg’ was initially framed as an informal meeting of the EU-Western Balkan 
forum in the margins of the Gymnich meeting in March 2006.586 Its stated goal; 
‘reconfirming Thessaloniki’, did not go down too well with the instigators of the first 
581 Coweb capitals 1-6-2005. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At this particular meeting only 
the negative result of the French referendum was known. The Dutch no-vote followed two days later. 
582 Amongst its many internationally renowned members were the former German President, Richard von 
Weizsäcker, the former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, the former Italian Prime Minister, Giuliano 
Amato and the Slovenian EU Commissioner, Janez Potocnik.
583 These were Chairman Giuliano Amato’s words, at the presentation at the presentation of the Report.
584 This does not necessarily mean a driver, but rather a Presidency willing to concern itself with the matter.
585 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-11-2005.
586 What is often referred to as the Salzburg summit was in fact Austria’s Gymnich meeting.
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Thessaloniki Summit.587 Greece and others did not see the need. What were the 
Austrians going to offer that had not already been offered by the Greeks? For a long 
time, this remained unclear. Austria was deliberately vague about the expectations 
for Salzburg, presumably because the region was too volatile to allow long term 
planning. Brakemen were not at all comforted by Austrian reassurances that 
Salzburg was just about sending a positive signal to the region that the European 
perspective was still there.588 The mood was obviously not right for another big 
initiative. The Austrian Presidency then opted for a different approach, which was to 
hook up to the broader enlargement strategy debate, thereby making ‘Salzburg’ 
appear less of a singular event and more as part of the regular agenda. 
While maintaining its presumably modest ambition, the Austrian Presidency 
informed the member states that the Commission’s forthcoming communiqué on 
the Western Balkans would form the basis for the Salzburg Declaration.589 The 
December 2005 Council had already “concluded that the Enlargement Strategy 
Paper 2005 is a good basis for a necessary, further discussion on enlargement in 
2006.”590 Commissioner Rehn would present/defend the communiqué at the 
Council meeting in January. In the Council Conclusions we see the birth of the 
rhetorical commonplace that would come to form the basis of the Salzburg 
Declaration: “The EU remains committed to help the Western Balkans countries on 
their road to the EU through practical measures to make the European perspective 
more tangible.”591 The mantra of ‘practical and tangible measures’ can be seen as 
an extension of the ‘anything but’ argumentation developed at Thessaloniki. Once 
again the Council managed to avoid a fundamental debate about speeding up or 
slowing down the integration process, by limiting the discussions to matters on which 
all could easily agree: “consolidating stability, stimulating trade and investment, 
raising prosperity, Europeanizing the next generation”. It thus comes as no surprise 
that the January Council considered the Commission’s communiqué: “a good 
basis for further work in preparing discussions at the Gymnich and the informal 
EU-Western Balkans Foreign Ministers Meeting in Salzburg in March 2006.”
587 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 17-5-2011, 23-6-2011. 
588 Coweb 1-12-2005. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
589 Coweb 13-12-2005, 10-1, 20-1-2006. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
590 2700th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 12-12-2005. Enlargement. Council Conclusions. 
Coreper had crossed swords about whether or not the Council should explicitly refer to the Commission’s 
Report, as well as mention a time frame (2006) for the debate. It was a false B point on the Council’s 
Agenda. Coreper 8-12-2005. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
591 2706th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 30-1-2006. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. Note 
that the Balkans were discussed by the General Affairs instead of the External Relations Council.
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The actual preparations for Salzburg started rather late. Seeing that the Presidency 
considered it to be ‘merely’ a political statement and not a legally binding document, 
it had hoped for a short and crisp debate. Yet, there was a procedural coup that did 
not go unnoticed: a supposedly informal meeting would lead to a formal and joint 
(press) statement. Brakemen would not let the opportunity pass to include what 
they considered essential elements in the Declaration. The ensuing Coweb, 
Coreper and Council debates can be reconstructed by means of the eventual 
Salzburg Statement.592 After the familiar reconfirmation of ‘European futures’, 
brakemen grabbed hold of the pen leading to statements such as: “The EU recalled 
that a debate on the enlargement strategy is due in 2006 as set out in the Council 
conclusions of 12 December 2005.” “The EU also notes that its absorption capacity 
has to be taken into account.”593 The Statement continued with stressing the need 
of the Western Balkan countries to fulfil conditions (ICTY), accelerate reforms, bear 
in mind the importance of “good neighbourly relations” and “the need for finding 
mutually acceptable solutions on outstanding issues with neighbouring countries”. 
Particular effort should be put in achieving “a negotiated settlement of the status of 
Kosovo, mutually acceptable to the parties concerned.” It was only in the fifth and 
final paragraph that the drivers managed to recapture the pen to stress all the 
“practical measures to make the European perspective more tangible”, the EU had 
in store for the Balkans. The fact that the declaration explicitly mentioned visa 
facilitation appears one of the few points drivers managed to score. 
If, as the Austrian Presidency had intended, this was to be a message of encouragement 
then the Balkan countries cannot have felt very encouraged. What Salzburg seemed to 
stress above all was that “the road is long and full of obstacles”.594 What had happened? 
In view of the timing of events it seems that brakemen had been able to blackmail 
drivers, and in particular the Austrian Presidency, into accepting the wording brakemen 
would prefer. If there was going to be a joint statement, than it would not be a particularly 
positive one. Austria could have opted for a Presidency Statement, but refrained. 
Afterwards drivers argued that being able to send ‘a signal’ in such an unfavourable 
enlargement climate was already a victory. Getting the March 2006 Council, without 
much ado, to endorse the Salzburg Statement, certainly was.595 It was now part of the 
592 Coweb 2-3, 3-3, 6-3-2005, Coreper 8-3-2005, Council (informal meeting) 11-3-2005. Internal reports, 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
593 ‘Salzburg EU/Western Balkans Joint Press Statement, Salzburg’, Salzburg 11-3-2006: 2. 
594 Agence Europe 14-3-2006: 4-5. Statement of Austrian Foreign Minister, Ursula Plassnik to the press. 
595 2719th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 20-3-2006. Relations with the Western Balkans. 
Council Conclusions. Note that the Western Balkans had been transferred back to the External Relations 
Council. This is of course a gathering of the same ministers, be it formally in a different configuration. 
Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-11-2011.
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rhetorical commonplaces and could be referred back to along the same lines as the 
Thessaloniki Agenda.596 Was Salzburg a success? It is telling that the Austrians 
themselves chose to refer to it mainly as a ‘stock taking exercise’. In the end, it seems 
the message was mostly in the meeting. And the meeting itself had certainly not been 
a ‘Thessaloniki Two’. Above all, it had shown that a broader debate about enlargement 
could no longer be postponed.
Improving the ‘quality’ of the enlargement process
The Commission, as I have explained, is a driver of the enlargement process, 
unless someone else is trying to be on the wheel. Now that the Austrian initiative 
had ‘faltered’, Commissioner Rehn went into the offensive. He openly repeated 
something he had already mentioned at the March 2006 Council meeting: now is 
not the time to call into question the Balkans’ accession prospect. Rehn message 
was first and foremost aimed at countries such as France and the Netherlands, 
which openly wondered whether the yellow brick road should necessarily lead to 
accession. Rehn made no attempt to mask his discontent: “Too often in the nineties, 
Brussels twiddled its thumbs while the Balkans burned. We must not risk this 
happening again.”597 Whether the Balkans were indeed burning was doubtful, but 
inside the Justus Lipsius people were certainly not twiddling their thumbs. Coreper 
had come to it at last, the big debate about the enlargement strategy. This debate, 
in the run up to the European Council meetings of June and December 2006, would 
largely take place behind the scenes. But again its contours can be reconstructed 
with help of the evolving language at the European Council level. 
The June European Council formally announced a continuation and deepening of 
the discussion on enlargement as had been initiated at Salzburg. In reality, the 
in-depth part of the debate had hardly gotten off the ground. The general questions 
outlined by the European Council made it clear that this was in essence a debate 
about absorption capacity. In a six sentence statement the Heads of State and 
Government managed to address the Union’s “continued ability to function 
politically, financially and institutionally as it enlarges” five times.598 Coreper was to 
concern itself extensively with the content and meaning of this highly ambiguous 
concept.599 Yet, in reality the debate came down to this: how concrete the European 
Council would want to define the absorption capacity of the EU? Brakemen would 
prefer to flesh out all possible implications of further enlargements, whereas drivers 
596 See for instance: 2840th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 10-12-2007. Western Balkans. 
Council Conclusions. 
597 Agence Europe 4-4-2006: 4.
598 European Council meeting, Brussels 15/16-6-2006. Presidency Conclusions (b). Enlargement: 53.
599 Coreper 17-5, 24-5, 31-5, 8-6, 25-10, 29-11-2006. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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would like the Council to recognize that any definition reflected a political position.600 
Seeing that the biggest thing the Union would have to absorb would be Turkey, 
drivers were keen to avoid explicit mentioning of absorption capacity as a criterion 
for the Western Balkans. At best it could be mentioned as something of a general 
precondition.601 This was of course largely a semantic discussion. Absorption 
capacity was not something that could be properly assessed, let alone ‘measured’. 
In the June European Council Conclusions the drivers indeed managed to avoid 
explicit mentioning of the concept in the text on the Western Balkans.602 Yet, what 
the brakemen wanted most of all was for the European Council to specify: “further 
ways of improving the quality of the enlargement processes on the basis of the 
positive [sic!] experiences accumulated so far”.603 More aptly put, they wanted to 
avoid repeating the bad example set by the imminent accession of Romania and 
Bulgaria. In the Fall of 2006 the Council, and Coreper in particular, would thus 
necessarily engage in a learning exercise, while the December European Council 
could be considered as the final exam. 
The first point for debate about this ‘renewed consensus on enlargement’ was on 
whether the European Council should explicitly call it that. ‘New’ presupposed a 
clear demarcation of the actual changes in the (pre)accession trajectory. A ‘new 
consensus’ implied that there had been discord (about enlargement) which had 
subsequently been resolved. This discussion about semantics adequately reflects 
the two lines of arguing in the debate about ‘absorption capacity’. There was -1- the 
‘technical’ debate about improving the quality of the process, and -2- the broader 
‘political’ debate about enlargement as such and whether ‘institutional settlement 
should precede further enlargement’.604 All were aware that the second debate was 
conducted with the privileged partnership of Turkey in mind.605 This was certainly 
not a race in which all could have prizes and thus chances of arriving at a 
breakthrough were severely limited. Whether institutional reform - the entering into 
force of what would become the Lisbon Treaty - would have to precede further 
enlargement, was an issue that the December European Council decided not to 
600 Author’s interviews, Coreper level, 7-7-2010, 4-8-2010.
601 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 7-7-2010.
602 European Council meeting, Brussels 15/16-6-2006. Presidency Conclusions (c) Western Balkans. The 
Conclusions do explicitly state that progress depended on “full cooperation with the ICTY and maintaining 
good neighbourly relations”, verbal side payments to the Netherlands and Greece.
603 European Council meeting, Brussels 15/16-6-2006. Presidency Conclusions (b) enlargement. Item 53.
604 A statement by Commission President, Barroso, which adequately reflects the position of specific 
member states in the Council, most notably Germany and France. Agence Europe, 30-9-2006: 4.
605 Some countries, most notably Austria but also Greece and France, had suggested that instead of a clear 
membership perspective, Turkey should be offered something of an intermediate status. 
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address explicitly. In Coreper the buck stopped at the ‘informal understanding’ that 
such a sequential ordering would be highly desirable.606
The debate about quality appeared more promising, because of the many different 
ways in which the issue could be framed. The challenge for Coreper was to agree 
on an interpretation of absorption capacity that was sufficiently tangible to satisfy 
the brakemen, while at the same time sufficiently broad so as not to offend the 
drivers. The Commission played an important entrepreneurial role when it presented 
its ‘Enlargement Strategy Paper 2006-2007: challenges and integration capacity’.607 
The definition of integration capacity was left rather open: “whether the EU can take 
in new members at a given moment or in a given period, without jeopardizing the 
political and policy objectives established by the Treaties.” What the Commission 
proposed was an elaborate evaluation method to be carried out by the Commission 
itself. It would carry out “impact studies” to assess the extent to which enlargement 
would affect the “EU’s capacity to maintain the momentum of European integration”. 
This still seemed a rather abstract base for ‘measurement’. But in the filling in of the 
details the Commission started to cater to the brakemen. It spoke of the need for 
“transition periods, derogations and other safeguards for the new Member States”. 
The impact of enlargement on ‘key policy areas’, such as the common agricultural 
policy, the cohesion policy as well as strategic areas such as the common foreign 
and security policy would receive particular attention. Most importantly, instead of 
time-tables and target dates, the Commission now proposed benchmarks: “Their 
purpose is to improve the quality of the negotiations by providing incentives for the 
candidate countries to undertake necessary reforms at an early stage.” There 
would from now on be opening as well as closing benchmarks for each and every 
chapter of the accession negotiations. Negotiations on difficult chapters, such as 
administrative and judicial reforms and the fight against corruption, would be 
handled first.608 Although some of the conditions were necessarily less concrete 
than others – for example assessing ‘the rule of law’ – the benchmarking system 
made the process as a whole more transparent.609 In fact, the only concept for 
which the Commission would not be able to provide benchmarks was the 
aforementioned ‘integration capacity’. 
606 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 4-8-2010.
607 ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council’, Brussels 8-11-2006. 
The Commission preferred to speak about integration capacity instead of absorption capacity, because 
the latter already referred to a country’s capacity to adequately absorb capital flowing in from abroad (for 
instance through grants and aid). Integration capacity referred to the capacities of the Union.
608 A clear lesson drawn from the experiences of Bulgaria and Rumania, where the EU necessarily had to 
continue monitoring the implementation of the reforms in these issue areas even after their accession.
609 Author’s interviews, Coreper and Commission (Director) level, 7-7-2010, 22-7-2010.
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The European Council Conclusions of December 2006 show that the Commission 
did a very good job in drafting. Nearly all of its suggestions survived. “The European 
Council agrees with the improvements suggested by the Commission concerning 
the management and the quality of the negotiations.”610 By splitting the debate on 
the feasibility of further enlargement from the debate about improving the process, 
the Commission had managed to break the ranks of the brakemen. The key to this 
success was the inherent uncertainty as to whether making the process more 
‘manageable’ would speed up (create automatisms) or slow down (strengthen 
conditionality) the enlargement process.611 Those on the brake for political reasons, 
could be separated from those on the brake for technical reasons. Those who had 
entered the debate about quality chiefly in an attempt to slow down enlargement in 
itself, could be shamed into silence.612 Coweb managed to avoid further 
contamination of the Council Conclusions on the Balkans with language from the 
enlargement strategy debate.613 The Conclusions only vaguely “recalled relevant 
parts of the European Council Conclusions of December 2005 and June 2006”. 
Coreper concerned itself with procedural matters; more specifically whether there 
would be an ‘open’ debate about enlargement at Council and European Council 
level.614 The content of the renewed consensus was no longer subject of the debate. 
The term itself still was. But brakemen were rhetorically entrapped. On the one 
hand they would have preferred avoiding the terms ‘new’ and ‘consensus’, but on 
the other hand they wanted to stress that significant changes had been introduced 
in the enlargement process. It thus comes as no surprise that the term survived and 
featured prominently in the Conclusions. 
To sum up: still going and/or again under control?
How ‘new’ was the renewed consensus on enlargement and how ‘typical’ was its 
coming about? Too much of the debate took place behind the scenes to be able to 
apply all four categories of observable implications. Thus, I necessarily focus on 
the general outlines of the debate. Failed ‘deepening’, in the shape of the French 
and Dutch no-votes on the Constitutional Treaty, had created doubts and 
kick-started a debate about ‘widening’. Thus, the most remarkable element of the 
renewed consensus is the element that is missing. Heads of State and Government 
had decided not to include any reference to the need for institutional reform before 
any new enlargement rounds. The European Council Conclusions reconfirmed, 
610 European Council meeting, Brussels 14/15-12-2006. Presidency Conclusions. Enlargement Strategy: 7.
611 The terminology stems from the Commission Communication of November 2006.
612 This particularly applied to France. Author’s interview, Working party level, 7-7-2010.
613 2771st External Relations Council meeting, 11/12-12-2006. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Coweb 4-12-2006. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
614 Coreper 29-11, 6-12-2006. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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without really specifying, the importance of absorption capacity: “As the Union 
enlarges, successful European integration requires that EU institutions function 
effectively and that EU policies are further developed and financed in a sustainable 
manner.”615 The Commission’s suggestions for quality-improvement were largely 
taken over. Outsiders and insiders, most notably Commission President Barroso, 
judged this new consensus to be highly fragile. It did not result from a reasoned 
consensus on the pace of the Turkey and Balkan enlargement process.616 Instead, 
the consensus was found in the approach; with drivers stressing that the process 
was still going, and brakemen emphasizing that the process was again under 
control. This consensus might be partly rhetorical, but it was substantial nonetheless.
The secret behind the success appears to have been in the approach chosen by 
the Commission and the Finnish Presidency. Where the Austrians had opted for a 
big gesture, the new Dodo had presented the enlargement strategy debate as 
“something of a housekeeping job”.617 The way in which the consensus was 
achieved was indeed typical. Framing and salami tactics proved to be key. By 
engaging brakemen in low-key technical debates about making the process more 
manageable, they managed to ensure the continuation of the process in itself.618 In 
view of the mood in the Council, it would be hard to argue that drivers had a 
structural advantage. And at the end of the debate, brakemen were not ‘cured’ of 
their enlargement fatigue. The domestic backlash against the EU, and against 
enlargement in particular, was still there. But this could not negate the commitment 
to the process, which drivers and brakemen had publicly proclaimed. Because of 
this commitment they could be forced to engage in small argumentative battles to 
make the process better. Due to clever drafting, this had indeed been a race in 
which all could (claim to) have prizes. 
615 European Council meeting, Brussels 14/15-12-2006. Presidency Conclusions. Enlargement Strategy: 9. 
The explicit reference to finance again brought home the point that the main concerns were with Turkey.
616 EU Observer, 15-12-2006: ‘New EU ‘consensus’ on enlargement highly fragile’.
617 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-11-2010.
618 The Austrian and Finnish Presidencies could make use of the fact that at European Council level, 
President Chirac was more favourable towards enlargement than his Foreign Minister, Douste-Blazy. But 
this mattered little, as the details of the renewed consensus were negotiated in Brussels. 
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8.2  Meandering around Mladic. Towards signing an SAA  
with Serbia
This section traces the Council’s negotiations on signing an SAA with Serbia. This 
was a game that consisted of three rounds, which I believe should be discussed 
separately: 
Round I. Suspending the SAA negotiations (2006 Austrian Presidency).
Round II. Resuming the SAA negotiations (2007 German Presidency).
Round III. Signing of the SAA (2008 Slovene Presidency).
Round I: The suspension
At the start of the SAA negotiations with Serbia (Montenegro and Kosovo), the 
Council had presumably provided the Commission with an added competence. 
The Commission could suspend further negotiations if it felt that insufficient 
progress had been made in:
- Development of the legislative framework and administrative capacity so as to 
allow for proper implementation of the agreement;
- Implementation of the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro;
- Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.619
The first criterion primarily applied to tiny Montenegro, the independence of which 
was imminent. The Council had always stated that Serbia had sufficient administrative 
and judicial capacities. The second criterion was necessary but symbolic. The Council, 
for the moment, had to insist on the proper functioning of the State Union. The third 
was the necessary verbal side payment to the Netherlands in order for the negotiations 
to be able to start.620 The Commission was not too happy about this new competence. 
It would have preferred some more leeway in its dealings with Serbia. “The Commission 
did not want to see itself cornered by making the arrest of both Karadzic and Mladic 
an explicit condition.”621 It wanted to look at the broader (rule of law) picture. Also it 
wanted to be able to take into account internal developments in Serbia. Here Boris 
Tadic’s DS party had decided to leave the parliament, necessitating new elections in 
the run-up to the eventful year of 2006.622 Many member states were unhappy about 
the timing of the Montenegrin referendum and wanted to make sure that the results 
would be as clear cut as possible. The Council opted for high thresholds, a 50% 
619 2679th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 3-10-2005. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Serbia and Montenegro, Stabilization and Association Process. 
620 See Chapter 7, Section 2.
621 Author’s interview, Commission (Serbia Unit) level, 4-6-2010. Coweb 26-9-2005. Internal report, Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
622 Southeast European Times, 6-10-2005: ‘Serbian President’s Party leaves Parliament’.
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turnout of which 55% needed to vote in favour of independence, so as to be able to 
sell the referendum to the Serbs.623 Conspiracy theorists have since then wondered 
how the Montenegrins managed exactly to meet this threshold. But after 55,5% voted 
in favour of independence on 21 May 2006, the loss of Montenegro was something 
that Serbia would simply have to swallow. 
The loss of Kosovo would be an entirely different matter. Council and Commission 
had been ambivalent in their November 2005 statement that “the resolution of 
Kosovo’s future status must enable both Belgrade and Pristina to make progress 
towards the European Union”.624 Commissioner Rehn made it abundantly clear 
that: “the political leaders must adopt a constructive approach towards Kosovo”.625 
The message was that Serbia might not (yet) have to swallow the independence of 
Kosovo. But it had to come to terms with the fact that its behaviour towards Kosovo 
would affect its European perspective. Telling about the anticipated direction of 
these status talks was that three days later the Commission for the first time 
presented a separate Progress Report for Kosovo. Kosovo would from now on be 
treated as a separate ‘entity’ by the Commission. And because of this bureaucratic 
exercise, Kosovo seemed de facto lost to the Serbs. 
In its further dealing with Serbia the EU wanted three things: to be able to remain 
tough on conditionalities, to get the country to adopt a constructive attitude in the 
Kosovo status process, and to support the democratic forces around Tadic. It now 
appeared there was little the EU could do with regard to the second goal. Brakemen 
rightly foresaw that the only leeway the Commission had in achieving the third goal, 
was to be more lenient on the first. The UK Presidency pre-emptively decided to use 
the final Coweb meeting of 2005 for another exchange of views with ‘team Del 
Ponte’.626 The ICTY, released from the Croatia/Gotovina file, had its eyes fixed on 
Serbia now.627 The ICTY cooperation that had been sufficient in October had 
deteriorated by December.628 While Del Ponte was considering whether she should 
623 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-11-2006.
624 2687th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 7-11-2005. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Serbia and Montenegro/Kosovo.
625 Agence Europe, 11-11-2005: 5. 
626 Coweb 19-12-2005. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
627 The ICTY cooperation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was more difficult to monitor and assess, seeing that 
this was effectively a protectorate. The ICTY would then to some extent have to judge the performances 
of the international community. This is why, even in the hunt for Radovan Karadzic, who was supposedly 
hiding in Montenegro and the Serbian part of Bosnia, the outward focus would still be on Serbia and 
Mladic. This very much to the discomfort of Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte (Del Ponte, 2008: 450).
628 Presumably Prime Minister Kostunica had promised Del Ponte the arrest of Mladic before October, which 
explains why the General Prosecutor ‘turned’ in the months November and December.
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issue another ‘within reach’ statement, brakemen already started to propose the 
suspension of the SAA negotiations. Notably the UK, who had enabled the start of the 
SAA negotiations, was amongst those suggesting a speedy suspension.629 To the 
incoming Austrian Presidency it was clear that the Council had provided the 
Commission with a poisoned chalice. Now that the Commission had ‘gained’ the 
capacity to suspend the negotiations, it was expected to use it. Del Ponte decided to 
set a deadline for the apprehension of Mladic, July 2006, urging Commissioner Rehn 
to suspend the SAA negotiations if necessary.630 Rehn replied that he would like to 
consult with the Council about this. Debates about the Council’s ICTY Conclusions in 
the next couple of months, or even years, would mainly be about how firm they 
wanted to address the issue. One should not be fooled by the sometimes threatening 
language, for example in the January 2006 Council Conclusions: “Full cooperation 
with the ICTY is essential to achieve lasting reconciliation in the region and lift a 
fundamental obstacle on the way towards the European Union.”631 After all, none 
(openly) refuted the importance of ICTY cooperation. The debates about tough 
wording were in fact a smokescreen. The real debate was about when to apply this 
particular conditionality. As long as the Council refrained from linking the ICTY 
conditionality to specific steps in the process, drivers could easily be kept on board. 
With regard to the ‘when’ question, it quickly became clear that the July 2006 
deadline originally proposed by Del Ponte was unfortunate, because it was too 
close to the Montenegrin referendum and the foreseen presentation of the Ahtisaari 
plan for Kosovo.632 Brakemen were thus able to argue that if suspension of the SAA 
was going to take place, it would be better to have it sooner than later. The February 
Council presented as its main result an explicit warning to Belgrade as well as 
Sarajevo, “that full cooperation with the ICTY must be achieved to ensure that the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement negotiations are not disrupted”.633 The 
deadline of one month, as it was proposed by Commissioner Rehn, did not make it 
into the formal Conclusions. Drivers had scored what appeared to be a Pyrrhic 
victory, by using the term ‘disruption’ instead of ‘suspension’.634 Some member 
states even decided to speak in terms of a ‘slowing down’ of the negotiations.
629 See Chapter 7, Section 2. Coweb 12-1-2006. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
630 EU Observer, 20-1-2006: ‘Serbia to choose Mladic or EU, Rehn and Del Ponte say’. 
631 2705th External Relations Council meeting, 30-1-2006. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
632 In the end the Ahtisaari Report would only come out in February 2007, but at the time the Council was 
labouring under the assumption that the Plan would be presented in the second half of 2006 at the latest. 
633 2712th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 27-2-2006. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
634 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 7-7, 2010, 10-11-2010.
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Commissioner Rehn, still making use of the term ‘suspension’, came to the seemingly 
inconsistent observation that ICTY cooperation had been deteriorating since April 
2005.635 While Rehn was mainly parroting Del Ponte in this, it made it a bit difficult 
to understand why Commission and Council had agreed to the opening of SAA 
negotiations in October 2005. The Council lost a lot of credibility now that it became 
apparent that the presumed temporal improvement in the ICTY cooperation, had 
simply been a mirage.
The SAA negotiation round, that was to be disrupted, was planned for the beginning 
of April. But the death of Slobodan Milosevic on 11 March 2006, meant that the 
informal Mladic deadline was extended with one month.636 The Council temporarily 
softened its tone speaking of ICTY cooperation as a simple “requirement” instead of 
fundamental obstacle.637 In view of the supposedly unstable political situation ensuing 
635 Agence Europe, 24-2-2006: 4.
636 A suggestion by SG/HR Solana in view of the according to him fragile political situation in the country. 
637 2719th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 20-3-2006. Relations with the Western Balkans. 
Council Conclusions. Serbia and Montenegro (for once there is no separate paragraph dedicated to 
ICTY). 
When Who What
3-10-2005 Council Judged that “the pace and conclusions of negotiations 
would depend on… full co-operation with the ICTY”.
07-11-2005 Council States that “the resolution of Kosovo’s future status must 
enable both Belgrade and Pristina to make progress 
towards the EU”.
20-01-2006 ICTY Del Ponte sets a deadline (July) for apprehension of Mladic. 
30-01-2006 Council Lacking ICTY cooperation is labelled as “a fundamental 
obstacle on the way towards the European Union”.
23-02-2006 Commission Follows Del Ponte in noting that ICTY cooperation had in 
fact been deteriorating since April 2005. 
27-02-2006 Council Concludes that “full cooperation with the ICTY must be 
achieved to ensure that the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement negotiations are not disrupted”.
03-05-2006 Commission Rehn suspends SAA negotiations because of failure to meet 
Mladic deadline. 
15-05-2006 Council “Underlines that a swift conclusion of the negotiations… is 
still within reach.”
Table 8.2   Key moments in the debate on suspending SAA negotiations (Serbia)
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from the death of Milosevic, it is strange that Rehn as well as Del Ponte expected 
concrete results in the next couple of weeks.638 Even loyal brakemen started 
wondering what positive signals Del Ponte had picked up during her recent visit to 
Belgrade.639 Extending the deadline with one month had the unfortunate side effect 
that there were no SAA negotiations planned for the beginning of May. Thus there 
was no negotiation round that could be suspended.640 Commissioner Rehn effectively 
told his staff to create an extra round. The way out was found in splitting the agenda 
of the April SAA meeting in two. The second part of this meeting, which coincidentally 
concerned Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) issues, was the meeting that could and 
would be suspended. In spite of progress in Serbia’s ICTY cooperation the 
Commissioner decided to suspend the negotiations in the beginning of May. Even 
though Rehn presented it as a rule of law issue, the failure to meet the Mladic deadline 
was the one and only reason.641 While inevitably endorsing the Commission’s decision 
to “call off” the SAA negotiation round, the Council immediately engaged in an almost 
surreal debate about whether it should set a target date for the conclusion of the SAA 
negotiations that had just been suspended.642 This debate is reflected in the Council 
Conclusions where “the Council underlines that a swift conclusion of the negotiations 
according to the timetable envisaged by the Commission1 is still within reach.” The 
numeral superscript referred to a footnote, stating that “the Commission envisages 
end of 2006”.643 Here, the brakemen got the decision; the drivers got the (encouraging) 
language. And as a direct consequence, the message that the Council as a whole 
was sending can only be interpreted as confusing. The debate about resuming the 
SAA negotiations in fact started at the very same meeting. 
The consensus underlying the ‘disruption’ of the SAA negotiations with Serbia was 
at best a consensus on timing. If suspension could not be avoided, better to have it 
before the next Serbian elections, the Montenegrin referendum and a decision on 
Kosovo’s status. The suspension also proved that one did not necessarily need the 
Presidency to create dams.644 Austria was certainly not in favour of the suspension. 
Commissioner Rehn had been able to mobilize sufficient support in the Council, 
before presenting it with what was in fact ‘a fait accompli’. The Commission autonomously 
638 EU Observer, 31-3-2006: ‘EU postpones Serbia Mladic ultimatum’.
639 Serb authorities were able to convince Del Ponte that they would be able to capture Mladic in a matter of 
days. Author’s interview, ICTY level, 15-11-2005. 
640 Author’s interview, ICTY level, 15-11-2010. The next SAA negotiation round was initially planned for 
November.
641 EU Observer, 3-5-2006: ‘EU suspends talks with Serbia’.
642 Coweb 8-5-2006, Coreper 11-5-2006. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
643 2728th External Relations Council Conclusions. Brussels 15-5-2006. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
644 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-11-2010.
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decided to suspend the negotiations.645 This then immediately opened up a new 
round in the Serbia game, this time about the conditions for resuming the SAA 
negotiations with Serbia. Then, as we have seen in the Croatia game, the burden of 
proof shifted. Instead of brakemen underlining all the things the Serbs were not 
doing (effectively rounding up supporting networks around Mladic within the Serb 
army), drivers started to stress all the things the Serbs were doing (even in what for 
them must be difficult times).
Round II: The resumption
From the suspension of the SAA negotiations the Council rolled right into the debate 
about the Montenegrin independence and the consequences this might have for 
the other semi-autonomous entities in the region (Kosovo, the Republika Sprska). 
The June Council however had nothing to offer Serbia apart from recognizing it “as 
the continuing State of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro”.646 The ICTY and 
Serbia itself decided to change their tactics. The ICTY, perhaps realizing that the 
focus had been too much on Mladic, started mentioning some of the other big fish 
it wanted to catch. Most notably amongst them was the Kosovar Prime Minister, 
Ramush Haradinaj. Haradinaj was a former leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA), charged with war crimes committed during the war of 1999. It seemed to be 
a smart idea to broaden the focus a bit, so that it did not appear as if the Tribunal 
was only ‘hitting the Serbs’. But the ICTY would soon find out that the always 
anonymous international community was not too enthusiastic about prosecuting 
key figures in Kosovo. The ICTY fruitlessly criticized the limited cooperation it 
received in its investigations in Kosovo.647 Also, the efforts in Kosovo did little to 
improve the standing of the Tribunal in Belgrade. Serbia also changed tactics. It 
started asking the EU, Germany in particular, for the necessary help in capturing 
Mladic.648 The Serbian Foreign Minister, Draskovic managed to capture three flies in 
one stroke by clever framing: In view of the impending ‘solution’ of Kosovo’s status, 
“the pro-Milosevic forces in Serbia are particularly happy to support Mladic thereby 
strangling any European perspective for Serbia”. Help from European intelligence 
services would be much appreciated. Building on the example set by Croatia, 
Serbia presented its own Action Plan for the apprehension of Mladic.649 Commissioner 
645 Agence Europe, 4-5-2006: 4.
646 2737th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 12-6-2006. Montenegro Council Conclusions.
647 Author’s interview, ICTY level, 15-11-2010. See also Del Ponte (2008: 255). 
648 Agence Europe, 21-6-2006 : 7. EU Observer 22-6-2006: ‘Belgrade seeks German help in catching war 
crimes suspects’. 
649 EU Observer, 26-6-2006: ‘Serbia to file new Mladic arrest plan’. The full name was: “Action Plan of the 
Government of Serbia aimed at locating, arresting and transferring Ratko Mladic and the remaining 
Hague indictees to The Hague”.
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Rehn seemed unimpressed. But both the ICTY and Serbia were anxious to see how 
the Council, and the Finnish Presidency in particular, would want to deal with the 
matter.
During the first Coweb meeting the Finns announced that they wanted to step up 
EU engagement with Serbia.650 This would already begin at the July meeting. The 
Council for once decided not to end its Conclusions on the Western Balkans with 
the ‘ceterum censeo’ request for improved ICTY cooperation.651 More important 
than the meeting itself was the ensuing EU Troika meeting with Prime Minister 
Kostunica. The Troika meeting was dedicated primarily to the significance of the 
Action Plan. Del Ponte shared her disappointment by means of a letter. Her main 
concern was that no one appeared to be responsible for the overall coordination of 
the search for Mladic. What followed was a request for an ‘Operational Plan’. 
Nevertheless, in its September Conclusions the Council seemingly operationalized 
full cooperation as implementation of the Serb Action Plan.652 As had been the case 
with Croatia, brakemen got entrapped in insisting on the fulfilment of a plan they did 
not really care for in the first place.653
Again in parallel with Croatia, the October Council meeting was reserved for a firm 
debate about ICTY cooperation. Drivers pleaded unsuccessfully for the resumption 
of the SAA negotiations, if necessary with another suspension clause.654 According 
to them, broader political realities now mattered more than sticking to the rules. The 
weakness in their argument was that the elections, in which the democratic forces 
had to be supported, had still not been scheduled. Therefore, there was no immediate 
need for an encouraging gesture.655 Parliamentary elections in Serbia were subsequently 
planned for 21 January 2007. But Council discussions were then already about 
650 Coweb 3-7-2006. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
651 2744th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 17-7-2006. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
652 2748th/2749th General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 15-9-2006. Western 
Balkans. Council Conclusions. Serbia: “The EU is ready to resume negotiations with Serbia…as soon as 
full cooperation with the ICTY is achieved. The Council urged the Serbian authorities to step up their 
efforts in implementing their Action Plan in order to meet this criterion.”
653 The Council perhaps felt inclined to utter some words of comfort after the UN envoy Ahtisaari had set the 
country on fire by his statement that: “the Serbs are guilty as a nation”. The following months would be 
dedicated to presumed linkage between Kosovo’s status and the (reopening of the) SAA negotiations. 
654 2756th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 16/17-10-2006. Western Balkans. Council 
Conclusions. The Conclusions repeat the familiar message of resumption when there is full cooperation.
655 The EU managed to keep up its engagement with the Western Balkan region by means of the visa 
facilitation agreements. The Council adopted negotiation mandates for visa facilitation. The Commission 
could in the course of November start the negotiations on this matter. 2761st External Relations Council 
meeting, Brussels 13-11-2006. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
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‘engaging and supporting Serbia’ after the elections.656 Debates about ICTY 
cooperation were truly turning into ritual dances as Coreper wondered whether it 
should ‘recall’ or ‘confirm’ earlier Conclusions in this regard.657 The December Council 
decided it “recalled” them.658 Drivers made one last try at European Council level, 
to link the resumption of SAA negotiations to the renewed consensus.659 Serbia 
was presumably discussed in detail, but the European Council limited itself to an 
explicit message of encouragement: “In view of Serbia’s considerable institutional 
capacity, the European Council is confident that Serbia will be able to accelerate 
its preparations on the road towards the EU once the SAA negotiations are 
656 Coweb 9-11-2006, Coreper 22-11-2006. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was the 
title of a non-paper on Serbia by the Finnish Presidency.
657 Coreper 7-12-2006. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
658 2771st External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 11/12-12-2006. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
659 Agence Europe, 16-12-2006: 4. 
When Who What
12-06-2006 Council Recognizes Serbia “as the continuing State of the State Union 
of Serbia and Montenegro”.
15-9-2006 Council Urges Serbia “to step up their efforts in implementing their 
Action Plan in order to meet this criterion” [of full cooperation]
15-12-2006 European 
Council
Shows itself “confident that Serbia will be able to accelerate 
its preparations on the road towards the EU once the SAA 
negotiations are resumed”
22-1-2007 Council Welcomes ‘victory’ of the “reform oriented” political parties 
in the Serbian elections. The Council stresses that “the EU 
remains ready to support Serbia in its European perspective”.
12-02-2007 Council “Welcome[s] the Commission’s readiness to resume 
negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement 
with a new government in Belgrade provided it shows clear 
commitment and takes concrete and effective action for full 
cooperation with the ICTY.”
14-5-2007 Council After ‘discussing’ the formation in Serbia, Council indicates 
that it “stood by its commitments … of 12 February 2007”. 
18-6-2007 Council While welcoming the resumption of the SAA negotiations, 
stresses that: “The Council and Commission will jointly review 
Serbia’s performance in these areas, before the decision to 
sign is taken by the Council.”
Table 8.3   Key moments in the debate on resuming SAA negotiations (Serbia)
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resumed”.660 “The necessary conditions, notably full cooperation with the ICTY” still 
had to be met. 
Much of the Council’s debate on Serbia during the 2007 German Presidency is 
captured in one sentence of the February Conclusions: “Recalling its conclusions of 
3 October 2005, the Council welcomed the Commission’s readiness to resume 
negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement with a new government in 
Belgrade provided it shows clear commitment and takes concrete and effective 
action for full cooperation with the ICTY.”661 Drivers had obviously won two important 
battles; the first on the ‘warrant’ or definition of full cooperation. A ‘commitment 
towards’ or ‘actions leading to’ full cooperation were considered sufficient for 
resumption of the SAA negotiations. Brakemen and Del Ponte had fought hard to get 
the Council to acknowledge that the arrest of Mladic would then at least be a condition 
for the signing of the SAA.662 But this attempt failed. After all, the brakemen had 
traditionally been the ones who refrained from clearly specifying the conditions for full 
cooperation. The second battle drivers had won was about ‘who resumes’. Surprisingly 
enough the question of whether the Commission could autonomously decide to 
resume the negotiations, it had suspended, had yet to be answered. The brakemen 
realized that the resumption of the negotiations was a lost battle. Instead they tried to 
get the Council to acknowledge that it would be the Council that would have to decide 
on the signing of the SAA. This battle they won in June when the Conclusions stated 
that: “The Council and Commission will jointly review Serbia’s performance in these 
areas, before the decision to sign is taken by the Council.”663 Once again one side 
(drivers) got the decision, whereas the other (brakemen) got the language they 
preferred. And this language provided them with a head start in the next round.
How to explain the drivers’ victories of February 2007? Caucus races are about 
momentum; created by the Dodo feeding of the intangible mood in the room. As we 
have seen, the mood in the room had been shifting ever since the Council ‘agreed’ 
to suspend the SAA negotiations. The game play, on which I will elaborate below, 
would show that Macmillian Events, such as elections and arrests, can be helpful 
but are seldom decisive.664 Players might try to employ them to support their 
660 European Council meeting, 14/15-12-2006. Presidency Conclusions. Enlargement Strategy, Western 
Balkans: 15.
661 2780th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 12-2-2007. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
662 Agence Europe, 27-6-2007: 5. 
663 2809th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 18-6-2007. Western Balkans. Council 
Conclusions. 
664 EU Observer 9-2-2007: ‘Russia raises prospect of UN veto on Kosovo’. Here the proverbial senior EU 
diplomat explained why the Council might not necessarily follow the judgment of Del Ponte. 
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argument. But the positions themselves seldom change because of what happened 
in the field. There was no shortage of events in this period. The Serbian elections of 
January would be followed by the presentation of the Ahtisaari plan on Kosovo in 
February. The bigger brakemen, and the German Presidency in particular, were 
above all worried about Kosovo and about timing. This is why they started to 
mention the possibility of passing on this particular ICTY conditionality to the end 
of the SAA trajectory.665 
The January Council welcomed the ‘positive results’ of the Serbian elections. In 
fact, the elections had been won by the Radicals, but the “reform oriented” parties 
of Tadic and Kostunica had a better chance of forming a government.666 Coweb 
delegates with regional expertise already warned their peers that the formation 
would deliberately take a very long time, seeing that this would be the government 
that would ‘lose Kosovo’. The pro-EU leader, Tadic, had stated that the reopening 
of SAA negotiations might not be a good idea, as this created the impression of a 
trade-off on Kosovo.667 Nevertheless, at the January Council, the resumption of the 
SAA negotiations was already put on the agenda for the meeting in February. While 
the German Foreign Minister Steinmeier comforted the European Parliament by 
saying that: “we shall spare no effort to show that we are keen on the possibility of 
Serbia having European prospects”, Del Ponte reminded Solana that this was still 
primarily a quest for Mladic.668 In reality Commissioner Rehn and the majority of the 
member states were already looking for a broader definition of full cooperation, so 
as to avoid a Mladic blockade. The only element the Commissioner took over from 
Del Ponte’s appeals was that the new government would have to make sure, by 
means of ‘constructive appointments’, that “competent authorities should be 
[made] responsible for this cooperation”.669 In other words, the Ministries of Defence 
and Internal Affairs (which had to coordinate the search) should be governed by 
someone from the DS party of Tadic instead of from Kostunica’s DSS.
At the February 2007 Council the brakemen had to swallow the weakening of the 
ICTY language, as it was discussed above. In a meeting dominated by the Ahtisaari 
report on Kosovo, the need for an encouraging message to Serbia clearly prevailed. 
Commissioner Rehn boldly outlined the trajectory: resumption in the Spring, 
rounding of the SAA negotiations in the Autumn, reaching candidate status in 2008. 
665 Coweb 8-1, 15-1-2007, PSC 15-1-2007. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
666 2776th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 22-1-2007. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
667 Coweb 1-2, 2-2-2007. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
668 EU Observer 31-1-2007 : ‘UN prosecutor worried about EU easing pressure on Serbia’. 
669 Agence Europe, 7-3-2007: 5. Rehn also spoke of the need for ‘unreserved commitment in favour or 
arresting war criminals’ as well as access to archives and documents.
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The Council however was still waiting for a government to be formed in Serbia. 
March, April and May went by with a Commission now eager to resume negotiations, 
that had originally meant to serve as an incentive for these elections. The fact that 
the ‘carrot’ apparently was not sweet enough, did not seem to matter that much 
anymore. It should be offered anyway. The May Council Conclusions state that the 
“Ministers discussed the situation in Serbia following the recent agreement on the 
formation of a government by democratic parties.”670 In reality, there had been little 
discussion. The German Presidency had guillotined the debate so as not to let the 
mood in the room be infected by the doubts of some.671 Brakemen would have liked 
to have been provided with the opportunity to make their intervention, even though 
their position was of course well known. 
Commissioner Rehn then proactively answered the ‘who resumes’ question, by stating 
his intention to resume the SAA negotiations in the beginning of June.672 Drivers retro-
spectively argued that the Commissioner had had this competence all along, seeing 
that he was also the one who had suspended the negotiations. Brakemen wondered 
whether and how the Commissioner was going to take the judgment of the General 
Prosecutor into account. The more than welcome Macmillian Event followed when 
Serbia announced the arrest of Zrdravko Tolimir, one of the three remaining fugitives 
charged with genocide. Staged or not, the arrest induced even Del Ponte to state that 
there was ‘good will’ in Serbia.673 Yet, the General Prosecutor added that now that 
Serbia had showed its capacity to act, she expected the Mladic arrest within weeks.674 
In preparing the Council Conclusions for June, brakemen were above all set on reeling 
in the Commissioner.675 The arrest of Tolimir meant that to the outside world even the 
brakemen could now justify the decision to resume the SAA negotiations. There had 
been “clear commitment” and “concrete and effective action” after all.676 But the arrest 
was certainly not what “had enabled the Commission to resume negotiations”. The 
groundwork had been laid in the framing contest of February, which the Council kept 
referring back to. Commission and Presidency had found a way to argue around Mladic, 
without calling into question the importance of ICTY cooperation as such.
670 2800th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 14/15-5-2007. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
671 Coreper 15-5-2007. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
672 Coreper 30-5-007. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
673 Agence Europe, 7-6-2007: 5. The arrest was presumably staged, in that Tolimir had been arrested in the 
Republika Sprska, even though he had been captured in Serbia. It is clear that Serbian authorities, and 
Tadic in particular, had an interest in making it appear as if the arrest had not taken place in Serbia. 
674 EU Observer, 6-6-2007: ‘’Mladic arrest within weeks, UN prosecutor predicts’. 
675 Coweb 11-6-2007, PSC 12-6-2007, Coreper 13-6, 14-6-2007. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
676 2809th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 18-6-2007. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
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Round III: The signing
Probably the most convincing argument brakemen had made against the reopening 
of the SAA negotiations was that it would not solve anything.677 In view of the advanced 
stage of the negotiations and all the preparatory work that had been done behind the 
scenes, rounding off the negotiations would not take long. Which meant that in no 
time the Council would find itself having an identical debate about whether Serbia’s 
ICTY cooperation was sufficient for signing the SAA. This prediction turned out to be 
true. Already in the beginning of September Rehn announced that there was 
agreement on the SAA, which meant waiting for another judgement of Del Ponte.678 
Inviting Del Ponte to the October Council meeting had become part of standard 
operating procedures. But these (by now) ritual dances had traditionally ended with 
the Council at least stressing the importance of ICTY cooperation. However, the 
October 2007 Council Conclusions merely stated that ministers had met and talked 
with Del Ponte.679 Brakemen should have learned from this phrasing that this was not 
their hour. In internal debates, they had to intervene on the matter ever more often.680 
In the ensuing press conference the Chief Prosecutor repeated her message to the 
ministers: there had been ‘some but not enough’ improvement. Rehn replied by 
stating that according to him “the glass is half full rather than half empty”.681 Subtle as 
the difference might appear, the Commissioner was already creating room for the 
next autonomous move: the initializing of the SAA. Rehn had promised to wait until 
Del Ponte’s next visit to Belgrade, planned for the end of October. But there was a 
certain inevitability in the move, seeing that there was no doubt that it was well within 
the Commissioner’s competence.682 
The Commission used the focal point of the Progress Reports to announce its 
intention to initialize the SAA. Decision making on signing the SAA, and even 
providing Serbia with candidate status, was sucked into the vortex of the annual 
debates about the Progress Reports. A number of things came out into the open 
which had become more and more apparent throughout the year.683 First of all, the 
concept of absorption capacity did not really apply to the Western Balkans. The 
677 Coweb 8-2-2007. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
678 Agence Europe, 12-9-2007: 5. 
679 2824th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 15/16-10-2007. Relations with the Western Balkans. 
Council Conclusions. 
680 Coreper 17-10-2007. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
681 EU Observer, 16-10-2007: ‘Serbian cooperation with UN tribunal ‘still irresolute’ Del Ponte says’.
682 Although brakemen tried to argue (unsuccessfully) that in view of the particular circumstances this 
‘technical’ step did have certain political connotations. 
683 Coweb 8-11-2007, Coreper 27-11-2007, Council 20-11-2007. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
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signing of the SAA with Serbia (as well as Bosnia) was part of broader attempts to 
guarantee the stability of the region. Del Ponte’s farewell speech was in fact a cry of 
desperation: Mladic was biding his time in Serbia and after the signing of the SAA 
his arrest would never happen.684 By now, the Council had become fed up with her. 
Pseudo-debates about the political or technical nature of the decision to sign an 
SAA made it clear that the signing was near.685 Where the brakemen now would 
have liked the December Council to be explicit about linking specific steps in the 
European trajectory to specific steps in the ICTY cooperation – in other words 
‘Mladic’ in return for candidate status - the Conclusions made only a general 
reference. “The Council noted the initializing of the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement as an important step and recalled that its signature remains conditional 
upon Serbia achieving full cooperation with the ICTY.”686 The European Council 
even appeared to move ahead of things by explicitly mentioning the prospect of 
candidacy.687 Already looking ahead to the next step was certainly not in line with 
the ‘renewed consensus’, but it made it abundantly clear what the general mood in 
the Justus Lipsius was. 
684 EU Observer 5-12-2007: ‘EU warned against easing pressure on Serbia over war crimes suspects’.
685 Coreper 5-12-2007, 7-12-2007. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
686 2840th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 10-12-2007. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Serbia. 
687 European Council meeting, Brussels 14-12-2007. Presidency Conclusions: 71. 
When Who What
15-10-2007 Council Merely notes that “Ministers also met Carla del Ponte … to 
discuss cooperation with the ICTY”.
07-11-2007 Commission Decides to initialize the SAA with Serbia
10-12-2007 Council Generally recalls that “its signature remains conditional upon 
Serbia achieving full cooperation with the ICTY”
14-12-2007 European 
Council
Reiterates “its confidence that progress on the road towards 
the EU, including candidate status, can be accelerated.”
28-1-2008 Council Proposes “an interim political agreement on co-operation 
between the European Union and Serbia”.
29-04-2008 Council While signing SAA and IA, “agreed to submit the SAA to their 
parliaments for ratification and the Community decided to 
implement the Interim Agreement as soon as the Council 
decided that Serbia fully cooperates with the ICTY.”
Table 8.4   Key moments in the debate about signing an SAA (Serbia)
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And then came the Slovenian whirlwind. The Slovenian 2008 Presidency devoted a 
lot of their time, efforts and social resources to the Balkans. It not only aimed at 
signing the SAA’s with Serbia and Bosnia, but also a date for the opening accession 
negotiations with Macedonia and candidate status for Serbia.688 Slovenia would 
have a successful Balkan presidency. But with hindsight perhaps the most 
important proof that even now drivers did not have a structural advantage, lies in 
what the Slovenes failed to achieve. The final round of the Serbia/SAA game would 
be about readjusting the balance so that even under these most unfavourable 
circumstances brakemen could bring home prizes. 
At the end of 2007, even Carla del Ponte had the impression that the Council would 
sign the SAA already in January. The Commission was working on yet another 
communiqué on ‘enhancing the European perspective’ of the Western Balkans.689 
Solana went all out to secure the SAA for Serbia now that the EU faced what he 
called ‘the most important mission in its history’ in Kosovo.690 Kosovo’s 
independence was (now really) imminent and Serbia was (again) warming up for an 
election round which (again) the Radicals were set to win. The Presidency had 
boldly put the signing of the SAA as “possible A-point” on the provisional agenda 
of the January Council.691 Yet, the Dodo still had to invent a way to get the matter 
past the brakemen. A number of different routes were tried. First of all, the Slovenes 
proposed setting up a Taskforce which (as was the case with Croatia) was meant 
to assist and assess Serbia in their quest for full cooperation.692 Seeing that Serbia 
already had sufficient capacities, it was unclear what this Taskforce was going to 
contribute.693 The Netherlands were invited to take part in this Taskforce but politely 
declined. However, Dutch Foreign Minister Verhagen had pre-emptively started 
looking for some more room to manoeuvre on the matter, particularly from his own 
parliament.694 
A second creative solution, suggested by Commission and drivers, was only to sign 
the Interim Agreement (IA) in January as a positive signal to Tadic, who had lost the 
688 Agence Europe, 21-12-2007: 4. Coweb 7-1, 14-1-2008. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Author’s interview, Coreper level, 3-7-2012.
689 Or as the subject was referred to in the corridors: ‘should there be a second big bang?’
690 Coreper 17-1-2008. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
691 Agence Europe, 5-1-2008: 3.
692 Agence Europe, 15/18-1-2008: 5. Meeting of Foreign Ministers Rupel and Verhagen in The Hague 
16-1-2008. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
693 Coweb 14-1-2008. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
694 Author’s interview, Council level, 28-6-2012.
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first round of the Presidential elections to the Radical Nikolic.695 The IA was 
essentially about trade. So one could argue that political conditionalities did not 
really apply here. Brakemen perhaps would have preferred this intermediate option, 
as it meant they were off the hook on the SAA for a while. This might also have been 
the reason why ‘the motion failed’. Some considered the mere signing of the IA as 
too insignificant a signal. However, the signal that the January Council did decide 
to send was even more of a sop. “The Council decided to propose an interim 
political agreement on co-operation between the European Union and Serbia 
providing a framework for making progress… towards the EU.”696 A lot of ‘Salzburg 
language’ – “concrete benefits, people to people contacts, educational 
co-operation, funds for Serbian students, easier travel” – was used to dress up this 
invitation. But the Serbian emperor was not happy with these new clothes and 
refused to sign the agreement.697 They would not allow the EU the opportunity to 
pretend that the process was moving forward, when there was in fact nothing 
happening.698 It was clear that the brakemen were overdoing it with their salami 
tactics. But they had managed to postpone a decision until after the second round 
of the Serbian elections, and more importantly, after Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence. 
While Coreper needlessly bothered itself with the content and meaning of the 
political agreement, and the PSC was trying to figure out what the Taskforce was 
supposed to do, Tadic went ahead and won the Presidential elections.699 One 
would expect that the need for a positive gesture was now gone. But this was not 
the case. Drivers immediately started to argue that the next thing Serbia would have 
to swallow was the EU mission to Kosovo. Kosovo’s long awaited declaration of 
independence on 17 February 2008, provided the Council with some breathing 
space. Even the new ICTY General Prosecutor, Serge Brammertz, was aware of the 
awkward timing and thus seemed reluctant to come to a new assessment.700 Rehn, 
believing that Serbia was “so close to full cooperation”, tried to get the signing of 
695 Author’s interview, Commission (Serbia Unit) level, 4-6-2010. Coreper 25-1-2008. Internal report, Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
696 2845th/2846th General Affairs and External Relations Council meetings, Brussels 28-1-2008. Main results 
of the Council and Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
697 Another reason the Serbian authorities, and Kostunica in particular, supposedly refused to sign the 
agreement was that it would be an indirect recognition of Kosovo. Agence Europe 6-2-2008: 4. However, 
it seems that signing an SAA that did not apply to Kosovo, would then certainly come down to a de facto 
recognition. Author’s interviews, Commission (Serbia Unit) and Serbia level, 4-6-2010, 7-7-2011. 
698 Author’s interview, Serbia level, 7-7-2011.
699 The Taskforce in fact never met. Author’s interview, Commission (Commissioner’s Cabinet) level, 
15-7-2010. PSC 6-2-2008, Coreper 30-1-2008. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
700 EU Observer, 25-2-2008: ‘New UN prosecutor says arrest of Mladic, Karadzic still top priority’.
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the SAA on the Agenda for February but failed.701 In the beginning of March another 
Serbian government fell; according to Kostunica because of differences on Kosovo, 
according to Tadic because of differences on EU integration. The Council by now 
must have become aware that their impact on Serbian politics was limited at best. 
But nevertheless, at the Gymnich in Brdo, the ritual dance continued. Drivers (and 
brakeman France) wanted to give the Serbs something tangible before the elections 
of 11 May. Brakemen openly expressed that they got tired of the same routine.702 
While Tadic had framed the umpteenth Serbian elections as a referendum on 
Europe, there cannot have been many in Brussels who still genuinely believed that 
anything the EU would say or do mattered for the outcome.703
Why then the ‘creative solution’ of April 2008? While it took nocturnal bickering in 
the Verhagen’s hotel room, the solution in itself had been precooked in the month(s) 
before.704 The Council would simply ‘add another step’ by separating the signing of 
the SAA from the start of the ratification process. The Council could then sign the 
SAA and IA, but the implementation of both would be ‘frozen’. The legality of this 
solution was doubtful. Normally when a country signs an agreement, it automatically 
commits itself to implementing it.705 Purists even argue that provisions in Article 59 
of the IA (Article 138 in the SAA), which clearly state that the IA will enter into force 
in July 2008, overrule the political decision reached in the night of 29 April.706 But we 
do not need this legal fine-tuning to realize that this was nothing more than a 
gentlemen’s agreement. The brakemen got the language. The Netherlands in 
particular were satisfied now that the political understanding on ICTY cooperation 
had been upgraded to a legal requirement as part of the SAP. “The Council recalled 
articles 2, 4 and 133 of the SAA and articles 1 and 54 of the Interim Agreement and 
stated that full cooperation with the ICTY, including all possible efforts to arrest and 
701 Agence Europe, 7-6-2008: 4. The Council was simply too busy agreeing on a reaction to Kosovo’s 
independence. See Section 3.
702 Agence Europe, 1-4-2008: 4.
703 Agence Europe, 17-4-2008: 6.
704 Cf. EU Observer, 25-4-2008: ‘Netherlands prepared for ‘creative solution’ on Serbia’. Foreign Minister 
Verhagen had already asked the Dutch parliament for the necessary room to manoeuvre on 24 April. The 
solution as such, decoupling the signing from the ratification of the SAA, had featured in his January 
conversation with the Slovene Foreign Minister, Rupel. The Hague, 16-1-2008. Internal report, Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
705 Author’s interview, Council and Commission (Serbia Unit) level, 4-6-2010, 28-6-2012.
706 The article reads: “The Parties shall approve this Agreement in accordance with their own procedures. 
This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the second month following the date on which the 
Parties notify each other that the procedures referred to in paragraph 1 have been completed. In the 
event of the procedures referred to in paragraph 1 not being completed in time to allow for its entry into 
force on 1 July 2008, this Agreement shall provisionally apply as from that date.”
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transfer indictees, is an essential element of these Agreements.”707 The drivers got 
the decision. And then the Caucus race continued. President Tadic aimed for 
candidate status before the end of the year.708 Drivers started calling for positive 
signals to facilitate the forming of a government, whereas brakemen continued to 
stress Serbia’s ICTY cooperation as well as its constructive attitude to (the EU 
mission to) Kosovo.709 
To sum up: Salamis and symbolism 
How to make sense of the process and outcome of the Serbia/SAA game? With 
regard to the outcome, there was at least consensus on one thing. All sides agreed 
that the April 2008 solution was symbolic.710 The readings of, and reasons for, the 
agreement were the same: a gesture of good will for the benefit of Tadic. Whether, 
as drivers argued, the gesture worked, in that it helped Tadic ‘win’ the May 2008 
parliamentary elections, is highly doubtful.711 Drivers and brakemen tend to 
emphasize (attach different significances to) different elements of the agreement.712 
Drivers did not seem to worry too much about the upgrading of the ICTY 
conditionality. The brakemen on the other hand focussed solely on the upgrading, 
rather than on the signature they had put under a frozen agreement. In view of the 
limited domestic repercussions, the signing of the SAA did not cause a lot of 
waves.713 Nor was it really considered as a ‘problem solving’ solution to the triple 
challenges the EU faced. Rather, it seems that the matter had sufficiently matured 
and the decision as such was considered ‘ripe for the picking’.714 
If we then look at the process leading up to this decision, we can conclude that the 
eventual agreement on signing the SAA was certainly not reached by ‘deliberating’ 
and then ‘convincing’ relevant others that the Council’s gestures were effective. 
Such encouraging gestures (to support European forces in Serbia) were rather sold 
as being ‘appropriate’. Throughout the debate there had been a lot of reciprocal 
707 2864th/2865th General Affairs and External Relations Council meetings, Luxembourg 29-4-2008. Western 
Balkans. Council Conclusions. Serbia.
708 Agence Europe, 15-5-2008: 4.
709 Coweb capitals 14-5-2008. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
710 Author’s interviews, Working party and Commission (Serbia Unit) level, 3-6-2010, 16-6-2010. 
711 Whether Tadic had really ‘won’ the elections was also an issue for debate, seeing that he would need the 
Socialist party of the late Milosevic in order to be able to form a government. EU Observer, 12-5-2008: 
‘Serbia’s pro- Europe forces claim election win’. 
712 Which is a typical characteristics of a rhetorical consensus. See Chapter 3, Section 3.
713 It would be hard to argue that by 2008 press and public in the Netherlands would not allow positive 
moves toward Serbia, because of Mladic. The developments in the coming years would show that the 
personal commitment of Minister Verhagen mattered more than the constraints he presumably faced.
714 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) level, 10-11-2010.
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bargaining in trading language for decisions, but this reciprocity can again only be 
interpreted as diffuse. It was in essence about salami-tactics, in which the Council 
was trapped in highly repetitive discussions about what would be a good time to 
swallow the next ‘slice’. This made the messages of the Council as a whole seem 
rather incoherent. Less than two months after the start of the SAA negotiations the 
brakemen already wanted to suspend them. The Council started discussing the 
resumption of the SAA negotiations on the day it endorsed the suspension. It 
brought about the resumption of the negotiations, by temporarily changing the 
definition of full cooperation into a ‘commitment’. But it then enabled the signing of 
the SAA by again upgrading the definition of the ICTY conditionality. All in all, the 
Serbia/SAA game provides a clear-cut example of a non-competitive debate, in 
which the way forward was found in finding adequate ways for the Council to reward 
the current level of investment on the matter either by means of language or by 
means of decisions.
8.3   “A European perspective in line with the European 
perspective of the region”
Throughout the decade, consecutive Coweb presidencies would tease each other 
about which of them would have to deal with (the independence of) Kosovo.715 Ever 
since the 1999 war, the EU had been keen on playing a leading role in Kosovo. Individual 
member states however were unsure whether this was something they wanted to invest 
in. Kosovo was not a dossier on which one could reasonably expect tangible 
deliverables. Member states were not even agreeing on whether they were dealing with 
a country, a province or a region. To be sure, the status process in itself was a 
UN-matter.716 The EU, and the Council in particular, mainly had to find an agreement on 
the European perspective of Kosovo. The fact that Kosovo had a European perspective 
was never an issue for debate. But what it meant that Kosovo had this perspective was, 
as I will argue, an issue that the Council would consistently avoid addressing. The 
Kosovo game was about moving from one rhetorical commonplace to the next. 
Throughout the decade constructive ambiguity was a necessary condition for 
maintaining the momentum.717 By keeping the measures ‘concrete’ and the dialogue 
‘practical’ the consensus in ‘engagement’ could endure.
715 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 8-11-2010, 10-11-2010, 
716 The Contact Group and the Quint would remain the locus of decision making on Kosovo. The Quint was 
in fact a continuation of the former Contact Group, that had lead the UN and NATO intervention during 
the 1999 war in Kosovo, be it without Russia. It has five members; the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, Italy and Germany. 
717 Author’s interview, Commission (Kosovo Unit) level, 19-7-2010.
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As has been explained in the previous chapter, the March (2004) riots were the big 
game-changer for Kosovo as well as for the Balkans in general. In the direct 
aftermath of the crisis the Council felt the need to stress its commitment to the 
so-called ‘standards before status approach’.718 The reasoning behind this 
approach had in fact been called into question by the riots. Member states started 
to argue in favour of speeding up the Europeanization of Kosovo. The idea was that 
the EU should play a more central role in Kosovo vis-à-vis UNMIK. 719 There was 
never much debate about supporting Kosovo on a socio-economic level. This was 
basically what the Commission’s April 2005 Report was all about.720 This was 
moreover something that could be done as part of a regional approach. EU 
integration however was supposed to be about own merits. This meant that sooner 
or later the Council would have to start dealing with Kosovo as an autonomous unit. 
Many foresaw the rhetorical trap. Not only in the EU’s dealings with Serbia, but also 
for domestic reasons member states were divided on how to react to ‘separatist 
parts of autonomous states’. In February 2005 the Council had already made some 
general observations in this regard. While announcing a first evaluation of the 
progress made in complying with the standards, the Council mentioned that it 
would start dealing with the status issue Mid-2005. “The Council also emphasised 
that Kosovo would not return to the situation before 1999. Its future can only be 
conceived in the form of a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo.”721 This statement 
was not as innocent as it appeared. Calling a return to the pre-1999 situation out of 
the question, meant that Kosovo would never again be a Serb province. Those who 
stressed a multi-ethnic Kosovo were in fact arguing against subdividing the country 
so that the Serbs in the north could join Serbia.722 The Conclusions revealed a 
couple of other rhetorical commonplaces that would come to dominate the 
discussion in the years to come. When the Council “emphasised the importance 
which it attached to a substantial dialogue being established between the 
communities in Kosovo, and between the authorities in Belgrade and Pristina” and 
718 2577th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 26-4-2004. Western Balkans. Council 
Conclusions. Serbia and Montenegro/Kosovo. The policy came down to first making sure that Kosovo 
developed the necessary capacities, so that it could meet the standards required for further integration 
into the Euro-Atlantic structures. Only then would the international community start discussing its status. 
719 The EU already carried the responsibility for the so-called fourth pillar of the United Nations Mission to 
Kosovo (UNMIK), dealing with economic reconstruction of Kosovo 
720 Communication from the Commission. ‘A European Future for Kosovo’, Brussels 20-4-2005. 
721 2641st External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 21-2-2005. Western Balkans. Serbia and Montenegro/
Kosovo. 
722 There were some Serbian ‘enclaves’ in other parts of Kosovo, which for the larger part of the decade have 
been under constant UN/NATO supervision. But the larger part of the Serbs in Kosovo lived north of the 
river Ibar, in particular in and around the city of Mitrovica (cf. Judah, 2008). 
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when it “encouraged the Serbs in Kosovo to take their place in the PISG”, it was 
‘subtly’ trying to induce a de facto acceptance as a semi-autonomous unit.723 
In internal debates, it quickly became clear that enthusiasm for dealing with the 
Kosovo dossier was varying.724 The most important driver was the United Kingdom 
(as Presidency), which followed the United States in its suggestion to use the 
European perspective as a foreign policy tool. The UN’s status negotiations would 
commence before the end of the year and would probably last until June 2006. So 
it would be very much appreciated if the EU had something to offer Belgrade and 
Pristina by then. Thus should we interpret the November 2005 statement: “The 
resolution of Kosovo’s future status must enable both Belgrade and Pristina to 
make progress towards the European Union”.725 The incoming Austrian Presidency 
was well represented in the process, with Stefan Lehne being appointed as the EU-
Representative supporting UN Envoy Ahtisaari. The November Council made it 
explicit: “There can be no partition of Kosovo, nor any union of Kosovo with another 
country or with part of another country.” On the Serb side, people started to wonder 
what there was left to negotiate about.726 It appeared as if this was going to be a 
debate only about timing. The Commission for its part had a thing or two to say 
about timing. Kosovo was lagging behind with regard to reforms. The first separate 
Progress Report for Kosovo had been very negative about the extent to which it met 
EU-related standards. So for the moment, brakemen could counter the ‘regional 
stability’ argument of the drivers with a ‘merits-based’ rebuttal.
With the launching of the Kosovo status talks, the official mantra became ‘standards 
(in parallel) with status’. The Salzburg Declaration added a number of elements to 
the equation by calling for a “negotiated settlement of the status of Kosovo, mutually 
acceptable to the parties concerned”.727 The independence of Kosovo was a done 
deal. Negotiations would mainly be about the conditions under which this could 
take place.728 In spite, or because of, the stalemate in the technical part of the 
negotiations, “the Council welcomed his [Ahtisaari’s] intention to move forward into 
723 The PISG are the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, seeing that formally Kosovo could not have 
its own ‘government’ because that would imply it was an autonomous republic. This also explains why, in 
the years to come, Serbia would (unsuccessfully) maintain that there was no one, in the sense of no 
recognized authority, to negotiate with. 
724 Coweb capitals 1-6-2005. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
725 2687th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 7-11-2005. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Serbia and Montenegro/Kosovo.
726 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-11-2010.
727 ‘Salzburg EU/Western Balkans Joint Press Statement’, Salzburg 11-3-2006: 4.
728 Coweb capitals 26-4-2006. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hence the focus in the 
discussion on decentralizing authority and safeguarding minority rights.
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When Who What
26-4-2004 Council Emphasizes “its full support for the policy of Standards before 
Status”
21-2-2005 Council “Its future can only be conceived in the form of a multi-ethnic 
and democratic Kosovo.”
20-4-2005 Commission Presents Communication focussing on socio-economic 
development and building up institutional capacity.
07-11-2005 Council States that “the resolution of Kosovo’s future status must 
enable both Belgrade and Pristina to make progress towards 
the EU”.
11-3-2006 Council 
(Salzburg)
Calls for a “negotiated settlement of the status of Kosovo, 
mutually acceptable to the parties concerned”
17-7-2006 Council Welcomes the “intention to move forward into direct political 
talks on the status issue.”
17-10-2006 Council “Noted that striving for a negotiated settlement should not 
obscure the fact that neither party can unilaterally delay or 
block the status process from advancing.”
12-2-2007 Council “The status process has now entered its decisive stage... The 
final decision should be endorsed by the UN Security Council.”
18-6-2007 Council Calls for a new UNSC Resolution “also as a basis for future EU 
and international presence”.
15-10-2007 Council Expressed full support for the 120 days of further negotiations, 
urges “to make every effort to secure a negotiated settlement”. 
14-12-2007 European 
Council
Shows it readiness “to assist economic and political 
development through a clear European perspective, in line with 
the European perspective of the region”. 
18-2-2008 Council “Notes that Member States will decide, in accordance with 
national practice and international law, on their relations with 
Kosovo.” And “asks the Commission to use community 
instruments…in order to advance in that direction”
9-12-2008 Council “Welcomes the Commission’s intention to present a study 
examining means to further Kosovo’s political and socio-
economic development.”
14-10-2009 Commission Adopts ‘study’, coins the EU’s approach as “diversity in 
recognition, but unity in engagement”
7-12-2009 Council “Welcomes” study, “takes good note” of the proposals
22-7-2010 Council
(HR Ashton)
Welcomes the publication of advisory opinion on 
independence: “The focus should now be on the future.” 
“The EU is ready to facilitate a process of dialogue between 
Belgrade and Pristina”
Table 8.5   Key moments in the debate about the European perspective (Kosovo)
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direct political talks on the status issue.”729 What the July 2006 Council was mostly 
discussing was the EU’s own role and presence in Kosovo.730 To be able to enhance 
this role, the Commission in particular would need to be able to treat Kosovo as a 
unit with which it could enter into (contractual) relations. The debate between drivers 
and brakemen was about timetables: should there be any? This was also the main 
point for debate in the run-up to the October 2006 Council. The Conclusions did not 
mention any time-lines or dates. But “the Council noted that striving for a negotiated 
settlement should not obscure the fact that neither party can unilaterally delay or 
block the status process from advancing”. This ‘with or without you’ message to the 
obstructive Serbs was a victory for the drivers, but it kind of undermined the point 
of negotiating at all. Brakemen (the later non-recognizers) would have preferred 
sticking to the Salzburg formulation. The November and December Council debates 
were mostly about what to give Serbia in return. Meanwhile, the presentation of the 
Ahtisaari Report was lifted over the January 2007 Serbian elections. 
The German 2007 Presidency saw a continuation of familiar routines, with the EU 
trying to project a unity that was not there. Closed ranks were necessary in order to 
be able to put pressure on the Russian Federation, so that this Contact Group and 
UNSC member would accept a solution on Kosovo.731 Ahtisaari’s solution-proposal 
of 2 February was brought about because of the failure of the negotiations. 
Nevertheless it was presented by the German Presidency as ‘a basis for more 
talks’.732 The Report formed the focal point for the February Council Conclusions.733 
Drivers and brakemen were more evenly matched now. There was to be no reference 
to the ‘mutually acceptable solution’ anymore, while the Council noted that “the 
status process has now entered its decisive stage”.734 But after this, the brakemen 
grabbed hold of the pen. The Report was not ‘welcomed’ but rather presented as a 
basis for further negotiations. The Conclusions mentioned no timeline but stressed 
729 2744th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 17/18-7-2006. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Serbia/Kosovo. See also, Agence Europe, 11-7-2006: 5, 26-7-2006: 5. While Ahtisaari himself held the 
Serb side responsible for the stalemate, to the outside observer it appeared that the Kosovar negotiation 
position was the less flexible one. The Serb mantra; ‘more than autonomy, less than independence’ 
seemed to offer more leeway than the Kosovar; ‘nothing but full independence’. 
730 PSC 18-7-2006. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The basis was a joint Solana-Rehn 
Report presented at the July 2006 Council.
731 Russia, due to its own particular problems with the defiant peoples of the Caucasus, had its own reasons 
for being hesitant as they were unsure whether Kosovo would indeed turn out to be a ‘sui generis’ case.
732 Agence Europe, 3-2-2007: 3.
733 Coweb 5-2, 6-2, 8-2-2007, PSC 9-2-2007, Coreper 8-2, 9-2-2007. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.
734 2780th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 12-2-2007. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
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that “the final decision should be endorsed by the UN Security Council”.735 The 
latter was a substantial victory for the brakemen, who had become aware of the fact 
that nothing prevented Kosovo from unilaterally declaring its independence. All in 
all the brakemen won this round. Ahtisaari above all had wanted to step up the 
pace, whereas the message of the Council was: don’t be hasty. 
When presenting his final proposal in March 2007, the essence of which was 
‘independence under international supervision’, Ahtisaari made the EU’s rhetorical 
entrapment complete. “The solution on the future status of Kosovo will [only] be 
viable if Serbia and Kosovo join the EU”.736 At the Gymnich meeting in Bremen, 
dedicated to displaying unity in reaction to this proposal, Greece and Spain said 
their final goodbye to a “negotiated solution”.737 The unity could only be maintained 
by making some general references to European futures. At UNSC level the debate 
about a new resolution started. This would be the resolution that would enable 
Kosovo to declare its independence. This US quest would however fail and UNSC 
Resolution 1244 would therefore remain in place. From the outset, it had seemed a 
strange plan. The US suggested 120 days of fresh talk that would then automatically 
end in Kosovo’s independence.738 The June 2007 Council, which had agreed to the 
resumption of the SAA negotiations with Serbia, again made a subtle shift in 
language. The new UNSC Resolution was now presented “also as a basis for a 
future EU and international presence”.739 It was no longer a condition for the 
independence as such, which it had been in February. By means of this subtle shift 
in the subject of the debate, another one of these typical small argumentative 
battles on the way towards the impending Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) was won.
‘A debate about lengthening the debate’. Thus can we summarize the Council 
meeting in July 2007. After the attempt to get a new UNSR Resolution had failed, 
the ministers agreed “that the negotiation process would now [nevertheless] 
continue for a period of around 120 days”.740 The German Ambassador Ischinger 
735 To be clear, this refers to the decision to recognize Kosovo, not the decision to declare independence, as 
the latter was something which a ‘region’ could in principle autonomously decide on.
736 Agence Europe, 16-3-2007: 5.
737 Agence Europe, 31-3-2007: 4. 
738 EU Observer, 21-6-2007: ‘Russia and Serbia reject new Kosovo resolution’. In fact, not even Ahtisaari 
himself had expected that this idea would fly. 
739 2809th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 18-6-2007. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Serbia/Kosovo.
740 2817th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 23/24-7-2007. Western Balkans. Kosovo. Note the 
absence of the ‘prefix’ Serbia, up until then used when referring to Kosovo. The main difference with the 
aforementioned (failed) new resolution was that these talks would not automatically end in independence. 
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would be the EU’s interlocutor. The debate in the Council was about what would 
happen afterwards. Brakemen argued that drawing the conclusion beforehand, as 
Ahtisaari had done, made the negotiations as such redundant. On the other hand, 
all knew that Kosovo had 28 November in mind for its UDI.741 The Council had 
bought a few months in which it could harmlessly express its support for negotiations 
for which there was never much hope to begin with. Even the rhetorical commonplace 
of “a negotiated settlement” made a temporary comeback.742 The Council, and the 
PSC in particular, used the breathing space to agree on the technicalities of the EU 
mission to Kosovo.743 28 November passed without a declaration of independence, 
but also without progress in the dialogue.744 With the envisioned end-date of 10 
December in sight what little hope there had been for a new ‘Dayton’ evaporated. 
Compensatory measures for Serbia and Bosnia were already being prepared.745 
At the December 2007 Council meeting, another rhetorical commonplace suddenly 
gained centre stage. The international community was supposedly working towards 
a ‘controlled’ or (as it eventually was labelled) ‘coordinated’ Declaration of Independence: 
a CDI instead of an UDI.746 This was (for a change) not just a discussion about 
semantics. A coordinated independence might have been acceptable to some of 
the brakemen. Suddenly, a new UNSC Resolution appeared to be no longer 
needed. All but Cyprus and the Netherlands now considered UNSC Resolution 
1244 sufficient for a EU mission to Kosovo. But the hesitant Dutch would soon 
receive their own poisoned chalice when the Dutchman, Pieter Feith, was nominated 
as the head of this mission. The Netherlands were well aware of the price-tag on 
this appointment.747 For the Dutch, maintaining a low profile would now prove to be 
difficult. The Conclusions on Kosovo were left to the December 2007 European 
Council. Herein we see the culmination of all language agreed to during the last two 
years, for example about a multi-ethnic Kosovo, committed to protection of 
minorities and of cultural and religious heritage, whose pending status is “a sui 
741 This was remarkably enough the Independence Day of Albania, another country which Kosovo had no 
intention of being part of. 
742 2824th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 15/16-10-2007. Relations with the Western Balkans. 
Council Conclusions. Kosovo. 2831st External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 19/20-11-2007. 
Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. Kosovo. 
743 PSC 6-11, 29-11-2007. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
744 Supposedly US pressure had sufficed to keep Kosovo from declaring independence just yet. Author’s 
interview, Working party level, 17-12-2009. 
745 See Chapter 8, Section 2 and Chapter 9, Section 1.
746 EU Observer, 11-12-2007: ‘EU moves closer towards unity on Kosovo’. Agence Europe, 11-12-2007: 4. 
747 Author’s interview, PSC level, 10-9-2010. See Chapter 4, Section 1 on the Dutch positionality. 
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generis case that does not set any precedent”.748 We also see the inception of the 
agreed language that Kosovo has “a clear European perspective, in line with the 
European perspective of the region”. This rhetorical commonplace really seemed 
to be about semantics, as it merely served to stress that originally the European 
perspective had been given to the region, not to Kosovo.749 It was a verbal side 
payment with at best diffuse consequences. But it also redundantly showed that 
member states were still divided, not only on the status of Kosovo, but more 
importantly on how to deal with Kosovo’s European integration. The consensus that 
was reached was rooted in a more down to earth observation: “The negotiation 
process…between the parties on Kosovo’s future status has been exhausted.” 
With hindsight the first half of 2008 was about properly getting the inevitable UDI 
past Serbia and the five non-recognizers. Medium-sized member states such as 
Spain and the Netherlands were increasingly unhappy about being kept out of the 
(Contact Group and Quint) loop.750 ‘Don’t mention the UDI’ was the motto at the 
January Council meeting. Kosovo was not on the agenda in an attempt not to 
influence Serbian elections. The Declaration of Independence on 17 February 2008 
did not come as a surprise and in Brussels everyone and everything was ready to 
start assisting Kosovo. There was just the question of how to deal with the 
independence in itself. Obviously member states did not agree on recognizing 
Kosovo.751 The Council thus decided “that Member States will decide, in accordance 
with national practice and international law, on their relations with Kosovo”.752 That 
the Council “reiterates the European Union’s readiness to play a leading role” was 
also to be expected. Nor was its commitment to the European perspective new. 
However, that the Council “asked the Commission to use community instruments…in 
order to advance in that direction”, was noteworthy. This could be interpreted as taking 
the indirect road to recognition, seeing that the Commission would (have to) treat 
Kosovo as a contracting party. Thus, while the drivers could not force the brakemen 
into a decision (recognize Kosovo), they were able to instruct the Commission. 
With its February 2008 statement the Council had set the tone for the Kosovo 
debate in the years to come. It would be all about acting status-neutral. This meant 
that any statement or decision on Kosovo should not reflect a position on whether 
748 European Council meeting, Brussels 14-12-2007. Presidency Conclusions: 65-70.
749 Author’s interview, Working party level, 11-3-2011. Because Kosovo did not ‘exist’ back then. 
750 Author’s interviews, Coreper and PSC level, 10-9-2010, 3-7-2012. Coreper, 17-1-2008. Internal report, 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
751 Which however does not mean that there were fierce debates about the matter in the Council, even 
though this is what outside observers are inclined to infer from it (cf. Noutcheva, 2009: 1072-1073). 
752 2851st External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 18-2-2008. Kosovo. Council Conclusions. 
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or not Kosovo was an independent country. Typical Coweb and PSC debates would 
be on -1- how to ‘name’ or ‘address’ Kosovo and -2- whether the EU, the Commission 
and EUSR Feith in particular, were indeed acting status-neutral.753 One cannot 
solely blame the Brussels side for this ‘evasive’ approach. The Serbs and Kosovars 
themselves appeared anything but constructive. At the informal Gymnich meeting 
in Brdo the Slovenes had gone to great lengths to appease both sides, preparing 
four different nameplates for Kosovo: ‘Kosovo’, ‘UNMIK/Kosovo’, ‘Kosovo/UNMIK’ 
and ‘Kosovo/1244’.754 In its preparatory communiqué the Commission had put a lot 
of effort in appearing status-neutral by focussing on practical initiatives. In spite of 
all this, the Serb Foreign Minister Jeremic refused to meet or even be in the same 
room with the Kosovar Prime Minister, Thaci.755 
By June 2008 not even the European Council had much to say about Kosovo.756 
Whether there should be a separate paragraph on Kosovo had been the main 
subject for debate.757 The Commission was working on the first step in the EU 
integration of Kosovo, a feasibility study. In the Council, this was to be referred to 
simply as “a study” on furthering Kosovo’s political and socio-economic development.758 
The study came out on 14 October 2009. The Council again had to use evasive 
wording to be able to react to it: “The Council recalls that, in its conclusions of 
December 2008, it welcomed the Commission’s intention to present a study 
examining means to further Kosovo’s political and socio-economic development. 
In that regard, the Council welcomes the Commission communication. The Council 
takes good note of the proposals to make use of Community instruments.”759 All in 
all, it was clear that the Council had found its standard operating procedures for 
dealing with Kosovo. The plenary race typically was about semantics; the underlying 
753 Coweb 22-5, 29-5, 2-10, 27-10, 9-12, 15-12-2008, 9-7-2009, 11-1-2010, PSC 18-3, 17-6-2008. Internal 
reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
754 Author’s interview, Working party and domestic level, 16-7-2010.
755 Agence Europe, 1/4-4-2008: 4. Relations became even more sour when the ICTY acquitted former 
Kosovar Prime Minister Haradinaj of all charges, partly because the ICTY was hindered in their ability to 
gather enough evidence. As we saw in the previous section, the ‘international community’ had been 
anything but helpful in the ICTY’s investigations in Kosovo.
756 European Council meeting, Brussels 19/20-6-2008. Presidency Conclusions: 56.
757 Coreper, 6-6-2008. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
758 2915th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 8/9-12-2008. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Kosovo. Author’s interview, Working party level, 3-11-2010. Coweb 27-11-2008, 23-3, 14-9-2009. Internal 
reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was again to appear status-neutral. Assessing whether it 
would be feasible to engage in contractual relations with Kosovo meant recognizing it as an autonomous 
unit.
759 2984th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 7-12-2009. Enlargement/Stabilization and Association 
Process. Kosovo. 
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consensus was to assist Kosovo with ‘concrete and practical measures’. The major 
challenges that Kosovo still faced with regard to capacities and reforms, would 
make it possible to avoid addressing the big question for a long time to come.
To sum up: a sui generis case that does set a precedent?
In the Introduction, I have already elaborately discussed the July 2010 Council 
reaction to the long-awaited ICJ Opinion on the legality of the 2008 independence. 
It adequately captures the essence of Council negotiations on Kosovo. Insiders 
consider the statement, that the PSC eventually managed to reach consensus on, 
as proof that the Council is always able to deliver. “On Kosovo, the EU could not be 
more divided, but nevertheless we succeeded in reaching a consensus. The 
machinery does not stop simply because we are divided on recognition.”760 Indeed, 
there does seem to be a reasoned consensus on a number of things: that “the 
focus should be on the future”, that this future lies “in the European Union”, that the 
EU is built on “good neighbourly relations, regional cooperation and dialogue”.761 It 
thus comes as no surprise that after the ICJ Opinion, the Council called upon 
Belgrade and Pristina again to engage in a process of dialogue. The EU had in fact 
been calling for a ‘practical dialogue’, since the adoption of its Regional Approach 
in April 1997.762 Even though these had essentially always been dialogues of the 
deaf (cf. Ruecker, 2011; Weller, 2009).
Yet, there was something peculiar about the Council’s own ‘dialogue’. Most if not all 
the elements of the consensus in 2010 were already present at the outset of the 
debate. Of course it would not make sense to equate a reasoned consensus with 
an all out agreement on Kosovo. But the reconstruction of rhetorical commonplaces 
above, makes it difficult to see what the Council did manage to agree on over the 
years. Not on the importance of a negotiated settlement, not the need for a new 
UNSC Resolution, not on the pace of the proceedings, and not even on the use of 
Community instruments (in particular the ‘feasibility’ study). Of course, Kosovo has 
always been considered a sui generis case, which makes one wonder whether the 
consensus on Kosovo was also without precedent. This is a matter to which I will 
return in Chapter 10. But for now, it seems that the way in which this particular 
consensus was reached was actually rather typical: “The EU managed to remain 
united by not forcing each other into an open shoot-out.”763
760 Author’s interview, Working party level, 12-1-2011.
761 ‘EU Declaration by High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, on 
behalf of the European Union on the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Kosovo’, Brussels 
22-7-2010. See Introduction. 
762 Author’s interview, Commission (Kosovo Unit) level, 19-7-2010. See Chapter 6, Section 1.
763 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) level, 10-11-2010.
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8.4 Conclusion: Appropriate anticipation
‘Anticipation’ above all seems to characterize the Council’s Balkan debate(s) of the 
years 2006-2008. These were certainly not the most dynamic years in the region’s 
European integration. The main reason for this loss of momentum was the 
impending ‘solution’ on the status of Kosovo. The only country in a position to make 
progress, Serbia, was also the one primarily affected by the Kosovo status process. 
But for Serbia the bigger problem at the time still concerned the ICTY. I will evaluate 
the relevant developments in the Serbia and Kosovo game discussed in this 
chapter, by means of the four categories of observable implications.
-1- The players and their positions. Access to and participation in the third Serbia 
game materialized along the same lines as in the Croatia game. Commitment 
shown to the ICTY, Serbia or Kosovo dossier was decisive, not the material interests 
of a specific member state. It would be hard to argue that there were member states 
that had a lot to gain or lose from signing an SAA with Serbia. It was rather the EU, 
which would profit at least from signing the IA and thereby the opening up of the 
Serbian market.764 Instead, the IA and SAA became the objects of a political 
signalling game.
Positionality in this third Serbia game was a bit more varied than in the second one, 
because of the triple concerns the Council faced. Drivers (Italy, Austria, Spain, 
Slovenia, Greece) formed a more or less closed front, urging for positive signals to 
Europeanize Serbia. The brakemen’s ranks were somewhat split. There were those 
(Germany and at times the UK) that were on the brake for political reasons, in 
particular Serbia’s attitude towards Kosovo. There were those (the Netherlands, 
Belgium, sometimes Sweden) that were on the brake for ‘technical’ reasons, because 
Serbia had not fulfilled that one particular conditionality. And there were those on the 
brake for domestic reasons (mainly France), because of doubts about the enlargement 
process as a whole. Positions and coalitions tended to shift a bit, in particular in 
reaction to the current state of play on Kosovo. But drivers remained drivers, and 
brakemen remained brakemen. What varied was the vocality with which they 
defended their position. It is this varying vocality which explains the stop and go 
character of the Serbia/SAA game. Strategic silences or silencing (for example at the 
May 2007 Council) were more important than well known underlying positions.
Positionality on Kosovo was predictable and largely determined by what member 
states had at stake. Thus the five that for domestic reasons could not recognize 
764 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-11-2010.
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Kosovo, as well as the Netherlands, acted as brakemen.765 The large member 
states, with foreign policy concerns at stake and troops on the ground in Kosovo, 
were the drivers. Domestic constraints can serve to explain the positions of all but 
the Netherlands. Positions and coalitions hardly changed. Already in 2005 it was 
obvious who would and who would not recognize Kosovo. And member states’ 
positions on the status of Kosovo determined their position on employing 
Community instruments to give content to its European perspective. Thus, with 
regard to positionality this appears to have been a pseudo-debate.
-2- The game play. Press and public have a tendency to link the Council’s ICTY 
related discussions primarily to Serbia. Insiders, and notably Carla del Ponte 
herself, mostly remember specific debates about Croatia.766 This already serves to 
show that by the time the Council really got round to discussing the ICTY cooperation 
of Serbia, there was not much more that needed to be said.767 The argumentative 
trenches had already been dug. Participants could usually anticipate each other’s 
reactions. One did not have to be an ‘expert’ to participate in these ‘deliberations’. 
To a considerable degree, they had turned into ritual dances. Negotiation strategies 
came down to (temporarily) procuring plenary acquiescence, so as to be able to 
‘agree’ on an appropriate procedural solution. In view of the non-competitive nature 
of this debate, we can definitely rule out any deliberative interpretation of these 
proceedings. 
The same can be said about the Kosovo debate. Again, the game play was guided 
by a logic of appropriateness. The continued commitment to the collective endeavor 
was unquestionable. There were member-specific doubts about whether the EU 
could and should deal with this issue, precisely because it was so divided. But 
these doubts never seemed to have reached the Plenaries. Perhaps actors could 
be shamed into acquiescence. The EU simply had to take a leading role in Kosovo 
and the only way to do this was by confirming the European perspective. To this 
very day, a lot of shadowboxing is going on, with brakemen trying to ensure that 
anything the EU says or does is status-neutral.768 But this is done mainly to appease 
domestic audiences. These domestic constraints however have not hindered 
progress at the European level. Trade-offs between Serbia and Kosovo did not 
really take place. The Council only took this linkage into account in the timing of 
765 The five non-recognizers were Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia. See Chapter 4, Section 1.
766 Author’s interview, Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY (1999-2007), 14-6-2011.
767 To be more specific, they got round to discussing what this ICTY cooperation would mean for Serbia’s 
European (pre)accession trajectory.
768 The agreed language on naming Kosovo would eventually become: ‘Kosovo under UNSC Resolution 
1244/1999’. 
267
Searching for standard operating procedures (January 2006 – June 2008)
certain decisions. Salami tactics again proved to be far more effective. By engaging 
in small argumentative battles about the EU’s engagement with Kosovo, the matter 
of Kosovo’s status could be avoided but nevertheless addressed. This shows that 
the debate was neither pseudo, nor competitive, but rather non-competitive. 
-3- The results. The varying significances attached to the decisions on Serbia have 
already been discussed. The varying significance of any decision on Kosovo was 
clear from the start. However, on Serbia as well as on Kosovo, the Council eventually 
did move. This rules out a rationalist interpretation of the outcomes. Progress might 
have been extremely slow and circumstantial. But on Serbia, drivers somehow 
managed to find a way to ‘drag along’ the brakemen. The same goes for Kosovo. 
Albeit perhaps by an indirect route, all member states had to come to terms with the 
fact that Kosovo was an autonomous unit, that should be able to engage in 
(contractual) relations with the EU. This makes the consensus on Kosovo more than 
a veneer. In both the Serbia as well as the Kosovo game, constructive ambiguity on 
substantive matters allowed for incremental progress on the procedural level.
-4- The success. Either you get the language, or you get the decision. This seems 
to be a short explanation of successes in the third Serbia game. Some might argue 
that drivers had an advantage. All were aware that the EU intended to sign an SAA 
with Serbia in the near or distant future. However, presumed domestic constraints 
provided brakemen with plenty of opportunities to build dams. But, as we have 
seen in the case of Croatia, these dams could only hold back the water for so much 
time, after which a new dam needed to be built. Both drivers and brakemen 
necessarily had to engage in small argumentative battles. In order to get a decision, 
whether to suspend, resume or sign the SAA, the other side needed to be appeased 
with verbal side payments. One could interpret this as a rather indirect and 
ambiguous way of ‘trading’. But it explains why we see no linear or evolving pattern 
in the words the Council used to express itself. Instead, we see meandering. 
In fact, there was only one linear development in the debate: What was happening 
in Serbia, and how this was assessed by the ICTY, came to matter less instead of 
more. The role of ‘cry-wolf’ that had been Del Ponte’s, had become institutionalized 
with the arrival of Brammertz. Individual efforts, particularly of Presidencies, also 
started to matter less. The Council appears to have got caught up in its own internal 
decision making dynamics. By the end of the 2008 Slovenian Presidency, it had 
found its modus operandi on the ICTY and Serbia. The late comeback of the 
brakemen, I believe, demonstrates that neither side had a structural advantage. In 
the next chapter we will see whether this remained the case when the race 
continued. The Council had found a consensus in a step-by-step approach, even 
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though the conditions that had to be fulfilled at these different steps were essentially 
the same.769 The unexpected arrest of Karadzic in July 2008 would be the first test 
of the effectiveness of these standard operating procedures.
Macmillian events, which have always been rather recurrent in the case of Kosovo, 
put drivers in a better position than brakemen in this particular game. But it would 
again be exaggerating to claim that drivers had a structural advantage. Lengthy 
battles had to be fought at Coweb, PSC, Coreper and even Council level to induce 
the Council to move an inch. There was (and still is) consensus on Kosovo on a 
practical level. Kosovo’s backlog in reforms has allowed the Council to remain 
ambiguous about the exact interpretation of its European perspective. Which is 
also why all member states could easily be kept on board. Up until now a rhetorical 
consensus has been more than sufficient. There have simply been no substantial 
decisions on the European perspective of Kosovo, on which member states would 
have to disagree.
769 See Chapter 9, Section 3 for an elaboration on the ambiguities underlying this step-by-step approach.
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9.  Splendid isolation?                                                                                      
(June 2008 – October 2010)
The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rosenthal, offered a rather down to earth 
explanation for finally allowing Serbia to take the next step in its European integration: 
“We were isolated”.770 Media sources claimed that the Minister had simply bowed 
to the inevitable. This next step, which was asking the Commission for an avis on 
Serbia’s membership application, could have been taken without the Netherlands. 
A qualified majority (QMV) would have sufficed.771 Both observations were true, but 
at the same time completely off the mark. Yes, the Netherlands were isolated on the 
Serbia dossier, but it had been isolated for years. Until recently, taking the decision 
by qualified majority had not even been considered. The isolation in itself had never 
been a cause for concern for Rosenthal’s predecessor, Verhagen. Moreover, there 
were other Balkan files on which other member states were isolated, but there a 
breakthrough was not achieved. The United Kingdom was alone in its stance with 
respect to Bosnia. and Greece was isolated in its position on Macedonia. Apparently 
there are different ways in which member states can be isolated. It seems the 
applicable formal decision making rules (thus whether QMV applies or not) cannot 
help us distinguish between these different types of isolation.  772
770 NRC 25-10-2010: 1: ‘EU-ministers akkoord over EU-lidmaatschap Servië’. 
771 South Eastern Times, 26-10-2010: ‘Serbia’s EU bid gets a green light’. The Economist 25-10-2010 : 
‘Tip-toeing closer to Europe’.
772 The numbers between brackets refer to different steps in the trajectory. See Chapter 5, Section 3.
When What Who Concerning whom
16-6-2008 Signing of SAA and IA (5) Council Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
 1-7-2008 Entering into force of the IA (6) Council Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
14-9-2009 Adoption of (feasibility) study (2) Commission Kosovo
14-10-2009 Recommendation to open 
accession negotiations (13)
Commission Macedonia
7-12-2009 Entering into force of the IA (6) Council Serbia
14-6-2010 Start ratification process SAA (7) Council Serbia
25-10-2010 Request for avis on membership 
application (10)
Council Serbia
Table 9.1   Key decisions with regard to Balkan pre-accession (2008-2010)772
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This is a study about consensual processes leading to (seemingly) weak outcomes. 
That outcomes were ‘weak’ can be inferred from the small number of decisions in 
this fourth period under study. Table 9.1 again provides the reader with an overview. 
One can learn a lot about how consensual decision making works by studying how 
the Council deals with situations in which the configuration of players is twenty-six 
to one. One could argue that these are extreme cases (cf. Gerring, 2007: 101) in 
which the general inclination of member states to show understanding towards the 
political sensitivities of their peers, is pushed to its limits.773 Insiders note that the 
culture of consensus is as much about showing solidarity as it is about applying 
pressure.774 Yet, member states seem to vary in their willingness either to show 
solidarity or to apply pressure. At times, they can get tired of looking for ways to 
ensure that all have prizes. When, how and why this happens, is the question that 
will be addressed here.
Studying cases of isolation is revealing, also from a theoretical perspective. From a 
rationalist intergovernmental bargaining perspective, such isolation does not 
necessarily matter. Quite to the contrary, the perseverance of the loners reveals the 
severity of the (domestic) constraints they presumably face. Reasoning along the 
lines of Schelling’s paradox of weakness, this would turn them into very strong 
instead of weak players. As long as the constraints are there, one would expect the 
brakemen to be able to (more or less comfortably) remain in isolation. From a 
deliberative perspective, we would expect the exact opposite. For obvious reasons, 
insiders state that: ‘to presume that you are right and everybody else is wrong, 
does not show a lot of common sense’.775 Chances of truly convincing someone 
with arguments should dramatically increase, if there is just one party to convince 
and twenty-six available to provide the arguments. This should be a relatively ‘easy 
win’ for the drivers. Caucus races, on the other hand, are neither about constraints 
nor about convincing, but about commitment shown during the games. The 
excessive commitment of the one could in principle compensate for the more 
diffuse commitment of the many. Which means that, from this perspective, there is 
no reason to expect either side to have an advantage.
The final chapter on the Council’s negotiations about the European perspective of 
the Western Balkans thus has a slightly different set up. It is a comparative case 
study of three seemingly similar cases, leading to obviously different outcomes. It 
773 Author’s interview, Working party level, 3-11-2010.
774 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 28-9-2010. See also Chapter 4, Section 2 on Coreper. 
775 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 27-5-201, 14-7-2010, 27-9-2010.
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is a study of three Balkan countries who were eager to take the next step(s) towards 
Europe. It is also a study of three member states who were alone in considering it 
‘too soon’ for this next step. And lastly, it is a study of three different collective 
responses. For years the Council had been dragging along Bosnia, muddling 
through on Serbia, while generally ignoring Macedonia. However, in December 
2009 it took three separate decisions. The Council confirmed that it was in no 
position to consider a membership application of Bosnia. The Council noted the 
Commission recommendation to open membership negotiations with Macedonia. 
Lastly, it decided to rekindle Serbia’s Stabilization and Association Process.
This of course begs the question of why the Council ‘agreed’ to block Bosnia, to 
push for Serbia and (at least) to acknowledge the matter of Macedonia? I will 
compare the general characteristics of the isolated member states as well as the 
state of affairs (‘reform record’) in that particular Balkan country. But I will focus 
most of my attention on the differences in game play. Why was the UK more 
successful than the other two? Why were the member states more inclined to put 
pressure on the isolated Dutch, then on the Greeks or the British? In the subsequent 
analysis of Balkan decision making in the years 2008-2010, these are the questions 
to be kept in mind.
9.1. Bosnia and Herzegovina: ‘OHR Conditionality’
When trying to explain the protracted stalemate in Bosnia’s European integration, 
insiders tend to refer to article 39 of the December 2009 Council Conclusions. 
Here, the Council “calls on Bosnia and Herzegovina to meet the outstanding 
objectives and conditions which remain necessary for the closure of the OHR. The 
Council stresses that it will not be in a position to consider an application for 
membership by Bosnia and Herzegovina until the transition of the OHR to a 
reinforced EU presence has been decided.” 776 All sides (afterwards) agreed that by 
adopting these Conclusions, the Council had put itself in a straightjacket.777 The EU 
was not the one deciding over the closure of the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR). Inside the Council all but the UK (with some lukewarm support from the 
Netherlands) considered the OHR to have become part of the problem instead of 
the solution. This makes it difficult to understand why they all agreed to the 
December 2009 Conclusions, which made the closure highly conditional and thus 
776 2984th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 7-12-2009. Enlargement/Stabilization and Association 
Process. Western Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the OHR; see Chapter 7, Section 2. 
777 Author’s interviews, Working party, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit), Commission (Director and Bosnia 
Unit) and domestic level, 25-5-2010, 22-7-2010, 8-11-2010, 10-11-2010, 12-1-2011, 23-6-2011.
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unlikely to happen any time soon. Most, if not all, knew that the “outstanding objectives 
and conditions” were hard if not impossible for Bosnia to meet. Nevertheless the 
Council insisted that they should first be met.
Seeing that the Council’s words are anything but careless, one cannot maintain that 
these Conclusions were a mere slip of the pen. What lies beneath the December 
2009 statement was the idea that the EU cannot engage in an enlargement process 
with a protectorate.778 This meant that the ‘push-factor’, provided for by the OHR 
and his Bonn powers, should be replaced by a ‘pull-factor’, meaning the European 
perspective of Bosnia. However, as Council and Commission had learned soon 
enough, the pull factor was not nearly strong enough as an incentive for reforms. 
The question then became whether Bosnia’s European integration should proceed 
anyway?779 The December 2009 Conclusions provide a clear message in that 
regard: The road towards Europe still led through the closure of the OHR. At first 
sight, these Conclusions appear to be a clear victory for the one remaining 
brakemen on the matter, which was the UK. The negotiations that led to the coming 
about of this ‘OHR Conditionality’ are the subject of this section.
The United Kingdom: ‘The bigger ones get listened to a bit more carefully’
Even in a Council driven by a consensus norm some are more equal than others. 
Insiders couch it in diplomatic terms: “Bigger member states tend to raise their flag 
more often, talk a bit more, get listened to a bit more carefully, and usually have a 
better view of what is coming.”780 The UK was ‘bigger’ and isolated in its stance 
towards Bosnia. The UK first of all did not agree with the assessment that Bosnia 
was a (sufficiently) functioning country. Second, the UK doubted whether the EU 
was capable of handling the complex dossier.781 While there might be some others 
(mostly the Netherlands) able to agree with the first observation, none in fact agreed 
with the second one. By 2008, all but the UK wanted to move forward with Bosnia’s 
European integration. However, none of them proved willing or able to openly 
challenge the UK on the matter. Why was this the case?
778 See Chapter 7, Section 2. A proper integration process would (at least according to most participants) 
require a more ‘hands off’ approach towards Bosnia.
779 Author’s interviews, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) and Commission (Director) level, 22-7-2010, 
10-11-2010. See Chapter 7, Section 2. Already in 2005 the EU perspective had proven to be too little of 
an incentive for reforms.
780 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 8-12-2010.
781 Author’s interviews, Working party and Commission (Bosnia Unit) level, 22-7-2010, 10-2-2011.
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It appears that the best defence is in taking the offence. Few would deny that the 
UK has been in the lead in practically all Council debates on Bosnia.782 The UK has 
shown its commitment to Bosnia on multiple levels. Politicians, particularly the 
incumbent Foreign Secretary, William Hague, have shown a personal interest in the 
country. There is a large Bosnia Unit in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) and British negotiators are often considered experts on what others consider 
an essentially intangible problem.783 Does this expert role suffice to explain why 
others have not been willing or able to challenge the UK’s stance on Bosnia? It can 
of course be a contributing factor, but whether it is also a decisive factor is doubtful. 
If the UK delegates truly had an expert role on Bosnia, one would expect them to be 
able to convince at least some of the others that doing away with the OHR was not 
a good idea, or at least not at the moment. The opposite appears to have been the 
case. Over the last couple of years more and more member states got convinced 
that the OHR had become counterproductive.784 Why these member states 
nevertheless agreed to the December 2009 Conclusions remains a mystery. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: ‘Bosnia (still) is a special case’
How much of the stalemate on Bosnia can be accounted for simply by looking at 
what was and what was not happening in the country? One thing is certainly true; 
things were (and are) not moving in Bosnia. The Council’s ‘renewed engagement’ 
with Bosnia led to the opening of SAA negotiations in November 2005.785 Police 
reforms had gained centre stage in this debate, and would remain a key reform 
priority for years to come. But the November Conclusions reveal a more substantial 
cause for concern: “The Council recalled that the speed with which Bosnia and 
Herzegovina moves closer towards the EU will depend on how quickly it adopts 
and implements the necessary reforms for it to become a fully functioning and 
viable state.”786 The Council thus acknowledged that Bosnia’s current state 
structures were not viable. The main problem was with the fourth annex to 
the Dayton Peace Agreement, which concerned constitutional matters.787 The 
state Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it was sketched in the annex, consisted of two 
entities: The Republika Srpska (RS) of the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosniak-Croat 
782 Author’s interview, PSC level, 10-9-2010.
783 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 4-8-2010.
784 And because more and more member states openly stated that the Office should be closed, the OHR’s 
standing with the Bosnian political leaders further declined, thus creating something of a vicious circle. 
785 See Chapter 7, Section 2.
786 2691st External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 21/22-11-2005. Western Balkans. Council 
Conclusions. Bosnia and Herzegovina.
787 Author’s interview, Commission (Bosnia Unit) level, 22-7-2010.
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Federation.788 Above these entities we find a weak central state, in which power 
sharing between the three ethnicities (Serb, Croat, Bosniak/Muslim) was institution-
alized at all levels. The three members of the Presidency were directly elected by 
the entities and the Bosnian Parliament had a similar three-way distribution of 
delegates. Strengthening of the central institutions had been one of the key 
objectives of High Representative Ashdown. When Ashdown left, proposals for 
constitutional reform were left on the table. 
Below the level of entities, the Federation in particular is plagued by a proliferation 
of (cantonal and municipal) governing levels.789 All sides agree that the ten cantons 
should be replaced by fewer (around four) territorial units, but the demarcation of 
these units has always been an issue for debate. Serb leaders want the RS to be 
one of the units, whereas Croats and Bosniaks want these units to cut across the 
entity boundaries.790 Territorial reorganization was one of the key matters to be 
settled by means of constitutional reform. 
But these reforms never materialized. In March 2006, political leaders in Bosnia had 
managed to agree on a constitutional reform package, which would for instance 
have established a rotating presidency and a more effective parliament. But in April 
2006 the package-agreement was rejected by the House of Representatives, 
because of opposition from (part of) the Bosniak and Croat parties. This set the 
tone for the October 2006 elections. Ethnicity and nationalism dominated the 
campaign, with RS candidates even threatening with (or ‘promising’) a referendum 
on independence. The years 2007 and 2008 were crisis years in Bosnia, dominated 
by the personal enmity between the Bosniak leader, Silajdzic, and the Serb leader, 
Dodik. The EU necessarily fell back to its Nineties role of expressing disappointment 
and concern and urging for dialogue.791 
Tensions turned from bad to worse after Kosovo declared itself independent, 
seemingly setting a precedent for the RS. But instead of Dodik now opting for the 
(uncertain) road towards independence, the political leaders started talking again. 
788 In 2001, as in 1992, the Bosnian Croats had attempted to create (their own) third entity (Herceg-Bosna), 
but after this attempt failed their attitude towards the Federation can best be characterized as ‘detached’. 
Bosnian politics are thus mainly battles between the Serb and the Bosniak side. The latter want to do 
away with the entities and create one state, the former want to retain their semi-independent political 
status.
789 Author’s interview, European Parliament level, 12-10-2011. 
790 See Morrison (2009, 17-18) for further elaborations on the internal divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
791 See for example the rather typical Conclusions of the 2728th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 
15-5-2006. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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There was some ‘success’ in the area of police reform and more importantly the 
leaders engaged in a new round of talks on constitutional reform. These so-called 
‘Prud negotiations’ were set to commence in November 2008, but swiftly turned 
sour. This was mainly because of Silajdzic’s rhetorical attacks, which tarnished the 
(other) Bosniak leaders willing to engage in the negotiations. Then the international 
community again stepped in. In October 2008 Commissioner Rehn and High 
Representative Solana had presented yet another report outlining ‘new EU 
strategies for Bosnia’.792 This was an invitation specifically to the EU, which was to 
reinforce its presence in Bosnia. The invitation was accepted by the Swedes in 
particular. During their 2009 Presidency a new round of negotiations would take 
place, this time in Camp Butmir. But this ‘Butmir process’ also failed to break the 
deadlock, again mainly because of a lack of political will.793 And because 2010 was 
an election year in Bosnia, the continuing stalemate surprised no one.
Is Bosnia’s European trajectory blocked because of lacking (constitutional) reforms? 
To a certain extent it is. Had the leaders of the three ethnicities in Bosnia been able to agree 
on a new constitution, progress would have been possible. But on the other hand, those 
in Brussels, who had staked Bosnia’s progress on a constitutional agreement, must have 
been aware that they were betting on a lame horse. In his 2008 Report to the UN, High 
Representative Lajcak had noted the one constant in the fifteen years since Dayton: “the 
way politics are conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.794 Positions are diametrically 
opposed. The Bosniaks are still dreaming of one fully functional multi-ethnic state, while 
the Serbs are unwilling to give up any of the prerogatives acquired at Dayton.795 The 
Bosniaks therefore want to keep the OHR, whereas the Serbs want to get rid of it 
immediately. Few of these politicians claim that constitutional change is something they 
can achieve on their own.796 Precisely because it concerns the transfer of competences 
from entity to state level (although opinions differ on how much competences need to be 
transferred), this appears to be a zero-sum game. 
It thus comes as no surprise that Bosnia has been calling out for extra assistance 
and the dominant opinion in Brussels is that it is ‘something of a special case’.797 
792 They had written a similar Report in October 2006 on a ‘reinforced EU presence’ in Bosnia.
793 Author’s interviews, Working party and Commission (Bosnia Unit) level, 22-7-2010, 3-11-2010.
794 ‘34th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to the Secretary General of the United Nations’, Sarajevo 21-11-2008. 
795 Author’s interview, Commission (Bosnia Unit) level, 22-7-2010.
796 Author’s interview, Bosnia level, 6-7-2011. Some say the EU’s policy line is endorsing this Bosniak dream, 
or at least allowing it to endure. The only true option, according to them, would be a highly decentralized 
state within a European framework.
797 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 3-11-2010, 17-5-2011, 23-6-2011.
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The domestic deadlock is a constant, since the failure of the Butmir and Prud 
processes, the blocking of the April 2006 package and even before that. It is a 
necessary element in any explanation of Bosnia’s stalling EU integration. But it is 
not a sufficient explanation. The Council has constantly been looking for ways 
around the deadlock. They were however unable to agree on such an alternative 
approach, because of the opposition of one member state.
Council negotiations on Bosnia: ‘Alarming briefings in the PSC’
This section reconstructs the negotiation process that led to the formal endorsement 
of the OHR Conditionality. The Council’s debate about the closure of the OHR or 
rather the transfer into a reinforced EU presence was again primarily a debate 
about timing. No one denied that the Dayton arrangements were meant to be 
temporary. No one objected to the idea that EU should take over. But, as I have 
explained, the EU was not the one deciding over the closure of the OHR.798 The 
OHR was a creation of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), itself a creation of 
the international community after the Dayton Peace Agreement. The PIC’s Steering 
Board members were providing the OHR with political guidance. They also decided 
about its mandate.799 So rather than agreeing on what to do with the OHR, the 
Council had to decide on what role the OHR would play in the European integration 
of Bosnia.800 For years, this had been a recurring issue for debate in the seminar-like 
discussions of Coweb capitals.801 Ashdown’s efforts to strengthen the central 
institutions were part of a deliberate attempt to be the last High Representative. But 
after his reforms failed to get off the ground, the debate would be on whether the 
phasing out should commence anyway. 
The years 2006-2008 were about monitoring (non)developments and expressing 
disappointment about lacking (police as well as constitutional) reforms.802 In 2006, 
the Commission was dealing with the truly technical part of the SAA negotiations, 
expecting to be able to finish them before the end of the year.803 The Council could 
798 The OHR is also the EU Special Representative (EUSR), responsible for the overall EU political 
coordination. But this ‘second hat’ he does not seem to wear that prominently. It will however make an 
eventual transfer from OHR to EUSR easier to accomplish, seeing that they are (part of) the same office. 
799 Members of the PIC Steering Board are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, 
United States, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, and the Organisation 
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which is represented by Turkey. 
800 That there is something of a ‘link’ between the OHR and the SAA/accession trajectory was again never 
disputed. But how concrete the Council would want to refer to the link, particularly in the Council 
Conclusions. was what was at stake in the internal debate.
801 Coweb capitals 18-12-2002, 1-6-2005. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
802 Coweb 22-3, 8-5-2006. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
803 Coweb 24-7, 9-11, 20-11-2006. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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thus start to prepare itself for a debate on the political criteria for signing the SAA. 
At the time of the 2006 elections, the Council decided to address both the need for 
constitutional reforms and the envisaged OHR closure, be it separately.804 The 
Conclusions were supposed to send a message to the political leaders: They were 
the ones who had to take the responsibility for their European integration. The 
message was also meant to provide input for the Council’s debate on the transfer. 
“A reinforced EU presence” did not mean equipping the EU Special Representative 
(EUSR) with anything resembling Bonn powers.805 The renewed approach to 
Bosnia, as outlined in the 2006 Report by Solana and Rehn, would not make sense 
if the EUSR would simply take over from the OHR. The Commissioner and the High 
Representative had to strike a balance between ‘local ownership’ (so as to appease 
the drivers) and a ‘sufficiently reinforced EU presence’ (so as the comfort the 
brakemen). Luckily there was plenty of time to figure this out. None of the conditions 
formulated at the start, had been met at the end of the SAA negotiations. The 
Commission reassured all that it would not proceed with initializing the SAA before 
Council and Commission had jointly assessed that these conditions were met.806 
The year 2007 was a lost one. The March Council “took note” of the PIC Steering 
Board decision to aim for the closure of the OHR by 30 June 2008.807 The Council 
felt the need to stress that: “The policy of ownership remains the guiding principle”. 
This was a verbal side payment to some of the drivers (Sweden, Slovenia), who 
wanted the international community to stop taking the Bosnian authorities by the 
hand. Here, a truly idiosyncratic factor entered the Bosnia-debate in the person of 
the Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt. Bildt had been the first HR and still had a 
personal interest in the country.808 With Bildt in charge, Sweden would become a 
key player in the Bosnia debate, particularly in the run-up to its 2009 Presidency. It 
did not take long for the insiders to notice the sea change: “Sweden in fact became 
804 2748th/2749th General Affairs and External Relations Council meetings, Brussels 15-9-2006. Western 
Balkans. Council Conclusions. Bosnia and Herzegovina and 2756th External Relations Council meeting, 
Luxembourg 16/17-10-2006. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
805 The Bonn powers refer to the HR’s capacity to impose legislation and dismiss obstructive politicians or 
government officials. See Chapter 7, Section 2.
806 2771st External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 11/12-12-006. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Coweb 7-12-2006. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Note the 
difference with Serbia in November 2007, where the initializing of the SAA by the Commission was an 
autonomous decision. See Chapter 8, Section 2.
807 2789th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 5-3-2007. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
808 Bildt had become Minister of Foreign Affairs in October 2006. He had been the High Representative in 
Bosnia from December 1995 until June 1997 (right after the Dayton Peace Agreement).
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When Who What
21-11-2005 Council Recalls “that the speed with which Bosnia and Herzegovina 
moves closer towards the EU will depend on how quickly 
it adopts and implements the necessary reforms for it to 
become a fully functioning and viable state.”
15-9-2006 Council “In light of the envisaged closure of the OHR, these 
elections will be particularly significant as the leaders 
chosen will have to take greater responsibility for the 
realisation of BiH’s European perspective.”
12-12-2006 Council “Recalled that Bosnia’s and Herzegovina’s performance in 
all the areas set out in the…Conclusions of 12 December 
2005 will be jointly reviewed by the Council and the 
Commission before the [SAA] negotiations can be 
concluded.”
5-3-2007 Council Notes the extension of the OHR mandate with one year, 
stressing that: “The policy of ownership remains the guiding 
principle”.
20-11-2007 Council Reiterates “that police reform remains the key priority and 
one of the four necessary conditions for a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement”
4-12-2007 Commission Initializes SAA as reward for an Action Plan on police 
reforms. 
10-12-2007 Council Notes that “renewed commitment to police reform” has led 
to the initializing of the SAA.
10-3-2008 Council Welcomes the decision that the OHR “will remain in place…
until the necessary objectives and conditions are met”
16-6-2008 Council Welcomes the signing of the SAA as “an important step”.
10-11-2008 Council Reiterates “its support for the aim of transition from the 
Office of the High Representative to a stronger European 
Union presence.”
But also “pointed out that the Peace Implementation 
Council had listed five objectives and two necessary 
conditions for closure”
16-3-2009 Council Reconfirms “its readiness for a transition from the Office 
of the High Representative to increased local ownership, 
supported by a reinforced European Union presence.”
16-6-2009 Council Stresses “that the transition could be within reach in the 
months ahead.”
7-12-2009 Council “Stresses that it will not be in a position to consider an 
application for membership by Bosnia and Herzegovina 
until the transition of the OHR to a reinforced EU presence 
has been decided.”
Table 9.2   Key moments in the debate about the OHR conditionality (Bosnia)
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more British in its approach to the Balkans.”809 This ironically led to the UK becoming 
its strongest opponent. 
In the meantime a government had been formed in Bosnia, inducing Commissioner 
Rehn to start exploring the possibilities for initializing the SAA.810 Of the long list of 
reform demands, the Commissioner tried to prioritize those necessary for initializing 
the SAA.811 Within the walls of the Justus Lipsius, Bosnia debates were turning into 
ritual dances, with Coweb serving as gatekeeper and the PSC politely listening to 
the next alarming briefing by representatives from the field.812 Every once in a while 
the Council would reflect on these stocktaking exercises, but then the Conclusions 
were already agreed on at the lower levels.813 Bosnia was no longer a subject for a 
ministerial debate. However ‘ritual’ or ‘non-competitive’ the Bosnia discussions 
might have become, they did lead to some significant changes in the (agreed) 
language. First, the Council felt the need to stress, ever more explicitly, its support 
for the HR. He had at the time become part of the game; pro-actively engaging 
himself with the issue of police reform. HR Lajcak was engaged in a fierce dispute 
with RS leader Dodik about reform packages proposed by the HR. The Council was 
split. From a regional stability perspective, it wanted to be able to sign an SAA with 
Bosnia (and Serbia).814 However, it did not want to make it appear as if the SAA was 
merely offered as a tranquilizer for Kosovo. To get the conditionality-minded 
member states on board, the Council at the very least needed police reforms. But 
seeing that the Council had been stressing ‘local ownership’ it could not allow 
these reforms to be imposed by employment of the Bonn powers. The reforms 
needed to come ‘from below’. These contrasting concerns we see mirrored in 
the Council’s isolated remark in November 2007: “that police reform remains the 
key priority and one of the four conditions for a Stabilization and Association 
809 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 17-5-2011, 23-6-2011. 
810 Coweb 10-5-2007. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Commissioner had send a letter 
to the new Prime Minister, Spiric, explicitly mentioning the conditionalities that had to be fulfilled. 
811 Coweb 19-7-2007. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since December 2005 the key 
political conditionalities had been: -1- development of the legislative framework and (more importantly) 
the administrative capacities, -2- (implementation of) police reforms, -3- ICTY cooperation, -4- adaptation 
and implementation of the necessary Public Broadcasting legislation. There were many others concerns 
for the Council and the Commission to express, in particular with regard to the development/reform of the 
judicial system and rule of law, but also for example on enduring segregation in the educational system. 
812 Author’s interviews, PSC and Working party level, 10-9-2010, 3-11-2010. Coweb 3-9-2007, 13-9-2007, 
27-9-2007. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
813 See for example 2824th External Relations Council meeting, 15/16-10-2007 and 2831st External Relations 
Council meeting, Brussels 19/20-11-2007. (Relations with the) Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
814 See Chapter 8, Section 2. This ‘regional stability’ was needed to be able to safely deal with Kosovo.
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Agreement.”815 In light of the political realities of the day (Kosovo), the Council was 
basically pleading for something resembling an agreement on police reform, so 
that the SAA could be signed. 
But again, these police reforms failed to get off the ground. In Brussels Council 
members were bickering about whether it was just Dodik who should be blamed for 
this, or also the Bosniak leader, Silajdzic.816 More importantly, drivers started 
wondering whether there might be a way around this lack of reforms? This debate 
gained momentum when the Commission announced its intention to initialize the 
SAA anyway. The signing was considered warranted because the Bosnian 
parliament had adopted an ‘action plan police reforms’.817 Brakemen were not 
happy with what can only be interpreted as a watering down of conditions. They 
had every intention of getting this unhappiness reflected in the December 2007 
Conclusions. The Council merely noted “renewed commitment to police reforms”, 
certainly not the implementation it had been asking for since December 2005.818 
The Council “noted the initializing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
as an important step.” It also “reaffirmed its readiness, as soon as the four conditions 
are met, including full cooperation with ICTY, to sign a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement.” The explicit mentioning of this one particular conditionality, makes it 
obvious which two member states needed to be appeased.819 But with that the 
discussion on police reforms was suddenly over. In the next couple of years, when 
the brakemen wanted to make waves, they would stress the lack of constitutional 
reforms. 
The first half of 2008 was, as we have seen, dedicated to guiding the region through 
Kosovo’s independence. It is thus understandable that the March Conclusions on 
Bosnia went by almost unnoticed, even though they were at least as pivotal as 
those that would follow in December 2009: “The Council welcomed the PIC 
Steering’ Board’s unanimous decision that the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR) will remain in place and continue to carry out its mandate under the Dayton/
815 2831st External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 19/20-11-2007. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
816 Coweb 12-11, 22-11, 25-11, 12-12-2007. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
817 Author’s interview, Commission (Bosnia Unit) level, 22-7-2010. Coweb 3-12-2007, Coreper 5-12, 7-12-2007. 
Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
818 2840th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 10-12-2007. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
819 The UK and the Netherlands were, as we have seen, also key players in the ICTY debate. The latter 
however wanted to keep a low profile in the Bosnia debate. It haphazardly mentioned the importance it 
attached to (specific) conditionalities, while the UK was on the brake about the integration as such. In the 
ICTY debate, one could argue it was the other way around. See Chapter 4, Section 1.
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Paris Peace Agreement until the necessary objectives and conditions as set out in 
the PIC Steering Board Declaration are met.”820 The Council had been anticipating 
on the envisaged closure (June 2008) of the OHR for years. But all of a sudden it 
chose to endorse the lengthening of the mandate for an undefined period of time. 
This seems to have been a panic reaction to RS threats to follow the Kosovar 
example and declare independence. ‘Local ownership’ would have to suffer for a 
while. The immediate goal was to avoid further fragmentation in the region. This is 
also why the Council dangled the SAA carrot once more. One should interpret the 
March statement as a trade-off between drivers and brakemen. Drivers were happy 
now that the signing of the SAA (as well as a dialogue on visa liberalisation) was 
near, while brakemen were comforted by the thought that a strong international 
presence would be maintained at least for the foreseeable future.821 
Drivers wasted no time in pushing for the SAA. The overzealous Slovenian 
Presidency and the Commission orchestrated the signing of the SAA, with the 
former putting the issue on the table for the April, May and then June meeting and 
the latter noting ‘some progress’ in the fulfilment of the four conditions. A bill on 
police reform was passed by the Bosnian parliament and Council and Commission 
suddenly seemed to realize that ‘administrative reform’ was less of a condition and 
more of an ‘ongoing process’.822 Not entirely in line with the renewed consensus on 
enlargement, the April and May Councils already looked ahead to the signing of the 
SAA.823 The signing in June 2008 was welcomed without the by now familiar 
comments on Bosnia’s poor reform record.824 For once, the drivers seemed to have 
acquired the decision as well as the language.
Yet, brakemen could draw comfort from the agreed language at European Council 
level. The June 2008 European Council welcomed the signing of the SAA. But also 
820 2859th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 10-3-2008. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
821 PSC 4-3-2008, Coreper 19-3-2008. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The progress with 
regard to the SAA negotiations is noted in the March Council Conclusions. Brakemen (United, Kingdom, 
Germany, Netherlands, Belgium) were fighting a lost battle when trying to maintain tough conditionality in 
the debate about signing the SAA.
822 Agence Europe, 12-4-2008: 4. Coweb 21-4-2008. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
823 2864th and 2865th General Affairs and External Relations Council meetings, Luxembourg 29-4-2008 and 
2870th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 26/27-5-2008. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The April Council did not mention a target date, but “expressed its willingness 
to sign the SAA. Technical preparations are underway” The May Council was “looking forward to the 
signing of the SAA at the June GAERC meeting”.
824 2879th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 16-6-2008. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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took over much of the language of the March Conclusions. They urged Bosnia to 
start “fulfilling the objectives and conditions for transition from the Office of the 
High Representative to the European Union Special Representative (EUSR)”.825 The 
motivation of the UK in particular, was clear. It wanted to upgrade its concerns 
regarding constitutional reforms, even though technically they were not part of the 
EU conditionalities.826 An indirect route towards achieving this had opened up when 
the March Council had made the closure of the OHR conditional to such reforms. 
How exactly the fulfilment of the (5+2) conditions, the OHR closure and the 
European trajectory were related, remained to be decided.827 But that they were 
related was now out into the open. It seemed that the only way forward was through 
fulfilment of the conditions set by the PIC. 
The next one and an half year of negotiations on Bosnia would be about gently 
nudging the Council towards explicitly stating ‘OHR closure’ as a condition for 
progress towards Europe. The fact that there was still no reform momentum in 
Bosnia did not help the drivers.828 Arguments that Bosnia could not be left behind 
did not apply anymore now that Bosnia had overtaken Serbia.829 Nevertheless, the 
Council, and the PSC in particular could begin to discuss the technical aspects of 
the future EU presence in Bosnia. Discussing the actual transfer did not make 
sense, seeing that the Commission’s 2008 Progress Report was again negative. 
There was no point even to argue in favour of a softening of the conditionalities. 
What a Bosnia in crisis needed was a message of encouragement. The November 
Council needed to hark back to the “milestone” of signing of the SAA to be able to 
do so. In these Conclusions: “The Council reiterated its support for the aim of 
transition from the Office of the High Representative to a stronger European Union 
presence.”830 Notice the subtle shift in language, exacted by the drivers. From 
825 European Council meeting, Brussels 19/20-6-2008. Presidency Conclusions. Western Balkans: 56.
826 Coweb 15-5-2008. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
827 ‘Declaration by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council’, Brussels 27-2-2008. The ‘5+2’ 
refers to five objectives and two conditions set by the PIC Steering Board: These were: -1- agreeing on 
the partition of Defence Properties, -2- agreeing on the partition of State Properties, -3- deciding on a 
definitive solution for the status of the Brcko district, -4- entrenchment of the rule of law, -5- agreement on 
the issue of fiscal sustainability and the sharing of fiscal revenues. The two conditions were -1- signing of 
the SAA and -2- a positive assessment of the situation in BiH by the PIC Steering Board. The last condition 
in particular provided the PIC with a lot of ‘discretion’ to come to an assessment. 
828 Coweb and Coweb capitals monitored developments and reforms in light of the upcoming Progress 
Report. Coweb 1-10, 9-10, 14-10, 22-10-2008. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
829 The Interim Agreement (IA) with Bosnia had entered into force on 1 July 2008, whereas the IA with Serbia 
remained frozen.
830 2903rd External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 10/11-11-2008. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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welcoming the continuation of the OHR, the Council was back to looking forward to 
his departure. But brakemen made sure that the Council “pointed out that the 
Peace Implementation Council had listed five objectives and two necessary 
conditions for closure”.831 
Debates in the year 2009 can be characterized as ‘keeping it technical’. While 
discussing the operational aspects of the EU’s reinforced presence in Bosnia, 
drivers would from time to time question the feasibility of the 5+2 conditions.832 
There seemed to be some light on the horizon in Bosnia, with the Prud process 
mentioned above.833 A transition might be within reach after all. But this meant that 
the EU had to be ready. The difficult dilemma the drivers found themselves in is 
reflected in the March 2009 Council Conclusions: “The Council reconfirmed its 
readiness for a transition from the Office of the High Representative to increased 
local ownership, supported by a reinforced European Union presence, as soon as 
the conditions are met.”834 It was now all of a sudden primarily a transfer to local 
ownership. This is obviously Swedish talk. Yet it was not a very wise move, as it 
would make brakemen increasingly nervous about the possibilities for overseeing 
and directing developments in Bosnia. And the more they had doubts about the 
robustness of the EU’s presence, the less they would be inclined to consider a 
transfer. There were some verbal side payments for the brakemen, for instance in 
the explicit mentioning of the 5+2 conditions and the call to refrain from “nationalist 
(meaning secessionist) rhetoric and unilateral action”. But when the June 2009 
Council explicitly “stressed that the transition could be within reach in the months 
ahead”, it was clear that the momentum was currently with the drivers.835 Certainly 
with an incoming Swedish Presidency that was set on making Bosnia a priority.
Yet, as we have seen in the game of signing an SAA with Serbia, in Caucus races 
neither side has a structural advantage. Again the brakemen found a way to restore 
the balance, at a time when drivers were on the wheel. The Swedish Presidency 
831 Drivers (Sweden) did not like this explicit reference, seeing that these were PIC instead EU criteria.
832 Coweb 18-12-2008, 8-1, 22-1, 26-2, 2-3, 5-3, 9-3, 10-3-2009, PSC, 18-2, 4-3-2009, Council 23-2, 
16-3-2009. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
833 It was only in June 2009 that HR Inzko declared the Prud process had effectively ended (in failure).
834 2933rd External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 16-3-2009. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
835 2951st External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 15/16-6-2009. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was something strange about these Conclusions. On 16 June the 
Council “urged the BiH authorities to achieve concrete results before the June PIC Steering Board 
meeting”. This meeting was to take place on 29 and 30 June. It is hard to imagine how many far-reaching 
reforms could be implemented in two weeks. It rather seems the UK, who had asked for Conclusions 
mentioning this next PIC meeting, was trying to increase the importance of the meeting as a focal point 
for addressing Bosnia’s (lack of) progress. 
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had to take into account four years of Council debates on ‘the link’ between OHR 
and SAA. More importantly, it had to remain consistent with its own approach of 
stressing local ownership. Sweden thus adopted the mantra of EU rapprochement 
through fulfilment of the conditionalities, or: “getting the country in shape so that it 
could apply for membership”.836 Constitutional reform, which Sweden and others 
kept insisted was not an EU conditionality, was nevertheless transformed from 
priority into necessity. Risking everything on a domestic breakthrough was daring 
to say the least. The 2009 Progress Report was again rather negative about 
developments in the country. But the Commission and most of the member states 
felt the OHR had to go anyway.837 In its enlargement package, the Commission 
confirmed the route chosen by the Presidency: an application for membership 
would need to be preceded by closure of the OHR and candidate status was only 
feasible if Bosnia had a constitution that would turn it into a fully functional and 
viable state. In October 2009 the Council was in fact back to where it had been in 
November 2005. It thus comes as no surprise that the ministers could do nothing 
more than “hold an exchange of views” on the talks taking place between the 
political leaders in Butmir.838 There was simply no point in engaging in an in-depth 
discussion.839 
The December 2009 Conclusions, which formed the starting point of this 
reconstruction of Council debates on Bosnia, were not even discussed by the 
ministers themselves. The Pyrrhic victory for the Swedish Presidency was in the 
Council “underlining that constitutional reform is not part of the conditions for 
closure of the OHR”.840 But in the next sentence the Council stressed the need for 
“constitutional changes”. Semantic fine-tuning had reached the level of incompre-
hensibility, even for insiders. Like Cato the Elder, some member states would 
‘furthermore stress that they thought the OHR should be closed’.841 But certainly 
after the Butmir negotiations broke down, it was hard to see the point. The UK was 
indeed the only member state set on keeping the OHR. But this isolation did not 
836 Author’s interview, Working party level, 3-11-2010. 
837 Coweb capitals 16-9-2009, Coweb 15-10, 19-10, 23-11, 25-11, 26-11-2009. Internal reports, Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Commission report confirmed that police reforms had still not gotten off 
the ground. 
838 2971st External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 27-10-2009. Western Balkans. More often than not 
an ‘exchange of views’ comes down to the Ministers politely listening to the briefing of the Presidency or 
representatives. If an in-depth debate has taken place, the Council will feel no inhibition to calling it that. 
839 Which is also the reason why Bosnia was not on the Agenda in November. The PIC Steering Board had 
again postponed a decision on the closure of the OHR to January 2010.
840 2984th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 7-12-2009. Enlargement/Stabilization and Association 
Process. Western Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina.
841 Coweb 18-1, 20-1, 25-1-2010. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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appear as damaging, precisely because there were few who could have honestly 
believed that the OHR closure would solve anything. 
Telling in this regard was “The Sarajevo Meeting” on 2 June 2010. The meeting was 
organized by the Spanish Presidency as a Salzburg-like encouragement to the 
region.842 But this time the message really was solely in the meeting. The EU simply 
had nothing to offer. Real debates about Bosnia would have to wait until after the 
October elections and after the forming of a government. The Bosnia dossier must 
have been one that rotating Presidencies were happy to pass on to the Cabinet of 
High Representative Ashton. It was now up to her to find ways: “to recreate momentum 
for change in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the elections in October, with a stronger 
EU presence to use the EU perspective for BiH as a driver for change”.843
 
To sum up: ‘The only game in town’
The ‘Bosnia game’ is without a doubt the most complex one. One could argue that 
this complexity sets it apart from the cases of Macedonia and Serbia. To some 
extent one could frame it as a debate between ‘experts’ instead of ‘stakeholders’. 
Whether these experts were engaged in a competitive debate is however an entirely 
different matter. Insiders note very little progress or development in Bosnia 
debates.844 As the proverbial group of doctors coming together to decide how to 
tend to a patient, the Council never seemed to get any closer to agreeing on a 
treatment. Member states rather stuck with their preferred medicine. To be fair, 
discussions about the potential consequences of future choices – whether it is best 
to keep the OHR or proceed with the transfer – are not an exact science. There is 
little point in calling one perspective ‘right’ and the other one ‘wrong’. Member 
states moreover largely agreed on the general policy line towards Bosnia. However, 
continuously unaddressed were the matters of conditions and timing. Drivers were 
unable to convince the brakeman, that the (5+2) conditions cannot be met. The UK 
was unable to convince the others that Bosnia was too unstable to even consider a 
transfer. The result was the December 2009 entrapment. 
The current stalemate on Bosnia can be explained by the state of affairs in the country. 
But the state of affairs cannot explain the progress in the first half of 2008. There was 
no reform momentum then and nevertheless Bosnia moved closer to the EU, by signing 
an SAA. The current stalemate cannot be blamed solely on the United Kingdom’s 
refusal to agree to the closure of the OHR. Its isolation is real but simply not that 
842 The meeting took place on 2 June 2010. The June Council would adopt Conclusions on the basis of this 
meeting, but these Conclusions could only mention Bosnia’s progress with regard to visa liberalization. 
843 3029th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 26-7-2010. Western Balkans. 
844 Author’s interviews, PSC and Working party level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010, 10-9-2010, 3-11-2010.
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important. This explains why it was never addressed at the plenary meetings of the 
ministers. Process level observations fill the void. If drivers wanted to enthuse brakemen 
for engaging themselves with Bosnia, they could not suggest doing away with some of 
the conditions. They could only try to encourage movement on the trajectory that 
brakemen had helped to lay out.845 This has led to the paradoxical situation wherein 
twenty-six member states acknowledged that Bosnia needed a more ‘top down 
politicized’ approach, while the Council as a whole got caught up in a ‘bottom-up 
conditionality’ approach.846 The point is that this bottom-up approach had become the 
only game in town. And in view of its mediocre reform record, it appears that for the 
foreseeable future the only possible way forward lies in ‘dragging along’ Bosnia.
9.2. Macedonia: ‘Good Neighbourly Relations’
An ‘absence of urgency’ seems to characterize Council debates on Macedonia. 
The Council is certainly not dragging along Macedonia in the same way as it does 
Bosnia. Nor does it appear to be pushing for progress as with Serbia. For some 
reason it seems to be hard to keep Macedonia on the agenda. And when there was 
reason to put it on the table, most prominently when the Commission recommended 
the opening of accession negotiation in October 2009, the Council’s verbal reaction 
is almost as telling as its actual decision: “The Council notes that the Commission 
recommends the opening of accession negotiations with the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and will return to the matter during the next Presidency.”847 
The reason the Council did not act was relatively straightforward: “Not all member 
states were ready for it, and the mood in the Council was such that they preferred 
to show solidarity with the member state(s) in question”.848 This observation, while 
to the point, can only serve as a starting point of an exploration of the causes 
behind Macedonia’s deadlocked integration process. Why were member states 
inclined to show solidarity? How does one create (and maintain) such a mood in the 
Council? And when does the Council feel more or less ‘urge’ to deal with a dossier?
845 This made it impossible to agree on some sort of ‘tailor-made conditionality’ for Bosnia, as it was 
mentioned during a number of Coweb meetings in 2009.
846 Author’s interviews, Working party and Bosnia level, 28-9-2010, 6-7-2011. Although not all twenty six 
would of course necessarily participate in such debates, or even state their opinion on the matter. 
847 2984th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 7-12-2009. Enlargement/Stabilization and Association 
Process. Western Balkans. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: 32.
848 Author’s interview, Working party level, 3-11-2010.
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Amongst the explanations insiders provide for the Council not dealing with the 
matter of Macedonia, the perhaps most obvious one does not feature very 
prominently.849 It is not simply or solely a question of the constitutional name, ‘The 
Republic of Macedonia’, which Greece refuses to accept. The name-dispute is a 
UN matter. Negotiations towards a solution take place under auspices of the United 
Nations. The Council merely offers verbal encouragement and symbolic support. 
Nor does the labelling matter that much. It is true that some consider the Greece-
Macedonian dispute ‘a bilateral issue’, while Greece argues that it is really about 
‘good neighbourly relations (GNR)’.850 But not even the Greeks themselves deny 
that this is just about framing. How then to explain the differences in momentum 
between the Bosnian, the Macedonian, and the Serbian integration process? Why 
did Macedonia fail to get the kind of ‘special attention’ awarded to Bosnia? And why 
does the Greek isolation on Macedonia appear to be much more ‘comfortable’ than 
the Dutch one on Serbia? 
Greece: ‘A position of necessity instead of luxury’
Greece is not one of the bigger member states and it is too much of a stakeholder 
to be able credibly to opt for an ‘expert role’ on Macedonia. This might explain why 
its isolation on Macedonia appears a little less ‘comfortable’ than the UK’s isolation 
on Bosnia. Greece was at least confronted on the matter at the ministerial level, 
particularly in December 2009. However, as we will see in the next section, Greece 
was never as openly attacked as the Netherlands were on Serbia. Some might even 
say Greece was never really ‘alone’ on the matter. “It is a gross misunderstanding 
to state that Greece is isolated on Macedonia. There are always seven or eight 
member states expressing their solidarity with Greece. They do not have to agree 
with Greece’s position, but they are unwilling to put pressure on Greece.”851
Greece has no trouble explaining why it was able to gain more solidarity than the 
Netherlands. The Greek position is one of necessity, as it concerns vital national 
interests, whereas the Dutch position is one of luxury, not touching upon any direct 
interests.852 There is some truth to this claim. Engaging in membership negotiations 
with Serbia would not lead to big demonstrations in the streets of The Hague, 
849 Author’s interviews, Coreper, Working party, Commission (Macedonia Unit), domestic and Macedonia 
level, 8-7-2010, 16-7-2010, 27-7-2010, 4-8-2010, 12-1-2011, 26-1-2011, 7-7-2011.
850 The latter could be argued, is part of the Copenhagen conditionalities. Slovenia, in light of its own bilateral 
dispute with Croatia, had the tendency to challenge this Greek interpretation, arguing that both conflicts 
are essentially of the same nature. Author’s interview, Working party level, 15-6-2010.
851 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Director) level, 1-7-2010.
852 Author’s interview, PSC and Working party level, 8-7-2010.
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whereas a Greek government has fallen over its stance towards Macedonia.853 But 
this was in 1993 and the domestic constraints Greek politicians face over Macedonia 
have considerably lessened of late.854 One could also imagine that in light of the 
Euro/debt crisis the Greeks have plenty of other things to worry about. It rather 
seems that the reasoning in Brussels is the exact opposite: “now is not the time to 
pressure Greece on anything else”.855 The reason why Greek isolation on Macedonia 
appears to be bearable is that others have no interest in engaging in a showdown.856 
Greece does not even need to convince others of the sincerity of its concerns, or 
the reasonableness with which it tries to address them. It only needs to appear 
credible in its commitment to the matter. Such credible commitment suffices to get 
others to back down on the matter. While this reasoning can explain the larger part 
of the current Macedonia game, it does not account for the proceedings in the 
second half of 2009. Because then Greece was openly challenged.
Macedonia: ‘Macedonia has not been helping itself’
Insiders often refer to different things, when they state that the Macedonia has not 
always been helping itself.857 Sometimes they refer to its mediocre reform record, 
sometimes to the nationalist rhetoric and irredentist claims of its politicians (and 
Prime Minister Gruevski in particular), sometimes to an inability to organize proper 
elections, and sometimes merely to the tendency to continue naming airports and 
motorways after Alexander the Great. However, a lot of political rhetoric and a poor 
reform record we also saw in the case of Bosnia. But these overlapping character-
istics do not suffice to explain the stalling European integration of both.
There were certainly similarities between Bosnia and Macedonia in the years 
2006-2008. While it would go too far to refer to them as crisis years, as they were 
for Bosnia, these were lost years with regard to Macedonia’s European integration. 
Due to successive elections and government changes the reform process lost 
853 This was the government of Prime Minister, Mitsotakis, who in tandem with this Foreign Minister, Papa-
constantinou had shown a willingness to discuss a ‘compound name’ (which means including the word 
Macedonia). In September 1993 this led to the downfall of his government and soon after to Greece 
imposing a complete trade embargo on Macedonia. See also Axt, Milososki & Schwarz (2006: 15-16)
854 For example, at ‘Macedonia is Greek’ demonstrations in Thessaloniki in 2005 only 2000 people showed 
up. Similar protest-rallies in 1992 and 1993 attracted more than a million protesters. See Axt, Milososki & 
Schwarz (2006: 28).
855 Author’s interview, Macedonia level, 7-7-2011.
856 Author’s interview, Working party level, 10-2-2011.
857 Author’s interviews, Working party and Commission (Director and Macedonia Unit) level, 8-7-2010, 
22-7-2010, 27-7-2010, 12-1-2011. 
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most of its momentum.858 As was the case with the UK on the OHR conditionality, 
the Greeks did not even have to work that hard to justify their isolated stance. 
Explicit mentioning of the ‘GNR conditionality’ was not that important.859 In spite of 
being a candidate country Macedonia was not part of the enlargement discussions 
in Brussels. The December 2006 Council Conclusions were merely about stressing 
reforms, urging for more reforms and encouraging political cooperation that would 
enable further reforms.860 In the whole of 2007, Council Conclusions mentioned 
Macedonia only once.
These December 2007 Conclusions were largely a copy-paste exercise from a year 
before. There was only one notable difference. “The Council noted that there has 
still been no solution to the name issue.” Then followed a remark that could serve 
as the hallmark of all agreed language: “It called on the Government to make 
renewed efforts, with a constructive approach, to find a negotiated and mutually 
acceptable solution on the name issue with Greece, under auspices of the UN, 
thereby contributing to regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations.”861 
During the year the Greeks had become more eager in stressing the issue, even 
though there was still no immediate need.862 The Commission had made it clear, 
already in the beginning of the year, that there would be no recommendation to 
open membership negotiations. And when the Council agreed to extend the 
mandate of the EUSR in Macedonia, a move which according to many did not really 
‘befit’ a candidate country, further steps were certainly off the agenda.863 
858 Building governments in Macedonia was complicated by the fact that, as part of the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement, the winning Macedonian party was expected to build a coalition with one of the two Albanian 
parties. A significant amount of the domestic problems stemmed from the two Albanian parties (DUI and 
DPA) frustrating each others’ moves, thereby complicating political life between any government and the 
opposition. After the 2006 elections this even led to a parliamentary boycott. Coweb 23-10-2006. Internal 
report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (cf. Šedo, 2010). 
859 2744th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 17-7-2006. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Council merely refers back to European Council 
Conclusions of December 2005. See Chapter 7, Section 2.
860 2771st External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 11/12-12-2006. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
861 2840th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 10-12-2007. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
862 Negotiations regarding the name dispute were to be intensified in the next couple of months, which might 
explain Greek insistence on mentioning the subject (for example when discussing the accession 
partnership with Macedonia) and more importantly getting the Council to mention the subject. Coweb 
29-11, 17-12-2007, Coreper 5-12, 7-12-2007. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
863 See again Chapter 7, Section 2, where I argue how the continued presence of an EUSR, in an indirect 
way, interferes with the SAP process. 
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The year 2008 brought some progress on the issue of visa liberalization, where 
Macedonia turned out to be the best pupil of the class, but not on the political level. 
In a restricted lunch meeting in March, Ministers were of the opinion that the 
Macedonian authorities should seriously consider recent proposals on a new 
name. But there was again no need publicly to stress this point, as these authorities 
seemed to have more than enough on their mind. Behind the scenes, the Slovenian 
Presidency had been very active, trying to arrange a date for the start of the 
accession negotiations.864 But even they could not ignore the “terrible elections” of 
June 2008.865 The Council “condemned the violent incidents and regretted other 
serious shortcomings”.866 At some places the elections needed to be rerun. The 
only positive thing the Slovene Presidency could get the Council to welcome was: 
“the commitment of the authorities to address the issues”. Greece found easy 
support with the Commission and the conditionality minded member states, when 
arguing that for the time being there was no point in discussing further steps 
towards Europe.867 Yet, there was something strange about this episode. The violent 
incidents had only occurred in the Albanian electoral districts. Drivers were not sure 
whether it would be fair (also) to punish the Macedonian majority for this. But the 
brakemen, stressing the overall responsibility for holding proper elections, had the 
upper hand. 
The name dispute itself had again gained centre stage after Greece managed to 
withstand significant pressure from the United States at the NATO Summit in 
Bucharest in April 2008, and blocked Macedonia’s bid for membership.868 Greece 
did itself a huge favour in terms of credibility. It was an important signal to EU 
member states that there was simply no point in getting into a fight about the matter. 
The European Council Conclusions of June 2008 read as an resignation to this fact: 
“Maintaining good neighbourly relations, including a negotiated and mutually 
acceptable solution on the name issue, remains essential.”869 This must have been 
a bitter pill to swallow for the Slovenian Presidency set on making progress on 
864 Brakemen successfully argued to postpone such a decision until after the next Progress Report came out. 
865 Author’s interview, Commission (Macedonia Unit) level, 8-7-2010.
866 2879th External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg 16-6-2008. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
867 Coweb 2-6, 4-6, 9-6, 12-6-2008, Coreper 6-6-2008, Council 16-6-2008. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
868 To be precise, The NATO issued a non-invitation to Macedonia because of the inability to find a solution 
in the name dispute. The US had proposed to invite the country under its provisional (FYROM) name.
869 European Council meeting, Brussels 19/20-6-2008. Presidency Conclusions. 
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Macedonia. The European Council upgraded GNR into a de facto condition.870 
Macedonia appeared to be back at square one. Contrary to Croatia or even Bosnia, 
Macedonia may have had some sympathisers but few friends in Brussels, ready to 
provide the necessary push.871 Partly because of its uncompromising stances, it 
came to be seen as something of a nuisance in the corridors of the Justus Lipsius. 
A politicized process thus offered little prospect for Macedonia. Momentum could 
only be created by opting for a ‘low-key technical’ approach, such as the 
Commission’s.
Council negotiations on Macedonia: ‘Don’t call us, we will call you’
In the second half of 2008 there appeared to be very little light at the end of 
Macedonia’s enlargement tunnel. Then, one of those typical small argumentative 
battles commenced. The matter for the debate was too inconsequential ever to 
reach the ministerial level. But, as I will argue, the debate was as the butterfly wings, 
although it was unclear at the time whether these would indeed create a hurricane. 
This was the debate about the second stage of the SAA. In the whole pre-accession 
trajectory the decision to allow a country to enter into the second stage of the SAA, 
has perhaps become the most mystical step of all. Enlargement-weary France had 
put great emphasis on the two-phased structure of the SAA in 2005. It thus came 
as no surprise that the matter came to the fore during their 2008 Presidency. The 
Commission acknowledged the two-phased structure in itself. It had been part of 
the Europe Agreements signed with the candidate countries in the previous 
enlargement round. But the transition as such did not lead to any big changes and 
thus the second stage would naturally follow from the first.872 Yet the official decision 
was to be taken by the Council. It thus constituted a focal point for a debate: a 
debate in which Greece would again be in the dock. However, in September 2008 
there were still a number of others who considered it too soon for this next step. The 
political turmoil was the main cause for concern, as well as Macedonia’s conduct 
vis-à-vis its neighbours.873 
The Commission’s 2008 Progress Report was again rather negative. After signing 
an accession partnership with the country in January 2008, the Commission had 
870 See Chapter 7, Section 2. In the December 2005 Conclusions, the European Council had referred to the 
matter only very indirectly. Explicitly mentioning the issue did not make solving the name dispute an EU 
condition in the legal sense. But seeing that the European Council serves as the main provider of agreed 
language, I would argue there was no way around solving the name dispute anymore after June 2008. 
871 Author’s interview, Macedonia level, 7-7-2011. Perhaps Slovenia can be considered the exception.
872 Coweb 2-9, 4-9, 8-9-2008, Coweb capitals 24-9-2008. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
873 Bulgaria joined the fray, when it started questioning Macedonia’s conduct towards (its) minorities.
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set eight benchmarks for the opening of accession negotiations.874 The key concern 
can best be captured under the heading of ‘political maturity’, on which the March 
2009 Presidential elections were considered to be the great test case.875 
Commissioner Rehn put his prioritizing prerogatives to good use. The benchmark 
approach helped a lot in structuring the (Council’s) debate. If Macedonia started 
fulfilling the eight priorities set out in the accession partnership, there would be 
ample reason to put the opening of accession negotiations back on the table. In the 
meantime the Commission could let the Council bicker about the number and the 
tone of remarks on good neighbourly relations.876 As the significance of such 
references slowly decreased, Greece needed to work harder to get them accepted 
by the others. The agreed language was not that ‘agreed’ anymore. The mood in 
the Council started to shift, when member states felt they were dragged into 
symbolic battles on words. Slowly GNR statements became more detached from 
remarks about the pre-accession trajectory. In December 2008 there was a rather 
isolated remark that: “Actions and statements which could negatively impact on 
874 The priorities listed in the accession partnership would become the key benchmarks. The benchmark 
approach, agreed to as part of the renewed consensus on enlargement, would thus also be applied in 
the pre-accession process. Author’s interview, Commission (Macedonia Unit) level, 8-7-2010.
875 These are explicitly addressed in the Conclusions of the 2915th External Relations Council meeting, 
Brussels 8/9-12-2008. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
876 Coweb 27-11, 1-12-2008, Coreper 3-12-2008. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
When Who What
10-12-2007 Council Notes “that there has still been no solution to the name 
issue.”
19-6-2008 European 
Council
“Maintaining good neighbourly relations, including a 
negotiated and mutually acceptable solution on the name 
issue, remains essential.”
8-12-2008 Council “Actions and statements which could negatively impact on 
good neighbourly relations should be avoided.”
14-10-2009 Commission Recommends the opening of accession negotiations.
7-12-2009 Council “Notes that the Commission recommends the opening of 
accession negotiations…and will return to the matter during 
the next Presidency.”
14-6-2010 Council “Ministers also raised the subject of the situation in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”
Table 9.3   Key moments in the debate on good neighbourly relations (Macedonia)
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good neighbourly relations should be avoided.”877 But then followed separate 
remarks about Macedonia’s progress towards Europe depending on fulfilling the 
December 2005 conditions, the Copenhagen political criteria and the aforementioned 
eight priorities. Again the Commission’s conditionality approach appears to have 
become the only game in town. Contrary to the Bosnian case, Macedonia was 
eager to profit from this.
Progress however remained slow. The debate about the second stage of the SAA 
was again postponed from February to April 2009.878 Council and Commission 
decided to wait until after the Presidential elections. These were indeed the ‘free 
and fair elections’ the December 2008 Council had asked for.879 But they did not 
immediately ignite further discussions on Macedonia’s European trajectory. Yet, in 
the catacombs of the Justus Lipsius balances started to shift. All were aware that 
Greece was now (openly) blocking further discussions on the second stage of the 
SAA. Commission officials, looking for other ways to make progress, started to 
mention the ‘very real possibility’ that Rehn would suggest the opening of accession 
negotiations in October 2009. Macedonia was making progress in fulfilling the 
benchmarks. More importantly, Macedonia was again a real issue for debate, 
whether it concerned the extension of the mandate of the EUSR, the Council’s 
Common Position for the annual SA Council meeting, or the second stage of the 
SAA. And every time the Greeks needed to make their reservations public.880 Opting 
for a low key approach was no longer feasible. It was the prospect of the Commission 
recommendation that made the Greeks so eager to stress their concerns with 
regard to their neighbour to the north. While Greece usually managed to get its 
preferred wording adopted into the texts, it was wearing out its credibility. It might 
still be winning battles, but at the same time appeared to be losing the war.
In the second half of 2009 the stage was finally set for making a push for Macedonia. 
The Commission had been able to motivate Macedonia to engage in the necessary 
reforms, in spite of what was happening in Brussels.881 The resigning Commissioner 
877 2915th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 8/9-12-2008. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
878 Coweb 26-2, 4-3-2009. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
879 An actual political dialogue between government and opposition remained problematic however.
880 Greece was not isolated on all files. For instance, there were others, not to mention Solana’s Policy Unit, 
who wanted to extend the EUSR’s mandate. But Greece was alone in its reservations on all of the current 
files. Coweb 8-6, 11-6, 26-6, 2-7, 6-7, 9-7-2009. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
881 Author’s interview, Commission (Macedonia Unit) level, 26-1-2011.
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Rehn had been referring favourably to Macedonia and the opening of negotiations.882 
This was his only potential deliverable on Macedonia, seeing that a decision on the 
second stage of the SAA was still blocked. The Swedish Presidency had made it 
clear that it wanted the Commission to fulfil its role and not to be bothered by any 
political concerns member states might have.883 Macedonia might not have 
completely fulfilled all the benchmarks, but in terms of reforms it was far ahead of 
the rest of the region. At the same time a potentially more significant change took 
place in Greece. Here, the October 2009 elections brought the PASOK government 
of George Papandreou to power.884 Right away, this new government was presented 
with the fait accompli of the Commission’s recommendation.885 It was part of the 
2009 Progress Report, in which Macedonia was back to being ‘an example for the 
region’.886 The recommendation was framed as an incentive for Macedonia to find 
a quick solution for the name issue. This framing fooled no one. Nearly all member 
states favoured the opening of accession negotiations already in December. 
Greece was supported only by Cyprus in its reservations. 
And then, as we have seen so often in the Caucus race, (other) participants started 
to run in the opposite direction. Difficult to understand, even for the Greeks 
themselves, was the ‘increased understanding’ they received after the Commission 
recommendation was out.887 The Greek negotiators basically had to fall back to 
asking for some more time (for the new government) to come to terms with the 
situation and find a solution. Finally drivers had been able to shift the Macedonia 
debate to Council level.888 But the ensuing ministerial debate was a certainly no 
hurricane. Rather, it was a storm in a teacup. What was strange about this debate 
were not Greece’s reservations on setting a date, nor its request for solidarity. 
Remarkable was the amount of solidarity it actually received. Those showing 
solidarity (France, Spain, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal, Bulgaria) were referring to the 
‘renewed momentum’ in the UN-negotiations on the name. This was a strange line 
of arguing. If there was indeed momentum, what better way to reward it than with 
the prospect of EU integration? If anything the Council was sending a message of 
882 For example in his briefing to the European Parliament in September 2009. Internal report, Dutch Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. 
883 Author’s interview, Working party level, 3-11-2010.
884 Author’s interview, Working party level, 23-6-2011. 
885 Coweb 15-10, 9-11-2009. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
886 The same example it had been during the first round of the Macedonia game. See Chapter 6, Section 2.
887 Author’s interview, Working party level, 27-7-2010.
888 Coweb 30-11, 1-12-2009, Coreper 4-12, 7-12-2009. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
Coreper debate was more about practical reservations, such as Germany having to consult the 
Bundestag before being able to agree on a date for the opening of negotiations. 
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discouragement. Macedonia had (finally) played by the rules and fulfilled the 
benchmarks. And the Council could only reply by stating that it would “return to the 
matter during the next Presidency”.889 A suggestion by the Swedish Presidency to 
at least mention a date (March 2010) for reverting to the matter, was already 
considered a bridge too far.890 Even more difficult to understand is the run-up to this 
non-decision. If, as it turned out, member states had such strong reservations, why 
had they not shared them with their colleagues and with the Commission? Had they 
done so, Commission and Presidency would most probably not have taken the 
gamble. A more likely explanation is that shows of solidarity only occurred after the 
matter was put on the table. Some in the Council apparently got cold feet. In this we 
see the sequential logic of the Caucus race. First drivers, notably the Commission, 
fought hard (while brakemen showed acquiescence) to get the issue on the table. 
But then brakemen fought hard (and drivers backed down) to avoid an actual 
decision. 
The Greeks were not too worried about “the next Presidency” and its obligation to 
“return to the matter”.891 Greece did not even have that much in common with Spain, 
with the notable exception of the non-recognition of Kosovo. But the Balkans were 
not a big priority for the Spanish. Without much ado, the mandate of the EUSR was 
extended for yet another half year.892 The Council fell back into the familiar routine 
of monitoring developments, with Greece again taking the lead in stressing its 
concerns over internal tensions and lacking reforms. The matter of the second 
stage of the SAA was incidentally touched upon but never really tackled.893 Only in 
the beginning of June member states appeared to have realized that they needed 
to come back on the opening of accession negotiations.894 Although it considered 
it all a bit hasty, Greece showed a willingness to ‘discuss’ the matter. This is what is 
reflected in the June Council Conclusions: “Ministers also raised the subject of the 
situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”895 In reality the matter was 
not discussed. Again, presumed momentum in the UN negotiations about the 
name was presented as the reason.“High Representative Ashton and her Cabinet 
889 2984th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 7-12-2009. Enlargement/Stabilization and Association 
Process. Western Balkans. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: 32.
890 This suggestion, presented in a Room Document during the Council meeting was discarded over diner. 
891 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 17-5-2011, 23-6-2011.
892 Coweb 15-2-2010. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
893 It was still unclear whether the Commission could autonomously decide on the transition from the first to 
the second stage. The Commission seemed to opt for achieving consensus in the Council first. In June 
it presented a proposal for a decision to the Council.
894 Coweb 14-4, 17-5, 7-6, 10-6-2010, Coreper 10-6-2010. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
895 3023rd Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg 14-6-2010. Main results of the Council. 
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had decided that the EU should not jeopardize this opportunity by having an open, 
potentially confrontational, debate in the Foreign Affairs Council.”896 
To sum up: ‘time is on my side’
How to characterize the dynamics in the third round of the Macedonia game? It is 
clear that Macedonia would no longer benefit from a politicized process. There is 
no crisis anymore. Macedonia is a safe and more or less stable country. Something 
which, as we have seen, does not necessarily have to be an advantage when a 
country aims to make progress towards Europe.897 But that does not mean that a 
technical ‘Commission-driven’ process is a guarantee for success. The state of 
affairs in the country can account for much of the stalemate during the years 
2006-2008. And Macedonia did not all of a sudden become ‘a straight-A student’ 
in 2009. Macedonian politicians were still not doing themselves a favour with their 
provocative behaviour (for instance by claiming the supposedly Greek historical 
heritage of Alexander) and their uncompromising stances (mainly with regard to the 
name issue). But on the other hand few would deny that the bar for entering 
accession negotiations had been significantly raised over the years. Macedonia’s 
reform record does not sufficiently explain the developments in the second half of 
2009. According to the ‘benchmark approach’ agreed to in December 2006, the 
Council would have been more or less compelled to follow the Commission’s 
recommendation to open accession negotiations. After all, the Council admitted 
that the country had “substantially addressed the key priorities of the accession 
partnership”.898 That they did not follow the recommendation, might be the ultimate 
proof that reforms are a necessary but not sufficient part of any explanation of a 
successful integration into the EU.
Greek perseverance can account for the decision itself, but not for the decision 
making dynamics. A Greek veto was anticipated by the Commission, the Swedish 
Presidency as well as most of the other member states. As I have explained, Greek 
concerns towards Macedonia might be considered as something of a necessity. 
This explains why ministers might be inclined to show some understanding to the 
political difficulties of their Greek colleague. But according to this logic, the positive 
developments in the relations between Greece and Macedonia in the second half 
of 2009 and the first half of 2010 should have led to a more constructive approach. 
If a breakthrough really was on the horizon, an uncompromising stance on the 
896 Author’s interview, Working party level, 13-1-2011.
897 Author’s interview, Commission (Director) level, 22-7-2010. 
898 2984th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 7-12-2009. Enlargement/Stabilization and Association 
Process. Western Balkans. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: 31. The benchmark approach was 
the central part of the ‘renewed consensus on enlargement. See Chapter 8, Section 1.
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opening of accession negotiations, the second stage of the SAA and the mandate 
of the EUSR, does not make sense.899 These were not the acts of a minister faced 
with domestic constraints. Rather it seems that Greece saw a window of opportunity, 
it could try to use with regard to the UN process. In this regard, Greece received 
solidarity at the right time at the right place (the December 2009 Council). It was not 
as if ministers were all of a sudden convinced that Greece had a point. Nor could 
they have honestly believed that blocking EU integration would help solve the 
name-dispute, unless they were trying to enforce a solution. It seems that they 
simply preferred to show their solidarity with those at the table rather than those in 
the waiting room. The reason ministers did not show this open solidarity before, I 
believe, is rather straightforward: There was simply no need for it.
The Caucus race characteristics are obvious, with brakemen allowing drivers the 
opportunity to make waves when decision making is in the doldrums, and drivers 
providing brakemen with an emergency brake in case of rapids. As long as Macedonia 
was stuck, drivers had the upper hand in urging for some movement. When Macedonia 
was set on moving, brakemen had the upper hand in asking for time. It proves once 
again that the Council is a master in playing with time.900 And time appears to have 
been the most abundant resource in the debate on opening accession negotiations 
with Macedonia. ‘Convincing’ arguments and ‘real’ domestic constraints mattered 
less than habitualized negotiating norms and procedural routines. And one of the 
important norms is being aware of – and not crossing - the pain barrier of others. It is 
this live and let live attitude which ensured that a balance was kept.
9.3. Serbia: [Between brackets]
The third, but by no means final, round of the Serbia game rounds up the empirical 
part of this study. Rather than providing another chronological reconstruction of all 
relevant moves, this section tries to draw connections. Connections on the one 
hand to the standard operating procedures the Council developed in the run up to 
the signing of the SAA in April 2008.901 But it also aims to complete the comparison 
with the two previous sections. Again we see a member state in an isolated position, 
but this time the result was not protracted stalemate but incremental (‘step by step’) 
progress. The progress as such was perhaps to be expected, but the way in which 
899 Although one could argue that Greece showed a constructive attitude, when it ‘allowed’ Macedonia visa-
liberalization. But here the criteria were even more clear-cut and Macedonia was without a doubt the best 
pupil in the class (cf. Trauner 2009a: 785). Thus blocking the visa-dialogue would have been difficult.
900 Author’s interview, Serbia level, 7-7-2011. See also Avery (2009). 
901 See Chapter 8, Section 2.
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it came about, is telling with regard to the code of conduct that guides Council 
negotiations. More specifically, this refers to the perhaps most powerful norm: ‘to 
come up with solutions and keep the process going’. In the first chapter I have 
explained why we need not and should not equate a culture of consensus with an 
inclination to act consensually all of the time. Instead, it is about knowing which 
battles (not) to pick. To be taken seriously by others, it is usually a good idea clearly 
to delineate go and no go area, as long as one allows others the opportunity to look 
for ways around that roadblock.902 
Council debates are battles for words and phrases, and more specifically the words 
that adequately capture the current mood in the room. If Council negotiators are 
unable to agree on a compromise text on their level, they leave the disputed parts 
between brackets and send the text up to a higher level. These brackets would 
come to play a central role in the debate on Serbia. There were not a lot of real 
negotiations anymore, seeing that arguments and positions were well known and 
not likely to change. The game was basically about finding ways to argue around 
the ‘full cooperation with the ICTY’ roadblock. Contrary to the Bosnian and the 
Macedonian case, this was a matter which ministers would regularly concern 
themselves with. This increased exposure at the ministerial level can of course be 
an important contributing factor in explaining the different outcome. But whether it 
is also sufficient to explain the progress that Serbia was eventually able to make, 
remains to be seen.
The Netherlands: ‘Striking the right chord’
Isolation does not necessarily have to be a bad thing, but the Dutch isolation on 
Serbia was.903 This appears to be the general opinion amongst Council negotiators. 
Insiders provide various reasons for this. Some say it is mostly a matter of ‘striking 
the right chord’. “The Netherlands were too pronounced on the issue, which led to 
a situation in which others member states, who to some level agreed with our 
position, started to hide behind us”.904 It was not as if there was no sympathy at all 
for the Dutch position. Other member states were inclined to show some 
understanding, in light of the highly critical public opinion and the parliamentary 
scrutiny on the ICTY-issue. There was no need to mention Srebrenica. For the 
Dutch it was more about opting for the moral high ground on issues concerning 
‘international justice’, of which they believe The Hague is the world’s capital. But the 
thing about the moral high ground is that it is difficult to climb down from. One can 
902 Author’s interview, PSC level, 10-9-2010.
903 Author’s interviews, Council, Coreper, Working party level, 27-5-2010, 7-7-2010, 28-6-2012.
904 Author’s interview, Ben Bot, Coreper Ambassador (1992-2002) and Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(2004-2007) 6-12-2010.
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bargain over interests, or argue over opinions, but it is hard to be pragmatic about 
principles. The Dutch certainly did not want to be dragged into debates about the 
number of indictees to be exchanged for the opening of accession negotiations. 
The Greek and Dutch isolation were similar (and different from the UK’s) in that both 
considered it to be a burden instead of a deliberate choice. The problem for both 
was that they lacked an exit strategy. However, the Dutch seemed to have had even 
less room to manoeuvre than the Greeks. The Dutch position was inextricably 
linked to these two words (‘full cooperation’), which meant that trade-offs were 
impossible. In a race in which all must have prizes, the Dutch entrapped themselves 
by naming their prize.905 A way out could only be found at the ministerial level. It was 
obvious that this could not be done by arguing that the ICTY insistence was no 
longer correct. Nor did pointing out the economic and geo-political importance of 
Serbia help to soften up the Dutch.906 Again, salami tactics offered the most 
promising prospects.
Serbia: ‘a successfully socialized Serbia?’
We left Serbia when, in April 2008, it emerged from the ‘turmoil’ caused by Kosovo’s 
independence and a succession of elections, with a pro-European President and 
government in charge.907 The new government of Prime Minister Cvetkovic made it 
clear that European integration was a core interest. He was willing to sign an SAA 
that did not apply to Kosovo, something which his predecessor Kostunica had 
never been willing to do.908 Recognizing Kosovo was however still out of the 
question. But this was no reason not to strive for achieving candidate status by the 
beginning of 2009. 
Drivers wanted to welcome this new government but the French Presidency saw no 
immediate need for a Council debate on Serbia. This need quickly came when, on 
21 July 2008, Radovan Karadzic was arrested by the Serb authorities. If ever there 
was a moment to be positive about Serbian efforts, this appeared to be it. Drivers 
and brakemen had never defined full cooperation in terms of a result: ‘the arrest of 
the remaining fugitives’. But the latter had always stated that it would constitute: 
905 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 7-7-2010.
906 Although one cannot deny that from an economic and geo-political perspective, Serbia is a more 
important country than tiny Macedonia or Bosnia, in particular in light of the former’s (albeit overrated) ties 
to an increasingly assertive Russia. Author’s interview, Council level, 28-6-2012.
907 See Chapter 8, Section 2.
908 Author’s interview, Commission (Serbia Unit) level, 4-6-2010. EU Observer, 8-7-2008: ‘Pro-EU government 
approved in Serbia’. Kostunica had always felt it would come down to a de facto recognition of the 
independence of Kosovo.
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“the best possible proof that there is full cooperation”.909 To brakemen the arrest 
would have provided the ideal face-saving exit from the ICTY-web, they had helped 
to weave. But then procedures interfered. The arrest happened the day before the 
July Council. So it was impossible to discuss the issue via the usual channels. The 
French Presidency wanted to avoid a messy debate at the ministerial level.910 They 
knew the Council had to take note of the arrest, but wanted to avoid hassling over 
the potential consequences. At the meeting, drivers (Slovenia, Italy, Greece) 
suggested unfreezing the Interim Agreement (IA). Brakemen stated that they would 
rather mandate Coreper to assess the new situation and see what to conclude from 
it. In the July Conclusions “the Council welcomes the arrest of Radovan Karadzic” 
as illustrative of “the commitment of the new government in Belgrade”. This was “a 
significant step on Serbia’s path towards the EU”.911 
909 See Chapter 8, Section 2. This was a remark of Dutch Foreign Minister Verhagen at the visit to The Hague 
of his Slovene colleague, Rupel, in January 2008.
910 Author’s interview, Working party level, 7-7-2010.
911 2885th/2886th General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 22-7-2008. Western 
Balkans. Council Conclusions. Serbia.
When Who What
22-7-2008 Council “Welcomes the arrest of Radovan Karadzic...It is a significant 
step on Serbia’s path towards the EU.”
15-9-2008 Council After meeting with Brammertz, “resumed their discussion on 
the possible implementation of the Interim Agreement…and will 
return to this subject at a forthcoming meeting”.
8-12-2008 Council “Recognizes the progress achieved in terms of cooperation with 
the ICTY, but points out, however, that Serbia must complement 
this positive development by full cooperation.”
7-12-2009 Council “Notes that the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY is satisfied 
with the current level of efforts undertaken by Serbia …decides 
that the Union will start implementing the Interim Agreement. The 
Council will turn to the next issue – ratification of the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement – in six months time.”
14-6-2010 Council “Notes that Serbia has maintained its cooperation with the 
Tribunal…Ministers agreed to submit the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement to their parliaments for ratification.”
25-10-2010 Council While inviting the Commission to submit its opinion on Serbia’s 
application for membership, “calls for progress in the process of 
dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina”. 
Table 9.4   Key moments in the debate about asking a Commission avis (Serbia)
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It most certainly was not. The reason that there would be no breakthrough, was not 
(just) Dutch sabotage. Rather it was (rhetorical) entrapment. In April the Council 
had agreed to implement the IA as well as start ratifying the SAA “as soon as the 
Council decides that Serbia fully cooperates with the ICTY”.912 This implied two 
things. Seeing that the same conditionality applied to both steps, Coreper either 
needed to agree on both steps at once or else artificially decouple them. It was in 
this light that Germany in particular started to propagate a step by step approach. 
The essence of which was one step at a time. Serbia’s behaviour towards Kosovo, 
more than its ICTY cooperation, was Germany’s bone of contention. Serbia had just 
filed a complaint at the ICJ on the legality of Kosovo’s independence. This was not 
the ‘constructive attitude’ the Council had been asking for. 
More importantly, an assessment of full cooperation was necessary in order to be 
able to proceed, preferably from the ICTY itself. The real debate, in the plenary as 
well as in the corridors, was on whether the arrest of Karadzic could be equated 
with full cooperation. Some, notably the UK, did not agree with this equation. They 
merely acknowledged it as significant (improvement of the) cooperation.913 The 
Dutch for their part could not accept that significant cooperation led to the 
unfreezing of the IA.914 Seeing there was no way out of this rhetorical stranglehold, 
the French Presidency decided to grant the Netherlands some more time for 
internal consultations. To this the drivers resigned, knowing full well that there was 
no need to force through a decision now. The ensuing summer break did the rest to 
release the pressure.
By September the Council had fallen back onto its standard operating procedures. 
Any decision on the European integration of Serbia needed to be preceded by an 
assessment, preferably at the Council meeting, by the General Prosecutor. This 
effectively reduced the role of Coweb and Coreper to setting the scene and 
providing the bracketed text, that could potentially be adopted by the Ministers. The 
game was again about ‘inviting’ the General Prosecutor, Brammertz. This was done 
already in September. More telling than the assessment itself, there had been 
‘some notable’ improvement in the cooperation,915 was the reaction of the ministers: 
‘silence’. The Conclusions mention that after meeting with Brammertz: “Minister 
912 2864th/2865th General Affairs and External Relations Council meetings, Luxembourg 29-4-2008. Western 
Balkans. Council Conclusions. Serbia.
913 Author’s interview, domestic level, 8-11-2010.
914 Author’s interview, Working party level, 7-7-2010. Coreper 24-7-2008. Internal report, Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.
915 See also, EU Observer, 11-9-2008: ‘Serbia receives treaty nod ahead of EU meeting’. Here Brammertz 
speaks of “careful optimism”. 
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then resumed their discussion on a possible implementation of the Interim 
Agreement signed with Serbia on 29 April 2008, and will return to this subject at a 
forthcoming meeting.”916 In reality, drivers saw no point in engaging in a competitive 
debate on the matter. Instead, they opted for a less confronting strategy: ‘to keep 
bringing it up’. As the Conclusions show, drivers had already accomplished the 
decoupling of the IA (unfreezing) from the SAA (ratification). Also, they managed to 
keep the issue on the agenda. Brakemen knew they would be confronted with the 
same question over and over again.
Commissioner Rehn meanwhile induced the Serbian authorities into a show of 
goodwill. They decided unilaterally to implement the Interim Agreement from 1 
January 2009 onwards. All sides agree that this was a symbolic move. But the 
Dutch made the same fault as the Greeks had done in the debate about the second 
stage of the SAA: they overplayed their hand. The Netherlands did so in a debate 
about whether this unilateral implementation meant that Serbia was already building 
up ‘SAA track record’. Not surprisingly, the Dutch did not think this was the case. 
What they interpreted as a show of consistency, others began to see as obstinacy 
and an unwillingness to allow others to have prizes. Initially, the Netherlands could 
count on sympathy from its enlargement-weary ally, France. This explains why the 
issue was off the agenda for the remainder of the year.917 The 2008 Progress Report 
had not even been that bad. Commission and drivers carefully mentioned the 
possibility of candidate status in 2009. But such debates never transcended the 
Working party level. The Netherlands (and to a far lesser extent Germany and 
Belgium) were not forced into making a stance at the ministerial level. The December 
2008 Conclusions noted “progress achieved in terms of cooperation with the ICTY” 
and emphasized “the importance of a constructive attitude towards regional 
cooperation”.918 There was no mentioning of IA, SAA, candidate status, or even of 
further discussions on the matter. French objections on enlargement in general 
shone through in the Balkan Conclusions, where they state that: “a country’s 
satisfactory track-record in implementing its obligations under the Stabilization and 
Association Agreements, included trade-related provisions, is an essential element 
for the EU to consider any membership application.”919 If anything the Council 
appeared to be adding steps to the ladder. By again stressing “fair and rigorous 
916 2889th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 15/16-9-2008. Western Balkans. That the Council 
revealed its intention to return to the matter at a (so not ‘the’) forthcoming meeting was a Pyrrhic victory 
for the brakemen.
917 Coweb 2-10, 14-10, 17-11, 19-11, 27-11, 1-12-2009. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
918 2915th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 8/9-12-2008. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions. 
Serbia
919 2915th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 8/9-12-2008. Western Balkans. Council Conclusions.
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conditionality” brakemen were in fact bracing themselves for two successive en-
largement-friendly Presidencies. 
Can the state of affairs in Serbia explain the protracted stalemate in its European 
integration? From the second half of 2008 onwards this was no longer the case. 
There were still numerous things Serbia needed to improve, also in its cooperation 
with the ICTY. But there was at least substantial improvement. Moreover, 
enlargement is about more than fulfilling criteria. It is about building up trust and 
getting socialized into the European way of negotiating.920 Judged from that 
perspective, Tadic’s Serbia was taking giant leaps. With the (albeit perhaps partly 
coincidental) arrest of Karadzic, the unilateral implementation of the IA, the largely 
positive Progress Report, as well as in its relations with its neighbours, Serbia 
showed a mature and constructive attitude.921 In fact, the only matter on which it 
was not willing to compromise was Kosovo’s independence. The irony of the 
situation was that now that Serbia finally seemed to be willing to choose the EU over 
Kosovo, Brussels started to bargain for both.922
Council negotiations on Serbia: ‘a continuation of a trend’
On 22 December 2008, Serbia applied for membership. In light of developments in 
the second half of 2008 one would perhaps have expected a breakthrough, or at 
the very least a (ministerial) debate on the matter, during the 2009 Czech Presidency. 
This did not happen. The debate about whether asking for an avis on the member - 
ship application of Montenegro was a ‘political’ or a ‘technical’ step was no doubt 
handled with Serbia in mind.923 Drivers, and Commissioner Rehn, incidentally 
brought up the matter of the frozen IA, to see whether movement was possible.924 
But the routine was always the same, with Brammertz noticing some signs of 
progress and the Netherlands subsequently arguing that cooperation was still not 
‘full’.925 Then the matter would be dropped for a couple of months, until Brammertz 
visited Belgrade again. By June this routine was getting old. But on the other hand, 
920 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 8-12-2010. 
921 Author’s interviews, Commission (Serbia Unit and Commissioner’s Cabinet) level, 4-6-2010, 15-7-2010. 
The arrest of Karadzic was partly coincidental seeing that Serb Authorities were mainly searching for 
Mladic at the time.
922 Serb politicians no longer wanted to ‘keep’ or ‘regain’ Kosovo, but they did not want to be forced to 
‘acknowledge’ it. Which is exactly what EU member states wanted Serbia do to; acknowledge it.
923 A similar debate had taken place in the case of Croatia in the first half of 2003, which had not led to a 
definitive answer. See Chapter 7, Section 1.
924 This was for example in preparation for the February Council, in Coreper 18-2, 19-2-2009. Internal report, 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
925 At the February 2009 Council the Dutch isolation had become complete, when Germany started arguing 
in favour of the unfreezing and Belgium did not intervene. Brammertz visited the Council again in June.
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as we have seen in the case of Macedonia, there did not appear to be a great sense of 
urgency. There were no Council Conclusions on Serbia during the Czech Presidency. 
It was thus again left to the Swedes to force a breakthrough, as they had tried (and 
failed) to do in the Bosnia as well as the Macedonia game. Why they succeeded in 
the Serbia game is difficult to explain, even for insiders.926 In his December 2009 
assessment, Brammertz spoke of a ‘continuation of a positive trend’ and an ‘improvement 
of the cooperation’. And, contrary to his predecessor, he acknowledged the 
difficulties Serbian authorities faced in trying to tackle the networks protecting the 
remaining fugitives, Mladic and Hadzic. Did this positive assessment cause the 
unfreezing of the SAA? It would be more correct to state that it enabled it. After all, 
previous assessment had noted the same positive trend. And the General 
Prosecutor had still not spoken of ‘full cooperation’, because he considered this to 
be a political judgment to be made by the ministers themselves. Moreover, as 
drivers argued, if the Dutch were now truly and finally satisfied, the ratification of the 
SAA should also commence. This was considered a bridge too far. Which is why 
the drivers had to settle for a ‘date’: “The Council will turn to the next issue – 
ratification of the Stabilization and Association Agreement – in six months time.”927 
At that same Council meeting, Greece had been asking for some more time to deal 
with the Macedonia issue. The Netherlands were basically requesting the same 
although in this case, the term was fixed beforehand. Why this difference?
In the second half of 2009 insiders had started to note a change in internal debates 
on Serbia.928 There had been headcounts and tour de tables in which the score was 
twenty-six against one.929 The 2009 Progress Report was again positive and member 
states were clearly fed up with the matter. In the previous year, the Dutch had received 
some occasional support from Germany, mainly with an eye on (Serbia’s behaviour 
towards) Kosovo. But by now Germany as well as the UK wanted to have room to 
manoeuvre on the matter. We see this reflected in Council Conclusions. While 
remarks concerning a “constructive approach to regional cooperation” gained more 
prominence, ICTY related statements receded to the background.930 By now, the 
ICTY debate was completely exhausted. In June 2010, after another fairly positive 
926 Author’s interview, Working party level, 3-11-2010.
927 2984th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 7-12-2009. Enlargement/Stabilization and Association 
Process. Western Balkans. Serbia: 40-41.
928 Coweb 16-9, 18-9, 15-10, 22-10, 30-11-2009, Coreper 4-12-2009. Internal reports, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
929 Or twenty-five against two, as it was always a bit unclear how eager Belgium would be on the matter.
930 See for example the Conclusions of the 3041st Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg 25-10-2010. 
Conclusions on Serbia. Remarks concerning regional cooperation are in paragraph 3, remarks about the 
ICTY are in paragraph 4. Yet, the Council still felt the need to stress the need for full cooperation three 
times, which again drives home the point that explicit language more often than not is a side-payment. 
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assessment of Brammertz, the Council agreed to the start of the ratification process 
of the SAA. After that political realities - more particularly Serbia’s reaction to the (for 
them unfavourable) ICJ Opinion on the independence of Kosovo – gained centre 
stage. Tadic (again) adopted a constructive attitude.931 The EU (again) seemed 
content about being able to motivate Belgrade and Pristina for a dialogue.932 In 
October 2010 a new Dutch government was immediately confronted with the next 
step: asking the Commission for an avis on Serbia’s membership application. But 
now, contrary to the Greek case in December 2009, the Council did not want to waste 
any more time. The decision did not cause a lot of waves. Nor did the long awaited 
arrest of Mladic in May 2011. Only outsiders wondered what the arrest might mean for 
Serbia’s European accession.933 They were unaware that inside the Justus Lipsius 
another race had already begun. What was at stake in that race had been brought out 
into the open in the October 2010 Conclusions: “Progress in the process of dialogue 
between Belgrade and Pristina”.934 As for the debate on ICTY cooperation; one 
cannot continue to call something a race if there is only one contestant.
9.4 Conclusion: ‘Mention it, don’t insist’
At the end of this compressed comparative case study, it is time to turn back to the 
competing theoretical expectations with regard to isolation. I will not again engage in 
an extensive evaluations of all of the four categories of observable implications. Partly 
because this would result in a lot of repetition (with regard to players and positions but 
also game play). And partly because an extensive theoretical reflection will follow in 
the next chapter. I will however briefly discuss the fourth category and reflect on the 
central claim about expected success. The question was whether isolated players 
were in a particularly strong (from the perspective of constraints) or a particularly weak 
(because of opportunities for convincing) position? Or whether the strength of their 
position was highly dependent on the commitment, which they themselves and others 
chose to show over the course of the game (as the Caucus race model suggests)? 
 
It appears that rationalist explanations do not come up to the mark. In terms of 
constraints the British were clearly in the weakest position, yet their isolation appears 
to have been the most successful one.935 Deliberative conceptualizations also fail to 
provide us with a satisfactory explanation. The member state which others admitted 
931 Serbia even agreed to a joined EU-Serbia UN Resolution on the matter. 
932 Author’s interview, Kosovo level, 13-10-2010.
933 See the introduction to Chapter 5. 
934 3041st Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg 25-10-2010. Conclusions on Serbia.
935 In line with rationalist expectations is that the Greek isolation was more successful than the Dutch one.
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had the most expertise, which was the UK on Bosnia, was never able to convince any 
of the others (that is was unwise to close the OHR). When it comes to convincing the 
ones on the brake, it appears that most valid arguments (for allowing Macedonia to 
enter into accession negotiations) were directed at Greece.936 But none of the 
arguments seemed to hit the mark. But to be fair, neither did any of the arguments 
directed at the Dutch.
It thus appears that the different outcomes are related to differences in commitment 
shown, particularly by those confronting the loners. It seems that the willingness of 
others to invest in such a matter, was highly dependent on how much (social) 
resources they needed to invest. When comparing the British, Greek and Dutch 
isolation, insiders tend to refer to the fact that only the last one was openly isolated.937 
The Netherlands were certainly not the only country with ‘member specific concerns’ 
on the Balkans, whether they concerned the ICTY cooperation of Serbia, Croatia’s 
behaviour with regard to the bay of Piran, the name Macedonia, the OHR in Bosnia or 
the non-recognition of Kosovo. Nor can the state of affairs in the countries account 
for the difference, seeing that both Serbia and Macedonia were constructively 
engaged with fulfilling all the conditions. The crucial difference was that the Dutch 
stance precluded all movement on the file. This was what, at least according to 
participants, led to the open confrontations at the ministerial level. There was simply 
no way of working around the Dutch blockade. And this would explain why the others 
chose to face the Dutch head on. 
The process level observations above partly refute this reasoning. First, it would be 
hard to maintain that the Greek blockade on Macedonia was more ‘constructive’ than 
the Dutch one on Serbia. There is further little reason to presume that the Greeks 
were better players than the Dutch. Both member states tried to prevent practically all 
movement on the dossier, and both damaged their reputation in symbolic battles 
about the number of GNR or ICTY references, the second stage of the SAA or the 
SAA track record.938 Perhaps one could argue that the UK adopted the smarter 
approach by focussing its attention on PSC-level debates on the operational details 
of the EU’s reinforced presence in Bosnia. A direct debate about the OHR-closure 
could thereby be avoided. Let the Council first agree on what would have to come in 
its place. The UK could, as was mentioned above, focus on keeping the technical 
debate going. But Greece and the Netherlands were both far too partisan to opt for 
such an (pseudo) expert role. 
936 I refer to arguments about presumed momentum in the name dispute, that could have been rewarded. 
937 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 25-5-2010, 13-7-2010, 12-1-2011, 13-1-2011, 8-6-2012.
938 Although it is important to note that Greece and the Netherlands did not prevent movement on the issue 
of visa-liberalization. 
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Second, it would be hard to maintain that the Dutch were openly confronted on the 
matter. During the third round of the Serbia game, the exact opposite appears to 
have been the case. After the Karadzic arrest, none seemed to be willing to confront 
the Netherlands anymore. The last real debate about Serbia took place in July and 
August 2008, when drivers tried to convince brakemen that this was a breakthrough 
that needed to be acknowledged. After this attempt failed, others simply abandoned 
the race. There was no debate anymore, just routines and rhetoric. The board was 
set and the pieces made their familiar moves. Without much ado Coweb and 
Coreper would prepare bracketed texts, which were largely copy-paste exercises. 
Then Brammertz would be invited to state his by now familiar assessment: ‘anything 
but full cooperation’. After which the Dutch, with in their wake the Belgians and 
Germans, would reluctantly agree to a next step.939 
Comparing the Greek to the Dutch case, the only thing that appears to have been 
far more damaging for the latter was the concrete time frame there was for 
discussing ICTY. This is, I believe, the most significant factor in explaining the 
different outcome. As we have seen in the Macedonia game, Council debates are 
about playing with time; speeding things up and slowing things down. But what the 
Council does not do, is skip stages it has introduced in the past. The routine of 
waiting for Brammertz before deciding anything on Serbia had become part of the 
standard operating procedures. The Serbs tended to be highly critical about this 
routine.940 But I believe the Macedonian authorities would have loved to trade 
places. Because the routine also guaranteed that the issue would regularly, and 
without substantial investments in terms of commitment, be put on the agenda. 
While introduced by the brakemen, the routine came to provide drivers with a safe 
and non-confrontational way ‘to keep bringing it up’. 
This is, I believe, a telling conclusion of the empirical part of this study. In the 
Caucus race of Council negotiations no one has to truly agree with a position. But 
that does not mean that any of these players would be eager to, let alone benefit 
from, confronting the one in isolation.941 Better regularly to apply gentle pressure 
and then withdraw when hitting resistance. With this we are back at the battles of 
attrition, like the one described in the Introduction. Council negotiations are in 
essence about finding ways to keep mentioning something, but never insisting.
939 ‘Reluctantly’ because at the time Mladic had still not been caught. 
940 Author’s interview, Serbia level, 7-7-2011.
941 Author’s interviews, Council and Working party level, 10-2-2011. 28-6-2012.
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10. The causal significance of non-competitive debates
In this study I have tried to provide an alternative way of understanding Council 
negotiations and their significance. I believe these debates to be ‘neither cheap, nor 
communicative’. Rather, these are Caucus races. I have tried to substantiate this 
claim by means of an analysis of the continuous negotiations concerning (the 
European perspective of) the Western Balkans. In this chapter I will wrap up this 
analysis. I will start by recapitulating my main theoretical claim. The remainder of 
the chapter serves to substantiate this claim on the basis of the empirical data 
presented in Part III. 
Negotiation theory is an academic discipline characterized by dichotomies. There 
are, as we have seen in Chapter 1, numerous ways to conceptualize negotiations.942 
But none of these conceptualizations has been able truly to transcend the classic 
divide between ‘arguing’ and ‘bargaining’. One can essentially only bargain over 
interests, while one can argue over opinions.943 Underlying both approaches is the 
supposition that (either by affecting pay offs or by changing points of view) 
negotiators are trying to change the positions of their counterparts. As I have tried 
to explain in Chapters 1 and 2, both fail to capture essential elements of (day to day) 
Council negotiations in which there if often little to trade and no one to convince.
I have juxtaposed three different types of theoretical explanations of negotiation 
processes and outcomes in the Council. Rationalist intergovernmental bargaining 
models were presented as the baseline category. What is perhaps most striking 
about these bargaining models is that the bargaining process itself is black 
boxed.944 These models tell us very little about the actual negotiations. Instead they 
focus on explaining the (weak) outcomes. Rationalists feel they have valid 
methodological and theoretical reasons for doing so. Acquiring reliable data on the 
‘informal deal making’ that precedes the (formal) decision making is extremely 
difficult. Moreover, rationalists tend to downgrade the relevance of these interactions. 
Hence the imagery of ‘cheap talk’, ‘dialogues of the deaf’, or as I have called them 
pseudo-debates. The reasoning behind this approach is straightforward. Positions 
942 For example, ‘soft’ versus ‘hard’ or ‘integrative’ versus ‘distributive’ bargaining, problem solving, arguing, 
deliberation, communicative versus rhetorical action. See Chapter 1, Sections 1 and 2.
943 It is generally assumed that negotiation positions are the sum of interests and opinions. Opinions are also 
referred to as ‘beliefs’. Scholars have tried to show that interests are socially constructed, or, conversely, 
that opinions only serve to justify primary interests (cf. Jupille, Caporaso & Checkel, 2003: 23-24). Which 
would mean one could subsume bargaining under arguing or the other way around (cf. Müller, 2005; 
Schoppa, 1999).
944 See Chapter 1, Section 1.
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are for the larger part fixed. It is hard, if not impossible, to change (national) interests. 
Negotiators, particularly at the lower levels, have limited possibilities for affecting 
the pay off structure of their counterparts. Linkages and package deals are difficult 
to design and usually the prerogative of the (highest) political level. Negotiators 
moreover lack the means to force each other to accept specific outcomes. Because 
‘threatening and trading opportunities’ are limited, domestic constraints are 
considered to be the decisive element in the equation. Those with the least room to 
manoeuvre on the domestic level, set the tone at the interstate level. They will 
therefore have a disproportionately large impact on the outcome of the debate. 
Rationalists thus expect that the lowest common denominator will rarely be 
surpassed. A Council of 27 has to cater to a lot of member-specific concerns or 
interest, which explains why the overall progress is often limited and above all slow. 
The outcome of any Council debate, if there is such an outcome, will reflect a 
Veneer of Consensus.
The second type of explanation I have derived from constructivist or sociological- 
institutionalist theorizing on social interactions. Here, Council debates are conceptualized 
along the lines of ‘expert deliberations’. Arguing over opinions takes precedence over 
bargaining over interests. Deliberative models focus much of their attention on the 
process level. They generally do not tell us a lot about how specific processes are 
linked to (‘change’) outcomes. Rather, we are left with a few highly conditional remarks 
about how deliberative processes can sometimes lead to a Reasoned Consensus. 
Constructivists mainly seek to show how, over the course of time, an elaborate 
network of norms has come to guide Council negotiations.
Norms are indeed omnipresent in the interactions inside the Justus Lipsius, although 
participants tend only to become aware of them if they are violated. Some of these 
norms refer to day to day proceedings and thus bind all. The most pervasive one is 
perhaps the norm that one should limit his or her (plenary) interventions to the lowest 
amount possible. In Brussels jargon: ‘one should not (have to) raise one’s flag too 
often’. This explains why delegates will usually start their (second) intervention with 
something resembling: ‘Apologies for having to come back in again’. There are the 
perhaps familiar etiquettes: ‘always thank the Commission for everything it does’, 
‘always show your appreciation for whatever viewpoint expressed’. But there are also 
the more substantial norms, for example on not ‘surprising’ your colleagues by 
presenting radical new ideas or positions during the (plenary) meeting. There are 
norms on not taking issues prematurely to a higher level. And there are norms that 
refer less to day to day encounters and more to the overall game play. The latter, I 
have argued in Chapter 5, seem biased towards those who want to move forward. 
The most powerful norm was referred to repeatedly in Part III: ‘the shared responsibility 
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to come up with solutions and keep the process going’. Such constructivist insights 
hook up with modern neo-functionalist theorizing on decision making. A specific 
tradition of play has come into being in the Council, not only in the Balkan 
pre-accession game, in which “the default option is to proceed”.945
Constructivist and neo-functionalist theorizing provides for a different reading of 
the negotiations in the Council. Due to certain institutional characteristics: high 
interaction density, high degree of insulation and a long shadow of the future, a 
setting has come about in which deliberations have become possible and moreover 
worthwhile. In such a ‘friendly’ environment, negotiators can (afford to) look for 
genuine agreement instead of shallow compromise. The argumentative encounters 
taking place in the halls and corridors of the Justus Lipsius then come to matter a 
lot. In fact, it is only by the use of (superior) arguments that one can try to persuade 
one’s counterparts to agree to a certain (non)decision. This is why I have referred to 
them as competitive debates. However, with 27 member states at the table, a true 
consensus is much harder, and takes much longer, to reach. Which explains why in 
Council decision making incrementalism tends to prevail. 
Day to day Council negotiations (or at least the ones I have focused on) present 
both rationalism and constructivism with a puzzle. What we are confronted with on 
the process level is essentially ‘arguing from fixed positions’. Yet, what we end up 
with in terms of outcomes is more than a series of lowest common denominator 
outcomes, pre-determined by the relevant domestic constraints. It appears that we 
are looking at a highly ‘unusual kind’ of decision making process; one with fairly 
little competition and an abundance of prizes at the end. Identifying and explaining 
the particularities of these Caucus races was the central goal of this project. The 
key lies in grasping the exact role that arguments can play in the debates in the 
Council. Arguments are more than mere ornaments, but they will seldom be 
powerful enough to influence the positions of others. Instead, arguments should be 
seen as rhetorical devices, which serve to affect the mood in the room. And by 
altering the mood in the room, one can try to ‘channel’ decision making into a 
favourable direction. Arguments are effective, if they become part of the ‘legitimized 
discourse’, as reflected in the Council Conclusions. This is why I labelled such 
negotiations as non-competitive debates leading to a Rhetorical Consensus. 
To specify wherein Caucus races differ from arguing or bargaining contests, I have 
presented four categories of (competing) observable implications.946 These are:
945 Author’s interview, Working party level, 13-10-2010. See Chapter 5, Section 2.
946 See Chapter 3, Section 3 for the operationalization of these four categories. 
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1. The players and their positions
2. The game play
3. The outcome(s) of the game
4. The success (winners and losers) in the game.
The first two categories concern the process level. It is about who plays, when, why 
and above all how. The third and fourth category are about what comes out of the 
games. They serve to evaluate the results on the collective as well as the individual 
level. Bargaining models, as I have explained, tell us little about the process level. 
So with regard to the first two categories I have primarily juxtaposed the Caucus 
race model and the deliberative model. The key difference concerns the ‘openness’ 
of Council debates. Deliberations require players who are open actually to engage 
themselves with the opinions/arguments presented by others. Caucus races do 
not. 
Deliberative models have very little to say about the outcome level. Thus, with 
regard to the third and fourth category, I have primarily confronted the Caucus race 
model with rationalist models of negotiations. The key difference concerns the 
‘substantiality’ of the debate. Bargaining models explain outcomes from preference 
and salience patterns, thus consciously downplaying the significance of what 
happens in ‘the black box’. In the Caucus race model, the race in itself is considered 
to be important. Of course, claiming that the actual Council negotiations are 
important is not that exciting. More interesting is how they matter, or how they are 
‘causally significant’. 
In order to be able to determine the causal significance of non-competitive debates, 
I have engaged in an in-depth historical reconstruction of one the Council debates 
in one specific issue area. I have studied the negotiation games and rounds that 
jointly made up the meta-debate on the European perspective of the Western 
Balkans. Table 10.1 provides an overview of the fourteen games. I have outlined the 
name of the game, the key subject for debate (the ‘rhetorical commonplace’ around 
which the game pivoted), the related decisions (the steps in the European trajectory 
under consideration) and the duration of the game. The fourteen games have been 
analyzed, as far as possible, in the empirical chapters. There is no point in repeating 
this exercise. This chapter rather aims to draw comparisons and establish connections 
between the different games, thereby enabling an overarching assessment of the 
meta-game.
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10.1.  Verbal exchanges: The process of negotiating on the 
Western Balkans
The first step towards establishing the causal significance of non-competitive 
debates, would be to determine that Council debates were indeed non-competitive. 
As I have explained in Chapters 1 and 2, this is not because negotiators refuse to 
give arguments, or provide reasons for their national positions. It is because of a 
general unwillingness (or inability) to engage with the arguments of others. Like the 
contestants of the Caucus race in Alice and Wonderland, Council negotiators tend 
to get caught up in their own race.947 This race is essentially about making legitimate 
claims – or making claims to appear legitimate – so that they are taken into account 
by the Dodo, meaning the rotating Presidency. Participants only become aware of 
each other, when they get into each other’s way. This is when matters come to a 
head and the non-routine part of the debate starts. Then, the agreed language is 
not that ‘agreed’ anymore and the status quo approach is up for reinterpretation. 
What can we conclude about the negotiation process in the course of the Balkan 
pre-accession game? Can we establish that there was little or no openness and 
thus provisionally rule out deliberative models of Council debates?948 The first 
category of observable implications concerns the players and their positions. Here 
the Caucus race model to a large extent follows the line of the rationalist bargaining 
model, in assuming that positions are determined primarily by what a specific 
member state has to gain or lose on the domestic level. They are thus largely 
fixed.949 It significantly departs from deliberative model, which assumes open 
access and fluid positionality.
With regard to the positionality in the Balkan pre-accession game, let me start with 
an important shortcoming. The ‘interests’ referred to in this study to some extent are 
in the eye of the beholder. I have refrained from making (calculated) assessments 
of who had most to win or to lose in the (different) game(s).950 It was not always 
feasible to evaluate the reality of the domestic constraints, which many of the key 
players claimed they faced. This makes it harder to come to any definitive conclusions 
947 See Chapter, 2, Section 1. Here I elaborate on the participants and their reasons for joining the race.
948 See Chapter 2, Section 4. This is the first step in establishing the plausibility of the Caucus race model. 
949 See Chapter 3, Section 3. There are some subtle differences between the bargaining and the Caucus 
race model. In the latter, positions are also determined by previously shown commitment. With regard to 
players and positions, the substantial differences however are between the deliberative and the Caucus 
race model.
950 Cost-benefit assessments with regard to enlargement are necessarily highly tentative (Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier, 2005: 12). Thus one can justly doubt whether we can ‘calculate’ who gains how much. 
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on whether changes in the Council’s line of policy were preceded by (let alone 
caused by) changes in underlying interest patterns. However, it is not only the 
researcher, who is confronted with this limitation. Council negotiators themselves 
have difficulty trying to assess the political sensitivities of their peers. As I have 
explained in Chapter 1, in the normative environment of the Council, member states 
are induced to adopt a live and let live attitude towards the constraints presumably 
faced by others. If a minister, Coreper or PSC ambassador or Working party 
delegate can credibly claim to have ‘weighty concerns’ on the matter, others will be 
inclined to take these concerns as a given.951 
There is no doubt that perceived domestic constraints were an important 
argumentative resource at many moments in the debate. The most important of 
these constraints was the enlargement-sceptic mood in some of the member 
states. In terms of positionality, we can already explain a lot of the Balkan 
pre-accession game simply by looking at public opinions and domestic outlooks. 
Whether these concern Greek constraints on Macedonia, the Dutch constraints on 
Serbia, Slovenia’s constraints on Croatia, the constraints of Spain and the other 
non-recognizers of Kosovo or even the French outlook on enlargement in general, 
what mattered most was what participants claimed they would be able ‘to sell at 
home’. Germany’s reservations were often explained along similar lines. It could 
credibly claim that it would probably bear the brunt (in terms of costs and migration) 
when the Balkans became part of Europe. Those who seemed to have most to gain 
from Balkan enlargement; Italy, Slovenia, Greece, Austria (and the Habsburg block), 
were also the ones driving the dossier.952 Those who had little at stake (for example 
the Baltic countries, Ireland, Poland, Portugal) did not feature prominently in the 
debates. The anomaly in terms of participation is Sweden. One could argue that its 
participation, particularly under Foreign Minister Bildt, stemmed from a genuine 
belief that it could contribute something in terms of issue-specific expertise.953 In 
line with deliberative conceptualizations of debates, its participation can thus be 
seen as a conscious choice. For the others it was (at least presented as) something 
of a necessity.
951 This credibility-provision nevertheless limits the possibilities for making claims about constraints. It 
precludes for example Portugal claiming that ‘its hands are tied’ in debates about Bosnia. 
952 Although one could also argue that, while these countries had an interest in stabilizing the region and 
opening up their domestic markets, there was no immediate need to press for membership. 
953 One should note another idiosyncratic factor that might have influenced Swedish prominent presence in 
the Balkan debates. Sweden, and the Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh in particular, simply had to 
become a player during their 2001 Presidency. This was because of the crises in Kosovo, Serbia 
(Presevo) and Macedonia. Anna Lindh moreover was assassinated in September 2003, by Mijailo 
Mijailovic, a man with a Swedish Passport but a Serb background.
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Thus, if we would limit our analysis to the first category; the players and their 
positions, it would be correct to conceptualize the Balkan pre-accession game as 
a non-competitive or even a pseudo debate. To a considerable degree it was 
negotiating from fixed positions. Positions at the EU level were the necessary 
reflection of interest configurations at the domestic level. Which explains why 
positions could not and did not change much because of the interactions in 
Brussels. Positions only tended to become a bit more ‘pronounced’ (for drivers) or 
‘nuanced’ (for brakemen), if a member state took over the Presidency. But 
throughout the decade, we mostly see predictability in positionality and therefore 
stability in the coalition-blocks (or ‘groups of like-minded’). 
Positions form the input for, but do not necessarily determine the character of, the 
ensuing debate. Far more important is the second category: the game play. Here 
again, distinctions between the Caucus race and the bargaining model are limited, 
if only because the latter does not tell us a lot about what such bargaining would 
look like. The differences between the Caucus race and the deliberative model are 
more substantial: whether or not there was a lot of competition during the debate(s). 
To be able to come to such an assessment, I have looked at the way in which the 
game play was reflected in the Council’s words and deeds, and more particularly in 
its monthly Conclusions.
There was not a lot of competition in the three rounds of the general Balkan game. 
In fact, during the first two rounds there was not a lot of playing going on at all. 
Member states were largely bystanders in the first Balkan debate about the granting 
of the European perspective. It started with ‘gesture politics’ and private initiatives 
by the Commission, SG/HR Solana and the incumbent Presidency. Member states 
were not really sure what they were signing up to, apart from a commitment to try to 
stabilize the region. A lot of constructive ambiguity surrounded this ‘new category 
of contractual relations’. But this was so much the better.954 In light of the 1999 
Kosovo crisis, not to mention the EU’s faltering performance during the Yugoslav 
wars, the Council desperately needed something resembling a ‘comprehensive 
approach’. This was what led to the vague but real commitments of Feira and 
Zagreb. 
The second round of the Balkan game was again a private initiative, this time by the 
Greek Dodo. ‘Thessaloniki’ did not stem from a jointly felt need to reconsider (or 
‘revitalize’) the Council’s approach to the Balkans. Greece had of course tried to 
justify the summit on such grounds, but it failed to convince the more reluctant 
954 The ambiguity mainly concerned how to merge a regional (Stability pact) with an own merits (SAP) 
approach. See Chapter 6, Section 1 (cf. Bechev, 2006). 
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member states of this need.955 One could perhaps argue that the Summit was 
enabled by a permissive consensus in the Council. It furthermore appears that 
discussions on the deliverables of Thessaloniki, as long as they did not touch upon 
the sensitive issue of money (access to the pre-accession funds), were relatively 
open (or ‘competitive’). But, as I have argued in Chapter 6, the most important 
reason why member states managed to agree on the composition of the 
Thessaloniki Agenda, was that they attached varying significances to the different 
elements. Some saw the EU providing tangible incentives, others spoke of 
(distracting) side payments. Some believed Thessaloniki was mostly ‘creating 
mousse’. There was sufficient constructive ambiguity in the Agenda to keep all of 
them on board.
After Thessaloniki, the enthusiasm for enlargement ebbed away, which led to the 
third round of the Balkan game.956 This was the debate about improving the ‘quality’ 
of the integration process. The member states were definitely participating in the 
race by now. The mood at the time (enlargement fatigue) meant that the brakemen 
were in a position to set the terms of the debate. The debate about absorption 
capacity was all about domestic constraints, faced particularly by France, the 
Netherlands but also Germany. It were in essence their concerns that needed to be 
appeased by means of the renewed consensus on enlargement of December 
2006. Drivers did not share in the fatigue. Their goal was somehow to find a way to 
keep the process going. This meant that they basically had no choice but to accept 
the brakemen’s propositions for getting the process under control.
This change in the general mood had a direct impact on the second and third round 
of the Macedonia game. In the first round, Macedonia was still supposed to be the 
example for the region that European integration was possible. But by the time the 
country was ready to fulfil this role, it became an example in the negative sense. 
The Council used Macedonia to make it clear that enlargement was off the agenda 
for the moment. The Council, as well as individual member states, maintained that 
their position on Macedonia itself had not changed. What had changed was the 
eagerness with which (some in) the Council pursued the matter. The Conclusions 
of December 2005 (European Council), December 2009 and June 2010 adequately 
reflect this lack of urgency. 
955 Developments in the field were also not favourable for the Greeks. The region was calm and stable, but 
still lagging behind in terms of reforms. See Chapter 6, Section 3.
956 France moved further into the lower right corner of the plot (see Chapter 4, Section 1) after the failed 
referendum of 2005. The positions of the nine other key players have remained more or less the same 
throughout the decade. To the extent that there was variation, it was limited to the centre (‘the audience’). 
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What about the game play in the other games? The stakes in the Croatia game were 
clear from the start. The drivers wanted the opening of accession negotiations; the 
brakemen above all wanted Croatia to deliver Gotovina. A trade-off would have 
been the obvious bargaining result. An agreement on the exact (ICTY) conditions 
for opening accession negotiations was what would have come out of a genuine 
deliberation. What did come out was what neither side had wanted: a heavily 
delayed integration process on the basis of an uncertain promise (that Gotovina 
would soon be apprehended). The Council’s Croatia ‘debate’ was a succession of 
seemingly identical verbal exchanges, in which even insiders could not note any 
progress.957 There was progress nevertheless, be it not in the debate itself but in the 
underlying decision making process. Both sides could claim that their claims were 
legitimate, so this was not where a breakthrough could be achieved. In reality, 
drivers and brakemen were forcing each other to prove their commitment to the 
matter over and over again.958 The drivers forced the brakemen to (re)confirm Croatia’s 
European perspective. The brakemen forced the drivers to (re)acknowledge the 
ICTY conditionality. Underlying this approach was a salami tactical logic. Both 
sides wanted their renewed commitment to be reflected in the verbal statements by 
the Council. These statements could then be used to induce or preclude a decision 
(on a step towards the opening of negotiations). Vocality – by which I mean the 
extent to which positions were reflected in the Council Conclusions – varied with 
who was the dodo. A pro-active Commissioner could help create or diffuse momentum; 
as did Verheugen in April 2004 in favour of the drivers, or Rehn in January 2005 to 
the benefit of the brakemen. But the pseudo-neutral Presidency was decisive in 
allocating the prizes; be it the Dutch in their quest for tough ICTY Conclusions, or 
the British in their willingness to be pragmatic about the actual arrest of Gotovina. 
However, what effectively caused the eventual decision were the non-competitive 
debates on ‘full cooperation’.959 In April 2004, as well as October 2005, brakemen 
were entrapped by a turn of Del Ponte. But this trap had been laid out in the small 
argumentative battles of the preceding years. 
The Croatia debate set the stage for the debates on Serbia. The underlying logic 
was the same: through successive demonstrations of commitment, trying to force 
the Council into ever more explicit verbal statements about Serbia’s European 
future, its lacking ICTY cooperation and its behaviour towards Kosovo. In the 
second half of the decade the ICTY debates were becoming ever more ‘routine’. 
Vocality was determined less by the individual efforts of a particular Presidency and 
957 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Policy Unit) level, 10-11-2011. 
958 Author’s interview, Council Secretariat (Director) level, 1-7-2010.
959 ‘Non competitive’ because both sides were never able to agree on a definition of full cooperation (efforts/
commitment shown or a concrete result). But their disagreement could always be cloaked in words. 
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more by standard operating procedures. Elections in Serbia or developments with 
regard to Kosovo enabled the drivers. Visits of or assessments by the General 
Prosecutor provided the momentum for the brakemen. What was different, certainly 
in the latter stages of the Serbia debate, was that brakemen’s (mostly Dutch) 
insistence on Serbia apprehending Mladic could at times be denounced as 
inappropriate. Drivers would never claim that such concerns were illegitimate. The 
Netherlands did not really need the ‘legal anchoring’ of April 2008 for that. But 
drivers could argue that this was not the best time to insist on the condition. This 
was particularly the case when Serbia had to come to terms with unfavourable 
developments with regard to Kosovo. Also, the drivers kept insisting that it was 
appropriate for the EU to support the EU-minded forces in Serbia, even though 
such support seemed to be largely inconsequential.960
The third round of the Serbia game (the suspension, resumption and signing of the 
SAA) was perhaps the most erratic debate of all. Not only did the Council’s ‘words’ 
become all but detached from its ‘deeds’. But what the former tended to reflect was 
not the actual level of agreement on Serbia’s current ICTY behaviour. The words 
reflected the current level of commitment shown by the drivers and brakemen and 
the verbal side payments that were necessary to appease them. The opening of 
SAA negotiations in October 2005 was enabled by a verbal side payment (that the 
pace depended on full cooperation) and a temporary improvement of the ICTY 
cooperation, which afterwards appeared to be a mirage.961 Then we saw the Council 
setting a target date for the completion of the SAA negotiations on the very same 
day (15 May 2006) it endorsed the suspension. To get the brakemen to accept the 
resumption of SAA negotiations, the Council had to water down the ICTY 
conditionality into a ‘commitment to concrete and effective action’. This is what is 
reflected in the Council Conclusions of February and June 2007. But the brakemen 
ensured that before the signing of the SAA their definition of full cooperation would 
again be uploaded into the Council Conclusions. This is what happened in April 
2008, when drivers got the decision and brakemen the language.
960 EU support had done little to help oust Milosevic in 2000. In January 2007, in spite of EU support, the 
elections were won by the Radicals. Tadic lost the first and won the second round of the 2008 Presidential 
elections without any concrete EU support. By the time the EU was finally ready to use the SAA as a 
‘carrot’, there had already been quite a few election rounds, and an equal number of unstable governing 
coalitions. This made it hard to argue that the signing of the SAA would indeed help the pro-European 
forces win these particular elections. 
961 See Chapter 8, Section 2. Commissioner Rehn admitted in February 2006 that cooperation had in fact 
been deteriorating since April 2005. Also, brakemen started pushing for the suspension of SAA 
negotiations almost immediately after they had allowed them to begin. 
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That the Serbia debate was a non-competitive one became clear once more when 
in July 2008 Karadzic was arrested. This deed fitted the brakemen’s informal 
definition of full cooperation (‘the arrest of the remaining fugitives’). But when they 
nevertheless stated that they felt no great ‘urge’ to reward this Serbian gesture, 
drivers simply acquiesced. After that, the debate was effectively over and drivers 
fell back into the routinized mentioning of the matter.
If we look at the debates on Bosnia; the first round on police reforms, the second 
on constitutional reforms (that would enable the OHR to close), we see a similar 
pattern. The Conclusions do not reflect the actual level of agreement on Bosnia’s 
current reform record. What they reflected was the commitment shown at that 
specific point in time by either drivers or brakemen or both. If the latter was the 
case, Conclusions tended to become ambiguous. This was for example the case in 
March 2009, when the Council wanted to stress ‘increased local ownership’ as well 
as ‘a reinforced EU presence’. Constructive ambiguity characterized the Council’s 
debate on police reforms. Council and Commission lacked (Acquis-related) standards 
on the requirements in the area of police restructuring. Thus it was left somewhat in 
the dark what was required from Bosnia: a commitment to, an agreement on the 
political level, a legislative anchoring (‘a law’), or full blown implementation of these 
reforms.962 Eventually, in December 2007, brakemen had to settle for ‘renewed 
commitment to police reforms’. By that time broader concerns on constitutional 
reform had (again) taken centre stage. However, also in the latter debate we see 
little progressive development. The coming about of the OHR conditionality, 
explicitly confirmed in December 2009, and the endorsement of the PIC’s conditions 
in March 2008, were not the result of a competitive debate. The latter was a panic 
reaction to the independence of Kosovo. The former was an example of clever 
framing (by the brakemen) and ensuing rhetorical entrapment (of the drivers). One 
should perhaps also blame local authorities for the fact that the Bosnia debate was 
propelled, not by actual developments in the field, but by varying commitment 
shown in Brussels. Based on the actual reform record, progress would have been 
even less. This became most obvious in November 2005, when the Council 
managed to brighten up the ten year anniversary of Dayton with the opening of SAA 
negotiations. This was a “historic moment” not because of any developments in 
Bosnia. What it represented, was an exceptionally one-sided victory (for the UK 
Presidency) in a race that had always been rather evenly balanced. 
The debate on the European perspective of Kosovo can perhaps serve as a 
textbook example of a non-competitive debate. Underlying it all was a logic of ap-
962 See for example the Council Conclusions of June 2005, October 2005 and November 2007. 
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propriateness: the EU ‘should’ take the lead role in Kosovo. The only way the EU 
‘could’ do this was by starting up Kosovo’s European integration. However, the EU 
‘should’ operate in a ‘status-neutral’ way. This effectively came down to assisting in 
the building up of a state it did not formally recognize. Drivers made no attempt to 
force brakemen into a debate about the recognition of Kosovo. They opted for the 
less confrontational approach: to engage in small argumentative battles about 
upgrading EU engagement with Kosovo. This upgraded involvement could then be 
mentioned in the Council Conclusions. In its verbal statements: on ‘the study’, the 
‘European perspective in line with the perspective of the region’, or the general 
reference to ‘Kosovo under UNSC Resolution 1244’, the Council tended to cater to 
the brakemen. But what drivers expected in return was the pledge, that they were 
allowed to look for ways around the non-recognizers’ roadblock. Thus the drivers 
kept looking for creative ways to give content and meaning to the existence of 
Kosovo, whereas the brakemen continued to appease their domestic audiences by 
making all these acts appear status-neutral. But such a non-competitive approach 
guaranteed that both sides could continue with their races. 
Not even Greece itself denies the non-competitive character of the third round of the 
Macedonia game. With the temporary exception of the (presiding) Swedes and 
Slovenes, few chose to challenge Greek ‘expertise’ on the matter. There were again 
few who would dare to argue that concerns regarding good neighbourly relations 
were illegitimate. The validity of Greek reasoning on Macedonia (and this also goes 
for the Dutch reasoning on Serbia) was never up for debate. The question was 
whether it was always appropriate to emphasize the matter. I have attributed a 
considerable amount of causal primacy to small and seemingly symbolic 
argumentative battles, about the number of GNR or ICTY references, the SAA track 
record and the second stage of the SAA.963 Even insiders would say this was mostly 
shadow-boxing. But from an theoretical perspective these episodes were very 
revealing. They show that in Council debates one cannot simply stick to the same line 
of reasoning. In a competitive debate it does not matter how often and how fierce a 
country defends its argumentative stance. To the contrary, if the opinion is seen as 
sound, consistency would be considered an asset instead of a burden. In a non-
competitive debate the exact opposite is the case. Here arguments do not have to be 
refuted in order for them to lose their strength. They can simply become ‘worn out’. 
Looking back at the game play in the meta-debate, that was (and is) the Balkan 
pre-accession game, I would argue that it was about credible commitment to legitimate 
concerns to be introduced at the appropriate time. One could consider these the 
963 See Chapter 9, Sections 2 and 3. 
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individually necessary but insufficient elements that together form a sufficient but 
unnecessary causal mechanism with which to explain negotiation success in the 
Council (cf. Beach & Pedersen, 2012). I will first elaborate on the first and second 
element of this INUS causal mechanism. Of course, technically all delegates could 
choose to make a plenary intervention on a matter they considered of national 
interest. And naturally others would then politely listen and take note of what was 
being said. But if participants failed to convince a sufficient number of others that 
their country had something at stake in the matter, they would have trouble getting 
these concerns acknowledged in the joint texts. If they failed to explain why these 
concerns were legitimate, they could be shamed into acquiescence.964 But there 
the buck would normally stop. Resembling the procedure in a courtroom, after 
prosecutor and defence had been given the opportunity to state their case, it was 
up for the judge (the Dodo) to decide.965 Ministers, ambassadors and Working 
party members would normally refrain from openly attacking (the soundness of) 
the reasoning of their peers. This non-competitive approach is understandable. 
After all, calling into question the opinion of your peers, is one of the most confron-
tational moves one can make in social interaction. Interest might be considered 
‘national’ but opinions are always to a certain extent ‘personal’. The norms in the 
Council reward an accommodating  rather than a challenging stance towards the 
opinions of the remaining participants. Those who are able to fulfil the first two 
conditions, pass the argumentative threshold, are accepted as players and thus as 
a rule are eligible for prizes. 
The more difficult question is when to expect such prizes. The third and final 
necessary element that makes this INUS mechanism sufficient concerns ‘timing’. 
The challenge for Council negotiators, at all levels, is knowing when and when not 
to push for a decision.966 There are (again) few law-like patterns to observe in this 
964 This for example happened when Bulgaria expressed its concerns regarding protection of minority rights 
in Macedonia. It had happened to Slovenia in its dispute with Croatia about the bay of Piran. The 
upgrading of member-specific concerns into issues touching upon collectively shared values (as we saw 
with the GNR conditionality) is a perhaps symbolic but nevertheless important part of an argumentative 
intervention. However, there appears to be a very thin line between legitimate and illegitimate concerns. 
In the early rounds of the Macedonia and Croatia games, Italy, Greece and others made no bones about 
using the SAA to acquire concessions on the buying of property at the Croatian coast and around Lake 
Ohrid. Author’s interviews, PSC and Working party level, 8-7-2010, 14-1-2011, 10-2-2011.
965 To be precise, I refer to a regular court hearing without cross-examinations. 
966 The result of the December 2011 European Council Summit shows that even at the very highest level this 
logic seems to hold. Some observers rather convincingly argued that the British Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, overplayed his hand and failed to sense the changing mood in the room. Expecting to be 
backed up by a block of around ten other member states, Cameron would not lower his demands on 
protecting ‘the City’ from excessive EU regulation. Even when a solution was presented that would not 
necessitate treaty change, the Prime Minister held his ground. Presumably, he lost a lot of sympathy from 
the other non-Euro countries, who did not want to become part of some ‘outer core’. The Economist, 
9-12-2011: ‘The moment, behind closed doors, that David Cameron lost his EU argument last night.’ 
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regard. Instead, we can discern some general trends and regularities. Making 
waves to a certain extent is acceptable when one holds the Presidency. But one 
has to make it appear, as the 2005 UK Presidency has shown most convincingly, 
that the momentum was there to begin with.967 Member states above all do not want 
to feel rushed. Making too many waves, as was the case with the 2008 Slovenian 
Presidency and perhaps also the 2006 Austrian Presidency, will result in a backlash. 
A key role is played by the Commission(er), a driver of the enlargement process, 
unless someone else is trying to be on the wheel. This essentially bureau-political 
motivation is understandable, seeing that the Commission’s own standing depends 
on its ‘technocratic outlook’. It is one of those functional myths that guide Council 
proceedings. All are aware that the Commission is a player, but all have an interest 
in upholding its neutral image. This is because, by deciding what to include in its 
annual reports and regular evaluations, the Commission can facilitate or obstruct 
other players. Once the Commission adopts a member-specific concern, it 
becomes a Community level concern. This of course helps national negotiators in 
getting these concerns noted by the Council. Member states will generally keep 
their eyes fixed on the Commission (instead of on each other). After all, the most 
effective way towards the prizes, would be to ride the waves that were made by the 
Commission.
The remarks above focus on the role of the institutionally empowered players. One 
can justly ask what ‘regular’ member states can do to get prizes in the Balkan 
pre-accession game. For one thing, endurance matters more than creativity. 
Council debates are battles of attrition and the key to success lies, I believe, in the 
ability to keep finding semi-original ways to mention essentially the same matter. 
Again, one should not push beyond the boundaries of the appropriate. There are 
important signals that Council negotiators (for example the Greek, the Dutch and 
the Slovenes) could and should have picked up. If national negotiators notice that 
they have to work ever harder to get their familiar concerns acknowledged in the 
Council Conclusions, than this is a clear signal that they are wearing out their 
credibility (in the separate signalling games) and thereby damaging their social 
standing (in the overarching positional game).968 If, for some reason (because of 
regional developments or country-specific crises or elections), processes become 
‘politicized’, referring back to the standard operating procedures will no longer be a 
winning strategy. It is then better to bide your time. After a while normality will again 
set in, and there will still be plenty of opportunities to stress technicalities, conditions 
967 See Chapter 8, Section 2. The UK Presidency kept reminding its counterparts that it was still ‘business as 
usual’ and that it was not being ‘over-eager’ in dealing with these matters. 
968 See Chapter 2, Section 1 on the conceptualization of (Council) debates as signaling and positional games. 
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and reforms. This brings us to the perhaps most important ‘lesson’ of all. If one 
does feel the need to insist on something, then proactively try to provide your peers 
with an alternative route to keep the process going. After all, the ability to get prizes 
yourself depends of the willingness of others to carry on with the race.
10.2  Invisible hands: How outcomes are (eventually) reached in 
the Council 
With the help of the summary in the previous section, I hope to have convincingly 
shown that Council debates with regard to the Western Balkans were essentially 
non-competitive. In what follows, I attempt to establish that they were nevertheless 
causally significant. Here I position myself primarily against rationalist intergovern-
mental bargaining models. Even though the words uttered in the halls and corridors 
of the Justus Lipsius might seldom succeed in changing the positions of other 
players, they will (at times) lead to different outcomes. This might seem a rather 
self-evident claim. After all, few rationalists would claim that the Council’s verbal 
exchanges are completely irrelevant. But for them these words are mere lubricant. 
They can facilitate (or complicate) the deal-making, but they will not significantly 
change the content of the deal. In the Caucus race model, these words rather work 
as glue. 
My third and fourth categories (the outcomes and the success) are about evaluating 
what comes out of the negotiations. Council debates, regardless of how long they 
take, usually end in a consensus. How could they not? After all, the only way to 
proceed is if all are at least nominally on board. It is the substantiality of such a 
consensus that is the subject of debate. Rationalists essentially adopt the sceptics’ 
point of view, which sees the Council as more or less unable to surpass the lowest 
common denominator. In Chapter 5, I have translated this into a brakemen’s 
advantage in these debates.
On the level of outcomes the Caucus race model has more in common with 
deliberative models. There is a subtle distinction, which can be clarified with help of 
the metaphor of doctors coming together to agree on a treatment. A reasoned 
consensus can then be equated with an overall agreement on the (albeit subjectively 
determined) applied cure. To arrive at a rhetorical consensus, the doctors ‘only’ 
need to agree on a (for all) binding procedure for deciding on a cure and then be 
willing to let the outcome be decided by means of that procedure. There thus needs 
to be agreement on procedures instead of on content (the specific ‘cure’ to be 
applied for instance to Bosnia). Because there is no substantial agreement, a 
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rhetorical consensus will only lead to ‘shaming’ and temporary acquiescence.969 
But participants can and will make use of the next available moment to challenge 
the outcome. Negotiation success is thus far more fleeting. This is something we 
might be able to observe by studying Council negotiations as iterative instead of 
one-shot games. What happens to the consensus reached at day one? If it is 
already challenged on day two, then one may justly wonder how substantial the 
agreement really was. Transferring this logic to the Balkan pre-accession game, if 
there is agreement on (the applicable conditions and procedures for) allowing the 
Balkans countries to come closer to Europe, then the default option would be to 
proceed along the lines of these procedures. This is what I have called a ‘driver’s 
advantage’. Such procedures can of course be challenged and changed at times. 
As long as they are not challenged most or all of the time. If the latter is the case, 
then neither side has a structural advantage. Judged from this perspective, the 
difference between a reasoned and a rhetorical consensus is thus a difference in 
degree. The ‘consensus’ reached according to intergovernmental bargaining 
models is however qualitatively different: Here, there is no agreement.
Let us now examine the outcomes of the different games and try to infer the 
substantiality of the consensus underlying them from how they came about and 
how long they ‘lasted’. With regard to the three rounds in the general Balkan game, 
I would argue that the substantiality of the agreement increased with each round.970 
The consensus underlying the Zagreb Summit of 24 November 2000 was, as I have 
argued in the previous section and Chapter 6, not a very deep one. At the time, the 
granting of a European perspective could even be considered a non-decision. It 
was clear that the Balkans, contrary to countries such as Morocco or Georgia, were 
‘part of Europe’. Acknowledging the EU’s obligation to stabilize the region was also 
rather uncontroversial. However, explicitly stating that this stabilization should be 
pursued through association (the SAP), was a bit more substantial. Here the 
member states accepted a commitment, that at least some of them were not too 
eager to live up to.971 But it would go too far to state that Council managed 
significantly to surpass the lowest common denominator here. For this, the material 
consequences that stemmed from this new commitment were still too diffuse. 
These abstract verbal commitments nevertheless formed the impetus for the 
Thessaloniki Summit of June 2003. Without Zagreb, the Greeks would have had a 
969 To be sure, this ‘shaming’ does not have to lead to personal feelings of embarrassment. It refers to the 
more general notion of member states’ sensing that there is currently no basis of support for their claims, 
and therefore refraining from openly intervening on the matter. 
970 The substance of the agreement also did change, particularly between the second and the third round. 
971 See Chapter 4, Section 1. The Netherlands were one of the more hesitant member states in this regard. 
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difficult time pressing for this member-specific priority. Presidency and Commission 
could present Thessaloniki as ‘the necessary re-evaluation of the SAP’. 
Nevertheless, to get the Council to move from a general political statement to an 
actual ‘Agenda’, required a lot of verbal side payments. The words that made up the 
Thessaloniki Declaration stress conditions (sticks) more than incentives (carrots). In 
this, it would form the prelude for the third round of the general Balkan game, that 
would take place throughout 2006. It was in fact only the notion of ‘absorption 
capacity’ that was to be added to the equation. 
A rhetorical consensus still formed the basis for Thessaloniki: ‘giving them 
everything/ anything but candidate status’. One could argue that a reasoned 
consensus came about with the ‘renewed consensus on enlargement’ of December 
2006. The consensus was that the EU needed to remain true to its commitments as 
well as credible in the conditions it posed. This consensus has since then seldom 
been challenged.972 After 2006, there was far less pushing for dates or pleading for 
shortcuts. The trajectory was now more or less clear. When a country overstepped 
the boundaries of the appropriate (such as Slovenia in 2008), others (most notably 
the Commission) would pre-emptively blow the whistle on them.973 In that sense the 
March 2006 Salzburg Summit marked the end of an era. Fast-track membership 
was off the agenda and the mantra of ‘practicable measures to make the European 
perspective more tangible’ gained centre stage. Drivers and brakemen had 
(necessarily) found each other in making the process manageable. The consensus 
on the pace might still be rhetorical, the consensus on the approach was real.974
In Chapter 7, I have discussed in great length the successive steps in the debate 
about opening accession negotiations with Croatia. In the previous section, I have 
underlined the extent to which this was a debate not about content (to what extent 
Croatia should at that time cooperate with the ICTY and what should be offered in 
return) but mainly about procedures (the setting of dates, the technical or political 
nature of decisions, the embedding of assessments). The single most important 
observation in this regard is the persistent lack of agreement on these procedures. 
The ‘mystery’ on whether asking for an avis constituted a political act was never 
solved. Whether it was appropriate to set dates and mention timelines, was the 
subject of three debates. But in the end drivers and brakemen still disagreed on the 
matter.975 While one could argue that drivers won the battle on dates, brakemen 
972 Author’s interview, Coreper level, 7-7-2010.
973 Author’s interview, Working party level, 27-7-2010.
974 Whether institutional reform should precede further enlargements had also been left under ambiguity. 
975 These debates took place in the run-up to the June 2004 European Council, the December 2004 
European Council and the June 2005 Council. See Chapter 7, Section 1.
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won the battle on assessments. Drivers were unable to find a way to argue around 
Del Ponte. Which meant that the General Prosecutor’s judgements had to be 
acquired one way or the other. But drivers could still challenge the procedural 
set-up of these assessments. Taskforces and Action plans and explicit statements 
that ‘the Council is the ultimate assessor’ was what they managed to obtain. 
Brakemen focussed their attention on getting the Council to adopt firm Conclusions 
on ICTY cooperation as an essential requirement already at this stage of the 
accession process. The October 2004 and January 2005 Conclusions were clear 
victories for them. There was not even a pseudo consensus on postponing the 
opening of negotiations in March 2005. It could only be achieved by means of 
verbal side payments to the drivers. The most explicit one was the open 
acknowledgment: “that Croatia is a candidate country for membership and that a 
bilateral intergovernmental conference should be convened so that negotiations 
may be started”.976 These side payments, I believe, provided the drivers with an 
advantage in the next round. The drivers wasted no time in pressing home their 
advantage. Already in June 2005 they got the Council to acknowledge that the 
matter was back on the agenda. 
Can we explain the ‘breakthrough’ of October 2005 in terms of a trade-off?977 If we 
assume that the UK had a bigger interest in Turkey, we come a long way. But if this 
was supposed to be a package deal, it was a highly unfavourable one for Austria, 
at least in terms of domestic constraints.978 Was the opening of accession 
negotiations the very least (the lowest common denominator) the Council could do? 
After Del Ponte’s positive assessment, one might argue this was the case. This was 
without doubt an example of entrapment. But the brakemen must have been aware 
of this trap ever since Del Ponte’s U-turn of April 2004.979 It seems that there was 
simply no way to avoid it. It was the most promising response to the drivers’ 
successful attempts to keep the matter on the table. For a long time the brakemen 
had been able to appease the drivers with verbal side payments. But in the end 
they themselves had to settle for one: ‘that full cooperation needed to be maintained’. 
976 2649th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 16-3-2005. Council Conclusions. Enlargement. Croatia. 
Croatia had achieved candidacy at the June 2004 European Council, but the explicit mentioning of the 
need to open negotiations was new. The other side payments were: the revealing of internal dissension 
on the matter, and the explicit promise that the negotiations would start at the very moment the Council 
noted full cooperation. A new debate about the matter was thereby precluded.
977 This ‘breakthrough’ was the simultaneous opening of accession negotiations with Croatia and Turkey. It is 
doubtful whether the UK indeed had more to gain on Turkey than it had to lose on Croatia. The UK must 
have been aware that Turkey’s was a open-ended process and thus likely to become a never-ending story. 
978 Cf. Die Presse, 4-10-2005, ‘Türkei-Beitritt: Österreich lenkt ein’. Blocking Turkey seems to have had 
priority over helping Croatia for the majority of the Austrian public.
979 Author’s interviews, Coreper and Working party level, 27-5-2010, 7-7-2010, 14-7-2010.
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Croatia’s difficulties in closing Chapter 23 of the accession negotiations, on 
Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, were to a substantial degree the result of this 
2005 side payment.980
If we look at the outcomes of the (different rounds of the) Serbia game, we can at 
least eventually observe a consensus on the procedures: a positive (ICTY) 
assessment as the basis for a ‘step by step’ approach. It took the member states a 
long time to get there. The logic of one side getting the decision while the other side 
gets the language, we see most explicitly reflected in the SAA game.981 The opening, 
suspension, resumption, signing and freezing, unfreezing of the SAA, as well as the 
asking for an avis were all achieved by means of verbal side payments.982 Did these 
side payments provide the receiver with a head start in the next round? I would 
argue they did. The speedy suspension of the negotiations would not have been 
‘appropriate’, had the Council not already stressed that possibility when it opened 
them.983 A resumption would have been highly unlikely if the definition of full 
cooperation had not been temporarily slackened.984 But after that it was again about 
Serbia’s “performance” instead of its “commitment”.985 Seeing that performances 
could normally only be judged by the General Prosecutor, the drivers had to provide 
a lot of side payments so as to enable the signing of the SAA. The following two and 
a half years would be about the Netherlands cashing in on the verbal acquisitions 
of April 2008. By October 2010 these words were worn out and statements 
concerning ‘a constructive approach to regional cooperation’ gained centre stage. 
It seems that all in all - and even with the standard operating procedures in place - 
there was little automatism in the Serbia game. In this particular case, the default 
option was certainly not to proceed. But one can also not maintain that the Council 
was completely unable to surpass the lowest common denominator. The 
Netherlands would have very much preferred to wait for Mladic. Others had too little 
at stake to get into a fight with the Dutch about this. The progress that was made, 
albeit it slow, proves that a rhetorical consensus can be causally significant indeed. 
980 Author’s interview, Working party level, 27-9-2010.
981 This refers back to Expectations 3 and 4 of the Council Conclusions Reader. See Chapter 2, Section 3.
982 The exception to the rule is the decision to start the ratification process in June 2010. This appears to 
have become an almost routine matter by now. Most of these side-payments were ICTY related, but some 
(for example in December 2009 and October 2010) were related to Serbia’s behaviour towards Kosovo. 
983 Of course, technically the suspension would have been possible without this explicit statement. But it 
would have appeared odd that the EU invested in the start of negotiations, which would then almost 
instantly be broken off again.
984 ‘Temporarily’ because the brakemen would not allow that same definition to apply to the signing of the SAA. 
985 The first term features in the Council Conclusions of June 2007, the second in those of February 2007.
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The substantiality of the consensus on Bosnia is called into question even by those 
who created it: ‘to get the country in shape so that it can apply for membership’.986 
Bosnia should not be left behind, was the mantra of the drivers. Bosnia should 
simply start fulfilling the conditions, said the brakemen. Achieving both these aims 
seems improbable to say the least. There has never been a shortage of reform 
requirements in the case of Bosnia. This meant that the consensus that needed to 
be reached was on prioritizing. As I have shown in the previous section the 
consensus on prioritizing police and then constitutional reforms was (and still is) at 
best rhetorical. Is it more than a veneer? There is, I believe, no denying that the 
consensus on prioritizing police reforms worked as glue. Once the Council had 
explicitly stressed the matter, so as to appease brakemen and enable the start of 
SAA negotiations in November 2005, it remained a key priority for the years to 
come. But after December 2007, when the Commission jumped on the opportunity 
to use ‘renewed commitment to police reforms’ as sufficient for initializing the SAA, 
the glue did not hold anymore. One could argue that this was because member 
states were also glad to get rid of this particular conditionality.987 The glue on 
constitutional reforms (which would enable the transfer from OHR to EUSR), applied 
particularly in December 2009, was decomposed a bit in the Conclusions of 
2010.988 But the priority as such was still there. The Netherlands might have cashed 
in all its verbal side payments on Serbia by now. But the UK could still remind 
member states on what they had signed up to especially in March 2008: ‘continued 
support for the OHR until all conditions were met’. 
There have been too few decisions on Kosovo to come to any kind of conclusions 
on whether the verbal side payments offered during the game, have provided either 
side with an advantage. The consensus on the recognition of Kosovo – ‘a matter to 
be decided in accordance with national practice and international law’ – is of course 
a veneer. The substantiality of the consensus on the European perspective remains 
hard to assess. Even insiders have difficulty explaining what advantage the non-
recognizers might get out of the continued reference to a ‘European perspective in 
line with the perspective of the region’ or the omission of the word ‘feasibility’ in the 
October 2009 ‘study’. Unless I am completely mistaken, this really seems to be 
986 Author’s interviews, PSC and Working party level, 10-9-2010, 3-11-2010.
987 It was after all a conditionality introduced by HR Ashdown. See Chapter 7, Section 2.
988 Here the Council no longer explicitly states “that it will not be in a position to consider an application for 
membership by Bosnia and Herzegovina until the transition of the OHR to a reinforced EU presence has 
been decided.” In long and winding words it stressed that “The country needs to urgently address the 
political criteria…and speed up the relevant reforms…Such further steps, preceding a credible application 
for EU-membership, will be considered by the Council in line with the progress Bosnia and Herzegovina 
still needs to achieve.” 3060th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 14-12-2010. Enlargement 
Conclusions. Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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cheap talk. Or more aptly put, these words throw a little sand in the engine.989 They 
do not help to speed up the EU integration of Kosovo, but they do little to change 
the process as such. 
Moving beyond the lowest common denominator in Council debates on Macedonia 
has been challenging to say the least. The perhaps only real breakthrough occurred 
in the second round. It came with the most extensive list of verbal side payments of 
all. The European Council Conclusions mainly addressed the more general 
concerns, that did not solely apply to Macedonia. But the April 2005 Council 
Conclusions and the November 2005 Commission Opinion (subsequently endorsed 
by the European Council of December) effectively upgraded the GNR conditionality 
from a member-specific concern into a Community level criterion.990 Greece saw no 
need to use this verbal ammunition in the next couple of years, which might explain 
why it has not been completely used up by now. But that need came in 2009 in 
anticipation of the Commission avis (to open membership negotiations). I would not 
claim that the shows of solidarity of December 2009 and June 2010 were caused 
by the rhetorical battles won by Greece in 2005 and again in 2008.991 But these 
verbal side payments did make it a lot easier for member states to justify their 
solidarity with Greece. If this had been openly acknowledged as a bilateral dispute, 
as was the case with the Slovene-Croat conflict, putting pressure on the sympathizers 
of Greece would have been far more easy.992 It is hard to come to a definitive 
judgment on how ‘significant’ the verbal side payments in the Macedonia game 
really were. But I think the least we can say is that they provided Greece, one of the 
losers of the second round of the Macedonia game, with a head start in the third 
round. 
I have started my analysis of the Balkan pre-accession game with the image of ‘the 
double bluff’ in which the EU pretends to offer membership, while the Balkan 
countries pretend to reform.993 My analysis only allows me to say something about 
the Brussels’ side of the bluff. The slow pace and erratic pattern by which the 
Balkan countries have been moving closer to Brussels, has often been blamed on 
989 Although in this particular case, it does not appear that the engine is breaking down because of the sand. 
990 See Chapter 8, Section 2 on the exact reading of these statements. Commission officials maintain that 
there is always a full stop between the Acquis related criteria and remarks about Good Neighbourly 
Relations. This is true and perhaps relevant from a legal perspective. But from a negotiation perspective, 
that ‘full stop’ is too little to prevent the use of such statements as ‘verbal ammunition’. 
991 In December 2008 in particular Greece got the Council openly to acknowledge that “actions and 
statements which could negatively impact on good neighbourly relations should be avoided”. 
992 Putting pressure on the ones in the argumentative trenches, is not that worthwhile. A potentially more 
rewarding strategy is to focus one’s attention on the protective belt of member states surrounding them. 
993 See the introduction to Chapter 4. 
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an EU, and a Council in particular, that is unable to deliver. Underlying such 
impressions is an intergovernmental bargaining logic: the Council is structurally 
incapable of surpassing the lowest common denominator. Not a lot of effort has 
been put in explaining why this is the case. Easy explanations are often sought and 
found on the level of intentions. Particular member states do not want specific 
Balkan states to become members. The reservations of the few then explain why 
the Council as a whole was unable to move. By means of the previous analysis, I 
have tried to show why this reasoning is flawed. First of all, the Council has been 
able to transcend the lowest common denominator on the Balkans as a whole, on 
Croatia and Serbia and to a somewhat lesser extent on Macedonia, Bosnia and 
perhaps even Kosovo. Second, intentionality matters less than the institutionalized 
procedures by which such intentions need to be transformed into actions and then 
results. The Balkan pre-accession game was never about confronting and 
overcoming those in the trenches. It was about finding a way to argue around them, 
so that they themselves would come to realize that they were stuck in a ‘Maginot 
line’. This, I believe, shows that EU debates need not be competitive in order for 
them to be causally significant. If we want to be able to grasp the character of the 
Balkan pre-accession game we need to look at the procedures that bind all, instead 
of the reservations of the few.
It is by these very same procedures that winners and losers are decided. This refers 
to the fourth category of observable implications as delineated in Chapter 3. The 
added value of the Caucus race model lies in its ability to account for the procedural 
pathways that (pre)determine eventual success. Rationalist scholars usually try to 
deduce such success from abstract calculations based on exogenously determined 
interests. Constructivists tend to infer it from at best uncertain appraisals of 
endogenously induced changes in (dis)positions. The Caucus race model defines 
success in a bureau-political way. It thereby seeks to draw attention to a blind spot 
in current Council theorizing. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with the image of 
Council negotiator as ‘staunch defenders of the national interest’. They may at the 
very same time be seen to take the concerns of the Community as a whole into 
account.994 But in their day to day proceedings, they are, I believe, first and foremost 
bureau-political actors, who have an interest in safeguarding their relevance as a 
group and in the group. They are thus bound by, and perhaps even socialized into, 
the organizational rules and maxims that drive the interactions in this environment. 
And it is these organizational rules that determine how processes lead to outcomes, 
and how winners are distinguished from losers.
994 This refers back to the image of ‘Janus-faced’ officials, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Section 1.
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Underlying the Caucus race model lies the perception that in many political 
interactions, the (only) substantive battles are in fact the procedural ones.995 Which 
would imply that the most successful participants are those who are able to bend 
the rules and twist the procedures to their advantage. However, it appears that the 
procedures in the Council have something of an built-in compensatory mechanism. 
It is this bureau-political mechanism, that the Caucus race model above all has 
tried to capture. 
This mechanism is such that it precludes vigorous and unequivocal responses to 
the challenges faced. To explain why this is the case, I need only to refer back to the 
maxim that has already been mentioned in Chapter 1: “The only way to get 
something in the Council is by others allowing you to have it.”996 Those who aim to 
get a lot out of specific negotiations are more likely to interfere with the races of 
others. These others might perhaps be disposed, by the consensual norms that 
guide Council interactions, to look favourably upon their counterparts’ requests. 
But they still have to make sure that this does not interfere with their (ministers’ or 
countries’) own race. Big ambitions are therefore perceived as threatening. This 
explains why member states will above all want to make it appear as if everything 
they want, is business as usual. In the Balkan pre-accession game it was seldom 
business as usual. The fourteen stages that came to make up the overall game in 
fact never made it into the rulebook.997 Their coming about was the result of a series 
of small argumentative battles, in which one side was trying to create rapids, as the 
other side was trying to create diversions or build dams. If one side would push for 
shortcuts (for example opening SAA negotiations with Bosnia, candidacy for 
Macedonia, signing an SAA with Serbia), the other side would propose intermediate 
steps (a second stage in the SAA, separating candidacy from the opening of 
accession negotiations, decoupling the signing from the ratification of the SAA). 
The almost inevitable result was that neither side was able to acquire a structural 
advantage. 
The standard operating procedures, that were established in the second half of the 
decade, were the result of lessons learned. Drivers and brakemen slowly started to 
find each other in something resembling a ‘standardized approach’. Henceforth, 
995 A second presupposition is that participation in this process is a necessary precondition for being 
considered (more or less) successful. This to prevent actors from being able to claim that the decision 
making process was already moving in their direction, without them even having to invest in the process. 
In Chapter 2, Section 1, I explain why it is reasonable only to take into account the positions of those, who 
are actively engaged in the plenary part of the proceedings.
996 Author’s interviews, Council and Working party level, 27-5-2010, 14-7-2010, 28-6-2012.
997 See Chapter 5, Section 3 for an elaboration of these different steps.
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responsible decision making tended to be equated with a willingness to allow 
matters to run their natural course. Even though all were aware that there was still a 
lot of peddling needed below the surface. But as long as this peddling did not 
cause too many waves at the surface, all had an interest in allowing this functional 
myth to endure. To those looking at Council decision making from the outside, it 
might appear that, at least when it comes to the Balkans, the Council nowadays 
tends to ‘go with the flow’. Even participants may hardly recognize that they are the 
ones creating this flow. The mechanism prevents both drivers and brakemen from 
dictating the course. But it is by the ‘tyranny’ of their individual efforts, that the 
Council as a whole is provided with traction.
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11. Concluding remarks 
11.1 Overview: The governing dynamics of Council negotiations 
Consensual processes and weak outcomes. This characterization of EU negotiations 
formed the starting point of my analysis. I have presented an example of a (supposedly) 
typical Council debate in the Introduction. There we have seen the Council’s Political 
and Security Committee (PSC) struggling to come to an understanding about how to 
react to the apparent legality of Kosovo’s independence. The consensus that was 
eventually reached, lacked substantiality. Rather, the Council decided to convey a 
message that was vague and open to different interpretations. Moreover, it was a 
message that appeared to be outdated the very moment it was sent. 
The example confirms to an image of Council decision making that reaches us 
through the press. Before the doors close, we can observe exaggerated protocol 
and stage managed camaraderie. When the doors (finally) open again, we see 
similar spectacles of solidarity. One can then rush to any of the press briefings to 
hear that ministers had a ‘constructive debate’, or at the very least ‘an interesting 
exchange of opinions’, after which they found themselves in almost complete 
agreement. Meetings, particularly in the issue area of foreign policy, typically end 
with the Council making a number of statements, in which the ministers can share 
their concerns or express their preferred course of developments. It is just the actual 
decision, that is often missing. But usually ministers have no trouble reassuring 
bystanders that they are getting there, all in due time.
What we normally do not see, is what happened in between. Outsiders have speculated, 
on the basis of the anecdotal evidence provided by participants, about (the distinctive-
ness of) the negotiation culture in the Council.998 Yet, we still know very little about how 
this consensus making mechanism actually works. The overarching goal of this study 
was to try to grasp some of the governing dynamics of Council negotiations. I believe 
they are to be found in language. More specifically, the language with which the Council 
chooses to express itself. By tracing the way in which this language evolved, I hoped to 
be able to reveal the workings of this mechanism.
I have presented two overarching goals: 
1. To describe, characterize and explain Council negotiations.
2. To explain what comes out of these negotiations, in terms of words (statements) 
as well as deeds (decisions).
998 See Chapter 1 on theorizing EU negotiations, where I have elaborated different understandings of 
Council debates.
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In Part I have concerned myself with theories and methodologies. I have started my 
search for the governing dynamics by first looking at ‘conventional’ theorizing on 
interstate and EU negotiations. But, as I hope to have shown in Chapter 1, current 
negotiation theories fail to grasp some of the particularities of these negotiations. 
Council negotiations present the two currently dominant theoretical perspectives, 
rationalist intergovernmental bargaining and constructivist deliberative theories 
with a problem. What EU Member states appear to be predominantly engaged in, 
resembles neither bargaining nor deliberating.999 A different kind of ‘debating’ 
seems to hold centre stage. This I have tried to capture with the help of the metaphor 
of the Caucus race. In Chapter 2 I have presented an alternative understanding of 
Council negotiations. Here, I have tried to turn the metaphor into a full blown 
negotiation model. In Chapter 3 I have operationalized this theoretical model and 
specified its observable implications. I have particularly tried to delineate wherein 
these implications differ from those of the rationalist and constructivist models. 
The added value of any theoretical model lies less in its analytical elegance than in 
its empirical applicability. In Part II of this study, I have prepared the ground for 
applying the model. I have presented the negotiations I would focus on: the 
debate(s) about the European perspective of the Western Balkans. In Chapter 4, I 
have explained some of the general characteristics of the negotiations in this 
particular field. I have introduced the players and their positions as either driver or 
brakemen, and sketched the race course: the five levels on which the Balkan 
negotiations have taken place. In Chapter 5, I have outlined the general profile of 
the debate, in terms of the set-up and the rules of the game.
Part III consisted of an historical analysis of the actual negotiations. My approach has 
been largely chronological. I have delineated four distinct time periods. Chapter 6 has 
described the coming about of the European perspective in the period of 2000 to 2003. 
This was the period in which the Council added content and meaning to the ‘potential 
candidacy’ of the Balkan countries. But, as we have seen, the real debate between the 
member states had not really started yet. In Chapter 7 I have discussed the second 
period from 2003 until 2005. This was arguably the most exciting period, when member 
states had to agree on how actually to deal with the integration requests of specific 
Balkan countries. This was also the period in which it appeared that drivers had the 
upper hand. Although the analysis has shown that their advantage was in fact quite 
small. Extensive (verbal) side payments were needed to keep the process going. This 
shows that (even in this period) there was little self-evidence in the process. Rather, the 
Caucus race characteristics ensured that a balance was kept. 
999 This is not to claim that arguing and bargaining do not take place at all. Rather, the claim is that in day to 
day decision making a different kind of mechanism seems to govern interactions.
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Chapter 8 has discussed the period 2005 to 2008, when some standard operating 
procedures for dealing with the (Balkan) enlargement came into being. Doubts about 
the enlargement process as such, and the way in which it was to be carried out, 
meant that brakemen now found themselves in a better position. But again the 
analysis showed that their advantage was limited. Brakemen could not prevent all 
movement (beyond the lowest common denominator). Instead of stalemate, we see 
a Council ‘muddling through’. The typical pattern, in which one side gets the decision 
and the other the preferred language, ensured that it was indeed a race in which all 
could have prizes. Chapter 9 has discussed the most recent period of 2008 to 2010, 
where we can doubt whether there was still a lot of actual debate going on. I compared 
the three for this study most important countries: Serbia, Bosnia and Macedonia.1000 
From a negotiation perspective, comparing these three cases has been particularly 
insightful. This is because we were presented with three member states (United 
Kingdom, Greece and the Netherlands) that stood isolated. By analyzing how some 
managed to withstand the pressure (of all), while others less so, we have been able 
to learn a lot about how Caucus races are won and lost. 
Chapter 10 of Part IV has been about establishing connections between the different 
games and rounds. Here, I have tried to distinguish case-specific idiosyncrasies 
from systematic observations. I have sought to draw general conclusions about the 
distinctive characteristics of Council negotiations, primarily but not only with regard 
to the Western Balkans. I have tried to show that the Caucus race model is (more) 
successful in explaining Council negotiations (than rationalist or constructivist 
models). I have also tried to identify the governing dynamics of these negotiations. 
They are in essence about credible commitment to legitimate concerns to be 
mentioned at the appropriate time. Whether or not the latter is the case, depends 
on the specific configuration of participants and the races they are at that time 
involved in. Whether and what outcomes are reached, depends on the endurance 
of the players, rather than the strength (size) of their country or the soundness of 
their arguments. Council negotiations are about anticipating the momentum. 
Sometimes the momentum is already there. At other times, one can try to create (or 
diffuse) momentum, mainly with help of the (interventions of) like minded. But the 
key lies in being able correctly to assess what is and what is not moving in Brussels. 
Council negotiations thus circle around the twin processes of anticipation and 
orchestration. Those who can master both will probably be the ones taking home 
most prizes. 
1000 Croatia had by then already left the Balkan pre-accession game. Kosovo has been pretty much stuck at 
square one. Montenegro’s integration into Europe was relatively uncontroversial. Lastly, Albania has 
always been somewhat of an isolated case (the proverbial ‘ugly sister’), in which the main obstacles to 
EU integration stemmed from internal difficulties instead of disagreement between EU member states. 
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In the present chapter, I have started with providing an outline of this study. In the 
subsequent section, I will consider further implications this research project might 
have for the study of (Council) negotiations in general. In the final section, I will 
shortly engage myself with what is arguably the most relevant question: how to 
negotiate. 
11.2   Reflection: How to bring forward the study of (Council) 
negotiations?
Science is the art of systematic over-simplification (Popper, 1982: 44). Science and 
art are typically presented as each other’s opposites. Yet, when studying social 
processes as ‘soft’ as negotiations, the two poles necessarily have to come together. 
This is to be able to get away from the colourful memoirs (cf. MacMillan, 2001), but 
also from the commonsensical insights (cf. Fischer & Ury, 1981). Reality will no doubt 
keep interfering with the parsimony of our (negotiation) theories. There may be some 
who maintain that the art of negotiating can never be captured in comprehensive 
theoretical statements. This study has nevertheless attempted to do so.
A lot has already been said, particularly in Chapter 3, about the benefits and 
drawbacks that come with this kind of interdisciplinary research. There, I have tried 
to justify the trade-offs that had to be made between internal and external validity, 
between sources and evidence, and above all between empirical richness and 
analytical rigour. In short, I have tried to combine the strengths of journalistic, 
historical and social scientific research. I have sought direct access, hard sources, 
a compelling story as well as generalizable insights. Here I will focus on some of the 
weaknesses, which could and perhaps should be addressed in future research.
Journalists attach great value to acquiring information firsthand. This is part of their 
instinct. Often, one can doubt whether there is real added value to ‘being there’ and 
‘talking to the people on the ground’. It is certainly not a very efficient way to gather 
empirical data. A lot of time is often spent on finding the ones involved and then 
inducing them to provide more than a few general comments on the matter. 
Moreover, for the issue areas of foreign policy making, enlargement and particularly 
the Western Balkans, a wealth of secondary data is available (cf. Schwarz, 2010). 
Yet, for this study a disproportionate amount of time and effort has nevertheless 
been put in acquiring firsthand evidence. Journalistic obstinacy was partly the 
reason for choosing this approach. I have read most, but seldom referred to any, of 
the reports written by expert observers or press monitors. I have followed the 
debates on the EU’s Balkan policies, as they took place within and between different 
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think tanks and research institutes, such as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), the 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the International Crisis Group (ICG). But I 
have seldom referred to them explicitly.1001 Instead, I have often relied on interview 
data and personal observations, which admittedly were sometimes hard to verify.1002 
From a social scientific point of view, one can justly criticize this approach. Maybe 
I have sometimes overestimated my own and my respondents’ capacity correctly to 
assess matters. Maybe I should have relied more on the assessments of others. 
Social scientists generally seem to care less about the originality of their data and 
more about the creative and reliable way in which they can be analyzed or 
manipulated. Methodological purists would claim that this is in fact the (only) proper 
way to proceed. It is just that, at least in this particular field of study, most events 
have already been thoroughly studied. And all (accessible) data has by now been 
used over and over again. So, one can wonder whether another run to ‘Euro-ba-
rometers’ and ‘Conflict monitors’ really helps the discipline forward. What can we 
truly learn from creatively combining insights that other outsiders have provided? 
Journalists arrogantly assume that the only way truly to understand matters is by 
being present: by witnessing something with your own eyes or at least talking to 
those who were directly involved.1003 The same arrogance underlies this research 
project.
Historians above all value the quality of sources. They generally care less about 
(grand) theories or (sophisticated) methodologies. History as an academic discipline is 
part of the ‘Arts’. As I have explained in Chapter 3, for the historian the added value 
of an accurate and convincing reconstruction of historical events, lies in the 
reconstruction itself. Chronology is sacred to them, which explains why (bad) histo-
ry-writing is often referred to as ‘one damned thing after another’ (Toynbee, 1957). 
The same critique might apply to some parts of this study. Parts II and III in particular 
served to provide the interested reader with such a historical reconstruction. They 
could perhaps be read separately as a (hopefully) catching but (nevertheless) 
realistic description of ‘the games governments play in Brussels’ (cf. Naurin & 
Wallace, 2008). A tendency to reconstruct sequences of events may have sometimes 
1001 This also has to do with the fact that such reports tend to parrot each other. More importantly they tend 
to reify assessments made in Strategy Papers and Progress Reports by the Commission (for example on 
the ‘temporarily improved’ ICTY cooperation of Serbia in 2005 en 2008), whereas I have tried to find out 
what motivated the Commission to come to such an assessment. 
1002 Although, as I have explained in Chapter 3, the reports of the interviews can be obtained by those willing 
to respect the confidentiality arrangements applying to them. A list of the respondents can be found in 
Appendix I as well as on the author’s website. This should allow the reader to verify whether the sample 
of respondents was sufficiently broad and representative. 
1003 From this point of view I highly regret not having been able to talk to High Representative, Xavier Solana, 
Commissioner, Olli Rehn and Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt.
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won out over the need to provide the reader with adequate (analytical) guidance. 
Readers, particularly those who were completely unfamiliar with the proceedings in 
Brussels and/or the Balkans, might at times have felt lost, for instance in the 
complicated debates about Bosnia. Which coincidentally is an adequate reflection 
of how (at least some of the) participants felt.1004 Council debates can be messy; 
Council Conclusions incomprehensible. Outside observers tend to ascribe (often 
with hindsight) more rationality and intentionality to them than insiders would. 
Scholars are inclined to observe patterns, where there often are none. My approach 
was to stay as close as possible to the experiences and perceptions of those 
involved. The goal was after to all to capture the day to day realities of Council 
negotiations. But this excessive narrativism might have sometimes come at the 
expense of an univocal interpretation.
Social scientists usually claim that they want to do more than ‘story-telling’.1005 Part 
I and IV encompass an attempt to live up to Popper’s maxim. These served to 
explain what is typical about Council negotiations. Some might consider a weakness 
of this study to be the case selection. If I want to understand the typical character-
istics of Council negotiations, why have I chosen such a seemingly atypical issue 
area as the Western Balkans? There is a practical and a more fundamental reason 
for doing so. First, this is an issue area in which the Council can act rather 
autonomously: meaning without formal involvement of the European Parliament 
and without much interference from pressure groups or lobbyists. The Commission 
proved to be more prominently present, than I had expected at the outset. But I still 
maintain that this issue area offers perhaps the best opportunities for studying 
Council proceedings in themselves. Second, foreign policy making may not be 
considered to be at the heart of EU decision making, but enlargement certainly is. 
Enlargement is about more than ‘just’ values (whether or not countries are 
considered to be ‘part of Europe’). It is also about ‘bread and butter’ concerns, 
such as the conditions for allowing Croatian Anchovies and Macedonian wine onto 
the European Market. It is, as we have seen in Chapter 8, about ensuring the 
functioning of the EU as a whole. These are not struggles in the margins. Some will 
maintain that, in the case of the Balkans, there never was much at stake, at least not 
from a material perspective. However, from a Brussels perspective, the Balkans 
continues to be the single most important region with which the EU has had to 
concern itself. Nevertheless, it would be very interesting to see whether, and to 
1004 Author’s interview, PSC level, 10-9-2010.
1005 Although, as I have elaborated on in Chapter 3, Section 2, it could very well be that social scientists are 
deluding themselves in thinking that their approach is qualitatively different from that of historians. I would 
argue that the main difference is that the latter are usually far less explicit about the claims they are trying 
to make about patterns and regularities in the empirical world.
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what extent, the Caucus model also applies to the negotiations in perhaps more 
obvious issue areas, such as the Internal Market, the Common Agricultural Policy 
or the Euro.1006 
Scientific knowledge grows by means of “conjectures and refutations” (Popper, 
2004). This study might have focused a bit too much on the former, at the expense 
of the latter. I have made a lot of claims, which I could not always ‘test’ to the extent 
that I would have liked. After all, I primarily wanted to present a new theoretical 
perspective; in the words of John Nash, an original idea. Hopefully, I have been 
able to collect a sufficient amount of ‘circumstantial evidence’ to show that this idea 
is not only original, but also plausible. Still, some more modest scholars might feel 
that in a normal scientific environment, even an abundance of circumstantial 
evidence does not allow for any tentative verdict.1007 However, I believe, negotiation 
theory is not (yet) part of ‘normal science’ (Kuhn, 1964). Scientific debates about 
Council negotiations display some of the same characteristics often attributed to 
Council debates themselves. With some notable exceptions (cf. Häge, 2008, Neyer, 
2004), the field seems to have reached an impasse, with one side that continues to 
black box the process, while the other is still forced to make unverifiable claims 
about the outcomes. All in all there still appears to be little agreement on what 
constitutes the ‘hard core’ of this particular ‘research programme’ (Lakatos, 1978). 
This study has tried to meet the challenge posed by one of the protagonists in this 
scholarly debate: “If we do not advance some causal mechanism as to why 
unanimous decisions are more frequent than one would expect, we cannot move 
further in our understanding of this particular institution” (Schneider, 2008: 281). To 
this end, it has presented a number of concrete and contingent, but at the same 
time sufficiently general conjectures about the governing dynamics of Council 
negotiations. In this way, I hope it will help revitalize the academic study of EU 
negotiations and political negotiations in general.
1006 The latter in particular is interesting in view of claims, by participants but especially in the press, that 
because of the Euro/debt crisis, the member states have become far more confrontational in their 
approach.
1007 I deliberately speak in terms of a tentative rather than a definitive ‘verdict’. There is a tendency to equate 
Popperian thinking with naïve falsificationism, as if we could design crucial empirical tests with which we 
could refute a theory. A theory does not conflict with ‘the facts’, because what we consider to be a crucial 
fact is determined by that theory. Rather than trying to refute specific theoretical propositions, we should 
be looking for progressive development within research programmes (Lakatos, 1978). 
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11.3. Final consideration: ‘But then how to win?’ 
Good negotiating is about achieving what you want without getting, or forcing 
others, into a situation in which you or the other has to be very explicit. The 
quintessential negotiator is the one who can limit himself to mentioning matters, but 
never has to insist. This is because the latter involves a substantial investment of 
social resources (in terms of credibility, reputation and social status). Anyone who 
invests resources is prompted to look for returns. Underlying this reasoning is a 
Darwinian logic. The environment ‘rewards’ the winner of social interactions 
(‘signalling games’) with social standing (a higher ranking in the ‘positional game’). 
Those with a higher standing have to invest less resources to get returns. Those 
with a lower standing will have to invest more resources to get any of their concerns 
noted and taken into account. In a setting in which actors interact frequently and 
know that they are stuck with one another for the foreseeable future, standing and 
reputation thus become the standard currency. And those with most to spend, will 
be least inclined to spend it.
The individual disinclination to squander social resources makes the organizational 
unit as a whole inflexible when having to react to (sudden changes in) its environment. 
This structurally induced inflexibility has become one of the cornerstones of bu-
reau-political theorizing (cf. Lieshout, 1995: 156-158). Too often this inflexibility has 
been blamed on participants, who put their own - or in this case their national - 
interests above what is in the general interest (cf. ‘t Hart & Rosenthal, 1998: 240). 
This is not a correct translation of what the bureaucratic model states about 
attitudes and dispositions. As Halperin has eloquently demonstrated, there is 
nothing morally discreditable about the behaviour of bureau-political actors. They 
do not necessarily act only in their self-interest nor do they consciously neglect the 
collective good. What does happen is that different actors act according to what 
they think is in the collective interest. Actors furthermore believe - and should believe 
- that their own contributions are crucial for realizing this collective goal (Halperin, 
Clapp & Kanter, 2006: 96). Therefore, actors above all strive to avoid marginalization 
(Allison, 1971: 76). They always want to remain involved, but never too prominently 
present. After all, their success is measured by the extent to which their individual 
efforts are reflected in the collective outcome. 
Bureau-political actors are judged, by press and public, as well as by their peers, 
not by their capacity always to win. They are judged on their ability to avoid losing. 
Engaging in competitive debates is therefore not a wise investment strategy. One 
could very well end up in a situation in which one has to admit argumentative 
defeat. This might feel like a satisfactory result for a naïve Popperian, eager to get 
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his conjectures refuted. But politicians, who reason along these lines would never 
make it to the higher echelons. Their environment is such that it expects returns on 
their argumentative investments. What struck me most as someone who had the 
privilege of being ‘parachuted’ into this organizational environment, was the truly 
inappropriate extent to which domestic press and public opinion seemed to be 
interested only in one thing: ‘how and why is this good for us?’ Ministers, certainly 
those with something at stake, simply cannot afford to lose time in intellectually 
challenging but politically uncertain debates. The ‘persuasiveness’ of plenary 
interventions primarily lies in the ability to ‘convince’ others that this is indeed a 
battle one wants to pick. An actor, who has committed himself to a certain issue, 
needs results. The ‘cosiness’ of the Council’s negotiation arena provides the 
participants with the means for achieving such results. This explains why, particularly 
in highly visible issue areas such as foreign policy and enlargement, Council 
members share an instrumental interest in upholding the metanorm of consensus. 
But it is unfortunately this same normative environment, that does not reward the 
more ‘deliberative’ forms of interaction.
When the mood was right, I tried to provoke my respondents into explaining me 
why, in day to day negotiations in Brussels, participants were so rarely inclined to 
put the squeeze on each other. Why do they so often fake understanding, when 
they would have preferred confronting their opponents? Why do they usually spend 
more time orchestrating the interventions of their like-minded, than on trying to 
convince those with a truly different opinion? Respondents were never offended by 
the question. But they pointed out that this prudent approach is in fact the only 
strategy that works. “The Council works from an almost post-modernist notion of 
consensus building. Negotiations therefore tend to be less ‘zero sum’ than 
elsewhere.”1008 What one should definitely not try to get out of these negotiations is 
a final verdict on who is (considered) right and who is wrong. There is something in 
these statements that transcends the Justus Lipsius, ‘the Brussels bubble’, or even 
the field of decision making as a whole. The ‘live and let live’ attitude, which 
characterizes so many of our interactions, has become an integral part of our social 
survival strategy. Whether we are ‘sincere’ or ‘strategic’ in our dispositions is in fact 
an irrelevant question to ask.1009 In politics, certainly in science and perhaps even 
in social life in general, those who did not live up to this maxim have for the larger 
part become extinct. They have been replaced by pseudo-neutral institutionalized 
procedures for deciding on winners and losers. Perhaps this is all for the best, 
seeing that these institutions and procedures provide us with non-confrontational 
1008 Author’s interviews, Working party level, 14-7-2010, 27-9-2010.
1009 Although there is no denying that, to refer back to March and Olson’s distinction, some appear to be 
generally more aware than others of the favourable consequences that stem from acting appropriately.
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ways to steer social encounters into a preferred direction. In the meantime, we can 
all comfortably continue with our own particular races. This however also means 
that we will seldom experience the joy and frustration that stem from an opponent 
truly taking you seriously. On the other hand, it becomes much easier to maintain 
that one has never lost an argument.
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Appendix I:
Details of the research project. List of interviewees
Participant observations & Insider reports: The observations were conducted from 
the Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the European 
Union in Brussels. The author was a member of the Dutch delegation to the Council 
Working Party on the Western Balkans (Coweb) and the Council Working Party on 
Enlargement (Coela). Other members of the delegation were Mr. Joost Flamand 
(Deputy Director European integration at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Ms. 
Sladjana Cemerikic. The necessary arrangements were made by Mr. Tony Agotha 
(Spokesperson of the Permanent Representation). The observations took place 
during the Spanish and the first part of the Belgium Presidency in 2010. As a 
member of the delegation, the author had access to the reports of the relevant 
Council meetings at the Working party, PSC, Coreper and ministerial level held, in 
particular since 2003, as well as other relevant documentary material since 2000. 
The author is not at liberty publically to share these reports, his field notes or any of 
the other material gathered during his work in the Council and the Permanent 
Representation. However, for verification purposes, access to this documents can 
be obtained, by those willing to sign and respect the confidentiality arrangements. 
To obtain access: please directly contact the author at: S.Smeets@fm.ru.nl. 
Interviews & Interview reports: The interviews were conducted in part during the 
stay at the Permanent Representation and in part afterwards. The author, primarily 
making use of the method of snowball sampling, strove to acquire a comprehensive 
overview (‘representative sample’) of persons involved in terms of member states, 
EU institutions and, most importantly, different Council levels. He opted for in-depth 
interviews with key players in the EU’s Balkan negotiations. Seventy-five interviews 
were held with participants of Council decision making on the domestic, Working 
party, PSC, Coreper and the ministerial level, Commission officials (Directors, 
members of the Commissioner’s Cabinet and of the different Balkan country Units), 
and officials working within the Council Secretariat (Western Balkan Unit, Policy 
Unit). Further interviews were held with senior representatives from the five Balkan 
countries, the European Parliament, as well as relevant ‘outsiders’, particularly from 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Most of these 
interviews were (necessarily) framed as informal background conversations. 
Detailed (and partly anonymous) reports of these interviews are nevertheless 
available for those willing to sign and respect the confidentiality arrangements. 
These interviews were set up as journalistic instead of social scientific interviews. 
The author has refrained from providing full transcripts of the conversations, nor 
348
Appendices
has he chosen to apply coding schemes to the material. Rather the reports were set 
up so as adequately to reflect (and summarize) the respondents’ recollections and 
viewpoints under a number of thematic headings. Respondents were provided with 
the opportunity to react to these reports and suggest changes (textual, but also 
with regard to content). If substantial changes were suggested, they were 
incorporated in a revised version (annotated as REV 1) of the report. To obtain these 
(revised) reports: please directly contact the author at: S.Smeets@fm.ru.nl. A list of 
the interviewees can be found below.
Formal Documentation and Council Conclusions: The formal outcomes of Council 
(ministerial) proceedings are (to a large extent) available to the general public. 
Access was obtained through the Council’s website: http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/documents. Particularly for the years 2000-2003 outcomes and reports were 
acquired through the Archives of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
European news agency: Agence Europe. For the period 2005-2010 these findings 
were complemented with (online) reports by EU Observer, as well as relevant 
domestic media in key member states. Documentation with regard to activities and 
reports of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Enlargement was 
obtained partly through their website: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement and partly 
through the (confidential) reports sent around on the Correspondance Européenne 
(Coreu) communication network. Relevant background information on the Western 
Balkans was obtained, amongst other sources. through the Southeast European 
Times and the Waz EU Observer on South Eastern Europe. Regular assessments of 
the developments with regard to the Western Balkans were primarily obtained 
through the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) – in particular the ‘Chaillot Papers’, 
the International Crisis Group (ISG) – in particular the ‘Europe Reports’ - and the 
regular reports of the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (FES).
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List of interviewees
Germany
Wilhelm Schönfelder, Coreper (II) Ambassador 1999-2007 (Brussels, 2011)
Edmund Duckwitz, Coreper (II) Ambassador 2007-2010, Coreper (II) chair 2007 (Brussels, 2010)
Christian Klein, Coweb delegate 2004-2005, Deputy Coreper (II) Ambassador (‘Antici’) 2005- 
2007, Deputy Ambassador Kosovo since 2010 (Pristina, 2010) 
Andrea Berdesinski, Coweb delegate 2006-2008, Coweb chair 2007 (Berlin, 2010)
Christoph Wolfrum, Coweb delegate 2008-2009, Civcom delegate since 2009 (Brussels, 2010)
Carsten Wilms, Desk Officer EU-Western Balkan Relations Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Auswärtiges Ambt) since 2008, Envoy to Slovene EU Presidency 2008, (Berlin, 2010)
Alexander Jung, Coweb delegate 2009-2011 (Brussels, 2010)
France
Alix Everard, Coweb delegate 2005-2009, Coweb chair 2008, Permanent Coweb chair (on behalf 
of the EEAS) since 2011 (Brussels, 2010)
Cyril Piquemal, Coweb delegate since 2010 (Brussels, 2011)
United Kingdom
Duncan Sparkes, Coweb delegate 2002-2006, Coweb chair 2005 (Telephone, 2010)
Lance Domm, Coweb delegate 2007-2009 (Brussels, 2010)
Louise Taylor, Coweb delegate since 2009 (Brussels, 2011)
Italy
Luca Giansanti, PSC Ambassador since 2010, Coweb delegate 2001-2004, Coweb chair 2003 
(Brussels, 2010)
Luca Gori, Coweb delegate 2004-2007, Author of L’Unione Europea e i Balcani Occidentali. La 
prospettiva europea della regione 1996-2007 (The European Union and the Western Balkans. 
The European perspective of the Region) (Washington, 2011)
Fabrizio di Michele, Coweb delegate 2007-2009, Deputy PSC Ambassador (‘Nicolaïdis) since 
2010 (Brussels, 2010)
Maurizio Greganti, Coweb delegate since 2009 (Brussels, 2010 & 2011)
Austria
Gregor Woschnagg, Coreper (II) Ambassador 1999-2007, Coreper (II) chair 2006 (Brussels, 2010)
Hans Dietmar Schweisgut, Coreper (II) Ambassador 2007-2010 (Brussels, 2010)
Gernot Pfandler, Coweb delegate 2004-2007, Coweb chair 2006 (Vienna, 2010)
Lucia Kronsteiner, Coweb delegate since 2007 (Brussels, 2010 & 2012)
Greece
Themistoklis Demiris, PSC Ambassador since 2008, Coweb delegate 2001-2005, Coweb chair 
2003 (also during Thessaloniki Summit) (Brussels, 2010)
Konstantina Athanasiadou, Coweb delegate 2005-2008, Director EU External Relations Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (Geneva, 2011)
Evangelos Sekeris, Coweb delegate 2008-2010 (Brussels, 2010)
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The Netherlands
Bernard Bot, Coreper (II) Ambassador 1992-2002, Minister of Foreign Affairs 2004-2007 (The 
Hague, 2010)
Maxime Verhagen, Minister of Foreign Affairs 2007-2010 (The Hague, 2012)
Tom de Bruijn, Coreper (II) Ambassador 2002-2011, Coreper (II) chair 2004 (Brussels, 2010)
Robert Milders, PSC Ambassador 2005-2009, (The Hague, 2010)
Marije Balt, Coweb delegate 2000-2001 (The Hague, 2011)
Tony Agotha, Coweb delegate 2003-2005, Coweb chair 2004 (Brussels, 2010 & 2011)
Joost Flamand, Coela delegate 2008-2011, Director Enlargement Permanent Representation 
(Brussels, 2010)
Sladjana Cemerikic, Coweb delegate 2006-2010 (Brussels & Amsterdam, 2010 & 2011)
Jan de Boer, Coweb delegate since 2012 (Brussels, 2010).
Sweden
Veronika Wand Danielsson, Coweb delegate 2000-2003, Coweb chair 2001, Ambassador to 
NATO since 2008 (Brussels, 2011)
Anna Craenen, Coweb delegate 2007-2012, Coweb chair 2009 (Brussels, 2010)
Slovenia
Igor Sencˇar, Coreper (II) Ambassador 2005-2010, Coreper (II) chair 2008, PSC Ambassador 
2004-2005, Director-General for European Affairs 2010-2012, State Secretary for European 
Affairs since 2012 (Telephone, 2012)
Damijan Sedar, Coweb delegate 2005-2008, Coweb chair 2008 (Brussels, 2010)
Leon Marc, Head of South-East Europe Division (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Coweb (capitals) 
delegate, 2008 (The Hague, 2010)
Peter Golob, Coweb delegate since 2009 (Brussels, 2010)
Spain
Belén Yuste Rojas, Coweb delegate since 2009, Coweb chair 2010 (Brussels, 2011)
Belgium
Michel Versailles, Coweb delegate since 2009, Coweb chair 2010 (Brussels, 2011)
European Commission
Axel Wallden, Director Unit Enlargement Strategy since 2007, Member of Directorate General 
for Enlargement since 1999 (Brussels, 2010)
Reinhard Priebe, Director for the Western Balkans, Directorate General for External Relations 
2000-2004, Directorate General for Enlargement 2004-2006 (Brussels, 2010)
Pierre Mirel, Director for the Western Balkans since 2006, Directorate General for Enlargement, 
(Brussels, 2010)
Maria Asenius, Deputy Head of Cabinet of the Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn 
2007-2008, Member of Cabinet (Croatia) 2004-2007 (Brussels, 2010)
Thomas Hagleitner, Deputy Head Croatia Unit since 2010, Member of Croatia Unit 2002-2008 
(Brussels, 2010)
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Myriam Verger, Member of Cabinet (Serbia) of the Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn 
2007-2009, Assistant to the Director General for Enlargement 2004-2005 (Brussels 2010)
Lars Erik Forsberg, Deputy Head Serbia Unit 2009-2010, Member of Serbia Unit 2004-2009 
(Brussels, 2010)
Therese Sobieski, Head of Serbia Unit 2006-2011, Member of Serbia Unit 2000-2005 (Brussels, 
2010)
Feruccio Bogo, Member of Macedonia Unit 2006-2010, Member of EU delegation in Skopje 
(Macedonia) 2002-2006 (Brussels, 2011)
Martin Dawson, Head of Macedonia Unit since 2007 (Brussels, 2010)
Paola Pampaloni, Head of Bosnia Unit since 2009, Head of Macedonia Unit 2005- 2008, Deputy 
Head Croatia Unit 2003-2004, Chief Negotiator of SAA Macedonia 2000-2002 (Brussels, 2010 
& 2011)
Ruud van Enk, Deputy Head Kosovo Unit since 2008 (Brussels, 2010)
Council Secretariat (including Policy Unit & European External Action Service)
Leopold Radauer, Director for the Western Balkans 1996-2002 (Brussels, 2011)
Stefan Lehne, Director for External and Political-Military Affairs (Policy Unit) 2002- 2008, Political 
Director Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Austria) since 2008 (Vienna, 2010)
Christina Gallach, Spokesperson for High Representative Secretary General Xavier Solana 
1999-2009 (Brussels, 2010 & 2011)
Fernando Gentilini, EU Special Representative to Kosovo since 2011, Senior Advisor Western 
Balkans (Policy Unit) 2006-2011, Head of Unit for Western Balkans Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Italy) 2002-2004 (Brussels, 2010)
Jonas Jonsson, Director for the Western Balkans 2008-2010, Head of Western Balkans Unit of 
EEAS since 2011 (Brussels, 2010)
European Parliament
Doris Pack, Chair Delegation for relations with South-East Europe 1994-2009, Vice-Chair 
Delegation for (the Republics of former) Yugoslavia 1989-1994 (Brussels, 2011)
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor 1999-2007 (Ascona, 2011)
Jean Daniel Ruch, Political Advisor to Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte 2003-2007 (Bern, 2010)
Western Balkans
Andrej Plenkovic´, State Secretary for European integration (Croatia) since 2010, Deputy Head 
of Mission of Croatia to the European Union 2002-2005, Negotiator of SAA 2000-2001 (Brussels, 
2011)
Roksanda Nincˇic´, Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia to the European Union since 2005 
(Brussels, 2011)
Vlatko Stankovskí, Counselor Mission of the Republic of Macedonia to the European Union 
since 2002 (Brussels, 2011)
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Osman Topcagic, Ambassador of the Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the European 
Union since 2009, Director European integration Prime Minister’s Office (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) 2003-2009, Deputy Ambassador of the Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
the European Union 2002-2003 (Brussels, 2011)
Luljeta Krasniqi, Officer Political Affairs International Civilian Office (Kosovo) (Pristina, 2010)
Fransisco Capote, Political Advisor EU Special Representative (Kosovo) (Pristina, 2010)
Miscellaneous
Nico Wegter, Spokesperson for Commissioner for External Relations Hans Van den Broek 
1993-1999 (Hilversum, 2010)
Valerie Sluijter, Deputy High Representative (OHR Bosnia) 2000-2002, Secretary Balkan Unit 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The Netherlands) 1999-2000, Ambassador to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 1997-1999 (The Hague, 2009)
Jaap de Zwaan, Legal Advisor Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representation of the 
Netherlands to the European Union 1979-1998, Author of The Permanent Representatives 
Committee. Its Role in European Union Decision-Making (The Hague, 2009)
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Appendix II:
Chronology of the political steps in the Balkan 
pre-accession game
Political steps in the pre-accession trajectory of the Western Balkan states1010
Macedonia Croatia Serbia Montenegro Albania BiH Kosovo
Steps taken by the Council taken by the Commission
14 opening of accession negotiations 3-10-2005 9-12-2011
13 recommendation to open accession 
negotiations
14-10-2009 20-4-2004 14-10-2011
12 awarding of candidate status 17-12-2005 18-6-2004 1-3-2012 17-12-2010
11 delivery of avis on membership application 9-11-2005 20-4-2004 14-10-2011 9-11-2010 9-11-2010
10 request for an avis on membership 
application
17-5-2004 14-4-2003 25-10-2010 23-4-2009 16-11-2009
Application 22-3-2004 21-2-2003 22-12-2009 15-12-2008 28-4-2009
Ratification and
Entering into force of the SAA 
25-2-2004
1-4-2004
1-2-2005 n.a 29-3-2010
1-5-2010
26-2-2009
1-4-2009
7 Decision to start ratification process  
of the SAA
n.a. 21-12-2004 23-6-2010 n.a n.a n.a.
6 Entering into force of the Interim 
Agreement (IA)
1-6-2001 1-3-2002 7-12-2009 1-1-2008 1-12-2006 1-7-2008
5 Signing of the SAA and Interim  
Agreement (IA)
9-4-2001 29-10-2001 29-4-2008 15-10-2007 12-6-2006 16-6-2008
4 Initializing of the SAA  
(closing of SAA negotiations)
24-11-2000 14-5-2001 7-11-2007 15-3-2007 28-2-2006 4-12-2007
3 Opening of SAA negotiations 5-4-2000 24-11-2000 3-10-2005 3-10-2005 21-10-2002 21-11-2005
2 Adoption of the feasibility study 24-1-2000 24-5-2000 12-4-2005 12-4-2005 21-10-2002 18-11-2003 14-9-2009
1 Request for a feasibility study  
for a Stabilization and Association  
Agreement (SAA)
16-6-1999 15-2-2000 11-10-2004
21-7-2003
24-11-2000
11-10-2004
21-7-2003
24-11-2000
12-6-2001 1-9-2002 18-2-2008
0 pre-trajectory (political dialogue, 
autonomic trade preferences, road map, 
tracking mechanisms)
Prev Prev Prev Prev Prev 24-11-2000 6-11-2002
1010 Steps 8 and 9 have been excluded from this overview, because they have never been formally 
acknowledged as such. Step 8 (assessment of track record in the implementation of the SAA) only (and 
temporarily) applied to Serbia. Step 9 (entering into the second stage of the SAA) so far only applied to 
Macedonia.
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Political steps in the pre-accession trajectory of the Western Balkan states1010
Macedonia Croatia Serbia Montenegro Albania BiH Kosovo
Steps taken by the Council taken by the Commission
14 opening of accession negotiations 3-10-2005 9-12-2011
13 recommendation to open accession 
negotiations
14-10-2009 20-4-2004 14-10-2011
12 awarding of candidate status 17-12-2005 18-6-2004 1-3-2012 17-12-2010
11 delivery of avis on membership application 9-11-2005 20-4-2004 14-10-2011 9-11-2010 9-11-2010
10 request for an avis on membership 
application
17-5-2004 14-4-2003 25-10-2010 23-4-2009 16-11-2009
Application 22-3-2004 21-2-2003 22-12-2009 15-12-2008 28-4-2009
Ratification and
Entering into force of the SAA 
25-2-2004
1-4-2004
1-2-2005 n.a 29-3-2010
1-5-2010
26-2-2009
1-4-2009
7 Decision to start ratification process  
of the SAA
n.a. 21-12-2004 23-6-2010 n.a n.a n.a.
6 Entering into force of the Interim 
Agreement (IA)
1-6-2001 1-3-2002 7-12-2009 1-1-2008 1-12-2006 1-7-2008
5 Signing of the SAA and Interim  
Agreement (IA)
9-4-2001 29-10-2001 29-4-2008 15-10-2007 12-6-2006 16-6-2008
4 Initializing of the SAA  
(closing of SAA negotiations)
24-11-2000 14-5-2001 7-11-2007 15-3-2007 28-2-2006 4-12-2007
3 Opening of SAA negotiations 5-4-2000 24-11-2000 3-10-2005 3-10-2005 21-10-2002 21-11-2005
2 Adoption of the feasibility study 24-1-2000 24-5-2000 12-4-2005 12-4-2005 21-10-2002 18-11-2003 14-9-2009
1 Request for a feasibility study  
for a Stabilization and Association  
Agreement (SAA)
16-6-1999 15-2-2000 11-10-2004
21-7-2003
24-11-2000
11-10-2004
21-7-2003
24-11-2000
12-6-2001 1-9-2002 18-2-2008
0 pre-trajectory (political dialogue, 
autonomic trade preferences, road map, 
tracking mechanisms)
Prev Prev Prev Prev Prev 24-11-2000 6-11-2002
1010 Steps 8 and 9 have been excluded from this overview, because they have never been formally 
acknowledged as such. Step 8 (assessment of track record in the implementation of the SAA) only (and 
temporarily) applied to Serbia. Step 9 (entering into the second stage of the SAA) so far only applied to 
Macedonia.
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Political steps in the pre-accession trajectory of the Western Balkan states. 
Macedonia Croatia Serbia Montenegro Albania BiH Kosovo
Steps taken by the Council taken by the Commission
14 opening of accession negotiations UK
(2005)
Poland 
(2011)
13 recommendation to open accession 
negotiations
Sweden
(2009)
Ireland
(2004)
Poland 
(2011)
12 awarding of candidate status UK
(2005)
Ireland 
(2004)
Denmark 
(2012)
Belgium
(2010)
11 delivery of avis on membership application UK
(2005)
Ireland 
(2004)
Poland 
(2011)
Belgium
(2010)
Belgium
(2010)
10 request for an avis on membership 
application
Ireland 
(2004)
Greece 
(2003)
Belgium
(2010)
Czech Rep
(2009)
Sweden
(2009)
Application Ireland 
(2004)
Greece 
(2003)
Sweden 
(2009)
France 
(2008)
Czech Rep
(2009)
Ratification and
Entering into force of the SAA 
Ireland 
(2004)
Luxembourg 
(2005)
n.a. Spain 
(2010)
Czech Rep
(2009)
7 (Decision to start) ratification process  
of the SAA
n.a. Netherlands 
(2004)
Spain
(2010)
n.a. n.a. n.a.
6 Entering into force of the Interim 
Agreement (IA)
Sweden 
(2001)
Spain 
(2002)
Sweden
(2009)
Slovenia 
(2008)
Finland 
(2006)
Slovenia 
(2008)
5 Signing of the SAA and Interim  
Agreement (IA)
Sweden 
(2001)
Belgium 
(2001)
Slovenia
(2008)
Portugal
(2007)
Austria
(2006)
Slovenia
(2008)
4 Initializing of the SAA  
(closing of SAA negotiations)
France 
(2000)
Sweden 
(2001)
Portugal
(2007)
Germany
(2007)
Austria
(2006)
Portugal
(2007)
3 Opening of SAA negotiations Portugal
(2000)
France 
(2000)
UK
 (2005)
UK
(2005)
Denmark
(2002)
UK
(2005)
2 Adoption of the feasibility study Portugal
(2000)
Portugal
(2000)
Luxembourg 
(2005)
Luxembourg 
(2005)
Denmark
(2002)
Italy  (2003) Sweden
(2009)
1 Request for a feasibility study  
for a Stabilization and Association  
Agreement (SAA)
Germany 
(1999)
Portugal 
(2000)
Netherlands 
(2004)
Italy 
(2003)
France 
(2000)
Netherlands 
(2004)
Italy 
(2003)
France 
(2000)
Sweden
(2001)
Denmark 
(2002)
Slovenia
(2008)
0 pre-trajectory (political dialogue, 
autonomic trade preferences, road map, 
tracking mechanisms)
Prev Prev Prev Prev Prev France 
(2000)
Denmark 
(2002)
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Political steps in the pre-accession trajectory of the Western Balkan states. 
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Steps taken by the Council taken by the Commission
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of the SAA
n.a. Netherlands 
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Spain
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Sweden 
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Slovenia 
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Finland 
(2006)
Slovenia 
(2008)
5 Signing of the SAA and Interim  
Agreement (IA)
Sweden 
(2001)
Belgium 
(2001)
Slovenia
(2008)
Portugal
(2007)
Austria
(2006)
Slovenia
(2008)
4 Initializing of the SAA  
(closing of SAA negotiations)
France 
(2000)
Sweden 
(2001)
Portugal
(2007)
Germany
(2007)
Austria
(2006)
Portugal
(2007)
3 Opening of SAA negotiations Portugal
(2000)
France 
(2000)
UK
 (2005)
UK
(2005)
Denmark
(2002)
UK
(2005)
2 Adoption of the feasibility study Portugal
(2000)
Portugal
(2000)
Luxembourg 
(2005)
Luxembourg 
(2005)
Denmark
(2002)
Italy  (2003) Sweden
(2009)
1 Request for a feasibility study  
for a Stabilization and Association  
Agreement (SAA)
Germany 
(1999)
Portugal 
(2000)
Netherlands 
(2004)
Italy 
(2003)
France 
(2000)
Netherlands 
(2004)
Italy 
(2003)
France 
(2000)
Sweden
(2001)
Denmark 
(2002)
Slovenia
(2008)
0 pre-trajectory (political dialogue, 
autonomic trade preferences, road map, 
tracking mechanisms)
Prev Prev Prev Prev Prev France 
(2000)
Denmark 
(2002)
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Appendix III:
The analytical structure of the argument.
Guiding questions:
1. How to describe, characterize and explain Council negotiations?
2. How to explain what comes out of these negotiations, in terms of words (statements) 
as well as deeds (decisions)? More specifically, how to account for the Council’s 
successive statements and decisions on the European perspective of the 
Western Balkans?
Two step plausibility probe of the Caucus race model of (Council) 
negotiations:
Step I  Establishing (by means of process level observations) that Council debates 
are (essentially) non-competitive. 
Step II  Establishing (by means of outcome level observations) that the outcomes 
of Council debates are (nevertheless) causally significant.
Expectations with regard to patterns of statements and decisions  
(The Council Conclusions Reader):
E1  The more member states tend to invest/engage in a debate, the more ambiguous 
subsequent Council Conclusions will become. 
E2  The less member states tend to invest/engage in a debate, the more Council 
Conclusions will reflect the (‘inherited’) agreed language on that issue. 
Rhetorical
Consensus
Veneer of
Consensus
Non-competitive
debate
Competitive
debateStep I
Step II
Rationalist
bargaining model
Caucus race
model
Constructivist
deliberative model
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E3  The less member states have succeeded in moving the decision making 
process in a for them favourable direction, the more their interests/concerns 
will be reflected in the language of the Council Conclusions.
E4  The more member states have succeeded (by making use of the agreed 
language) in moving the decision making process in a direction favourable to 
them, the less their concerns/interests will be reflected in subsequent Council 
Conclusions. 
The four categories of observable implications of the Caucus race model 
of negotiations.
1.  The players and their positions
Implications of Pseudo debate Non-competitive 
debate
Competitive debate
Players
(conceptualization)
National 
representatives
Bureau-political 
actors
Experts, community 
members
Access to and 
participation in the 
debate (who plays)
Limited access 
(have something at 
stake)
Limited access, 
lock in (as a 
result of previous 
investments)
Open access 
(Mutual recognition)
Positions
(driver or 
brakemen)
Fixed positions 
(determined 
by domestic 
constraints)
‘Sticking’ positions 
(also determined by 
commitment shown)
Fluid positions 
(determined by 
issue-specific 
assessment)
Coalitions
(who supports 
whom)
Stable coalitions 
(‘blocks’) 
Size of coalition 
matters most
Stable composition, 
but ‘varying vocality’
Vocality of coalition 
matters more than 
size
Fluid composition of 
coalitions 
Composition of 
coalition matters 
most
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2.  The game play
3.  The results
Implications of Pseudo debate Non-competitive 
debate
Competitive debate
Logic of decision 
making
Logic of 
Consequences
Logic of 
Appropriateness
Logic of Arguing/
Deliberation
Type of 
negotiations
Resembling those at 
the Market place
Resembling those in 
a Courtroom
Resembling those at 
a Forum
Style of reasoning Bargaining 
(can be distributive 
as well as 
integrative)
Rhetorical action
(making legitimate 
claims, making 
claims appear 
legitimate)
Expert deliberations 
(aimed at convincing 
undecided members 
of the audience)
Negotiation 
strategies
Threatening (with 
constraints), trading, 
linking, grouping
Salami-tactics
Procuring plenary 
acquiescence 
Relying on the 
force of the better 
argument
Implications of Veneer of 
Consensus
Rhetorical 
Consensus
Reasoned 
Consensus
Substantiality (of 
the Consensus)
Lowest Common 
Denominator
Ambiguity
Entrapment
Agreement 
Readings of the 
outcome
Different reasons 
for reaching an 
agreement
Different reading of 
that agreement
Paying lip service 
to (the line of) the 
agreement
Different 
significances 
attached to that 
agreement
Same reasons 
for reaching an 
agreement
Same reading of that 
agreement
Same significance 
attached to that 
agreement
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4.  The success
Implications of Veneer of  
Consensus
Rhetorical  
Consensus
Reasoned  
Consensus
Negotiation 
success
Depends on (ability  
to affect) domestic 
win-sets
Can be considered as 
exogenous and thus 
relatively constant
Depends on (ability  
to affect) assessments 
of Presidency (perhaps 
indirectly through the 
Commission)
Can be considered as 
endogenous and thus 
varying
Depends on (ability 
to affect) positions of 
(undecided) members 
of the group
Can be considered as 
endogenous and thus 
varying
Winners  
& Losers
Brakemen advantage
Status quo positions 
structurally favoured
(The paradox of 
weakness)
No structural 
advantage for either 
drivers or brakemen
(The tyranny of small 
argumentative battles)
Drivers advantage
The default option is 
to proceed (The neo-
functionalist logic)
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Raadsonderhandelingen inzake de Westelijke Balkan (2000-2010)
Toen Mark Rutte tijdens een lijsttrekkersdebat werd gevraagd wat hij als premier met 
name had moeten leren, verwees hij resoluut naar ‘het spel in Brussel’: “Wat voor mij 
nieuw was, was hoe dat in Europa gaat. Hoe zorg je ervoor dat je de coalities bouwt; 
hoe zorg je ervoor dat de standpunten van Nederland goed voor het voetlicht worden 
gebracht.” (RTL Premiersdebat, 26-8-2012). De premier bevond zich hiermee in goed 
gezelschap. Op zijn eerste EU top bleek zelfs de Franse president, François Hollande, 
enigszins verrast door het schouwspel. Er was nauwelijks conflict of confrontatie en 
de partijen kwamen in vijf uur debat geen centimeter dichter tot elkaar. Wat de 
president precies verwacht had is onduidelijk; klaarblijkelijk geen avondvullende 
series van ogenschijnlijk op zichzelf staande interventies (EU Observer, 24-5-2012).
Dit is een onderzoek naar het diplomatieke spel in Brussel. Het spel zoals het 
gespeeld wordt door de vertegenwoordigers van de verschillende lidstaten, verenigt 
in de Raad van Ministers (ook wel ‘Raad van de Europese Unie’ of eenvoudigweg 
‘Raad’ genoemd). Uitgangspunt is het standaard, wellicht haast cliché, beeld van de 
Brusselse besluitvorming, zoals dat ons bereikt via de media. Dit is een beeld van 
‘oude-jongens-krentenbrood’, van overdadig plenair protocol en klassiek getouwtrek 
achter de schermen; van dienst en wederdienst met het onvermijdelijke slappe 
compromis als resultaat. Een compromis dat zevenentwintig ministers vervolgens 
weten uit te leggen als een persoonlijke overwinning.
Insiders en outsiders zijn het erover eens dat er een ‘cultuur van consensus’ heerst in 
Brussel. Ook erkennen ze dat het deze ‘consensuele processen’ zijn, die eenduidig 
en daadkrachtig optreden van de EU vaak in de weg staan. Lastiger wordt het 
wanneer hen wordt gevraagd wat deze cultuur nu precies inhoudt en hoe deze 
gerelateerd is aan de ‘zwakke uitkomsten’. Dit onderzoek heeft twee doelstellingen: 
- Te komen tot een (meer adequate) beschrijving, typering en verklaring van de 
onderhandelingen in de EU Raad van Ministers.
- Het geven van een (betere) verklaring voor de uitkomsten van deze onderhandelin-
gen; Meer specifiek een verklaring voor de Raadsbesluiten en Raadsconclusies 
over het Europese perspectief van de Westelijke Balkan. 
Deel I van het onderzoek gaat in op de ‘consensuele processen’. In hoofdstuk 1 sta ik 
stil bij de conventionele onderhandelingstheorieën. De kernvraag is in hoeverre deze 
de interstatelijke onderhandelingen binnen de kaders van de EU kunnen verklaren. Ik 
vergelijk rationalistische intergouvernementele en constructivistische deliberatieve 
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onderhandelingsmodellen. Beide lijken niet in staat om de Raadsonderhandelingen 
correct te duiden. De lidstaten gedragen zich noch als spreekwoordelijke kooplui op 
de markt (‘bargaining’), noch als oratoren op het forum (‘arguing’). Voor alle duidelijkheid, 
dergelijk gedrag komt wel voor. Maar een ‘andere’ vorm van onderhandelen lijkt 
dominant; een vorm die niet primair draait om het uitruilen van belangen of het 
overtuigen van je opponenten.
In hoofdstuk 2 presenteer ik daarom een alternatief onderhandelingsmodel. Centraal 
daarin staat de metafoor van de Caucus race, gelijk die waar Alice toe uitgenodigd 
wordt kort na haar aankomst in Wonderland. Een aantal typische kenmerken lijken 
van toepassing op de races in Raad: spelers die op willekeurige momenten in en uit 
de race stappen, een voorzitter die bepaalt wanneer de race voorbij is en een 
overvloed aan prijzen aan het eind. In dit hoofdstuk probeer ik vanuit deze metafoor 
een volledig onderhandelingsmodel op te bouwen. Daarbij maak ik gebruik van 
inzichten uit de bureaupolitieke traditie en Schimmelfennig’s model van strategische 
interactie. In hoofdstuk 3, de methodologie, werk ik het model verder uit en leg ik uit 
hoe ik dit model wil gaan toetsen.
Deel II van het onderzoek staat stil bij de ‘zwakke uitkomsten’. Hier tref ik de 
noodzakelijke voorbereidingen voor het toepassen van het theoretisch model op een 
concrete empirische casus. De onderhandelingen waarop ik me in dit onderzoek 
concentreer zijn die over het ‘Europees perspectief’ van de Westelijke Balkan (de 
landen van het voormalige Joegoslavië minus Slovenië). In 2000 werd deze landen 
een toekomstig (en ‘potentieel’) EU lidmaatschap aangeboden. In het decennium dat 
daarop volgde werd er vrijwel continue onderhandeld over wanneer, en onder welke 
voorwaarden, de verschillende landen daadwerkelijk zouden kunnen toetreden. 
In hoofdstuk 4 introduceer ik de spelers in dit onderhandelingsspel, als ook hun rol 
als ‘aanjager’ (‘driver’) of ‘controleur’ (‘brakeman’). Ook schets ik ‘de arena’; oftewel 
de vijf niveaus waarop er binnen de Raad over dit dossier wordt onderhandeld. In 
hoofdstuk 5 sta ik stil bij de specifieke kenmerken van deze race: de opzet en de 
regels van het spel. Daarbij ga ik met name in op de vraag of een van de deelnemende 
partijen wellicht bevoordeeld is. Of is het eerder zo dat beide zijden gevangen zitten 
in een ‘tirannie van de kleine debatten’.
In Deel III onderzoek ik de relatie tussen de consensuele processen en de zwakke 
uitkomsten. Het bevat een historische analyse van tien jaar onderhandelen over de 
Balkan. Ik onderscheid daarin vier tijdsperioden. Hoofdstuk 6 beschrijft en analyseert 
de jaren 2000 tot 2003, waarin aan het ‘potentieel kandidaatschap’ invulling gegeven 
diende te worden. Het blijkt dat de onderhandelingen tussen de lidstaten nog niet echt 
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van de grond gekomen zijn. In deze vroege periode speelden de Europese Commissie, 
HR/SG Solana, diens Raadssecretariaat en met name het roulerende Voorzitterschap 
een dominante rol. Anders geformuleerd; de dodo’s prepareerden de renbaan. 
Hoofdstuk 7 beschrijft de onderhandelingen in de jaren 2003 tot 2005. Dit was wellicht 
de meest levendige periode. De lidstaten moesten nu daadwerkelijk overeenstemming 
zien te bereiken over hoe om te gaan met de concrete toenaderings- en/of lidmaatschaps-
verzoeken van de verschillende Balkan landen. Kroatië was de eerste gegadigde, maar 
al snel volgden Servië (met toen nog Montenegro en Kosovo), Bosnië Herzegovina 
en Macedonië. In eerste instantie leek het een periode waarin de aanjagers de sterkere 
hand hadden. Uit de analyse blijkt echter dat hun voordeel beperkt was. Zij moesten 
veel investeren om het proces gaande te houden en de controleurs wisten de nodige 
prijzen in de wacht te slepen. De prijzen waren met name kritische Raadsconclusies 
(‘Council conclusions’). Men zou kunnen spreken van verbale ‘sloten op de deur’.
Deze prijzen kwamen goed van pas in de periode die daarop volgde. In hoofdstuk 8 
bespreek ik periode 2005 tot 2008. De onderhandelingen betroffen met name Servië 
en Kosovo. De ‘uitbreidingsmoeheid’, die volgde uit de mislukte referenda over de 
Europese grondwet in Frankrijk en Nederland, zorgde ervoor dat de controleurs de 
sterkere positie hadden. Maar ook hun voordeel bleek vrij beperkt. De controleurs 
slaagden er zelfs nu niet in om het proces te blokkeren. In plaats van een impasse 
zien we een Raad die ‘doormoddert’. Dit volgens het typische patroon waarbij een 
zijde het door hen gewenste besluit krijgt, terwijl de andere zijde zich tevreden moest 
stellen met een voor hen gunstig gezamenlijk standpunt. Dit zodat beide zijden 
konden blijven beweren dat ze met de prijzen naar huis gingen.
Hoofdstuk 9 beschrijft de meest recente periode 2008 tot 2010, waarvan men zich 
kan afvragen of er van een echt ‘debat’ nog wel sprake was. De onderhandelingen 
betroffen met name de toepasbaarheid van eerder overeengekomen standaardpro-
cedures. Ik vergelijk de besluitvorming inzake Servië, Bosnië en Macedonië. Wat 
deze onderhandelingen bijzonder interessant maakt, is dat op alle drie deze dossiers 
er een lidstaat geïsoleerd stond. Sommigen bleken echter beter in staat dan anderen 
om de druk van de meerderheid te weerstaan. De Britse isolatie op het Bosnië-dossier 
was minder schadelijk dan de Griekse isolatie op het Macedonië dossier en zeker de 
Nederlandse isolatie op het Servië dossier. Een gestructureerde vergelijking van de 
onderhandelingen verschaft ons inzicht in hoe men Caucus races wint of verliest.
Deel IV omvat de conclusie en discussie. In hoofdstuk 10 probeer ik uit de casus 
gebonden observaties van het vorige deel, patronen en regelmatigheden af te leiden. 
Ik vergelijk de bevindingen van de verschillende spellen en rondes en kom tot algemene 
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conclusies over enkele typische kenmerken van Raadsonderhandelingen. Ik hoop 
hiermee aan te tonen dat het Caucus race model er (beter) in slaagt om deze onder-
handelingen te verklaren (dan intergouvernementele of deliberatieve onderhandelings-
modellen). 
Van alle typeringen die men door de jaren heen gebruikt heeft om het spel in Brussel 
te typeren, blijven er enkele relevant. Het zijn zonder twijfel uitputtingsslagen, waarin 
men bovenal moet prioriteren (‘pick your battles’) en er naar sommigen nu eenmaal 
net wat aandachtiger wordt geluisterd dan naar anderen. Maar mocht al sprake zijn 
van ‘essentie’, dan ligt die volgens mij in het vermogen om correct te anticiperen op 
‘het momentum’. Soms komt dit momentum van gebeurtenissen waarover men geen 
controle heeft. Vaker zal men, met behulp van (de interventies van) gelijkgezinden, 
trachten dit momentum te ensceneren. Dagelijkse onderhandelingen dienen met 
name om het overzicht te behouden over welke dossiers muurvast zitten en waar 
beweging mogelijk is.
Goed onderhandelen, zo typeer ik het in hoofdstuk 11, draait om het vermogen om 
met een zo gering mogelijke investering van sociale middelen, een zo effectief mogelijk 
resultaat te behalen. De prototypische (Brusselse) onderhandelaar hoeft dingen slechts 
terloops te noemen. Hij heeft de open confrontatie niet nodig en voorkomt daarmee 
gezichts- en geloofwaardigheidsverlies van hemzelf en van anderen. Bovenal voelt 
hij feilloos aan wat het moment is waarop hij in of uit de race moet stappen. De cultuur van 
consensus, waarmee dit onderzoek begon, draait dus met name om accommodatie. 
Al geldt dat tegenwoordig wellicht voor het merendeel van onze geïnstitutionaliseerde 
interacties. Zij die daarin uitblinken, zullen de meeste prijzen in de wacht weten te slepen.
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